

Articles and Essays by Richard M. Bank and Steven R. McCarl, Norman I. Fainstein and Susan S. Fainstein, Ralph Ross, Terry Nardin

Karen Orren
Standing to Sue

Benjamin I. Page
The Theory of Political Ambiguity

Arthur H. Miller, Warren E. Miller, Alden S. Raine,
Thad A. Brown, Samuel Popkin, John W. Gorman,
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The Presidential Election of 1972

R. D. McKinlay and A. S. Cohan
Performance and Instability in Military and
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ARTICLES

- 723 **Standing to Sue: Interest Group Conflict in the Federal Courts.** The law of standing—rules by which judges find whether a party may bring suit—has been liberalized in the federal courts to permit interest group disputes not ordinarily possible. Following an historical pattern of conflict containment within judicial-style processes, consumer and environmental groups contest corporate business decisions by challenging the legality of their regulatory or legislative authorization. The vagueness and *substantive* emphasis of the new rules give groups more influence in determining when courts will intervene in the affairs of the other branches; and the doctrine's recognition of noneconomic injuries logically forces judges to consider whether they may find standing for some "public interest" beyond a specific plaintiff. Changes in standing equalize social power; but the entanglement of courts in the puzzles of interest representation may restrict protections for strictly private litigants, and may further remove the political system from the Rule of Law.

By KAREN ORREN, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of California, Los Angeles.

- 742 **The Theory of Political Ambiguity.** The ambiguity of politicians' words and actions is sometimes attributed to rational seeking of support or votes. Such an explanation must clearly specify the preferences and decision processes among constituents and the calculations by politicians which make ambiguity seem attractive.

The leading effort of this sort is Shepsle's *lottery theory*, in which politicians take probabilistic stands on issues in order to appeal to risk acceptant, expected-utility-maximizing voters. But the lottery theory suffers from several difficulties. Its predictions are not strong; it can at best account for only certain kinds of observed ambiguous behavior; its main condition for the prediction of ambiguity—risk acceptance among constituents—may not be met; and the expected utility model of risky decision making is not well supported by available evidence.

An *emphasis allocation theory* is suggested as an alternative. According to it, ambiguity involves an effort to reduce the salience of conflictual matters (such as specific policy alternatives) in the evaluation of politicians, so that attention will be paid to consensual appeals (peace, prosperity, honesty in government).

By BENJAMIN I. PAGE, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Chicago.

- 753 **A Majority Party in Disarray: Policy Polarization in the 1972 Election.** The Center for Political Studies' 1972 presidential election survey was used to investigate the role that issue voting, ideology, candidate assessments, and partisan defections played in the Republican landslide of that year. An analysis of issue attitudes revealed a deep policy schism among the Democrats: McGovern supporters preferred liberal policy alternatives while Nixon Democrats favored distinctly conservative issue positions. Interitem correlations among various issues and a liberal-conservative scale showed the voters to have substantial attitude consistency. A normal-vote analysis of these issues demonstrated that the Vietnam war and social issue domains contributed more significantly to the explanation of the vote than did cultural or economic issues. The candidates were clearly perceived as having taken opposing issue positions, with Nixon's position the more preferred by a majority of the population. A proximity measure, computed as the discrepancy between perceived candidate issue position and the voter's policy preference, proved to be a better predictor of the vote decision than the voter's own issue position taken alone. Analyses of candidate assessments showed that McGovern was not a personally appealing candidate—a factor that allowed issue differences to gain maximal importance. The sharp intraparty polarization of Democrats over policy alternatives, a change in the educational composition of the electorate, a decrease in partisan identification, and a growth in partisan defection combined to suppress the impact of party identification as a determinant of the vote decision. It was concluded that the 1972 presidential race could be labeled "ideological" by comparison with past elections.

By ARTHUR H. MILLER, Study Director, The University of Michigan, Center for Political Studies, WARREN E. MILLER, Director, Center for Political Studies and Professor of Political Science, The University of Michigan, ALDEN S. RAINE, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Rutgers University, and THAD A. BROWN, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of California, Los Angeles.

- 779 **Comment.** By SAMUEL POPKIN, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of California, San Diego and Cambridge Survey Research; JOHN W. GORMAN, Vice President, Cambridge Survey Research; CHARLES PHILLIPS, Ph.D. Candidate in Government, University of Texas at Austin; and JEFFREY SMITH, Ph.D. Candidate in Government, University of Texas at Austin.
- 806 **Comment.** By FREDERICK T. STEEPER, Senior Analyst, Political Division, Market Opinion Research, and ROBERT M. TEETER, Executive Vice President, Market Opinion Research.
- 814 **Comment.** By DAVID E. REPASS, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Connecticut.
- 832 **Rejoinder.** By ARTHUR H. MILLER and WARREN E. MILLER.

- 850 Performance and Instability in Military and Nonmilitary Regime Systems.** The analysis of military regimes, as opposed to military coups, has attracted comparatively little attention. This paper examines whether the political, military, and economic performance of systems which have experienced a military regime differs from the performance of systems which have not. The comparison between the performance of these two types of system is then used to examine the validity of the occurrence of a military regime as an indicator of instability. The population consists of all independent countries of the world. The time span examined is 1961–70. The comparison is made across a number of political, military, and economic variables. The basic comparison is elaborated by introducing controls for GNP, area, number of coups, and duration of the military regime. While the controls show a number of variations, the main summary finding is that it is easy to differentiate military and non-military regime systems in political terms, but not in military and economic terms. This finding seriously questions the utility of the occurrence of a military regime as an indicator of instability.

By R. D. MCKINLAY, Lecturer in Politics, University of Lancaster, and A. S. COHAN, Lecturer in Politics, University of Lancaster.

- 865 Science and Rule in Bacon's Utopia: An Introduction to the Reading of the *New Atlantis*.** Bacon's *New Atlantis* presents a picture of human life governed by the new science to be produced by his reformation of the arts and sciences. Unlike his successor Hobbes, who forged a link between modern science and a certain, demonstrable doctrine of political rule, Bacon made no claim to found or present a political science. The reason for this is shown by an analysis of the political teaching of the *New Atlantis*. Bacon's political teaching is indirect, but it is the core of his comprehensive account of science and man. According to Bacon, the end of science is fully disclosed by political wisdom, and that wisdom shows the perfection of science to reverse the moral superiority of moderation over excess. The full meaning of Bacon's scientific utopia consists in a new stance toward the traditional problems of political philosophy.

By J. WEINBERGER, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Michigan State University.

- 886 "Virtue, Obligation and Politics" Revisited.** Stephen Salkever in this *Review* ("Virtue, Obligation and Politics," *APSR* 68 [March, 1974]) discusses two paradigms of politics: one based on the concept of virtue (ancient political philosophy), the other resting on obligation (modern political thought). We analyze the meaning and significance of these two paradigms in terms of the cognitive-developmental moral psychology common to Lawrence Kohlberg, John Dewey, and Jean Piaget. We first present the cognitive-developmental theory and its empirical findings. We then demonstrate that the politics of obligation falls within the virtue paradigm as a necessary stage in the development of virtue, which involves placing Plato, Aristotle, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Rawls within our developmental scheme. Finally, we explore the nature of understanding moral principles from within the cognitive-developmental perspective. In all this, we agree with Salkever's basic assumption that any account of political good (public as opposed to private) must be based on moral psychology, i.e., it must deal with the question of "What is good for the most inclusive of all publics, the human species?" We go two steps beyond Salkever, however, by showing the significance of the question, and by providing an answer to it (both of which bear upon the understanding of morality). An underlying purpose of our research is to present and to promote the political relevance and significance of moral psychology in general and cognitive development in particular.

By RICHARD M. BANK, Graduate Fellow, University of California, Santa Barbara, and STEVEN R. MCCARL, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Denver.

- 905 The Future of Community Control.** The nature of community control ideology, its relation to more general political consciousness, and its social correlates are explored. The primary data are drawn from two main sources: a survey of the attitudes of 362 civic and political leaders in seven districts of New York City conducted in 1972 using a combination of structural and reputational indicators to identify the sample; and intensive participant observation in three of these districts during 1973–74, along with 175 semi-structured, in-depth interviews with individuals in district-level voluntary organizations, interest groups, political parties, poverty boards and agencies, and "street-level" bureaucratic roles.

Both quantitative and qualitative analyses suggest that the great majority of leaders subscribes to a democratic rather than a race-conflict rationale for community control, but that there is a strong independent relationship between minority group status and operational support for community control. Possible explanations for this finding include the present interests of minority groups in American cities, the functional inadequacies of the political party structure, and the developmental history of the civil rights movement and its ideology. The relationship between race and community control may fade, however, if community control ceases to be a useful vehicle for advancing the interests of minority groups. One crucial determinant will be the identifications and beliefs of minority group members who are recruited into urban bureaucracies. Another is whether experience with decentralized city agencies indicates that movement toward increased community involvement in govern-

ment leads, in fact, to enhanced power and patronage for minorities. The data point to a continuing attachment to the community control ideology but also a recasting of it in a more qualified and complex form.

By NORMAN I. FAINSTEIN, Associate Professor, Dept. of Urban Affairs and Policy Analysis, Center for New York City Affairs, The New School for Social Research, and SUSAN S. FAINSTEIN, Associate Professor of Urban Planning, Livingston College, Rutgers University.

4 COMMUNICATIONS

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9 On the *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*. David I. Sills, editor, *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*.

By RALPH ROSS, Professor of Philosophy, Scripps College, The Claremont Colleges.

2 **Philosophy and International Violence.** Contemporary analytical philosophy has produced a body of work of considerable interest concerning the legal and moral aspects of warfare. Originally stimulated by public controversy over American involvement in the Vietnam War, the attention of philosophers was soon drawn to a number of more general moral and conceptual problems raised by the conduct of war. Those explored in the resulting literature include the nature and justification of the laws of war, the moral evaluation of military conduct, the dilemmas confronted by attempts to allocate blame for acts of military violence, and the implications of different ways of describing such acts for legal and moral judgment. Because investigation of these problems requires both substantive knowledge of international politics and philosophical interests and skills, it should be continued by political scientists as well as by philosophers.

By TERRY NARDIN, Associate Professor of Political Science, State University of New York at Buffalo.

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Standing to Sue: Interest Group Conflict in the Federal Courts*

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When he penned his famous remarks on the American judiciary, De Tocqueville worried about the destabilizing effects of private lawsuits entered directly against official actions; he advocated instead the guise of judicial settlement of disputes between two private parties as being less damaging to the moral force of law and to popularly held principles of majority will as embodied in legislatures. He could not foresee the subject of this essay—the circumstances in which direct challenges to official actions would in fact be thinly concealed disputes between private parties—if for no other reason than that he did not anticipate the domination of American government by administration and the subsequent subdivision of policy among corresponding private groups. And if contemporary students of politics have likewise failed to pay scholarly attention to this phenomenon, it may be because they are so accustomed by training and experience to take for granted private group interest behind every public act that they have seen little need for comment.

The parties themselves of course are well aware of the interests at issue in a challenge to the legality of the official action in question, and in recent years an increasing number of suits have attempted to obstruct a wide variety of private projects and activities which, without government endorsement, would be perfectly legal. The increase, moreover, is due not only to the initiative of interest groups, but to radical changes in judicial doctrine which permits such suits.

The rules governing who may bring suit, with respect to which official actions, are known as the law of standing.¹ Along with other aspects of ju-

diciability like ripeness, mootness and political question, they have been liberalized considerably as the courts have assumed a more activist role in the federal system. But the doctrine of standing in particular constituted a barrier to parties who would protest actions—frequently private actions with an official stamp—but who had not been designated by Congress or otherwise legally recognized as “parties aggrieved” entitled to initiate judicial review.

The following essay analyzes the changes in the federal doctrine of standing as they have come to permit the juxtaposition in court of private interests. Such a juxtaposition might have been impossible in normal social and political life for a variety of reasons: the disparity in resources between the parties; the lack of an available arena in which the conflict might be joined; the influence of the defendant interest in relevant legislative and administrative bodies; and others. In the essay, attention is directed to the effect that changes in standing have already had on the relationship of corporate business to its public; but corporate business is

cal implications will find nothing in the political science literature. This is a result not only of the relative newness of the standing changes, but of the general recent neglect of the role of judicial doctrine in the political system. Many entirely comprehensible articles on the subject of standing have been written by legal scholars, however. These concern a different range of questions from those of immediate interest here, but they are indispensable for an understanding of the doctrine and for references to additional cases, as well as for information bearing on political matters. The specific interpretation of standing in terms of the courts’ definition of *interest*, however, is original to this essay and has been prompted by the problem of group conflict.

See Lee Albert, “Standing to Challenge Administrative Action: An Inadequate Surrogate for Claim for Relief,” *Yale Law Journal* 83 (January, 1974), 425–97; Kenneth C. Davis, *Administrative Law Text*, 3d ed. (St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1972), Ch. 22; Louis L. Jaffe, *Judicial Control of Administrative Action* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1965), Chs. 12, 13; Jaffe, “Standing Again,” *Harvard Law Review*, 84, (January, 1971), 633–38; Jaffe, “The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Holfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff,” *University of Pennsylvania Law Review*, 116 (April, 1968), 1033–47; Kenneth E. Scott, “Standing in the Supreme Court—A Functional Analysis,” *Harvard Law Review*, 86 (February, 1973), 645–92; and Robert A. Sedler, “Standing, Judiciability and All That: A Behavioral Analysis,” *Vanderbilt Law Review*, 25 (April, 1972), 479–512. See also Alexander M. Bickel, *The Least Dangerous Branch* (Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill, 1962), pp. 120ff.

* I would like to thank Professors Sylvia Snowiss of California State University, Northridge and Robert Gerstein and Douglas S. Hobbs of the University of California, Los Angeles, who were kind enough to read and comment on an earlier draft of this essay.

¹ It is customary in writing on standing to warn the reader that Professor Paul Freund has said the concept of standing “is among the most amorphous in the entire domain of public law.” *Hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights*, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., (1966), pt. 2, p. 498. Justice Frankfurter called it a “complicated speciality of federal jurisdiction. . . .” *U.S. ex rel. Chapman*, 345 US 153 (1953), 156. Justice Douglas remarked that “generalizations about standing to sue are largely worthless as such.” *Association of Data Processing Service Orgs. v. Camp*, 397 US 150 (1970), 151.

The student interested in standing primarily for its politi-

only one among a number of powerful institutions—educational, scientific, industrial, and others—which may eventually be challenged in court under the new provisions. The argument advanced—that the specific character of the new doctrine has bestowed on private groups an enlarged measure of discretion in determining public policy—is intended to be understood in general terms; and the implications of the judiciary's aggressive involvement in group conflict for the effectiveness of its more traditional functions within the political system obviously have importance beyond the particular interests being arbitrated.

It might be noted that although changes in standing have taken place in the courts proper, the containment of interest conflict within diverse forums of adjudication is an observable pattern of American politics. In fact, during this century, those interest conflicts of each generation which most strained the balance of private social forces have been managed in precisely this way. In the first decades, business's demands for relief from the hazardous competition promoted by political reformers was accommodated by the network of quasi-judicial regulatory agencies. Organized labor of the 1930's was given recognition and the rights to bargain collectively under the auspices of the National Labor Relations Board. In neither case did these interests grow to broader political dimensions in the sense of seeking control of the central machinery of government.

The black movement, of course, relied heavily on the courts, largely by default and with somewhat less definitive results. Elsewhere I have discussed the lack of organizational structure within the black population as an obstacle to effective confrontation with opposing groups.² Here it may be noted in passing that the old law of standing restricted the questions which could be raised in court to the socially amorphous ones of civil rights, to the actions of a limited number of public institutions, and to private actions specified by statute. With the liberalization of standing, it is possible that black and other minority racial groups may follow the lead of environmentalists and consumers and press the interests of their constituencies along a much wider front of actions bearing the official stamp.³

² Karen Orren, "Corporate Power and the Slums: Is Big Business a Paper Tiger?" in *Theoretical Perspectives on Urban Politics*, ed. Willis Hawley and Michael Lipsky (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1976).

³ For some years before the general liberalization of standing by the Supreme Court in 1970 judges gave a liberal interpretation in cases concerning charges of racial discrimination. A summary is found in Sedler, pp. 499ff. Also see Thomas J. Barnes, "U.S. Government's Standing to Sue—A New Approach to Legal Assistance for Ghetto Residents or an Invitation to Executive Lawmaking?" *Wayne Law Review*, 17 (Sept.-Oct., 1971), 1287-1304. On the other hand, minorities have been notably unsuccessful

The environmental and consumer movements (they are often linked organizationally), which are likely contenders for the characteristic interests of the present decade, follow this pattern. Frustrated in Congress, these groups have made an end run to the courts, where they have skillfully exploited and magnified limited legislative gains, especially the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.⁴ Their cases, made possible only through recent changes in the law of standing, have been important in fundamentally transforming the relationship to the public of private interests, in particular corporate business, causing the environmental and consumer damages complained of—a transformation through adjudication analogous to the changed relationship between business and labor brought about by Section 7 of the Wagner Act.⁵

Before proceeding, I must dispense with the objection that standing is merely a preliminary finding, less important than the actual outcome on the merits of the case. For apart from a favorable ultimate verdict for which the right to sue is an obvious precondition, achieving standing is itself a significant victory in several ways. First—and here I depart from what will be my general practice of avoiding largely technical points of law—some legal scholars have argued that the nature of the "zone of interests" test is such that a decision on standing may prejudice a finding on the merits, since frequently the claim of illegality which the court must later determine rests precisely on the fact that the public administrator failed to take into account a legally protected interest;⁶ this

in obtaining the right to challenge alleged racial exclusion through local zoning, zoning being a subject resistant generally to the broadening of standing. See, for example, *Warth v. Seldin*, 495 F. 2d, 1187 (2d Cir. 1974).

⁴ The NEPA requires, among other things, that all administrative agencies establish procedures to consider "environmental amenities and values in their decision making and to include an environmental impact statement with every recommendation." It does not provide for judicial review but does state Congress's intention to preserve the natural environment for present and future generations. An excellent treatment of group strategy is Joseph L. Sax, *Defending the Environment* (New York: Knopf, 1971).

⁵ It may be the specific nature of these recent interests, particularly of the environmentalists, that has caused the recurrence in the doctrine of standing of conceptual formulations which, when put in practice in other policy-making contexts, are viewed skeptically by the courts. In particular, the coincidence of concrete circumstances—the scarcity of physical resources—with the growing recognition of human and natural interdependency and the mobilization of groups to speak on these issues, has provided new impetus to the prospect of giving representation to wholistic "public interests." Also, these circumstances may have had a more subtle influence on standing, for example, the emphasis on effects of legislative policy rather than on the intentions of legislators.

⁶ See for example Charles Allen Wright, *Handbook of the Law of Federal Courts*, 2nd ed. (St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1970), pp. 43ff.

problem of prejudice would seem to be evidenced most clearly in those cases where the claim of the plaintiff is that he has been unfairly excluded from an administrative hearing.

Second, the mere prolongation of litigation may, through delay, costs, and bad public relations, hinder the completion of the defendant's intended project, regardless of the final outcome; may allow further time for the plaintiff to maneuver in Congress and gain public support; and may serve as a deterrent to the undertaking of similar projects by others—as, for example, the electrical power industry claims it has been deterred. Third, despite a decentralized federal court system, decisions in one circuit influence those in others, and of course the Supreme Court binds them all; thus, reasons for granting standing in one case may reverberate for plaintiffs in analogous situations to challenge additional and assorted offending actions.

Finally, the wider opening of the courts to groups for doing battle with their opponents is an important element of strategy and therefore of the strength of plaintiff interests. To clarify, changes in standing might be compared to the class action, which is perhaps more familiar. The class action is a technique that allows groups by consolidating small claims to exploit tactically judicial resources that already exist. Standing, however, shifts the parameters within which groups may operate: what may now be asked of the court in the way of judgments, injunctions, and so on; and the range of social enterprises open to challenge. The class action is usually remedial, providing for the collection of damages which may or may not significantly modify future private behavior without further litigation; the confrontation through standing may bring results in the form of rescinding a required authorization or reversing an administrative decision and constitutes direct participation in piecemeal policy making.

Corporate Business, the Public, and the Law of Standing

The liberalized law of standing permits the litigation of disputes between private interests that cannot be effectively juxtaposed in ordinary social life. There is irony in the fact that essential conditions of this development are identical to those that have enabled entrenchment in government by defendant groups.

Consider as an example a recent district court case, *Consumers Union v. Rogers*, in which a consumers' organization protested the agreements entered into by several foreign steel companies to reduce the amount of steel they would import into the United States for domestic sale. Under ordinary social conditions it is difficult to imagine how the consumer group might have confronted the companies: boycott would have been un-

feasible, given the nature of the product and the fact that the companies accounted for more than 85 per cent of steel imports; protest—picketing and so on—was likewise unfeasible, since there are over a dozen companies and they are headquartered abroad; nor could the companies be considered tortfeasors and sued in the regular courts. The opening wedge, however, is provided by the circumstance that the steel agreements had come about as a result of negotiations initiated by the U.S. Secretary of State. Under the new law of standing the consumers could complain not directly about the actions of the steel companies, but about Secretary Rogers's allegedly unconstitutional stimulation and implementation of these actions.⁷ Notice that the dispute between the consumers and Secretary Rogers is artificial; the real parties are the consumers and the companies.

As well as indicating the general format of interest group conflict under the law of standing, the example suggests the specific primary social effect of the new rules, which has been to fundamentally alter business's relationship with the public.⁸ To speak of the primary social effect is emphatically not to de-emphasize the importance to society of plaintiffs whose disputes are actually with the government and the laws and have nothing to do with business or any other private interest. Pregnant women seeking abortions, citizens opposed to the expenditure of public funds to support religious schools, white parents challenging school segregation, welfare recipients, residents displaced by urban renewal, antiwar organizations—the new rules have allowed these and others to turn to the courts for redress of grievances.⁹ But while such suits may have enhanced the influence of certain interests and indicate the more active role of the courts in the arrangement of powers, they do not amount to a fundamental change in the relationship of the government and its citizenry: this is, however, the case with business and its public.

To explain, a brief discussion of some of the characteristics of corporate business is in order (keep in mind, however, that a different but parallel analysis might apply to, say, labor unions, educational institutions, and others wielding sig-

⁷ *Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Rogers*, 352 F. Supp. 1319 (D.D.C. 1973).

⁸ By corporate business is meant industry, finance, and "agribusiness." For a recent standing case concerning corporate farming, see *Bowker v. Morton* (N.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 1973), *Environmental Law Reporter*, 4, 20255.

⁹ *Doe v. Bolton*, 410 US 179 (1973); *Flast v. Cohen*, 392 US 83 (1968); *Whitley v. Wilson City Board of Education*, 427 F.2d 179 (4th Cir. 1970); *Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency*, 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968); *Reservists Committee to Stop the War v. Laird*, 323 F. Supp. 833 (D.C. Cir. 1971).

nificant social power).¹⁰ Political scientists with a taste for "political economy" have in recent years united business and government conceptually, as alternative allocative systems—an exercise which, if it has no other benefit, serves to throw light on a crucial distinction between the two. Perhaps nothing so characterizes contemporary government as its active and intense intercourse with private interest groups: candidates are selected, policies framed, and allocations allocated with an eye to group needs, demands, and power. Corporate business, on the other hand—enmeshed as it is in a variety of contracts with creditors, stockholders, suppliers, dealerships, and employees—is related to the public to whom it allocates its investments and products only in a manner which is general, diffuse, and legally insulated.

Business's relationship with the public is general in the sense that its legitimacy rests on a broad mandate of effective performance, free of particularized group interests and demands; this generality has been continually and successfully defended against municipalities, states, occupational groups such as farmers, and others who have occasionally entertained the idea of imposing special obligations or impeding the progress of certain enterprises. The relationship is diffuse in the sense that while business decisions viewed collectively have vast and differential effects on social groups, these are the result of decisions made discretely, *seriatim*, for profit, by hundreds of individuals and companies; for this reason among others, when individual dissatisfactions congeal into group claims, they are usually addressed not to business but to government.¹¹

At the level of the individual company, business enjoys considerable insulation through the principles of tort law, which may deny relief even when business actions cause injury and are unlawful. If the court finds that the defendant company owes no duty to the plaintiff, or that the conduct is not the legal cause of the plaintiff's injury, or that the plaintiff's interest is not one which the law intended to protect, then it will usually deny relief. To be sure, definitions of duty and legal cause have been modified considerably in recent years—the imposing of strict liability for defective products being one of the most important changes and one which has figured in a number of class action suits; but the concepts of "proximate cause," "ambit of risk," and *caveat emptor* in consumer

contracts provide a substantial margin of protection from the public.¹²

An essential preliminary to the juxtaposition of business and private interest groups drawn from the diffuse public has been the growth of the administrative apparatus, and in particular the agencies regulating business "in the public interest." For while neither the rhetoric nor behavior of these agencies significantly infringed on the generality of business legitimacy, the aggregation of companies and industries within functionally defined departments and agencies introduces a clear structure, and thereby the potential for organized contacts with other interests. As recent studies have amply demonstrated, opportunities for concerted action were quickly and skillfully seized by producer groups—business and agriculture; while until very recently, reformers and consumers were poorly organized, inhibited by a public ideology of scientific decision making and dollars-and-cents rationality, excluded from hearings by restrictive rulings on administrative intervention, and, as will be explained below, without standing in court.¹³

Nonetheless, the *conditions* set by this system of cabinet bureaus, agencies, and independent regulatory commissions may in the long run turn out to be as politically important as their long captivity. Students of the administrative process are fond of quoting a letter written by Attorney General Olney, in which he consoles a railroad company president by predicting that the newly established Interstate Commerce Commission would become a protection for the industry, "a sort of barrier between the railroad corporations and the people."¹⁴ As a contrast, it is interesting to cite a dissenting opinion in one of the earliest standing cases, also concerning the ICC, which signaled the newly vulnerable status of industry. Several railroads had sued to recover losses they had suffered when the ICC, acting under the charge of the Transportation Act of 1920, had authorized a previously independent terminal line to be acquired by their powerful competition, the New York Central. Under ordinary commercial law, the railroads could not recover damages from the lawful pursuit of business by a competitor. Justice Sutherland for three dissenting judges argued against the majority decision which found that the railroads had standing to sue:

¹² See Robert E. Keeton, *Venturing to do Justice* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969), Chaps. 1 and 7.

¹³ See Grant McConnell, *Private Power and American Democracy* (New York: Knopf, 1966), Chap. 6 and *passim*; also Theodore J. Lowi, *The End of Liberalism* (New York: Norton, 1970), Chaps. 4, 5.

¹⁴ Quoted in Jaffe, *Judicial Control*, p. 12 and McConnell, p. 284.

¹⁰ For a suggestive discussion of collective bargaining see Harry H. Wellington and Ralph K. Winter, Jr., *The Unions and the Cities* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1971), pp. 150ff.

¹¹ For a fuller discussion of these points see Orren, "Corporate Power and the Slums."

Before Transportation Act, 1920, the New York Central would have been free to acquire these terminals without the consent of the commission. . . . It is claimed, however, that Transportation Act, 1920, so alters the rule as to give a right of action to complainants where none existed before. I am unable to perceive any sound basis for the conclusion. . . . A private injury, for which the law provides no remedy, cannot be converted into a remediable injury merely because it results from an act of which the public might complain.¹⁵

As it turned out, the dissent proved to be a very distant early warning; for four decades the law of standing would be an effective barrier against such new rights.

Before turning to the actual changes in legal doctrine, I shall disassociate this analysis from any perspective that would attribute these changes to a shift from a "pro-business" to an "anti-business" outlook, either on the part of individual judges or the court as a whole. It is true that the more limited role of judicial review was a fixture of the nineteenth century, with judicial concern for "vested rights" an important aspect of that period's preoccupation with property.¹⁶ And it is also true that the court's more liberal perspective on standing appears to derive, in part at least, from a disenchantment with the business-dominated administrative process, and, in some cases, from the specialized concerns of certain judges—for example, that of Justice Douglas about the spoliation of the natural environment. But the social effects of standing ultimately have little to do with special advantages that business may have previously had in the courts or, for that matter, in the agencies. They have to do with the functions which corporate business performs in society.

Corporate business is not simply an interest group, any more than are labor unions, universities, or other large concentrations of social power. Businessmen do not only lobby and take cases to court along with other interest groups. They are the employers, technological innovators, price-setters, land developers, mineral extractors—in other words the generators (albeit with official imprimatur) of the injuries which individuals and groups go into court to protest. Given these circumstances, the most scrupulously neutral administration of the liberalized rules—often, as it happens, benefiting businessmen, just as the old rules sometimes disadvantaged businessmen—is an infringement on business autonomy. One need not minimize the promotional services of the legal system

for business enterprise to observe that it is those members of the public on the receiving end of investment and production decisions (or of decisions made by other socially powerful institutions) who are most in political need of official recognition of their interests and the opportunity to pursue them aggressively in the courts.

The "Legal Wrong" Test

The change in the law of standing may be seen in terms of a drift in the court's own conception of the *interest* of groups and individuals who seek litigation of their grievances. From a view that was highly *legalistic*—recognizing interest only as it arose from specific constitutional or statutory boundaries which the plaintiff claimed had been overstepped in causing him injury—the court has moved to seeing interest in a *substantive* light, as being composed of the plaintiff's values, activities, or characteristics independent of the official action that he claims caused the injury. These conceptions of interest, moreover, are inextricably tied to a changing attitude on the part of the court toward the function of judicial review: from a reticence about interfering with the actions of the other branches of government, except when necessary to protect identifiable and concrete personal rights, to today's forthright acceptance of the commission to give authoritative interpretation of the laws.¹⁷ For the juxtaposition of groups through standing is exactly contrary to the dominant practice of legislative and administrative politics, which is interest segregation.

To illustrate the distinction between the legalistic and substantive conceptions of interest and provide a preview of the doctrinal changes described below, we might reconsider the case of the consumers and the foreign steel companies. Consumers Union complains in court that the steel companies have damaged consumers' "interest"; they must now pay more for finished products they purchase. Under the legalistic view, the court might answer: yes, you have perhaps suffered an unfortunate disadvantage; but as far as the law is concerned you have no real or legal interest, since Congress has nowhere explicitly said that the injury you complain of is to be afforded protection by Secretary Rogers or other officials administering foreign trade. Under the new, substantively based rules, the court reasons: yes, as consumers of steel your interest has indeed suffered through what the companies have arranged; now let us see

¹⁵ The Chicago Junction Case, 264 US 258 (1924), 271-73.

¹⁶ An interesting discussion of nineteenth-century law as it pertained to business can be found in James W. Hurst, *Law and the Conditions of Freedom* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1956), Chap. I.

¹⁷ For a consideration of standing within the context of a change in the court's philosophy of judicial review see Henry P. Monaghan, "Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When," *Yale Law Journal*, 82 (June, 1973), 1363-97, and Fritz W. Scharpf, "Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis," *Yale Law Journal*, 75 (March, 1966), 517-97.

whether your interest may be considered one of those that is afforded protection by the relevant statutes or by the Constitution.

An emphasis on the plaintiff's substantive claim instead of the administrator's violation obviously takes the court closer to a more explicitly political mode, for interest is now subjectively asserted as it is in, say, an electoral or legislative context, rather than regarded as emergent from the confines of already existing law. The problem is not entirely removed from law, of course, because the question of statutory intent becomes central. But as long as the court was reluctant to interfere (unless explicitly directed otherwise by Congress) with the activities of the other branches except when necessary to protect identifiable and concrete personal rights similar to those protected by courts of common law, then it could not provide leeway for the pursuit of interests any greater than that provided by existing political arrangements. In other words, without a more expansive attitude toward judicial review, it would permit no social intrusions on the functionally defined, clientele-minded, and strictly independent systems of congressional committees, regulatory agencies, and Cabinet bureaus which compose the policy-making apparatus and which have worked to keep interests segregated from one another.

In general, although Congress has sometimes legislated expressly narrow provisions for review, the courts have long been given statutory authorization to intervene at the behest of "any party at interest" or "persons aggrieved," and are left with considerable room for construction.¹⁸ Likewise, agency rules are vague regarding intervention in their proceedings (as for "good cause") or non-existent, and the court is left to decide such problems as whether a prospective intervenor's interest had been inadequately protected by the existing parties. However, recent resistance in Congress to explicitly granting standing to previously excluded groups, as well as the tug-of-war between agencies and judges which has followed liberalization in the courts, are indicators of the extent to which entrenched parties have expected courts to ratify the pattern of interest segregation by restricting judicial construction to a limited range of common law injuries.¹⁹

¹⁸ Examples of narrow provisions include the Federal Trade Commission Act's provision for review by "any person . . . required by an order of the Commission to cease and desist," and the Federal Power Act confining review to parties who participated in Commission proceedings. Examples of broad provisions include "any party at interest" in the Interstate Commerce Act; "persons aggrieved" in the Federal Communications Act; "any person disclosing a substantial interest in such order" in the Federal Aviation Act; and see also the National Labor Relations Act and the Securities Act of 1933.

¹⁹ Intervention upon "good cause" is provided by the

The change in the court's conception of interest, then, must be seen in two aspects: the method used by the court to establish congressional intent, and the type of injury considered sufficient for standing. Whereas today many of the most intriguing problems concern the type of injury involved, in the early cases, the injuries complained of were generally concrete, economic, and thus judicially familiar, and the major hindrance to review was the court's test of "legal wrong." A legal wrong is one against which the party is afforded protection by either common law or statute; if no such protection is found, then no matter how offensive the injury suffered may be to abstract notions of justice or legality, standing is denied. This idea remains an element in determining standing today, but it has been relaxed to an "arguable" legal wrong. In the early cases, complaining parties faced a rigorous, even meticulous, determination before the court would proceed with the suit.

In order to re-emphasize that the law of standing is not a veiled expression for ideological preferences on economic matters, it is useful to begin our discussion of cases with two in which the more restrictive, legalistic doctrine worked to deny adjudication to important segments of private industry. Consider *Tennessee Electric Power Company v. TVA*, in which the plaintiffs were eighteen electric power plants who asked the Court to prevent TVA from selling its power directly to industrial users and to end a system of public grants for the construction of municipal power plants, on the grounds that such government subsidy of their competition was unconstitutional. The Court looked to the statutes authorizing the offending actions to see whether Congress had created a right of review for competitors such as these; finding no provisions for review, the Court sought guidance in common law, where no protection exists against business losses suffered through the lawful pursuit of competition. An injury inflicted by governmental action, Justice Frankfurter wrote in denying standing, could not be challenged "unless the right invaded is a legal right—one of property, one arising out of contract, one protected against tortious invasion, or one founded on a statute which confers a privilege."²⁰

In *Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co.* seven steel companies attempted to challenge the method of administering a provision in their government contracts which required that they pay their employees a minimum wage, to be determined by the Secretary of Labor according to the "locality" of the plant. Secretary Frances Perkins had divided the

organic act of the Federal Trade Commission. See Ernest Gellhorn, "Public Participation in Administrative Proceedings," *Yale Law Journal*, 81 (January, 1972), 359–404.

²⁰ 306 US 118 (1939), 137.

nation into six localities, and the companies, seeking a more refined breakdown, complained that her action was a violation of the Public Contracts Act. But the Court held that before the alleged violation could be considered, the companies must demonstrate "an injury or threat to a particular right of their own, as distinguished from the public's interest in the administration of the law." The Public Contracts Act, said the Court, created no such right; it had not been enacted for the benefit of the companies (nor, for that matter, of employees); it did not represent a regulation of the industry by Congress. The Government enjoys the same rights as private individuals to "unrestricted power" to make purchases, etc.²¹ The companies were denied standing.

Since the legalistic approach acknowledges that an interest would be sufficient if it was founded on a privilege conferred by statute, the legislative background in these two cases is worth noting. In both of the relevant acts, the legislative history actually did show numerous concessions to persons in the same situation as these plaintiffs. The "locality" phrase in *Perkins* was just such a concession; and the Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933 contained several provisions designed to protect and reassure the TVA's private competitors in the power business.²² But the Court declined to confirm these political compromises by finding privileges to invoke review for particular categories of plaintiffs; instead it sought explicit statutory provisions or common-law protections that the public administrator may have violated, making his behavior illegal.

Two other cases rest their claim to adjudication on specific provisions for judicial review in the statutes under which the offending administrative acts had been taken. In the *Chicago Junction Case* six rival trunklines complained they had lost \$10,000,000 in business because the ICC had illegally authorized the New York Central to acquire a previously independent terminal railroad. The action, said the six, was illegal because the ICC had no evidence that it was "in the public interest," the agency's mandate in all such decisions. The Transportation Act of 1920, which had assigned the authority to the ICC, had provided for judicial review of "any party at interest." The Court, however, in an opinion written by Justice Brandeis, denied that the six railroads were "parties at interest" as a result of business lost to their competitor. Standing nonetheless was found to rest on the grounds that in creating a monopoly the ICC had denied them *equal treatment* to which their businesses were entitled in the form of full, reasoned consideration by the Commission. In

their right to equal treatment the railroads were found to have a "special interest" in the proceedings and could initiate a suit under the provisions of the Commerce Court Act that provide that any party to a proceeding may become party to "any suit wherein is involved the validity of such order."²³

In *Alexander Sprunt v. United States*, however, where equal treatment was not at issue, plaintiffs were denied standing. Here the ICC had ordered a railroad to stop exacting certain charges which had benefited cotton-compressing companies that were located right on the wharves. Alexander Sprunt and Son and several other waterfront companies claimed they were entitled to standing to test the validity of the Commission's orders under the same provisions of the Commerce Court Act relied upon in *Chicago Junction*. But the Court ruled they had suffered no legal wrong, since by its order the ICC had precisely accorded equal treatment to all companies.²⁴ Note that the interest found in the competitors under the Commerce Court Act in *Chicago Junction* does not extend to the competitors in *Sprunt* who claimed standing under the same act. The interest is not substantively defined: it does not derive from anything the plaintiffs are, or do, or value, or even how they are affected by the Commission's orders. Brandeis punctiliously hinges his recognition of interest on whether the administrator followed procedures appropriate to the effects that the actions would have on the relevant parties.

For a final case under (if unsteadily so) the older rules, *FCC v. Sanders Brothers Radio Station* shows the vehemence of the Court against basing standing on a substantive definition of interest, even while actually according the right of suit to a plaintiff because of the values he seeks to defend. The facts of the case were as follows: the FCC granted a license for a radio station to the *Times-Herald*, a newspaper in Dubuque, Iowa, to operate a radio station there. This was done over the protests of Sanders, who for years had operated a station just across the Mississippi River, and who claimed that there was not enough advertising or talent to support two competing stations and that his was already providing the community with adequate service. Sanders appealed under Section 402(b) of the Communications Act which authorizes judicial review to "persons aggrieved or whose interests are adversely affected by any decision of the Commission granting or refusing . . . [an] application." After reviewing the Communications Act, the Court did recognize Sanders's standing on

²³ 264 US 258 (1924), 267.

²⁴ 281 US 249 (1930). For the view that the decision may have overlooked Sprunt's common law rights see Jaffe, *Judicial Control*, pp. 511-12.

²¹ 310 US 113 (1940), 125, 127.

²² See Albert, pp. 445-47.

the basis that Congress "must have had some purpose" in enacting the section and may perhaps have thought that only someone who had suffered a financial injury would have the incentive to bring illegal actions of the FCC to court.

Sanders had suffered such a financial injury, but the Court also insisted that no substantive interest of Sanders was at issue: "resulting economic injury to a rival station is not, in and of itself, and apart from considerations of public convenience and necessity, an element the [FCC] must weigh, and as to which it must make findings. . . . The Act contains no express command that in passing upon an application the Commission must consider the effect of competition with an existing station." Sanders was not legally a person "aggrieved" according to the statute and could not have been granted standing on that ground.²⁵ The implications of the disclaimer were underlined in a dissent by Justice Douglas in a follow-up case, *Scripps-Howard v. FCC*, where standing was found according to similar reasoning: Douglas argued that he did not see how a statute could allow a person to sue if Congress did not create "an individual substantive right to be free of competition."²⁶

From the perspective of our broader concerns, then, it may be seen that the old rules of standing permitted the juxtaposition of conflicting interests only under the most stinting conditions. Unaided by the courts, the smaller railroads had no recourse against the New York Central; the dockside cotton compressors had none against the railroads; Sanders had none against the *Times-Herald* (except, of course, by way of the marketplace, which theoretically is a recourse for all social groups). And in failing to find a "legal wrong" in competition, courts refused to recognize an interest that could be asserted in litigation. The question is moot whether, had judges been faced with the kind of groups that present themselves for standing today, the doctrine itself might have been different. What is apparent is that given an analogous set of agency actions and statutes, environmentalists, consumers, and others could not have confronted railroads and foreign steel companies and corporate farmers without considerable doctrinal modification.²⁷

The "Zone of Interests"

Had the new doctrine of standing merely recognized a longer list of "legal wrongs" through, say, an expanded view of common law rights, it

would have changed the frequency but not the nature of the court's participation in group conflict. But in resting standing on a judicially inferred protected zone, one which is forthrightly arguable and vague in its contours, present rules have loosened the interest asserted from any statutory or constitutional moorings. While it is quite true, as students of the court have argued, that these changes have considerably increased judicial discretion, a no less important effect is allowance for an exercise of group discretion not possible under previous rulings.

The decisive break in the legalistic reasoning discussed above came with two decisions in 1970, *Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp* and *Barlow v. Collins*.²⁸ The emphasis on "legal wrong" had persisted straight through the lower court opinions in the cases in which it was to be overthrown. *Data Processing* concerned a dispute between a group of sellers of data processing services and some national banks. The banks had been authorized by the Comptroller of the Currency, Camp, to provide data services also. The legal issue presented was whether the data processors could, as competitors, challenge this authorization. The district court had said no, citing the long line of cases which held that plaintiffs whose only injury was loss from competition had no standing. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, reciting Frankfurter's litany of legal rights in *Tennessee Electric*.

The Supreme Court, however, disagreed. Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, makes the starting point Article III of the Constitution, quoting an earlier opinion that "standing is related only to whether the dispute sought to be adjudicated will be presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of judicial resolution." He then sets out a two-pronged test: whether the plaintiff alleges "injury in fact, economic or otherwise"; and whether the interest sought to be protected by the complainant is "arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question."²⁹ If an interest is arguably within the zone, then Section 10(a) of the Administrative Procedures Act, which grants standing to a person "aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute," provides for review.³⁰

²⁸ 397 US 150 (1970) and 397 US 159 (1970).

²⁹ 397 US 150, 151, 152.

³⁰ Section 10(a) of the Administrative Procedures Act provides: "Except to the extent that (1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by law . . . a person suffering legal wrong because of agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof." Section 10(c) provides: "Agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review."

²⁵ 309 US 470 (1940) 473, 477.

²⁶ 316 US 4 (1942), 20.

²⁷ For an example of a case decided shortly before the liberalization of standing, where plaintiffs were found not to "have any real interests" in the litigation under way, see *South Hill Neighborhood Association, Inc. v. Romney*, 421 F.2d 454 (6th Cir. 1969).

Douglas proceeds to demonstrate that the data processors have suffered an injury, and that such a competitive interest is arguably within the required zone. He finds this by citing an opinion by the circuit court in *another* case, one concerning travel agents, that Section 4 of the Bank Service Corporation Act of 1962—*not* the Act under which the Comptroller had acted and which concerned yet a different kind of potential bank competition—“had a broader purpose . . . it was also a response to the fears expressed by a few senators that without such a prohibition, the bill would have enabled ‘banks to engage in a nonbanking activity’.”³¹ The Court left the precise applicability of Section 4, the test of “legal interest,” for the merits, but regarded this history to satisfy the test of “arguably.” The plaintiff was found to have standing.

The *Barlow* case, decided on the same day, arose from conflict between tenant farmers and their landlords. Prior to an amended regulation issued by the Secretary of Agriculture, tenant farmers had been permitted to assign their payments as security to obtain financing for all their needs in making a crop except the rent for their farm land. The new regulation broadened their freedom, allowing them to assign their payments for rent. The tenant farmers sued to hold the amended regulation invalid and sought an injunction prohibiting federal officials to permit such assignments. *Barlow* and the others claimed they suffered injury in the following way: each landlord now required that his tenants assign to him all payments in advance as a condition for the lease to work the land. With their one source of collateral now gone, the tenant farmers were forced to obtain financing for their groceries, tools, clothes, and so on from their landlords at excessively high prices and interest rates. They had become “captive consumers.” The question remained, however, whether the Court would find this injury as damaging to a *protected* interest, particularly since the provision’s ostensible intention was to broaden the tenants’ financial options rather than to restrict them.

The Supreme Court did find them within the “zone” as set forth in *Data Processing*. Since the legislative history of Congress’s provisions for “making a crop” was too sparse to base a protected right, various remarks by legislators indicating “congressional concern for the farmers’ welfare” were added to other expressions of protections for the “interests of tenant farmers” in the Food and Agricultural Act of 1965 and the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act of 1935. The farmers were aggrieved parties under the Administrative Procedures Act. Nothing was

found to preclude judicial review, and standing was granted.

These two cases illustrate the turn away from a legalistic view to one recognizing the plaintiff’s substantive interests independent of specific administrative illegality. First, the invocation in *Data Processing* of the case or controversy clause of Article III is an indication of new functions which standing is expected to provide the court. This is a development of the opinion in *Baker v. Carr* where the Court said that the “gist of standing” hinges on whether “the appellants alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for the illumination of difficult constitutional questions.”³² This function, of course, rests for its performance on the plaintiff and his alleged injuries, and not on the limits of the administrator’s authority.

Second, the very notion of a protected zone strongly suggests that there is a range of *a priori* interests which fall into this privileged area, and there exist complementary categories of prospective plaintiffs. The Court’s opinion in *Data Processing*, when discussing not the basis for standing but whether review had been precluded, indirectly pointed to the presumption of this range in an expression most suggestive of the substantive view of interest: “The Acts do not in terms protect a specified group. But their general policy is apparent; and those whose interests are directly affected by a broad or narrow interpretation of the Acts are easily identifiable.”³³ This is a definite shift from placing the burden of proof on a plaintiff to show a “legal wrong.” The elusiveness of the boundaries of this zone prompted Justice Brennan, joined by Justice White, to argue concurring in *Barlow* that “injury in fact” should be the only test.³⁴

Third, the blurry idea of a zone is accompanied by an equally vague indication of the contours of the interests protected, and thus of the categories of plaintiffs. In cases concerning competitors, there is no practical distinction to be made between the competitors as “persons aggrieved” and the business losses they had suffered; the concept of “competitor” is relatively indicative of the plaintiff’s activities, of the nature of his injury, and of the relationship between the parties; as opposed to, say, the category of “businessman.” In *Barlow*, however, the Court finds legislative concern for “the interests of farmers” and “the tenants wel-

³² 369 US 186 (1962), 204.

³³ 397 US 150 (1970), 157.

³⁴ 397 US 159 (1970), 177. For the view that the “zone of interests” test is meaningless in practice, see Sedler, pp. 486 and 511.

³¹ 397 US 150 (1970), 156. The case Douglas cited was *Arnold Tours Inc. v. Camp*, 400 US 45 (1970).

fare," and says nothing of the *particular* activities or values injured which the plaintiff seeks to protect—a long way from the hair-splitting in the ICC cases, whether the competitor was one who had previously been advantaged and was now on an even footing, or one who was previously even and now disadvantaged.

The rather cavalier use of legislative materials to establish Congress's protective intention is quite the opposite from the demand of the reluctant court seeking some explicit authorization or constitutional duty before passing on actions of the other branches. It might be argued that under the earlier doctrine courts did not search hard enough; in the recent cases they have exerted themselves far in the opposite direction to accommodate the values of plaintiffs. This freewheeling approach has continued in subsequent cases; the bounds of "arguably" are nowhere specified.³⁵ Moreover, the reliance on the Administrative Procedures Act has lifted the burden of finding explicit provisions for judicial review among the snippets of legislators' remarks, judges' opinions, and provisions from other, related-in-varied-degree statutes which arguably add up to legislative intent.³⁶

While there can be no question of the judicial activism involved, the court's behavior shows considerable political realism. For if the search for explicitness endorsed the practice of interest segregation, the new generous approach draws on another congressional tendency—that of legislators to raise a rhetorical umbrella above as many beneficiaries as possible. The course of virtually any bill through Congress will elicit on various sides remarks about who will benefit, questions of concern about whether this or that interest will be hurt, assurances that there is no such intention and in fact the contrary is the case, and so on. Similarly, while statutes may be vague and perfunctory on the topic of who shall have standing, they are noticeably silent about those specifically *not* authorized.

The same may be said about the elusive zone and its crudely suggested categories of plaintiffs. Quite apart from the difficulties in cataloguing injuries of the type courts are now willing to recognize, about which I will say more below, and the fact that Congress itself speaks in shorthand, the

flexible approach to legislative purpose accords with certain realities of how laws are made. Professor Kenneth Davis, discussing the opinion in *Barlow*, has written that finding protection for "the welfare of tenant farmers" was "a verbal infelicity of no consequence"; the Court, he says, should have referred to the particular interests the farmers had asserted.³⁷ While Davis's argument may be valid in terms of a coherent doctrine of standing, the Court's own phrasing is probably closer to reality. Undoubtedly many lawmakers acted with nothing more specific than a diffuse concern about tenant farmers and the hope that their long status of quasi-serfdom be improved or at least not made worse. In general, when legislation is drafted, compromised, adjusted at the behest or on behalf of groups—the Sierra Club, social security recipients, chambers of commerce or whoever—it is with an eye to their members as constituents and contributors rather than to the exact "injuries" the bill may be warding off.

Similarly, judges today have a more realistic understanding of the limits of unchecked administrative processes than judges of only a generation ago. In fact, a pronounced disenchantment with the federal agencies runs the extent of the Supreme Court's ideological spectrum. Thus Justice Douglas has written that "they are notoriously under the control of powerful interests who manipulate them through advisory committees, or friendly working relations; or who have that natural affinity with the agency which in time develops between the regulator and the regulated."³⁸ And, shortly before going to the Court, Justice Burger, typically more circumspect, wrote of an administrative hearing that he himself had ordered while still a U.S. Appeals Judge, chiding the agency in question for "a curious neutrality-in-favor-of-the-licensee. . . . To borrow a phrase from the Examiner, his response manifests a 'glaring weakness' in his grasp of the functions and purpose of the hearing and the public duties of the Commission. . . ."³⁹ In this sense, the liberalized rules of standing might be considered to reassert Congress's purposes as embodied in the agencies' organic acts.⁴⁰

Realism notwithstanding, however, the effect of the willingness to infer a protected zone of indis-

³⁵ In *Investment Company Institute v. Camp*, 401 US 617 (1971), the Court found that the mutual funds suffered an injury "indistinguishable" from that of bank service companies in *Data Processing* without any study or discussion of the specific legislation whatever.

³⁶ Professor Davis has long advocated the view that the APA refers to any persons "adversely affected" by agency action and not merely those "aggrieved" within the meaning of a relevant statute providing review. See Davis, pp. 436–37. For the view that the court has effectively obliterated the distinction between statutory and non-statutory review see Albert, p. 451.

³⁷ Davis, p. 425.

³⁸ Dissent in *Sierra Club v. Morton*, 405 US 727 (1972), 745.

³⁹ Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. F.C.C., 425 F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1969) 547–48.

⁴⁰ For a recent example see the remarks of Judge Skelly Wright: "Our duty, in short, is to see that important legislative purposes, heralded in the halls of Congress, are not lost or misdirected in the vast hallways of the federal bureaucracy." *Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. Atomic Energy Commission*, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).

inct dimensions—dimensions not only shifting from case to case but purposely uncertain—is to pass the job of defining the interest largely into the plaintiff's hands. Thus in *Barlow*, as has been seen, the Court finds protection for the asserted "interests of farmers," who claim they must now pay more to finance their planting. Data processors seeking to bar competition are found to be within a zone conjured to embrace competitive interests of (among others) banks, travel agents, mutual funds, and public accountants, deriving its protective force from acts other than the one whose administration was being contested.

Such a doctrine obviously does more than provide plaintiffs with a vigorous role in framing the issues, a role already sanctioned by the case and controversy limitation on federal litigation. More importantly, in its present form at least, the notion of the protected zone vastly extends the possibilities of the lawsuit as an interest group strategy. This means a resort to the courts not only to protect ingeniously construed common law and constitutional rights, but as a sustained and even preferable alternative to legislation in circumstances where legislation may be politically or technically unfeasible, or both. Official actions taken and sanctions given under the authority of laws which, in their historical timing and immediate purpose, could never have contemplated the existence, yet alone the protection, of interests that come before the bar as injured parties might now be challenged as a means of disputing an endless variety of private projects carried out under public aegis. Although pending congressional intervention, it is still the courts who have ultimate discretion in the matter of standing, the present options available to interest groups would seem to be limited only by the imaginative and financial resources of the groups themselves.

Further, while the general question of judicial policy making is beyond the concerns of this essay, whatever problems it does in fact pose for a democratic society are compounded by the dependence of intervention on group interests who would use the courts in a discretionary manner. If the case and controversy provision already relies heavily on private initiative to determine the circumstances and subject matter of judicial intervention, and environmentalists and consumerists are merely imitating civil rights groups in their legal strategies, then the changes in standing rules have grossly exaggerated these features and opened to their operation a vastly widened scope of administrative decisions and nongovernmental projects behind them.

New Injuries and Their Representation

An important element in the discretion permitted the challenging party is the courts' relaxa-

tion of what kind of injury is sufficient to satisfy the test of "injury in fact." This change, moreover, corresponds to the prominence of the organizational plaintiff, not merely in a historical sense, but as a function of a representational logic in the new rules for standing.

The consumers' challenge of the steel companies provided no new problems with respect to injury, nor did the data processors or tenant farmers, since all are of an economic nature which, like damages to health, safety, and other concretely experienced injuries, have long been acknowledged by common law and in statutes. But since 1966, a series of opinions has recognized injuries other than economic or direct physical damage as sufficient grounds for standing, thereby, of course, permitting the legal juxtaposition of a far wider variety of private conflicts. In *Office of Communications of the United Church of Christ v. FCC*, it was held that listeners who had suffered abuse through being denied a fair and balanced presentation of controversial issues had standing to challenge the renewal of a television license.⁴¹ Prior to this decision, only electrical interference and, in the special case of *Sanders*, economic loss had been acceptable in granting standing under the Federal Communications Act. In *Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC*, with the assist of the Federal Power Act's expressed concern for "other beneficial uses, including recreational purposes," the court recognized injuries to the aesthetic and conservationist values of the plaintiffs.⁴²

An environmental injury was the basis of a claim for standing for the first time in a Supreme Court case in *Sierra Club v. Morton*. The Sierra Club attempted to stop Walt Disney Enterprises from building a ski and recreation development in the Mineral King Valley of the Sierra Nevada Mountains. The legal presentation of the matter was the Sierra Club's attempt to enjoin the U.S. Forest Service and the Department of Interior from granting the necessary approval and permits, which the Sierra Club charged would be in violation of several statutes. The Club claimed that it was a party aggrieved, about to endure injuries to its environmental, recreational, and aesthetic values. Although it was to deny standing on other grounds, the Court affirmed that these types of harms "may amount to an 'injury in fact' sufficient to lay the basis for standing."⁴³

The recognition during the last decade of environmental and aesthetic values, as well as the acceptance of the principle of noneconomic values, new varieties of which may be expected to confront the courts, implies an investing of rights

⁴¹ 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).

⁴² 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965).

⁴³ 405 US 727 (1972), 734.

in certain categories of plaintiffs, rather than a delineation of specific "wrongs" which will be accorded status as injuries for standing. This is the case because these injuries often occur to the intangible values of the plaintiff, rather than to anything which may be observed and measured by others. For standing to be found in such circumstances the plaintiff must solidly establish that he does suffer an injury in fact; "arguably" is applicable only to the zone of interests test. To establish that he does or does not suffer from the claimed aesthetic or emotional stress entails inquiry into the plaintiff himself, his other values, his activities prior to and perhaps surrounding the specific complaint. The court must establish that he is a genuine environmentalist or historical buff, or whatever; and that he falls into or outside of some class of persons who may legally claim the injury.

This is by no means always a straightforward task. For example, Ralph Nader was allowed to challenge an extension of time given an auto manufacturer to comply with safety standards in the National Traffic and Motor Safety Act; the court reasoned that the presence of unsafe autos on the road would injure Nader in his capacity as a crusader for auto safety and as a member of the Safety Advisory Council.⁴⁴ Nor is it always a benevolent one. In *Zlotnick v. Redevelopment Land Agency*, the district court denied standing to property owners seeking to enjoin condemnation of their land, an act they claimed was illegal because the environmental impact statement required by the National Environmental Policy Act had been inadequately prepared. The court, however, inquiring into their motives, found that their concern for the environment was "at best remote, highly speculative, and ephemeral. They have nothing but their own financial interest to protect, as their continuing efforts to achieve financial settlements emphasize. . . . The Act was not designed to assist individual property owners seeking to enhance payments from the Government when taking by eminent domain threatens."⁴⁵ Here, the court considers two substantive interests of the plaintiffs: it finds the financial interest to fall outside of the zone; and the financial interest is then used by the court to demonstrate that the environmental interest, which would fall within the zone, is at best ephemeral and insufficient for injury in fact.

It is at this juncture that organizational plaintiffs perform a valuable judicial function. If judges must distinguish genuine concern, say, for the preservation of a building of historical importance, from a bad faith or spurious suit, member-

ship in a recognized organization is one indicator. Also, organizations with specialized purposes and experience in a given and frequently unfamiliar subject area would seem to meet the need for the sharp presentation of issues which the Court has said is the "gist" of standing.

More fundamental, however, is the role of organizations in litigation by virtue of a representational logic in the present doctrine of standing. I have argued above that the concept of a zone of protected interests implies the existence of classes of plaintiffs to defend them. Seeing a plaintiff as a member of a larger class, of course, is a standard practice in jurisprudence, with the aim being equal treatment and not representation. But when the court infers protection for such abstract and intellectual values as listeners' sensibilities with respect to broadcasting or aesthetic and recreational taste, or the more concrete values such as the desire for air line service in a community and protection from atomic plants,⁴⁶ it is obviously looking to the interests of a sector of the citizenry of which the isolated plaintiff must be a representative. In the areas of environment and historical preservation, the plaintiff's injuries are once-removed from injuries to the inanimate object, which perforce places him, in part at least, in the position of protector.⁴⁷

Judges active in the liberalization of standing have said as much, and have gone a step further in suggesting the desirability of plaintiffs to represent protected interests. Justice Stewart for the majority in *Sierra Club*, for example, acknowledges that aesthetic and environmental well-being are "important ingredients of the quality of life in our society . . . and [are] deserving of legal protection through the judicial process"; Justice Douglas eloquently extols the wonders of nature and seeks "legitimate spokesmen for it"; Justice Blackmun reminds the Court that "no man is an Island, intire of itself," and seeks plaintiffs to defend the environment with "provable, sincere, dedicated, and established status."⁴⁸ In an earlier court of appeals decision Justice Burger has written of "responsible and representative groups . . . found in every community" to contest broadcasting licenses.⁴⁹

Moreover, it may be in the nature of certain non-economic injuries, and those in which the indi-

⁴⁶ See *Palisades Citizens Assn. v. CAB*, 420 F.2d 188 (D.C. Cir. 1969); and *Crowther v. Seaborg*, 312 F. Supp. 1205 (D. Colo. 1970).

⁴⁷ On the inadequacy, therefore, of present standing doctrine to fully protect the environment see Christopher D. Stone, "Should Trees Have Standing—Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects," *Southern California Law Review*, 45 (Spring, 1972), 450–501.

⁴⁸ 405 US 727 (1972), 757–58, 734, 745, 760.

⁴⁹ Office of Communications of the United Church of Christ v. F.C.C., 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966), 1005.

⁴⁴ *Nader v. Volpe*, 320 F. Supp. 266 (D.C. Cir. 1970).

⁴⁵ (D.C. Cir. March 3, 1972) *Environmental Law Reporter*, 2, 20235–36.

vidual economic injury is trivial, that the incentive for any one individual plaintiff to bear the costs of litigation is quite low, and organizational support is essential for the interest to have a hearing. This is especially true if it be considered desirable that the protected interest be defended on a non-sporadic basis, not dependent on the time or wealth of prospective plaintiffs. Also, it may even be the case that injuries to the environment, consumer interests, or others are not felt or clearly understood without the pooling of experience offered by organizations.

Obviously, the organizational plaintiff is not unique to changes in the law of standing. Under the old rules, the federal courts had occasionally allowed organizations to sue on behalf of members who suffered judicially familiar injuries, such as economic harms or racial discrimination;⁵⁰ usually, however, unions and trade associations merely joined along in litigation with individual members; and more common in the civil rights area was the so-called test case. But under the new rules, the organization is the *typical* plaintiff. In the course of a spring tide of group activity in society generally, the liberalized approach has enabled numerous environmental, consumer, historical-preservational, and other associations, as well as a wide variety of ad hoc local citizens' groups, to come before the court to do battle with such diverse parties as land developers, lumber companies, and passenger railroads.⁵¹ The bid of these organizations for standing is a continuation of energetic efforts in Congress, the administrative agencies, and the judicial process itself. (It is interesting to note, for example, that the Sierra Club filed an *amicus curiae* brief in *Data Processing*.)

Nor is the court unfamiliar with the problem of representativeness. The degree to which an opinion will affect a number of persons similarly situated is a consideration, for example, in the Supreme Court's decision to hear a case; the question of ripeness implies that there are more or less propitious times for settlement of an issue which is of broader concern than just to the particular plaintiff at hand. In contemporary standing cases, however, the plaintiff is not merely representative

in the passive sense, but is an advocate of a substantive interest for which the court has inferred a zone of arguable protection—an advocate, as I have argued, invested by the new standing rules with wide discretion.

The questions presented to the court which surround the matter of representation are familiar to students of group politics as they occur in other contexts. Here we may briefly mention versions that have arisen in standing cases. There is first of all the question of who is an appropriate spokesman for a public interest. Consider for example the case of *National Helium Corporation v. Morton*,⁵² where an appeals court granted to a business corporation whose contract to deliver helium to the government had been cancelled, standing to assert the contracting official's violation of the National Environmental Policy Act. The court ruled that the fact that the company was seeking to protect its financial stake did not make it ineligible to represent the public's protected interest in the environment. Similarly, a plaintiff granted standing to dispute federal provisions for the labeling of vitamin content on oleomargarine packages was the manufacturer of a competing fish oil product.⁵³ In these cases, as in others, the court has avoided the issue of appropriateness of representation by describing the protected interest as a "public" one in which the entire public shares, a formulation about which more will be said presently.

Second, granted that an organization or individual has an established reputation for concern and expertise in a given field, there is the question of whether he may legitimately represent the interested parties considered as a class. In the area of environmental protection, for example, the Sierra Club takes different positions from other environmental groups—Friends of the Earth, the Audubon Society, the Wildlife Federation, and others—on various issues ranging from wildlife protection to energy policy. Or consider a recent case in which the National Welfare Rights Organization was granted standing to contest administrative hearings held under the Social Security Act.⁵⁴ The court argued that "the National Organization and the relevant state organization could be expected to serve the common good of all welfare recipients involved," although students of public policy have

⁵⁰ Cf. *Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Rogers*, 186 F. Supp. 114 (D.C. Cir. 1960); *Associated Industries, Inc. v. Ickes*, 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1943); *NAACP v. Button*, 371 US 415 (1963).

⁵¹ In addition to cases cited elsewhere above, see, for example, *West Augusta Historical and Genealogical Society v. Urban Renewal Authority* (4th Cir., Jan. 22, 1974) *Environmental Law Reporter*, 4, 20229; *West Virginia Izaak Walton League v. Butz*, (N.D. W.Va. Jan 25, 1974), *ibid.*; *West Va. Highlands Conservancy v. Island Creek Coal Co.*, 441 F.2d 232 (4th Cir., 1971); and *Upper Pecos Assn. v. Stans*, 328 F. Supp. 332 (D.N. Mex. 1971).

⁵² *National Helium Corp. v. Morton*, 455 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1971).

⁵³ *Reade v. Ewing*, 205 F.2d 630 (2d Cir. 1953). More recently, see *Duke City Lumber Co. v. Butz*, in which twelve large lumber companies were permitted under provision of the NEPA to defend the "continuation of free competition," an interest protected by the Small Business Act, against the S.B.A.'s small business timber set-aside program. (D.D.C. August 28, 1974) *Environmental Law Reporter*, 5, 20080-86.

⁵⁴ 429 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1970).

found a diversity in interest among welfare recipients and in particular the inadequacy of the N.W.R.O. in representing this diversity.⁵⁵

Again, while these problems of representation are by no means unique to the judicial process, their importance is perhaps heightened when they occur in a forum that supersedes all foregoing legislative and administrative processes. Furthermore, entirely unlike representative suits to protect specific constitutional rights, in standing cases potentially dubious representatives are allowed to litigate disputes on behalf of interests which are protected often only by "arguable" judicial inference and in the definition of which these representatives have played the primary role.

Organizations and the "Public Action"

The strength of representational logic in the present doctrine of standing shows itself nowhere more forcefully than in the Supreme Court's recent attempt to scotch it.

Insofar as organizations have continued their functions and activities on behalf of their members—in which case they perform analogously to class actions in ordinary damage suits—the court has avoided facing the difficulties of representation head on. The moment of truth, as it were, has occurred when, following a line of reasoning leading from the recognition of protection for substantive interests to the desirability that these interests be protected, organizations have claimed standing for themselves, without asserting any injury whatever to its members. In itself, this is not an entirely novel situation. Even under the old rules, the Supreme Court has acknowledged such independent standing when the social reputation and economic status of an organization qua organization is threatened; or when the right at issue—anonymity—would be undermined if members were required to participate; and even under the new rules when the question of standing is simply not raised.⁵⁶ The recent plea has been that organizations be allowed to vindicate the violation of some public interest within the protected zone as representatives of the public at large. For example, imagine that Consumers Union made no allegation that its members would be injured by higher domestic prices caused by the steel companies, but based its claim to standing on the argument that the damage was to the principles of free trade, embodied in the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, to which the organization had a long-standing public commitment.

⁵⁵ See Daniel P. Moynihan, *The Politics of a Guaranteed Income* (New York: Random House, 1973), pp. 329 ff.

⁵⁶ Cf. *Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath*, 341 US 123 (1951); *NAACP v. Alabama*, 357 US 449 (1958); *Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe*, 401 US 402 (1971).

Private organizations have received encouragement for this position in courts' greater receptiveness in recent years to the so-called *pro bono* suit or "public action."⁵⁷ In a public action the plaintiff sues to protest an illegal or unconstitutional act which affects him no differently from any other person. The alleged shared injury may be trifling, for the interest at issue is that of the public in legal government. Although most states have long permitted such suits, the federal courts until a few years ago turned them aside as being outside the constitutional requirement of case or controversy, according to which courts will intervene only to protect rights of private persons and not to pass on the validity of the behavior of the other branches.

The leading case until 1968 was *Frothingham v. Mellon*, in which the class of those affected was drawn slightly narrower than the whole public, at the taxpayers. The Court denied Mrs. Frothingham's protest against the expenditure of federal funds to support maternity hospitals on the ground that her interest was "comparatively minute and indeterminate." To have standing the plaintiff must prove "that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally."⁵⁸ In other words if the expenditure burdens all taxpayers in the same amount, then no one of them may contest its legality.

This decision was overthrown in *Flast v. Cohen*, in which seven taxpayers sued to have the court declare certain federal expenditures to assist instruction in religious schools as being both unconstitutional and unauthorized by statute. Ignoring the matter of the statute altogether and thus the question of who was authorized to initiate review under its provisions, the Court ruled that Flast and the others could challenge the expenditures because it violated specific limitations in the First Amendment on the spending powers of Congress. Significantly, the Court did not indicate what the injury incurred had been—religious, economic, or both—referring instead to the plaintiff's personal "stake" in the outcome; it emphasized only that there must be a "logical nexus between the status asserted and the claim sought to be ad-

⁵⁷ See Jaffe, "The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions." Jaffe has been the leading scholarly proponent of the public action, and his views are often cited in court opinions. Professor Davis has been the leading and apparently victorious opponent, arguing for injury as a basic element in standing. See Davis, *Administrative Law Text*, pp. 437–39. A student may follow the dialogue between these two through their respective journal articles over the last decade and thereby get an excellent view of the legal issues under debate into the courts.

⁵⁸ 262 US 447 (1923), 487.

judicated.”⁵⁹ Here the *Flast* opinion dovetails with changes in standing rules in private actions by focusing on the *substantive* base of the plaintiff's attack. Identifying a violation of the constitutional limitation on the taxing and spending power as the “claim,” the “logical” challenger is the taxpayer. Thus, for example, in two recent cases, the Court found that plaintiffs' standing as taxpayers does not logically entitle them to question Congress's failures with respect to the CIA or the Reserve status of Congressmen⁶⁰—though it must be presumed that some other status might.

The doctrine that an interest protected by a statute may best or at least reasonably be asserted by private plaintiffs who nevertheless act not for themselves but for the public is present in the *Sanders* case discussed earlier. Firm in its denial that as a broadcaster Sanders suffered no legal injury through the licensing of his competitor, the Court nonetheless found Sanders to have standing as a “person aggrieved,” arguing that otherwise Congress's provisions for judicial review would have no substantial effect.⁶¹ A few years later in another broadcast licensing case, *Scripps-Howard*, the Court, citing *Sanders*, likewise recognized standing saying: “The Communications Act of 1934 did not create new private rights. The purpose of the Act was to protect the public interest in communications. . . . These private litigants have standing only as representatives of the public interest.”⁶² And in *Associated Industries v. Ickes* Judge Frank thought he was following this lead when he found standing for coal companies as part of the consuming public at large, characterizing such a plaintiff as a “private Attorney General.”⁶³ But the impact of *Sanders* and *Scripps-Howard* was limited, perhaps because in these cases the courts had been less anxious to enfranchise the listening public than about giving any tinge of property rights to the holders of radio licenses.⁶⁴

⁵⁹ 392 US 83 (1968), 99, 102.

⁶⁰ *U.S. v. Richardson*, 94 US 2940 (1974); and *Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee*, 94 US 2925 (1974).

⁶¹ See above, p. 8.

⁶² 316 US 4, 14.

⁶³ 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1943), 704.

⁶⁴ But see *International Union of Electrical Workers v. U.S.*, 280 F.2d 645 (D.C. Cir. 1960), where a group of labor unions were granted standing as aggrieved parties to appeal a decision of the Atomic Energy Commission to construct a nuclear reactor on the grounds that it endangered the safety of an area where union members as well as others lived, and thus the economic interests of both unions and members.

See also *Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer*, 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970) to the effect that doubts of standing for bidders for government contracts should be resolved in favor of standing; bidders, while they lack a protected private interest, may litigate the public interest in contracting procedures.

The explicit severance here, as it later would be in *Flast*, of the injury-in-fact test from the substantive interest to be protected, served as precedents in group conflicts in lower courts prior to the *Sierra Club* decision. For example, in *Scenic Hudson*, an association of several nonprofit conservation organizations sought to prevent the construction by Consolidated Edison of a hydroelectric power plant authorized by the Federal Power Commission. The court rejected an argument that since the plaintiffs made no claim to any personal economic injury resulting from the Commission's action they therefore lacked standing. Pointing to the statute which specified that the Commission must look to “other beneficial uses, including recreational purposes, in the licensing,” it held that “[i]n order to insure that the Federal Power Commission will adequately protect the public interest in the aesthetic, conservational and recreational aspects of power development, those who by their activities and conduct have exhibited a special interest in such areas, must be held to be included in the class of ‘aggrieved’ parties. . . .”⁶⁵ Similarly, in *Office of Communications of the United Church of Christ* the court allowed a local church, a church communications office and two individuals to challenge a television license as “responsible representatives” of the listening public.⁶⁶ And in *Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin*, a number of organizations, including the National Audubon Society, the Sierra Club, the Izaak Walton League and others, were seen to have standing according to the reasoning that a “demonstrated interest in protecting the environment from pesticide pollution was sufficient to satisfy the injury-in-fact test.”⁶⁷

When, however, the question of organizational standing independent of injuries to specific members came to a head in *Sierra Club v. Morton*, the Supreme Court balked. The error in the plaintiff's argument, it said, was the theory that the “public action” constituted a separate doctrine of standing. In the Court's interpretation, injury in fact had been a requirement in the lower court cases: “most, if not all,” had at least one party to the proceeding who claimed an individualized injury. But the *Sierra Club* indicated a “mere ‘interest in the problem’,” asking the court “to authorize judicial review at the behest of organizations or individuals who seek to do no more than indicate their own value preferences through the judicial process.”⁶⁸

The Court had a point in noticing an economic injury to Mr. Sanders and, for example, to plain-

⁶⁵ 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), 614, 616.

⁶⁶ 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).

⁶⁷ 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970), 1097.

⁶⁸ 405 US 727 (1972), 739, 740.

tiffs residing along the Hudson River; but the argument that standing was based on that injury and only in such circumstances might the person argue the public interest seems contrary to the thrust of those earlier opinions, which, decided under the "legal wrong" theory, were firm precisely in the attitude that the plaintiffs suffered no judicially cognizable injury. At any rate, the opinion in *Sierra Club* refrained from reaching the second prong of the *Data Processing* test, the zone of interests. In so refraining it de-emphasized the *substantive* basis for the organization's appeal, the existence of arguable legislative intent that the environment be protected; thus it avoided the crux of the matter—why this legislative intent cannot be accomplished by willing and able groups sufficiently concerned to represent the public in bringing an offending action to litigation. Instead the court offered as a reason for its insistence on injury that otherwise it would have no basis for disallowing any other group, no matter how small or short lived, or any individual citizen with "the same bona fide special interest" to press his values in a lawsuit.⁶⁹ This of course is not an argument against representation, but merely a device for making representation manageable.

The artificiality of the Court's approach is evident in a remarkable case, *U.S. v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP)*. SCRAP, an unincorporated organization of five members, along with several other environmental organizations, asked that railroads be restrained from collecting a surcharge which, according to SCRAP, the ICC had authorized without the detailed environmental impact statement required by the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. It claimed to be a party aggrieved in the meaning of Section 10 of the APA by virtue of the fact that members, as campers, hikers, fishers and sightseers, used the forests, rivers, mountains and other natural resources in the Washington, D.C. area; and they were injured by the surcharge, which would make recyclable materials more expensive to transport, thus causing further consumption of trees and other resources, resulting in more depletion and pollution of the environment, some of this possibly in the Washington, D.C. area. The Court found that SCRAP had standing, considering that its members "alleged a specific and perceptible harm that distinguished them from other citizens who had not used the natural resources that were claimed to be protected," and therein finding the necessary "injury in fact."⁷⁰

It might be argued that the emphasis, however awkward, on the importance of "injury in fact" has reaffirmed a conception of judicial intervention

primarily to protect individual rights, as opposed to acceding to individuals or organizations who, as the Court has put it, "seek to do more than vindicate their own value preferences through the judicial process."⁷¹ But the limited intervention model has been traditionally associated with the protection of minority rights against legislative implementation of majority will; in the cases at hand, however, the plaintiff, as a representative of interests which the Court itself acknowledges to be "important ingredients of the quality of life" deserving of judicial protection, seeks to restrain administrative endorsement of minority—in particular corporate business—privileges. In other words, by explicitly rejecting the concept of a "legal wrong," and resting standing on a generous understanding of protected substantive interest, the Court has not substantially changed the direction or checked the momentum of its course.

SCRAP indicates the sophistry of the effort to designate interests of the kind that appear here in terms of private injury. As for injury "in fact," it is difficult not to agree with the dissent of Justice White when he deemed it "remote, speculative and insubstantial."⁷² Moreover, the formulation of personal injury forces a misrepresentation of the plaintiff's actual experience of the offending action: the injury is intolerable to him not only or even mainly because it infringes on his camping and sightseeing, but because it may deprive present and, perhaps even more important, future members of the public from enjoying these natural resources.

Sierra Club might have proved to be a setback of sorts, as in a case decided shortly afterwards where a lower court refused to allow an organization to challenge the construction of an industrial park because its members preferred open space to industry.⁷³ But the subsequent trivialization of the injury test in *SCRAP* suggests that the real challenge now is to ingenuity in legal drafting, by which, for the time being, organizations must continue to play the standing game according to the artificial rules. Thus, in a brief for a suit brought to prevent farmers from bringing ethylene-gassed tomatoes to market, Consumers Union denies the allegation by the Department of Agriculture that they represent only "the public at large": its members are purchasers and eaters of tomatoes who have been injured by eating tomatoes of high

⁷¹ 405 US 727 (1972), 740. And see Justice Brennan's dissent in *Barlow*, especially 176–78.

⁷² 412 US 669 (1973), 723.

⁷³ *Coalition for the Environment v. Linclay Development Corp.* 347 F. Supp. 634 (E.D.Mo. 1972). The Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed and reversed, acknowledging the "aesthetic and psychological benefit" of viewing the open space as one among other valid allegations for standing (8th Cir. July 31, 1974) *Environmental Law Reporter*, 4, 20717.

⁶⁹ 405 US 727 (1972), 741.

⁷⁰ 412 US 669 (1973), 689.

price, low quality, and of lesser nutritional value.⁷⁴

The strain in such an argument is apparent, a strain not only to the pleadings but to the integrity of the courts' own purposes in the standing test. If there is a legitimate reason to limit judicial intervention to private wrongs, then these cases stretch the point to vacuity. If the aim is to protect substantive interests affected by the administrative action in question, then the insistence on personal injury, as opposed to groups who may adequately sharpen the controversy, has so far served only to cloud the real issues of discretion and representativeness that remain.

Nor does other evidence indicate that the spirit of the public action has been exorcized from the federal bench. On the contrary, since *Sierra Club* courts have put forth what might be referred to as the "vitality" theory. In *Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company* white tenants were allowed to sue their landlord for violations of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 on their own behalf and "also as private attorney general" because "[w]e can give vitality to [the section of the Act granting administrative review to injured parties] only by a generous construction which gives standing to sue to all in the same housing unit who are injured by racial discrimination in . . . facilities under the auspices of H.U.D."⁷⁵ In *Potomac Passengers' Association v. Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad*, the relevant statute, the Amtrak Act, provides standing only for the Attorney General and employees and their representatives. But the court of appeals allowed passengers to challenge the discontinuation of certain trains, on the grounds that allowing additional parties standing "is not only fully consistent with but is also necessary to achieve [Congress'] objective."⁷⁶ These recent decisions are not inconsistent with the requirement of injury in fact, but they demonstrate judges' continuing flexibility in installing injured parties as representatives of the general public.

Standing and the Rule of Law

The changes in the law of standing have dealt a serious blow to the theory that the Supreme Court

might bring contemporary public policy under the Rule of Law.⁷⁷ While there have been some arguably advantageous political effects, the diminution of excessive delegations of legislative power and the formulation of clear and fixed rules are not among them.

The positive results of the new rules of standing, and some limitations, may be examined in light of a concrete example. *Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Committee v. A.E.C.* concerned a dispute between an environmental group, Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Committee, and the Baltimore Gas and Electric Company, over the latter's construction of a nuclear power plant on Chesapeake Bay in Maryland. Granting the plaintiff standing, the court found that in authorizing the plant the A.E.C. had violated the provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act in a number of ways, particularly by the reliance on other federal agencies' standards of water quality in evaluating pollution that might be caused by the facility, and by refusing to halt construction pending completion of environmental impact studies (non-binding on the final decision) required for operations. The court ordered the A.E.C. to itself balance environmental factors, the public's power requirements, and the costs and technology of supply; and to suspend construction so that alterations in the design of the plant could be made if desirable to implement findings of the environmental impact study.⁷⁸

From the straightforward viewpoint of social power, the effect of standing is obvious. Quite apart from the actual outcome on the merits, the ability of an environmental group to assert its interest against the disposition of the company represents an important redistribution of discretion between the parties. No claims need be made for the internal procedures of organizational life or the equality of access to resources needed for litigation to note the essentially democratic direction of these changes. In this sense also, the general looseness in the doctrine and the failure of the court to establish criteria of representation contribute to the adaptability and openness of the adjudicatory forum and may be regarded as beneficial.

Similarly, from the perspective of public policy, the court, by means of its own juxtaposition of interests, then proceeds directly to countermand the agency rule of segregation, ordering that the A.E.C. itself consider competing interests against one another, and thereby filling a vagueness in the NEPA in this regard. Here, as in recent standing

⁷⁴ "Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss," Consumers Union, Inc. v. Butz, Civil Action No. 2142-72, mimeo, pp. 8-9. Also see Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency (9th Cir. November 11, 1974), *Environmental Law Reporter*, 5, 20032-37, where the right to challenge an Arizona air quality statute was found in an individual plaintiff, there being "no doubt, that [he] as a resident of Arizona will suffer injury if compelled to breathe air less pure than that mandated by the Clean Air Act," while, in the same decision, standing was denied under *Sierra Club* to the National Resources Defense Council and the Arizona Nurses' Association, even though both have members residing, and presumably breathing, in Arizona.

⁷⁵ 409 US 205 (1972), 368.

⁷⁶ 475 F.2d 325 (D.C. Cir. 1973), 337.

⁷⁷ A recent proponent has been Professor Lowi. See his *The End of Liberalism*, Chap. 10, and *The Politics of Disorder* (New York: Basic Books, 1971), pp. 58-61 and 180-85.

⁷⁸ 449 F.2d 1109 (1971).

decisions generally, the court has harnessed the rhetoric of the "public interest"—in this case the public's power requirements—to a challenge rather than a defense of entrenched private privilege. And of course, the court's willingness to review the A.E.C.'s permit to Baltimore Gas and Electric is itself a desirable check against arbitrary use of administrative authority.

The final action in this sequence of events, however, occurred when Congress, in direct response to the court's decision, explicitly authorized the A.E.C. to issue temporary permits to allow power plants to proceed in their construction and operation while the more elaborate court-ordered (still nonbinding) impact studies were underway. This was done in consideration of, among other things, a national power shortage thought to be of crisis proportions. While one may disagree with the result on value grounds, it was at least achieved by a conscious choice among competing interests, one open to public scrutiny and reversible by normal political means, and one preferable to the A.E.C.'s independent decision which would have prevailed without litigation.

What was not finally accomplished, however, was a retraction of the authority delegated by Congress to the A.E.C. Just the opposite is the case: Congress decided to restore the discretion entrusted to the agency to the level prior to the court's decision. Moreover, had the court's decision stood, it might justly have been accused (or credited, depending on one's attitude) of legislating in Congress's stead. Such decisions—and in recent cases they have ranged from finding legislative protection for far-flung interests at the standing stage to arcane determinations on the merits like, for example, whether a given discontinued railway run is actually a "commuter" or an "inter-city" service⁷⁹—are useful and necessary to the administrative process, but are something quite other than the finding that a given delegation of authority by Congress, abhorrent in its vagueness to the Rule of Law, is unconstitutional.

Moreover, there is diminishing likelihood that the Supreme Court will be asked to declare agency authority unconstitutional, at least not at the behest of the new groups for whom it has found standing, for the good reason that it is only the pseudo-public status accorded private decision making which permits the challenger to put forth his own interest in opposition. If there remains an incentive for anyone to seek new and clarified legislation—assuming for purposes of discussion the dubious proposition that it is possible to lay down fixed and clear rules for the multitude of enterprises that modern government brings within

its purview—it may finally come from producer interests against an administrative system that has outlived its usefulness.

Enough has been said earlier about the lack of criteria in courts' treatment of legislative intent and injury in fact—sacrifices to the worthy judicial aim of providing a hearing for parties claiming to be adversely affected by government-endorsed actions, but not on that account any indication of an attachment to fixed rules, especially from the point of view of the defendant corporate interests. Perhaps a more fruitful question than whether the Supreme Court will restore the administrative process to the Rule of Law, is what effect its involvement in group conflicts through changes in standing may have on the viability of the courts to perform certain indispensable social functions, in particular as guardians of certain legal principles not considered to be subject to the push and pull of competing groups. Put somewhat differently, what difference does it make that deference to private initiative and the puzzles of authenticity in voices claiming to speak for diverse highly sanctified purposes which are so familiar in other policy-making contexts now occur with regularity in the judicial branch?

Perhaps the initial observation to be made is that the process is infused with false pretenses. I have already discussed misrepresentation of the plaintiff's grievance. But an even more fundamental false pretense is the idea that a dispute between, say, the Disney Corporation and the Sierra Club is a legal dispute in any basic sense. There is no question that such conflicts can be readily twisted into a lawsuit and that statutes like the National Environmental Policy Act and a similarly conceived bill for consumers not yet enacted are, if not an outright sanction, then at least a legislative preparation for this twisting.⁸⁰ But the distortion means that the outcome of the case, and thereby fragments of public policy, will also depend on a kind of trick: whether an administrator followed to the courts' satisfaction procedures for drawing up a nonbinding report on environmental impact; or, as in the SCRAP case, whether legislation authorizing a particular agency allows courts to issue the type of injunction necessary to remedy the administrator's acknowledged misstep. The issue is not whether judges must employ precision in the enforcement of laws, but whether such precision may take on an aspect of pettifoggery in especially inappropriate contexts.

⁸⁰ Certain groups in the environmental movement have proposed that blanket legislation be passed to establish standing for litigants seeking to protect the environment. See Sax, p. 247 ff. Such a law in Michigan was declared an unconstitutional delegation by the legislature of power to make the law. *Roberts v. Michigan*, *Environmental Law Reporter*, 2, 1612 (1971).

⁷⁹ *Potomac Passengers Association v. Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad Co.*, 363 F. Supp. 39 (D.C. Cir., 1973).

Another fundamental and false pretense lies in the idea that the "public interest" in a given area may be effectively protected in a form of arbitration between two parties. Consider the Consumers Union against the foreign steel companies. Obviously a question such as the level of foreign imports of a basic commodity involves a great number of interests other than those of the plaintiff-consumers and the companies—interests that may not be assumed to acquiesce in the outcome through their nonparticipation in the suit.⁸¹ It might be objected that this is true of virtually all significant questions on which decisions are rendered. But in the recent decisions permitted by the new law of standing, the courts are not passing on plaintiff's constitutional rights which are expected to take priority over all other interests; rather, they must make judgments on a variegated array of far-reaching matters at the initiative of parties whose protected interests or "rights" are based largely on judicial inference.

Perhaps the most troubling issue arises from the question of the appropriateness of representation, a question provoked by the definition of interest in substantive rather than legalistic terms. One example is the attitude shown in some instances for the standing of private property owners. I have already cited the lower court ruling in the *Zlotnick* case, to the effect that a suit motivated by private financial interest disqualified a plaintiff from challenging provisions intended to protect the environment; a similar verdict was rendered, for example, in *Higgenbottom v. Barrett* where it was found that the elimination of water pollution near private residences of plaintiffs who objected to the building of an adjacent apartment house was not arguably within the zone of interests protected by the Water Pollution Control Act.⁸² In view of the court's ordinary generosity as to legislative purpose, and its expressed endorsement of the idea that persons who suffer a recognizable injury from a government action may "then represent the public interest," these decisions stand out in relief. While no argument need

be made that these are the most appropriate plaintiffs (to adopt, for the moment, the logic of representation in standing), it is not clear why individual property owners are any less qualified to defend the "public interest" than are broadcasters, sports-fishermen, and government contractors.⁸³

Thirty years ago Friedrich Hayek argued that equality before the law was incompatible with government economic planning.⁸⁴ Certainly the piecemeal, ad hoc, privately initiated and privately defined policy which emerges at the end of the adjudicatory process described above is not what Hayek had in mind. On the other hand, the finding of a "public interest" in this or that substantive interest does constitute a sort of negative planning; and it may be predicted that the difficult social choices implied cannot be postponed indefinitely. The decision that private ownership of property does not confer status appropriate to contest offensive actions in court may be a small move in such a direction. Congress has for decades avoided openly facing the question of social priorities and their corresponding group interests, aware of the potential political consequences. It would be ironic if these choices were to be made by the judiciary, whose legitimacy rests uniquely and in large part on its blindness to social distinctions.

Finally, evidence from other countries suggests that the legal recognition of a myriad of "public interests" has led to a contraction of the rights of strictly private litigants.⁸⁵ It is difficult to know how seriously to take the Court's rhetoric in this regard; and, for the time being at least, the new doctrine of standing has certainly given rights to private plaintiffs, even if in categorical form, where none would have existed prior to 1970. Moreover, in addition to their involvement in interest conflicts over government-endorsed decisions, the courts have many other functions where they may and do show solicitude for private rights. But in an era of "Spaceship Earth," when Supreme Court Justices themselves warn that "no man is an Island" and advocate standing for natural objects, the protection of certain individual rights may be a particularly urgent task, and one for which the courts may require as full a measure of public support as ever in their history. I think it is this task against which the courts' active involvement in group conflict must eventually be measured.

⁸³ For an indication that "cures" to the discomforts of interest representation could be worse than the disease, and no less familiar to students of American politics, see the suggestions advanced by Scott (who, in any case, thinks that the issue "may be exaggerated"), pp. 680-81.

⁸⁴ Friedrich A. von Hayek, *The Road to Serfdom* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1944), Ch. VI.

⁸⁵ See S. M. Thio, *Locus Standi and Judicial Review* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1971), pp. 9 ff.

⁸¹ On the question of allowing participation of additional parties in suits see David L. Shapiro, "Some Thoughts on Intervention Before Courts, Agencies, and Arbitrators," *Harvard Law Review*, 81 (February, 1968), 721-72. On limited rights for "third party" interests, see Robert A. Sedler, "Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii in the Supreme Court," *Yale Law Journal*, 71 (March, 1962), 599-660, and Albert, p. 465.

⁸² 473 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1973). But see *Lathan v. Volpe*, 455 F.2d 1111 (9th Cir. 1971), allowing local residents to contest federal highway funding. For a decision denying a corporation's right on the basis of pecuniary interest to enjoin the construction of a competing facility along a nearby aircraft flight path and thus in alleged violation of the NEPA and the Noise Control Act, see *Clinton Community Hospital Corporation v. Southern Maryland Medical Center*, 374 F. Supp. 450 (D. Md. 1974).

The Theory of Political Ambiguity*

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Politicians are notoriously reluctant to take clear stands on the issues of the day. In the United States, congressmen often avoid roll-call votes, and bury bills in committee; presidents conceal their positions on legislation with hazy statements and quiet lobbying; candidates make vague appeals to the voters.¹ In other times and places the behavior of politicians seems much the same.

Efforts to account for political ambiguity sometimes assert that politicians are ambiguous because it is in their rational self-interest to be so. By shunning clear stands they avoid offending constituents who hold contrary opinions; ambiguity maximizes support.² This notion provides the starting point for a theory of political ambiguity, but only the starting point. A satisfactory account must specify what preferences and decision processes among constituents, and what calculations by politicians, make ambiguity seem an attractive strategy.

Such specification is easiest in the context of election campaigns, where politicians directly seek votes. Similar reasoning, however, would apply to elective officials who must face voters in the future; to bureaucrats; perhaps even to kings and dictators. All must worry about support from the general public or some other constituency.

Lotteries, Expected Utility, and Risk Acceptance

Kenneth Shepsle has developed a theory of campaign ambiguity based on an expected utility model of risky decision making; the possibility that the electorate may be risk acceptant; and the assumption that candidates can take "lottery" stands on the issues.³

A *lottery* (sometimes called a "lottery ticket," a "risk," or a "gamble") is a chance that particular

outcomes will occur with known probabilities. "One-half chance of winning \$100, and one-half chance of winning nothing," for example, is a lottery.

The expected utility model specifies one way in which people might make choices involving lotteries. It stands in contrast to the older expected value (EV) model, which asserts that people treat a lottery just the same as its mathematically expected value: the sum of the objective value of each outcome times its probability of occurring. Thus an EV decision maker would be just as happy to have half a chance of \$100 and half a chance of nothing as he would be to get exactly \$50.

In the eighteenth century Daniel Bernoulli rejected the EV model as not descriptive of human behavior. He proposed an *expected utility* (EU) model, in which people react to the mathematically expected *utility* of a lottery: the sum of the utility (or subjective value) to them of each possible outcome times its probability of occurring.⁴ Utility need not depend linearly on objective value. One might want \$100 either more or less than twice as much as he wanted \$50. Thus an EU decision maker might judge half a chance of getting \$100 to be either more or less desirable than the certainty of getting \$50.

An individual is called *risk acceptant* over a range of outcomes if he would always prefer to have a lottery over that range, rather than getting the lottery's expected value with certainty. A risk acceptant individual, for example, would rather have half a chance of \$100 and half a chance of nothing, than he would the certainty of \$50. He will take chances; he is willing to gamble.

A *risk averse* individual, on the other hand, would rather have the expected value with certainty. He will not take a fair bet. A *risk neutral* person is indifferent between a lottery and its expected value; he acts like an EV decision maker.

Under the EU model, but not necessarily otherwise, risk acceptance is equivalent to increasing marginal utility—that is, to a concave⁵ (upward curving) utility function, one in which each additional dollar brings a greater increment of pleasure,

⁴ Daniel Bernoulli, "Specimen Theoriae Novae de Mensura Sortis," 1738, trans. Louise Sommer, *Econometrica*, 22 (Jan., 1954), 23–36.

⁵ Shepsle (p. 561) and most economists reverse this usage of convexity and concavity; their reference point is the horizontal axis rather than the top of the graph.

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¹ See, for example, Stanley Kelley, Jr., *Political Campaigning: Problems in Creating an Informed Electorate* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1960).

² Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1957), pp. 132–39.

³ Kenneth A. Shepsle, "The Strategy of Ambiguity: Uncertainty and Electoral Competition," *American Political Science Review*, 66 (June, 1972), 555–68.

as the total number of dollars increases. Under EU assumptions, risk aversion is equivalent to declining marginal utility: a convex (downward curving) utility function. Risk neutrality is equivalent to a linear utility function. These relations are illustrated in Figure 1.


Shepsle applied this theoretical apparatus to campaign ambiguity by postulating a single issue dimension of the Hotelling-Downs sort.⁶ He assumed that all citizens have opinions, expressible as cardinal utility functions over the dimension, which are jointly-single-peaked (i.e., as each individual considers alternatives along the dimension further from his most preferred point, in either direction, his regard for them declines monotonically), and quasi-symmetric (utility declines at the same rate in both directions.) Two candidates take stands on the issue dimension so as to win or maximize votes. All citizens perceive these stands clearly and uniformly and vote on an EU basis for the candidate whose issue stand they prefer.⁷

Shepsle's chief innovation lay in not insisting that candidates take a single stand at one point on the dimension, but in allowing for the possibility that they can take lottery stands.⁸ That is, instead of announcing that he favors military spending of \$100 billion per year, a candidate might let the voters know that there was half a chance he would spend \$150 billion, and half a chance that he would spend only \$50 billion.

Shepsle further assumed (p. 560) that the incumbent is restricted to single stands, and the challenger to nondegenerate (non-single stand) lotteries. He then recalled Duncan Black's theorem that the median most preferred point on the issue dimension would win a majority of votes against any other single stand (p. 562). Shepsle showed that if all voters are risk averse over the entire issue dimension, the median point could defeat *any* other stand, single position or lottery (p. 563). Moreover, if a simple majority of voters is risk averse, the challenger has no winning strategy—that is, for any lottery there exists some single stand that can defeat it. (This does not imply that the incumbent always wins. Some new lottery may defeat that single stand, and a new single stand defeat that lottery, and so on; there may be no equilibrium [p. 564].)

Shepsle's key result is his Theorem 3: if a majority of voters is *risk acceptant* in some interval containing the median, *any* lottery over that inter-

a. Decreasing marginal utility and (EU) risk aversion.



b. Increasing marginal utility and (EU) risk acceptance.




Figure 1: Utility functions for money.
 $L_1 = \frac{1}{2}$ chance of \$100, $\frac{1}{2}$ chance of \$0. $E(L_1) = \$50$.

val with expectation at the median defeats a single-point stand at the median (pp. 564–5). In simple terms, when most voters want to take a chance on getting exactly what they want, rather than settle for a middling compromise, candidates apparently have an incentive to take lottery stands.

If we are willing to equate lottery stands with ambiguity, therefore; if we accept the assumptions of the theory; and if a majority of voters is risk acceptant on many issues, we seem to have an explanation for widespread candidate ambiguity. But there is reason to doubt (1) how strong the prediction of ambiguity is; (2) whether observed ambiguity can be characterized in terms of lottery stands; (3) whether the condition of risk acceptance is in fact met; and (4) whether the underlying model of voter decision making is correct.

Difficulties with the Lottery Theory

(1) *How strong is the prediction?* Shepsle's analysis applies only to *unidimensional* electoral competition, in which voters with jointly-single-peaked preferences decide on the basis of a single issue. We know, however, that preferences are

⁶ Harold Hotelling, "Stability in Competition," *Economic Journal*, 39 (March, 1929), 41–57; Downs, pp. 114–41.

⁷ Shepsle, pp. 557–58.

⁸ Shepsle, p. 559. Zeckhauser earlier introduced political lotteries in the social choice context. Richard Zeckhauser, "Majority Rule with Lotteries on Alternatives," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 83 (Nov., 1969), 696–703.

rarely organized in a simple unidimensional fashion.⁹ The predictions do not generally hold in the more realistic multidimensional case.¹⁰

Even for single-dimensional competition, the lottery theory reaches a definite prediction only by sleight of hand. The supposed attractiveness of a lottery strategy (given risk acceptant voters) rests on its ability to defeat the "best" single position, the median. Only if one candidate is forced to stand at the median, however, does it follow that the other has an incentive to take a lottery stand. Shepsle insures such a result by assuming that the incumbent is constrained to take a single position, and by also assuming—implicitly—that the incumbent must take his stand first and stick with it.

Both assumptions are arbitrary and contrary to observation. To be sure, an incumbent is generally better known than a challenger, and some information about his future actions can presumably be extrapolated from his past performance; but future policies are not uniquely determined by the past. Indeed an incumbent is often able to be *more* ambiguous about future policy than a challenger is, and to delay longer before taking any stand. He can strike an Olympian pose, too busy with affairs of state to descend to the campaign stump; and he can exalt his past record without committing himself on the future.

If the incumbent is not so constrained, the prediction dissolves. Rather than take an early stand at the median, the incumbent would bide his time. If the challenger took a lottery stand, the incumbent might well find a (non-median) single stand that would defeat it. Realizing this, why should the challenger take a lottery stand in the first place?

The fundamental difficulty is that no equilibrium or dominant strategy may exist, and that if a winning strategy does exist it may not—even with risk acceptant voters—be a lottery. Shepsle found that even for the continuous alternatives of his unidimensional issue space, a dominant strategy may or may not exist depending upon the particular electoral profile.¹¹ Zeckhauser has shown that, for a finite (not necessarily unidimensional) set of alternatives, if any lotteries are able to defeat the median, there *always* exists some single position which can defeat the lotteries; more gener-

ally, Fishburn showed (under weak assumptions about individual preferences) that *any* majority winner must be a single position, not a lottery!¹²

Under the most plausible circumstances, therefore—even if all voters are risk acceptant—the theory offers no guarantee that any particular lottery strategy is superior to all single positions, and no prediction that vote-seeking candidates will take lottery stands.

(2) *Do candidates take lottery stands?* Without doubt candidates are often ambiguous, but whether their ambiguity is properly characterized in terms of lottery stands is another question.

Of course candidates do not explicitly announce that there is a chance that they will do *X*, with a probability (say) of .63, but also a chance that they will do *Y*, with a probability of .37. (Even New York mayoral candidate Norman Mailer seems to have overlooked this strategy. Some bold experimenter may wish to carry on where he left off.)

There are some less outlandish ways in which such information might be conveyed. A candidate might, for example, make statements at different times and places that contradicted each other. He might say 63 per cent of the time that he intended to do *X*, and 37 per cent of the time that he favored *Y*, allowing voters to infer the probabilities from relative frequencies.

The available evidence indicates, however, that candidates rarely take contradictory stands. Outright inconsistency is avoided. To the extent that candidates say anything specific about an issue, they tend to say one thing and stick with it, sometimes repeating a verbal formula word for word.¹³

A better case can be made that candidates drop a number of vaguely conflicting hints about what they stand for. From different indications given to different audiences at different times, the average citizen might infer probabilities and form a lottery-like impression of a candidate's stand. This interpretation is supported by candidates' frequent proclamations of what they *don't* stand for—neither coddling criminals nor shooting thieves; neither unlimited pollution nor massive expenditures to stop it; neither unilateral disarmament nor a runaway arms race—as if they were putting boundaries on their ambiguity, within a range of risk acceptance.

At the same time, the lottery characterization misses a central feature of political ambiguity.

⁹ Donald E. Stokes, "Spatial Models of Party Competition," *American Political Science Review*, 57 (June, 1963), 368–77; Philip E. Converse, "The Problem of Party Distances in Models of Voting Change," in *The Electoral Process*, ed. M. Kent Jennings and L. Harmon Zeigler (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), pp. 175–207.

¹⁰ Zeckhauser, "Majority Rule"; Peter C. Fishburn, "Lotteries and Social Choice," *Journal of Economic Theory*, 5 (Oct., 1972), 189–207.

¹¹ Shepsle, pp. 566–67. Richard McKelvey and Jeff Richelson, "Cycles of Risk," *Public Choice*, 18 (Summer, 1974), 41–66, offers some "tracking" theorems for the unidimensional case, which hold regardless of disequilibrium.

¹² Zeckhauser, "Majority Rule"; Fishburn, "Lotteries and Social Choice." Equilibrium is not to be expected among single stands, either; see Charles R. Plott, "A Notion of Equilibrium and its Possibility Under Majority Rule," *American Economic Review*, 57 (Sept., 1967), 787–806.

¹³ Benjamin I. Page, "Constancy and Change," in *Choices and Echoes in Presidential Elections*, forthcoming. There are some exceptions, as in the cases of McGovern and Goldwater.

Often candidates do not give *any* emphatic impression of their stands, whether certain or probabilistic; their chief endeavor seems to be to come as close as possible to taking *no* stand. Except when pressed (in televised interviews or press conference question periods) they generally avoid specific issues altogether, and talk about such matters as the need for new leadership, the desirability of peace and prosperity, and the incompetence or wickedness of their opponents. The most specific stands are taken in obscure forums, where special audiences demand them but where they are easily missed by the general public.¹⁴

The lottery theory does not predict the low emphasis that is put on issue stands. In fact it cannot deal with variations in emphasis at all, since it postulates a single dimension: a single criterion for voting decisions, on which all citizens perceive candidates' stands clearly. At best it can account for only part of ambiguous behavior.¹⁵

(3) *Are voters risk acceptant?* This simple question leads us into a brief tour of decision theory.¹⁶ The answer seems to be (a) probably not, over the full range of utility functions for most goods; (b) possibly so, with respect to some gambles involving small amounts of money or other goods; (c) probably not, with respect to public policy alternatives. In the course of reaching these conclusions grave doubt is thrown on the EU model of decision making.

Much of economic theory has long assumed declining marginal utility (or its ordinal equivalent for money and other goods: that is, a man is happier to get an additional dollar when he is poor in income than when he is rich. There is little direct evidence on the validity of this assumption, but it is highly plausible. The sixth serving of caviar, or the fourth Lincoln Continental, simply does not give so much pleasure as the first. More-

over, if the contrary were true economic behavior would look rather different than it does, and general equilibrium might not exist.

Most economists who are concerned with risky choice have also accepted the expected utility theory of decision making. For them, the (presumed) existence of declining marginal utility implies that people are risk averse. Even without this reasoning, however, the conclusion is sensible. Many people buy insurance: they are willing to pay a premium to avoid risk of loss, even though (in order that insurance companies can pay operating costs and make a profit) premiums are higher than the expected value of losses. Granting that some insurance is compulsory, those who freely choose to insure reveal themselves to be risk averse.

A second phenomenon, however, casts doubt on the universality of risk aversion. Not only do many people buy insurance; many also gamble. Gambling (absent cheating) seems to be a clear sign of risk acceptance. Players at roulette tables, horse races, and slot machines regularly pay more than the expected value of their winnings, for a chance at a big payoff.

Gambling creates difficulties for declining marginal utility and/or EU theory. Friedman and Savage made an ingenious attempt to account for it, within the expected utility framework, by postulating that most individuals have *both* declining and increasing marginal utilities over different ranges of income: there are two inflection points in utility functions. The very poor, greatly valuing an additional dollar (at a decreasing rate) have declining marginal utility for money, as do the rich—who are more eager to keep the money they have than to get more. In between, however, there is an area of increasing marginal utility, within which people are willing to take a chance in order to get into a higher income group and life style.¹⁷

Another possible reconciliation of insurance and gambling is that some individuals have increasing marginal utilities and some have decreasing. Or, going beyond EU theory, perhaps people decide on the basis of subjective rather than objective probabilities; maybe gamblers overestimate their chances of winning, and don't realize they are paying more than expected value. Or perhaps risk itself—or playing a game—has utility; maybe people enjoy pulling levers or watching the spinning wheel even if they tend to lose. Perhaps people's reactions to risk reflect personality characteristics. Compulsive gamblers can't resist a last fling, to recoup losses or to punish themselves; the cautious hedge against any risk of loss.

Some experimental evidence, dealing with small

¹⁴ Page, "The Art of Ambiguity," in *Choices and Echoes*.

¹⁵ The leading multidimensional models of electoral competition, too, rule out variations in emphasis, or candidate manipulations of issue salience, since they postulate clear perceptions of stands and salience that is fixed with respect to candidate behavior. Otto A. Davis, Melvin J. Hinich and Peter C. Ordeshook, "An Expository Development of a Mathematical Model of the Electoral Process," *American Political Science Review*, 64 (June, 1970), 426-48.

¹⁶ For an introduction, see Ward Edwards, "Decision Making—Psychological Aspects," in *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, ed. David L. Sills (New York: Macmillan, 1968), IV, 34-42; and Edward C. Devereux, "Gambling," *I.E.S.S.*, VI, 53-62. Extensive literature reviews by Edwards and Luce, as well as several important articles, are reprinted in *Decision Making: Selected Readings*, ed. Ward Edwards and Amos Tversky (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin, 1967). Some of the major articles from an economic perspective are available in *Utility Theory: A Book of Readings*, ed. Alfred N. Page (New York: Wiley, 1968).

¹⁷ Milton Friedman and L. J. Savage, "The Utility Analysis of Choices Involving Risk," *Journal of Political Economy*, 56 (August, 1948), 279-304.

money gambles, throws light on whether people are risk acceptant, and why or why not. The leading experiment was performed by Mosteller and Nogee. Working with the cardinality and expected utility axioms of Von Neumann and Morgenstern,¹⁸ they had ten Harvard undergraduates and five National Guardsmen play "poker dice," with a table of true probabilities before them. The students proved to be "conservative," or risk averse; they refused even rather attractive gambles. The guardsmen, however, tended to be "extravagant," or risk acceptant: they took bets even at poor odds.¹⁹

Although Mosteller and Nogee assumed an EU decision model in order to measure utility functions, and concluded that the model was "not unreasonable," their work threw considerable doubt on it. They noted that the guardsmen made more conservative bets in "investment" decisions where an agent did the gambling, which suggested that participation itself had utility for them. Further, the results could be interpreted in terms of subjective probabilities, with the guardsmen—despite their probability tables—overestimating their chances. Finally, none of the subjects consistently accepted or rejected the same bets, as the EU model requires; responses were probabilistic.

Preston and Baratta had earlier found risk acceptant behavior in an auction game: their subjects tended to pay more than expected value for a small chance to win a large amount of money. This the researchers interpreted as caused by overestimation of low probabilities and underestimation of high,²⁰ with a crossover at about .20.

Similarly, Griffith found that racetrack bettors put more money on long-shot horses than objective performance justified, and less on horses with short odds: they seemed to overestimate small probabilities.²¹ McGlothlin later confirmed this finding, and showed that the overestimation increased with each new race on a given day—a phenomenon difficult to reconcile with most standard decision models.²²

¹⁸ John Von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, *Theory of Games and Economic Behavior* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1944).

¹⁹ Frederick Mosteller and Philip Nogee, "An Experimental Measurement of Utility," *Journal of Political Economy*, 59 (October, 1951), 371–404.

²⁰ Malcolm G. Preston and Philip Baratta, "An Experimental Study of the Auction Value of an Uncertain Outcome," *American Journal of Psychology*, 61 (April, 1948), 183–93.

²¹ R. M. Griffith, "Odds Adjustments by American Horse-race Bettors," *American Journal of Psychology*, 62 (April, 1949), 290–94. Like Preston and Baratta, Griffith found that objective and subjective probabilities coincided around .16–.20.

²² W. H. McGlothlin, "Stability of Choices Among Uncertain Alternatives," *American Journal of Psychology*, 69 (December, 1956), 604–15.

During the 1950s and early 1960s, Edwards, Coombs and others carried out a series of experiments which revealed curious mixtures of risk averse and risk acceptant behavior, and cast further doubt on the EU model. They seemed to find subjective probabilities; probability preferences (e.g., a tendency to favor a probability of $\frac{1}{2}$ more than it deserved, and to dislike a $\frac{3}{4}$ chance); and "variance preferences"—attitudes toward risk itself.²³

In 1959, Davidson, Suppes, and Siegel, using a method suggested by Ramsey,²⁴ attempted to put back together the pieces of decision theory. They formalized and tested a subjectively expected utility (SEU) model, postulating that individuals maximize the sum of the utility of each outcome, weighted by the *subjective* probability of its occurrence. Subjective probabilities could vary from the objective, but were assumed to conform to an axiom system in which, for example, probabilities of complementary events had to sum to 1. The researchers first established a benchmark, nonsense-syllable dice with observed subjective probabilities of $\frac{1}{2}$ for each syllable, and then calculated bounds on utility functions for money by having 19 Stanford students choose bets from a series of pairs. Nearly all were conservative (risk averse) with respect to big losses, but extravagant (risk acceptant) with respect to big gains. No one had consistently increasing or consistently decreasing marginal utility.²⁵

Davidson and associates decisively rejected the EU model by using these utility functions to measure subjective probabilities in reactions to new nonsense dice. Most subjects gave underestimates where the objective probability was .25. Even the SEU model, however, had serious problems. When subjects won or lost several times in a row they learned optimism or pessimism; there were recency effects from seeing syllables come up; there were some indications of a utility of gambling; some subjects' responses were inconsistent with any single utility function, and for others it was impossible to estimate subjective probabilities.

²³ See Ward Edwards, "Probability Preferences in Gambling," *American Journal of Psychology*, 66 (July, 1953), 349–64; Edwards, "Variance Preferences in Gambling," *American Journal of Psychology*, 67 (Sept. 1954), 441–52; C. H. Coombs and D. G. Pruitt, "Components of Risk in Decision Making: Probability and Variance Preferences," *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, 60 (November, 1960), 265–77. These experiments, like the others reviewed above, were plagued by inability to distinguish among the different possible components of reactions to risk.

²⁴ Frank P. Ramsey, "Truth and Probability" (1926), in his *The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1931).

²⁵ Donald Davidson, Patrick Suppes, and Sidney Siegel, *Decision Making: An Experimental Approach* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1957), chap. 2.

Royden, Suppes, and Walsh tried to measure the utility of gambling itself, assuming that people base risky choices on a simple function of expected value and the range of risk involved. Their 8 naval airmen and 8 Stanford students responded to a variety of 50-50 bets in a way that generated complex "utility surfaces," mixing both risk acceptant and risk averse behavior for nearly all subjects. The model was not impressive, predicting choices even less well than a simple EU model, though about as well as the old EV model.²⁶

Tversky used a new approach of simultaneous conjoint measurement of subjective probabilities and utilities, within variants of the SEU model. Eleven Michigan prisoners, making bets for cigarettes and candy, nearly all proved to be risk acceptant. In many cases they took grossly unfavorable bets. This was apparently not caused by increasing marginal utility as the EU model specifies; it resulted partly from overestimation of probabilities, especially low ones (as SEU models permit), but also partly from a positive utility of gambling (either participation or risk) not allowed for in SEU models. The extreme risk acceptance, of course, may be unique to criminals or bored prisoners.²⁷

The experimental findings, then, seem moderately supportive of the lottery theory, in that they suggest that risk acceptance may be sufficiently widespread in small ranges to motivate the taking of lottery stands. It does not seem *prima facie* unreasonable to generalize from results concerning private goods like money, candy, and cigarettes, to public goods of the sort that governments commonly provide.

There are, however, two reasons to doubt this interpretation. First, in the experiments an important component of risk acceptance may have been the pleasure of participating, of playing a gambling game. Voting for ambiguous candidates may be a less appealing pastime.

Second, the experimental results apply to *unconstrained* utility functions, for consumption of a single good taking everything else as constant. In such cases more is always better. So long as disposal is assumed to be free, utility rises indefinitely—or at least never falls—as quantity increases. In the issue space of the lottery theory, however, preferences are subject to an implicit budget constraint. People do not generally advocate an unlimited number of parks, roads, or rockets; they balance off their desires for various public goods

against each other and against private consumption in terms of a government budget. The most preferred points do not all fall at one extreme of an issue dimension, but are scattered along it.

For this reason the question of risk acceptance over an interval of issue space is quite complicated, even if we accept the EU model and focus solely on the shape of utility functions, disregarding subjective probabilities and variance preferences. An individual can have increasing marginal utility as he approaches his most preferred point from either direction; yet he is not risk acceptant in an interval containing his bliss point. He obviously will not prefer any lottery to certainty of the bliss point itself. (See, Figure 2; contrast Shepsle p. 561, 563.)




Figure 2. A political utility function; increasing marginal utility without (EU) risk acceptance.

$L_2 = \frac{1}{2}$ chance of \$50 billion, $\frac{1}{2}$ chance of \$150 billion.

The number of risk acceptant voters in an interval of issue space, therefore, depends partly on the number of most preferred points within that interval; it cannot be inferred from general reactions to risk or the shape of utility functions alone. Whether the condition of majority risk acceptance is met generally, or for any particular issue, is not easy to ascertain; but the likelihood does not appear great for distributions with preferred points clustered near the center.

Rather little is known about the shape of political utility functions, distributions of most preferred points, or reactions to political risk. These matters deserve study not only in connection with candidate ambiguity, but also for their implications concerning voting decisions, coalition formation, elite decision making, and social choice.

(4) *Is the underlying EU model of decision making correct?* The experimental evidence reviewed above strongly contradicts the EU model.

²⁶ Halsey L. Royden, Patrick Suppes, and Karol Walsh, "A Model for the Experimental Measurement of the Utility of Gambling," *Behavioral Science*, 4 (January, 1959), 11-18, at 15-17.

²⁷ Amos Tversky, "Additivity, Utility and Subjective Probability," *Journal of Mathematical Psychology*, 4 (June, 1967), 175-202.

At the least, subjective probabilities must be taken into account, and it is doubtful that they follow any simple set of SEU axioms. Very likely some sort of utility for risk, or variance preferences, also plays a part in reactions to risk, as do feelings about participation and game playing. Allais's early critique of the EU model appears to have been well founded.²⁸

Mathematical psychologists are still trying to bring theoretical order to the complexity. Approaches include stochastic decision making;²⁹ information-processing models;³⁰ an axiomatic treatment of risk resulting in a measure linearly combining expected values and variances;³¹ and a constrained optimization model based on "tolerable regrets."³² Other psychologists have explored variations in reactions to risk due to individual and group characteristics,³³ need for achievement,³⁴ and the psychopathology of compulsive gambling.³⁵

Many economists, perhaps appalled by the chaos, have acted as if nothing happened to the EU theory.³⁶ It is possible, of course, that in

certain theoretical applications—conceivably including ambiguity and lotteries—an expected utility model comes close enough to the truth to yield good predictions and a satisfactory theory *à la* Friedman.³⁷ This is a matter for empirical test. But if the lottery theory fails to predict well, one reason may be its reliance on the EU model.

The experimental evidence indicates that increasing marginal utility is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for risk acceptance. In the electoral setting, for example, voters with declining marginal utility might overestimate probabilities of favorable outcomes, or enjoy taking a chance, and favor a lottery candidate over one taking a clear stand at its expected value. Conversely, voters with increasing marginal utility over an interval might dislike risk itself, or estimate probabilities conservatively, and prefer the single-stand candidate.

The weaknesses of the lottery theory are at least serious enough so that alternatives should be considered.

The Emphasis Allocation Theory

One alternative to the lottery theory of ambiguity can be outlined as follows. Political information is imperfect; there are limits on the number of messages that candidates can transmit or that the average voter can or will receive. Candidates must allocate their emphasis (in time, energy, and money) among policy stands and other sorts of campaign appeals. Specific policy proposals turn out to be relatively ineffective in winning votes. Candidates therefore devote most of their efforts to projecting a favorable personal image and making other productive appeals; policy stands are left ambiguous, with very low emphasis.

For a fuller specification, consider electoral competition in a multidimensional issue space, in which citizens' preferences can be arrayed in a jointly-single-peaked fashion along a finite number of issue dimensions. Assume that citizens have cardinal utility functions over each dimension; they perceive candidates' stands without bias³⁸ and evaluate a candidate by summing the utility to them of his stand on each issue, weighted by a salience (or relevance) factor that responds to the

²⁸ M. Allais, "Les Comportement de l'Homme Rationnel devant le Risque: Critique des Postulats et Axiomes de l'Ecole Americaine," *Econometrica*, 21 (Oct., 1953), 503-46. The editors kindly provided a three-page English summary and a Voltaire-like defense of his right to express these misguided views.

²⁹ G. M. Becker, M. H. DeGroot, and J. Marshak, "Stochastic Models of Choice Behavior," *Behavioral Science*, 8 (January, 1963), 41-55.

³⁰ P. Slovic and S. Lichtenstein, "Relative Importance of Probabilities and Payoffs in Risk Taking," *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, 78 (November, 1968, Part 2), 1-18.

³¹ Alexander Pollatsek and Amos Tversky, "A Theory of Risk," *Journal of Mathematical Psychology*, 7 (October, 1970), 540-53.

³² F. Hutton Barron and Kenneth D. Mackenzie, "A Constrained Optimization Model of Risky Decisions," *Journal of Mathematical Psychology*, 10 (Feb., 1973), 60-72.

³³ Nathan Kogan and Michael A. Wallach, *Risk Taking: a Study in Cognition and Personality* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964); Kogan and Wallach, "Risk Taking as a Function of Situation, Person, and the Group," in *New Directions in Psychology* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967), III, 111-278.

³⁴ John W. Atkinson, "Motivational Determinants of Risk-taking Behavior," in *Motives in Fantasy, Action, and Society: A Method of Assessment and Study* (Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand, 1958), pp. 322-39.

³⁵ Edmund Bergler, *The Psychology of Gambling* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1957); Jay Livingston, "Compulsive Gamblers—A Society of Losers," *Psychology Today* (March, 1974), 51-58. See also the interesting hypotheses outlined in Devereux, "Gambling."

³⁶ John W. Pratt, "Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large," *Econometrica*, 32 (January-April, 1964), 122-36; Kenneth Arrow, *Essays on the Theory of Risk Bearing* (Chicago: Markham, 1971). Others, like Raiffa, sidestep the empirical questions by treating SEU as a normative model that rational men ought to use in making practical decisions. Howard Raiffa, *Decision Analysis: Introductory Lectures on Choices Under Uncertainty* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1968).

³⁷ Milton Friedman, "The Methodology of Positive Economics," in *Essays in Positive Economics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), pp. 3-43.

³⁸ A different theoretical approach might recognize that perceptions vary, and seek incentives for ambiguity in the fact that it permits citizens to project or selectively perceive that candidates stand for whatever they want them to. It is not obvious, however, why projection would gain a candidate any votes that he wouldn't get through low emphasis. Projection probably uses up some amount of evaluation rather than adding to it. If positive projection does add to positive evaluations, it is not clear why it would not be counterbalanced by negative projection adding to negative evaluations.

emphasis the candidate puts on that dimension. Citizens vote for the candidate they evaluate most highly. Two candidates choose stands on each issue dimension so as to maximize votes; they allocate emphasis among issues with the same aim.

This model departs from those of the Carnegie group³⁹ in two main respects. First, candidates do not merely take stands; they also allocate their speaking time, their press releases, and their media budgets so as to vary the emphasis on different appeals. Second, the salience of a given issue is not entirely independent of candidates' behavior; by varying the emphasis he puts on an issue, a candidate can manipulate the extent to which that issue is taken into account in evaluating him. Both points follow from the fact of imperfect information.

Under these assumptions, as a candidate decides how to allocate emphasis among different appeals it is clear that he must consider how citizens' preferences are distributed, how strong they are, and how steeply utility functions drop off with increasing distance from the most preferred points. If, for example, all citizens prefer precisely the same thing, and feel very intensely about it,⁴⁰ a candidate can safely take that stand and emphasize his position strongly, winning good will and votes from everyone. If, on the other hand, preferences are intense but widely dispersed—e.g., bimodally distributed—any stand the candidate takes will offend someone. If he agrees with the left-hand mode, he will outrage voters on the right; if he switches and takes a stand on the right-hand mode, he will alienate people on the left; and if he moves to the middle, everyone is disgruntled. Obviously the candidate's best strategy is to avoid issues of a divisive sort, and place (as nearly as possible) *no* emphasis on them, but devote all his time, money, and energy to matters of consensus.

We know empirically that on most matters of specific policy, opinions differ. Americans have disagreed vociferously on whether busing should be used to accomplish school desegregation; how much (if any) income maintenance should be given to the poor; how much money should be spent on military troops and weapons. But practically everyone agrees on certain goals, so long as they are put in general terms: racial harmony; abolition of poverty; world peace. Similarly, nearly everyone wants such qualities as honesty, intelligence, prudence, and energy in government leaders.

³⁹ Davis, Hinich and Ordeshook, "An Expository Development."

⁴⁰ Here intensity is conceived of in terms of the height and steepness of utility functions—that is, the amount of utility loss between favored and disfavored policies. Shepsle, p. 565, more narrowly identifies intensity with increasing marginal utility.

The issue space, for full generality, must encompass preferences and stands on these consensual goals and personal qualities, as well as on divisive policy questions. When candidates allocate emphasis, therefore, they most heavily emphasize shared goals, and avoid specific policy stands. They proclaim their devotion to progress, prosperity, and peace (while trying to associate their opponents with stagnation, depression, and war); they say little or nothing about research budgets, interest rates, or weapons systems.⁴¹ (See the Appendix for a simple illustration of the workings of both the emphasis theory and the lottery theory.)

The emphasis theory as stated so far raises several questions. First, why does low emphasis on policy also imply vagueness? Why don't candidates quietly release a detailed, specific statement on each policy area, and then move on to other matters? The answer is that candidates can only partly control the emphasis they put on a stand; their opponents and the media play a part too. A detailed statement on anything important would be picked up and publicized by reporters hungry for news; the opponent would make charges and criticisms; the candidate would find himself devoting time and energy to defenses and denials that would have been better spent making positive appeals.

But if this is so, why do candidates put *any* emphasis on policy at all? Why don't they allocate all their effort elsewhere and say nothing at all, not even a hint, about policy? Here, too, part of the answer is that candidates are not in complete control of emphasis. In some settings, like press conferences and televised interviews, they are asked highly specific questions. Considerable skill goes into the perfection of evasive answers, but sometimes they are cornered (at the risk of loss on such personal dimensions as courtesy and candor) into making a specific response. Behind this process may lie a public norm favoring at least minimal specificity on policy, which is reinforced by media

⁴¹ This analysis, cast in terms of rational economic man, could alternatively be expressed in terms of candidates' appeals to social-psychological man, who is prey to manipulation by symbols with high value content. (See, for example, the attitudinal consistency theories of Heider, Osgood, Abelson and Rosenberg, Festinger, Fishbein, and others.) Thus candidates attempt to link themselves to strongly positive concepts like peace and prosperity, so that attitudes toward themselves will change in a positive direction; they try to link their opponents to negative concepts; and they avoid elements—like specific policy stands—with mixed or ambivalent value loadings.

The economic analysis offered here, however, would seem to have at least equal explanatory power and to be susceptible of greater precision. Whether there are any genuine conflicts between the theoretical traditions is an interesting question.

condemnations of vagueness.⁴² A candidate who said nothing at all about policy would likely be punished at the polls. Thus Richard Nixon in 1968, much accused of ambiguity, proudly claimed that he had taken stands on 227 specific issues, and put together a book of quotations to prove the point.⁴³

Granting some necessary mention of policy, why don't candidates concentrate all their non-policy emphasis on the one most productive appeal, on which votes are most efficiently won? Why promise both wealth and brotherhood, if wealth alone will do it? Such a strategy would work if all voters felt most intensely about the same issue, as well as all taking the same stand on it, and if a candidate's emphasis on an issue completely controlled its salience in evaluations of him. But salience is also affected by voters' intensity on an issue: even if a candidate says little about a particular issue, the intense voter will take account of it. Moreover, intensity varies among voters; if a candidate were to devote all his attention to world peace, for example, he might lose the votes of those most concerned with prosperity, or honesty in government. The optimum allocation of emphasis would ordinarily involve a spreading of attention over several goals and valence issues as well as a nod to specific policy.

One advantage of the emphasis theory is that it accounts for both major aspects of ambiguity—vagueness and low emphasis—rather than just one. Another is that it can handle certain non-equilibrium situations which may be quite common. When cyclical majorities involve both single and lottery stands on policies, the lottery theory can make no prediction about candidate behavior, but the emphasis theory predicts that candidates reduce their emphasis on those issues as much as possible and concentrate on productive appeals. The emphasis theory also requires no assumptions about reactions to risk.

The reasoning of the emphasis theory is easily extended from the context of campaign rhetoric to the words and actions of office holders. It helps explain why congressmen avoid or conceal votes on controversial issues but are quick to let their constituents know about government projects, contracts, and installations in the district; why they emphasize favors done for constituents, their experience in office, their power and seniority.⁴⁴

⁴² Specificity could be seen as an evaluative (issue) dimension, with the special property that a stand on it is partly determined by the specificity and emphasis put on policy dimensions; or it might be conceived of in terms of risk aversion.

⁴³ *Nixon on the Issues* (New York: Nixon-Agnew Campaign Committee, 1968).

⁴⁴ These phenomena are noted, but not fully explained, in David R. Mayhew, *Congress: The Electoral Connection* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974).

It explains why presidents make much fanfare about landing a man on the moon, or journeying to Russia and China, but stay quiet about details of the space budget or wheat deals; why they accentuate personal style and the majesty of the office, rather than the need for particular legislation.

Conclusion

Political ambiguity is generally taken to be harmful from the point of view of public enlightenment and democratic social choice. Where ambiguity is widespread, we can hardly hope that political leaders will educate their citizens about the workings of government or the merits of contending policy proposals. A "responsible party" model of democratic control cannot work properly: the parties fail in their task of education and persuasion; voters are at a loss to make an intelligent choice since they cannot tell what the parties stand for. Nor does an electoral competition, or anticipated reactions, model function correctly: since government actions are concealed from the citizens, there is no need to do what the people want. (To be sure, a respectable social choice argument could be made in favor of lottery stands, if they were majority winners, if they were taken precisely and emphatically, and if policies were subsequently chosen in accord with them; but we have seen that neither the first nor the second condition generally holds. The third seems problematic.)

The emphasis-allocation theory (and for that matter the lottery theory as well) accounts for ambiguity in terms of politicians' incentives. It concludes that under certain presumably common circumstances, the self-interest of politicians dictates that they avoid specific stands and limit themselves to vague actions and utterances.

If our analysis is correct, therefore, we are faced with the discouraging conclusion that ambiguity will be difficult to prevent. Certainly mere exhortations to politicians are not likely to have much effect. Remedies lie instead in the direction of changing incentives, either by persuading the public to react more negatively to ambiguity (increasing the salience of the specificity dimension, and the intensity of preferences on it); or by structural changes such as legal requirements of legislative question periods, face-to-face debates, or written answers to specific questions.⁴⁵

Appendix

For a simple illustration of the workings of the lottery and the emphasis theories, we can consider a small political world in which there are two issue

⁴⁵ For some reflections on this problem, see Kelley, *Political Campaigning*, chap. 4.

dimensions (A and B) with three alternative policies (1, 2, and 3) possible on each; five voters (V, W, X, Y, and Z); and two candidates.

Let us further suppose that issue A is one of consensus: all five voters prefer policy 1. Issue B, however, is one of conflict, with a bimodal distribution: V and W prefer 1 over the other alternatives; X prefers 2; Y and Z prefer 3. Preferences are jointly single peaked: as any voter moves away from his most preferred point, he likes each succeeding alternative less.

(1) In the usual model of electoral competition, where candidates must take a single clear stand on each issue, there is a dominant strategy at the median: 1 on issue A and 2 on issue B. Clearly nothing can beat 1 on issue A, since all voters prefer it; it defeats either 2 or 3 by a vote of 5–0. On issue B, 2 beats 3 by a vote of 3–2 (V, W, and X *vs.* Y and Z) since by the single peakedness assumption the backers of 1 prefer 2 over 3; similarly 2 beats 1 by a 3–2 vote. Both candidates therefore take stands at 1 on A and 2 on B.

(2) For the lottery theory we need further information. Let us assume that on each issue the alternatives are measured in real units and are equally spaced, 1 unit apart; that the voters' feelings about each alternative can be measured in terms of cardinal utility; and—to illustrate the lottery theory—that voters follow an expected utility (EU) model of risky decision making. Now candidates are allowed to take lottery stands, consisting of probability distributions over the alternatives.

Suppose first that all the voters have declining marginal utility as they approach their most preferred points (this, by the EU assumption, is equivalent to risk aversion), and that the utility to each voter of each alternative is as given in Table 1.

If candidates were constrained to take single stands, the result we gave above would still hold. On issue A policy 1 beats any other, since it has

Table 1. The utility of alternative policies to voters with declining marginal utility

Issue A		Policy		
Voter	1	2	3	
V, W, X, Y, and Z	100	80	0	
Issue B		Policy		
Voter	1	2	3	
V, W	100	80	0	
X	50	100	50	
Y, Z	0	80	100	

utility of 100 rather than 80 or 0 for all voters; on issue B policy 2, the median, beats any other, since X combines with V and W to defeat 3, and with Y and Z to defeat 1.

Even when lottery stands are permitted, clearly 1 defeats any lottery on issue A; and it can also be shown easily that 2 defeats any lottery on issue B.¹ Candidates still take single stands at the median.

Suppose now, however, that the voters have increasing marginal utility (that is, by the EU assumption, they are risk acceptant) as in Table 2.

Table 2. The utility of alternative policies to voters with increasing marginal utility

		Policy		
Voter	1	2	3	
V, W, X, Y, and Z	100	20	0	
Issue B		Policy		
Voter	1	2	3	
V, W	100	20	0	
X	50	100	50	
Y, Z	0	20	100	

On issue A, a single stand at 1 still defeats any other stand, single or lottery. But consider the lottery, on issue B, of $\frac{1}{2}$ chance of 1 and $\frac{1}{2}$ chance of 3. The utility of that lottery to V and W (under an EU model) is $\frac{1}{2}(100) + \frac{1}{2}(0) = 50$ utiles; V and W prefer the lottery to the single position 2, with its 20 utiles. Similarly, for Y and Z the lottery has $\frac{1}{2}(0) + \frac{1}{2}(100) = 50$ utiles; they too prefer it to the 20 utiles of alternative 2. Only voter X prefers alternative 2, with 100 utiles, to the $\frac{1}{2}(50) + \frac{1}{2}(50) = 50$ utiles of the lottery. The lottery, therefore, defeats the median position, 2, by a vote of 4–1. Under the lottery theory, with these risk-acceptant voters there may be an incentive for candidates to be ambiguous, at least in challenging a median-clinging incumbent. (But note the lack of equilibrium; a single stand at either 1 or 3 ties the lottery. If the utility to X of 1 or 3 were slightly

¹ The general form of a lottery over policies 1, 2, and 3 is (a,b,1-a-b), where each of the three elements represents a probability associated with one policy. (Each must lie between 0 and 1, inclusive.) When the utility to each voter of this general lottery is calculated, using Table 1 and the EU algorithm, it becomes apparent that V and W prefer it to certainty of 2 if and only if $a > .8(1-b)$; Y and Z prefer the lottery if and only if $a < .2(1-b)$; and X never prefers the lottery, but is indifferent if $b = 1$: that is, if the lottery degenerates to certainty of 2. Given these conditions it is impossible to find permissible values for a and b such that a majority prefers the lottery.

increased there would be a cyclical majority, with that single stand defeating the lottery, the lottery defeating the median, and the median defeating that other single stand.)

(3) For the emphasis allocation theory we need information on the pre-existing salience of issues A and B, and on the extent to which candidates can control emphasis and manipulate salience. Let us suppose that the issues are equally weighted at the outset, each with salience of $\frac{1}{2}$. We assume for simplicity that candidates can entirely control emphasis (putting a weight between 0 and 1 on each issue, with the weights summing to 1) and that their emphasis completely determines salience. Voters evaluate a candidate by multiplying the utility of each policy he stands for by its salience weight, and summing.

Now consider the voters of Table 1. If a candidate emphasizes the two issues equally, and takes the optimal stands (1 on A and 2 on B), *V* and *W* evaluate him at $\frac{1}{2}(100) + \frac{1}{2}(80) = 90$ utiles. For *X*, the evaluation is higher, $\frac{1}{2}(100) + \frac{1}{2}(100) = 100$ utiles.

Note, however, that if the candidate devotes all his emphasis to issue A, on which there is consensus, everyone evaluates him at 1(100) or 100 utiles. Four voters, *V*, *W*, *Y*, and *Z*, prefer this strategy of total emphasis on A, while *X* is indifferent, at 100 utiles either way. This skewed emphasis strategy would defeat a strategy of equal emphasis on A and B, or for that matter any strategy involving *any* nonzero emphasis on B. This is true where the median stand is taken on B but also, by

extension, to any single or lottery stand on B. Even with risk averse voters, the emphasis theory predicts candidate ambiguity (in the sense of low emphasis) on a divisive issue.

The same conclusion applies to the risk acceptant voters of Table 2. Similar reasoning shows that a strategy of total emphasis on A (with a stand at 1) defeats one of equal or indeed any nonzero emphasis on issue B, taking a stand at the median 2 or any other single stand. But the A emphasis strategy also defeats any strategy which puts some emphasis on B and takes a lottery stand. Consider the $(\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2})$ lottery. An equal emphasis strategy has utility to *V* and *W* of $\frac{1}{2}(100) + \frac{1}{2}(\frac{1}{2}(100) + \frac{1}{2}(0)) = 75$ utiles; to *Y* and *Z* of $\frac{1}{2}(100) + \frac{1}{2}(\frac{1}{2}(0) + \frac{1}{2}(100)) = 75$ utiles; and to *X* of $\frac{1}{2}(100) + \frac{1}{2}(\frac{1}{2}(50) + \frac{1}{2}(50)) = 75$ utiles. But a strategy of total emphasis on A gives each voter 1(100) or 100 utiles; it would be preferred by all five voters.²

Thus whether voters are risk averse or risk acceptant, the emphasis theory predicts that candidates place all their emphasis on consensus issues, and say nothing about issues of conflict.³

² The superiority of a skewed emphasis strategy to one giving nonzero emphasis to a lottery on B holds under EU evaluations of lotteries, but not necessarily under other models of risky decision making. The superiority of total emphasis on A to any strategy putting nonzero emphasis on a single stand on B holds regardless of reactions to risk.

³ This conclusion holds if candidates completely control emphasis and salience, but as we suggest in the text they generally do not, and must put some minimal emphasis on conflictual issues.

A Majority Party in Disarray: Policy Polarization in the 1972 Election*

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The 1972 election marked the third time running that one of the major parties failed to cope with the polarization of policy demands among its supporters in the contest for the presidency. McGovern's defeat was the most notable of the three, but Humphrey and Goldwater before him also lost numerically significant and ideologically distinct segments of their parties' supporters to opponents whose policy positions were sufficiently more attractive to outweigh normal considerations of party loyalty and candidate preference at the polls. Indeed, even in the face of the Nixon landslide there are indications that the Republican party in 1972 confronted the same dilemma that faced a Democratic party whose internal disagreements had remained unresolved since the rebirth of the party under Franklin Roosevelt's leadership. This is the more significant precisely because policy disagreements strong enough to cause massive defections among rank and file party supporters had not been characteristic of post-war American national politics. Apparently it took twelve years of national leadership focused on national problems and policy alternatives to begin to reshape the American electorate and overlay the traditional politics of the 1950s—rooted in the Great Depression and the social cleavages made deep by economic distress—with a new issue politics. And it was the 1972 election that exposed the pervasive consequences that follow from dislodging party loyalty and candidate appeal from positions of dominance in mass electoral politics and complementing them with a widespread concern over policies intended to resolve very real national problems.

Contemporary electoral research came into being at the end of the era of Roosevelt and the New Deal and following a war that had been a total

national preoccupation for five years or more. The seven years of the Truman presidency during post-war relocation served largely to revive the issues and alignments of the Roosevelt era. The "issueless '50s" were so for a variety of reasons. The Cold War threatened to engage the electorate in a new and dire concern with foreign policy, but the Eisenhower presidency ended that threat, or opportunity. In the election of 1952, party lines were as sharply drawn on the broad dimensions of internationalism/nationalism or interventionism/withdrawal in foreign affairs as they were on controversies over the policies of the New Deal and the Fair Deal. But Eisenhower's leadership moved enough Republicans into the internationalist interventionist camp to obliterate foreign policy as an arena for national partisan dispute for a decade or more.

During the eight years of the Eisenhower presidency, the de facto national Democratic leadership of Johnson and Rayburn thwarted the attempts of such organizations as the Democratic Policy Council to define new domestic policy goals for the Democratic party and to engage the president in open confrontation over national policy directions. The nation was led by a popular, largely non-partisan president and a government only dimly perceived to be divided. "Mr. Republican," Senator Robert Taft, died before the end of Eisenhower's first term, and the rerun of the Eisenhower-Stevenson competition in 1956 produced a second election in which the only real contest was between persistent Democratic loyalties and the popular folk hero, General Ike. Whatever the "real problems" of the nation, the national leadership of both parties deprived their followers of any great sense of urgency to define the problems and argue over alternative solutions.

John F. Kennedy's call to get the nation moving again in an assault on the New Frontiers marked the beginning of a change in the posture of national party leadership toward questions of public policy. Although Quemoy and Matsu, the Great Debates, and Kennedy's Catholicism were prominent features of the Kennedy-Nixon contest, it was the subsequent Kennedy presidential legislative program

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that defined the enduring themes of national presidential politics for the next eight years. In 1964 the Republicans and Senator Goldwater did their part to sustain the decision to make American politics issue politics. Whatever the short-run costs to his candidacy and his party, the Goldwater decision to offer "a choice not an echo" reaffirmed the primacy of issues in presidential politics. And as President Johnson was applying his insider's skills to the achievement of national public purpose, the very real problems of the society were being publicized by word and deed through the dramatic medium of national television. In 1968, Governor Wallace, with virtually nothing in the way of personal appeal as a candidate and little more in the way of major party support, was an important national candidate solely because he articulated policy alternatives favored by one out of every seven or eight voters. Political scientists' long-standing pleas for the elevation of issue politics and the creation of conditions that would permit or force responsible party government into existence were being answered.

At the same time that national leaders were injecting a large element of policy-based controversy in American politics, a widening stream of research was documenting a spectacular change in the quality of mass attitudes toward questions of public policy. Both within and across broad policy domains, the structuring of popular attitudes in ways that make sense to the politician and to the student of mass ideology was replacing the ideological formlessness noted in comparable evidence from the 1950s. The universe of policy questions came to be reasonably well ordered by the electorate, with apparently sophisticated structuring. The change in level of interitem and interdomain constraint was so great, in contrast to the earlier period, that an intense search was launched to locate the cause of what appeared to be a basic discontinuity in the partisan concerns of the electorate.

Unhappily, research on mass behavior has seldom seriously grappled with—indeed has seldom even recognized—the problem of incorporating the conditioning and causing events of the real world in the design of the research. In the electoral realm we have been too prone to try to assemble disembodied data to map the "natural history of an issue" with little regard for the likely fact that leadership decisions to promote, to modify, to resist, or to surrender in a policy fight are major factors in determining that "natural" history. Systematic electoral research has largely ignored a major source of the observed change in the quality of mass attitudes on questions of public policy: leadership behavior that brings the substance of issue politics into the public domain.

The 1972 election provided a unique opportunity to investigate the consequence of change in leadership focus on policy and the responses of an

electorate mobilized by policy considerations. A detailed inspection of the electoral outcome illuminates some of the systemic problems which flow not only from the changes in the quality of electoral response to the contests for the presidency, but also from the increased impact of policy preference on partisan defection, the increased importance of issues as predictors of the vote decision, and the transformed nature of contemporary public involvement in policy issues. Each of these facets of the 1972 election make it very different from the presidential elections of the 'fifties. This contrast is most clearly revealed by analyses which compare the relative importance of policy voting with alternative and complementary explanations for the particular outcome of the 1972 presidential contest. Ideology and issue voting in that election provide a means for better explaining the unique elements of the contest than do the voters' social characteristics, the nature of candidates, the events of the campaign, political alienation, cultural orientations, or partisan identification. A consideration of the relative balance of these factors on the forces under the particular social and political conditions of 1972 helps us to recognize the problems facing political parties and political leaders whose constituents have been aroused to a high concern over questions of governmental policy. The mass recognition of the enduring existence of salient social problems uncovered by the analyses of the 1972 election suggests that subsequent electoral contests may be fought along lines of deepening policy cleavages.

The Political Setting

During the period just prior to the 1972 presidential primaries, numerous factors suggested a Democratic victory in the upcoming elections. Foremost among these was the war in Southeast Asia. Despite Richard Nixon's 1968 campaign pledge of a rapid end to U.S. involvement, the war continued, and it came to be seen as Nixon's war. American bombings of Vietnam and Cambodia continued even as the 1972 election approached. Although Nixon had run on a "law and order" platform in 1968, with promises of a reduction in the crime rate, violent crimes were still on the increase in 1972. The Administration itself was beset by a series of scandals involving possible criminal activity by well-placed members of the Administration. Moreover, the economic situation appeared bleak: unemployment was higher throughout the Nixon Administration than it had been under Lyndon Johnson; inflation increased substantially; government deficits grew, and the imbalance in foreign trade increased. All of these factors combined created a situation that seemed certain to benefit the Democrats. By early 1972 the Gallup poll reported a significant shift from 1968, with the Democratic party once more popularly

perceived to be the party best able to cope with the important problems facing the nation. And the Democratic lead in basic partisan loyalties showed little or no decline over 1970, a year in which the long string of Democratic national victories at the polls was continued with the re-election of a Democratic congress.

While the advantages and strengths of the Democrats prior to the campaign were substantial, some factors could be expected to benefit the minority party candidate, particularly the fact that Richard Nixon was an incumbent president in a position to exploit the ample political advantages of the highest office in the nation. Moreover, Nixon had achieved impressive gains in foreign affairs, including an historic Peking summit meeting and a growing détente with Moscow. By establishing price controls, he had reduced criticism on the economic front. He could, further, rebut criticism relating to the war in Southeast Asia by reference to the peace negotiations then in progress which eventually led to the pre-election pronouncement that "peace was at hand."

Throughout the campaign and almost up to the time of the election, more than half of the population expected to vote for Richard Nixon. The ultimate margin of victory (approximately 61 per cent voting Republican)¹ was, nevertheless, somewhat unexpected since among the eligible electorate, self-proclaimed Democrats² continued by almost 2 to 1 to outnumber Republicans.³ The degree of ticket splitting which reinstated a heavily Democratic Congress was likewise not widely forecast.

¹ Data for this report are primarily from the Center for Political Studies' 1972 national election survey, the twelfth in a series, which was based on a standard University of Michigan Survey Research Center national stratified probability sample of 2705 cases. The data are derived from personal interviews with eligible voters (citizens 18 years and older) taken before the election (September 1 to November 6) and reinterviews with the same respondents taken immediately after the election. The data and relevant codebooks for the 1972 study are available to any interested scholars upon request through the Inter-university Consortium for Political Research, The University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106.

² Party identification is based on the standard measure which asks the respondent: "Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what? Would you call yourself a strong Republican/Democrat or a not very strong Republican/Democrat?" If Independent—"Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican or the Democratic party?" The question gives rise to a measure with seven categories that range from strong Democrat to strong Republican. For the purpose of this paper whenever Democrats, Independents and Republicans are referred to, the leaning Independents have been collapsed with the Independent-Independents.

³ The most extensive analysis of the concept of party identification is provided in Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, Donald E. Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1960). See especially p. 124 for the distribution of party identification in the 1950's.

Most surprising, however (and perhaps equally alarming), was the lack of citizen concern about the outcome of the election. The percentage of the electorate expressing a personal concern about the outcome was lower than it had been for any previous presidential election during the past 20 years.⁴ On election day, only 55 per cent of the eligible electorate participated in the presidential election—the lowest turnout since 1948.

Policy Preference and the Vote

Following the election, politicians and political observers offered many explanations for the outcome, for the substantial defection among Democrats, for the high degree of ticket-splitting, and for the low turnout. Most often, these accounts speculated on the effects of various political incidents of the previous months, including such early events as the California Democratic primary debates, the selection of Democratic convention delegates on the basis of quotas rather than meritorious party service, the acerbity of the Illinois and California seating fights at the Democratic Convention, and the inability of McGovern campaign workers to cooperate with Democratic party regulars. The role of Nixon-McGovern disagreements over national policy, on the other hand, was frequently minimized by assertions that no real policy differences existed among the voters, or that McGovern wavered so much on the issues that he did not project a consistent, tenable policy position and hence was not perceived in terms of basic issues. Lipset and Raab, for example, argued, the unimportance of issues. They concluded that "there was no real gap on political issues separating the body of McGovern voters and the body of Nixon voters. The voters, in fact, were on the same side of *all* political issues. . . ."⁵ The same report went on to contend, moreover, that with respect to the issues the voters perceived little difference between the candidates. More generally, however, the treatment of issues in postelection analyses varied from the view that the issues were relatively unimportant to assertions that they entirely explained the 1972 presidential election outcome. Some analyses emphasized the importance of only a few issues, such as the "cultural" or the "racial" issues. Kirkpatrick, for instance, declared that "at every campaign stop he [McGovern] was hounded by questions about the 'three A's': am-

⁴ In response to the question, "Generally speaking, would you say that *you personally* care a good deal which party wins the presidential election this fall, or that you don't care very much which party wins?", the percentage personally caring about the outcome of the election in 1952 was 68%; in 1956, 65%; 1960, 67%; 1964, 69%; 1968, 64%; 1972, 62%.

⁵ Seymour Martin Lipset and Earl Raab, "The Election and the National Mood," *Commentary*, 55 (January, 1973), 43. Emphasis in the original.

nesty, acid, and abortion . . .,"⁶ and Rosenthal alleged that the election outcome was determined by the "hidden issue" of race.⁷ At the other extreme, some claimed that McGovern supporters constituted an ideological or issue elite who shaped the election outcome by taking an extremely liberal position on all the important issues of the day.⁸

It is understandable that many interpretations of the election placed little emphasis on the issues. Nixon had undertaken to neutralize the war in Vietnam, one of the most potent issues of the 1968 election, and the October announcement that "peace was at hand" seemed to guarantee peace with honor. At home, the college campuses were peaceful, and with the anticipated end to the military draft, they could be expected to remain so. The racial situation had quieted, and "crime in the streets" no longer captured headlines. Indeed, the only heated issues before the election appeared to be issues that had only recently become salient in the McGovern campaign: abortion, amnesty, busing, and the legalization of marijuana. On all these issues Nixon had taken a public stand which reflected the position of a large popular majority.

Nevertheless, there was reason to believe that issues had been important in the election, and that there had been sharp issue differences between the supporters of the two candidates. At the time of the election, the Vietnam war was still a position issue with the debate revolving around immediate American withdrawal from Vietnam versus a protracted military engagement while a peace settlement was negotiated. Despite the growing support for peace, even through unilateral American withdrawal, Nixon's supporters favored an escalation of the war and a renewed national commitment to achieve a military victory. Furthermore, McGovern's position on immediate withdrawal from Vietnam, his pro-amnesty sentiments, and his supposed special appeal to youth were intended to mobilize support along lines reflecting alternative ways of dealing with the nation's continuing social problems. While the racial situation had quieted, widespread social discrimination still existed in America, and there was little reason to expect much change in attitudes toward government assistance aimed at improving the social and economic condition of minority groups. Nixon's praise of the work ethic and his denigration of welfare were clearly at odds with McGovern's statements on welfare, including his early promise of a minimum \$1,000 personal income for every person in the nation.

In analyzing the role of policy preferences in the

1972 election, one must first ask whether the composition of McGovern's support changed during the campaign. Since much of McGovern's eventual success in attaining his party's nomination was based on his primary victories, it is useful to determine how different the policy preferences of his early and later supporters were. If they were different, this would illustrate the process by which a candidate is chosen as the presidential nominee of a party and then must broaden his base to include a national electorate as well as the fellow partisans who opposed his nomination.

The intraparty divisions within the Democratic ranks were already evident at the time of the primaries. On each of several issues, and especially with respect to Vietnam, amnesty, and government aid to minorities, McGovern's primary supporters were far more "liberal" than were those who voted for the other candidates in the Democratic primaries. As Table 1 reveals,⁹ McGovern captured most of the primary vote of the liberal Democrats while the conservative faction went to the several other contenders. Yet it should also be noted that the *total* set of Democratic primary voters was biased in a direction that might benefit a candidate espousing McGovern's policies. Even those who voted for some Democrat other than McGovern in the primaries were generally slightly more liberal than Democrats who were later to vote for Nixon in the general election.

The depth of the split within the Democratic ranks was fully exposed in the general election. There were only minor differences between McGovern's primary supporters and the much larger set of Democrats who voted for him in November. The differences that do appear, such as the slightly more liberal complexion of the primary supporters with regard to Vietnam and marijuana, largely reflect age differences between the two groups of

⁹ The issue scales used in Table 1 ranged from 1 to 7, with the extremes indicating designated policy alternatives. The respondents were asked to place themselves on the issue scale. The scales were trichotomized for ease of tabular presentation: categories 1 to 3 were combined into the "left" category, number 4 formed the "center," and categories 5 to 7 were designated as "right." On all the issue scales the left position identifies the liberal position. This is most clearly identified on the last scale in the table which ranged from "liberal" to "conservative" without any specific issue content.

The five-issue policy orientation index is different in that it combined responses to five of the specific issue scales. To form this index an average score was obtained from self-placement on the issues of the Vietnam War, urban unrest, campus demonstrations, protecting the rights of the accused and government aid to minorities. Scores ranging from 1-3 were considered as pro-social change while scores of 5-7 were designated as pro-social control. Placement at 4 on the scale was labeled "center." The distribution for this trichotomized index is 41% pro-social change, 29% at center, and 30% pro-social control. For a more complete discussion of this concept, see Arthur H. Miller, "Political Issues and Trust in Government," *The American Political Science Review*, 68 (September, 1974), 951-972.

⁶ Jeane Kirkpatrick, "The Revolt of the Masses," *Commentary*, 55 (February, 1973), 60.

⁷ Jack Rosenthal, "The Secret Key Issue: Study of Polls Shows Racial Attitudes to be Critical with Nixon Gainer," *The New York Times* (November 7, 1972).

⁸ Kevin Philips, "How Nixon Will Win," *The New York Times Magazine* (August 6, 1972), pp. 8, 34, 35-37.

voters. However, a deep policy schism among the Democrats is sharply defined when Democrats voting for McGovern in the general election are compared with the Democrats who voted for Nixon. The defecting Democrats were much less in favor of immediate withdrawal from Vietnam; they were much more likely to support the use of police force as the means of ending campus demonstrations; and they strongly opposed an active role for government in maintaining or improving the quality of life experienced by minority groups. On each of the specific issues, as well as on a more general policy orientation index and a liberal-conservative scale, Democrats as a whole were a very

heterogeneous collection of citizens. This lack of cohesion reflected long-standing regional differences between southern and non-southern Democrats, but, even within regional subgroups, a substantial degree of intraparty polarization was exposed by the general election.

The Republicans, on the other hand, exhibited a substantial degree of consensus on each issue except Vietnam, where the intraparty division found 31 per cent preferring immediate withdrawal, 30 per cent favoring a complete military victory and 30 per cent in the center. The Republican positions on the liberal-conservative scale also revealed substantial differences of ideological position within

Table 1. Issue Composition of the Candidates' Support

		McGovern Primary Voters	Other Primary Voters	Democrats Voting for McGovern	Democrats Voting for Nixon	All Democrats	McGovern Voters	Nixon Voters
	(N)	(78)	(104)	(377)	(271)	(1092)	(566)	(1021)
VIETNAM:								
	Left	79%	34%	69%	30%	52%	69%	29%
	Center	17	26	19	31	24	19	29
	Right	5	40	12	39	24	12	42
AMNESTY: ^a								
	Left	52%	17%	49%	18%	34%	54%	15%
	Right	48	83	51	82	66	46	85
MARIJUANA:								
	Left	41%	19%	30%	10%	20%	37%	17%
	Center	19	6	11	7	8	11	11
	Right	41	75	59	83	72	52	72
CAMPUS UNREST:								
	Left	b	b	40%	12%	31%	43%	11%
	Center	b	b	18	24	22	20	23
	Right	b	b	42	64	47	37	66
MINORITIES:								
	Left	49%	18%	50%	25%	39%	52%	25%
	Center	25	35	24	24	22	23	27
	Right	26	47	26	51	39	25	48
STANDARD OF LIVING:								
	Left	53%	28%	53%	21%	39%	50%	18%
	Center	16	22	23	24	23	24	25
	Right	31	50	24	55	38	26	57
BUSING:								
	Left	19%	4%	23%	2%	14%	22%	3%
	Center	10	2	8	2	5	8	4
	Right	70	94	69	96	81	70	93
FIVE ISSUES:								
	Left	51%	18%	45%	15%	34%	50%	16%
	Center	30	42	30	33	31	29	34
	Right	18	40	25	52	35	21	50
LIBERAL-CONSERVATIVE								
	Left	48%	24%	50%	14%	33%	54%	13%
	Center	38	33	36	44	41	32	37
	Right	14	43	14	42	26	14	50

^a The format for the amnesty question was suitable for collapsing into two categories only.

^b Data unavailable because primary voting and campus unrest questions were on opposite half-samples in the study design.

the party: 41 per cent saw themselves as "conservative" but 28 per cent labeled themselves as "liberal." On other more specific issues, the dominant Republican position was, more often than not, an overwhelming majority supporting a conservative preference against the minority made up of liberals and neutrals combined.

The stark issue differences that separated the total group of McGovern voters from the Nixon voters are also revealed by the data of Table 1. McGovern supporters were consistently more liberal than Nixon supporters. Even on the highly one sided issues—busing, amnesty and the legalization of marijuana where 86, 72, and 68 per cent of the total sample, respectively, expressed a very conservative policy preference—McGovern voters were more liberal than Nixon voters.¹⁰ On the question of Vietnam, which specifically referred to immediate withdrawal versus a complete military victory, 40 per cent more McGovern voters than Nixon voters preferred an immediate end to the fighting. Even with "peace at hand," a military victory in Vietnam was the Nixon supporters' preferred way to end the war. Using a trichotomized five-issue policy orientation index (see Table 1), we find that half of McGovern's voters exhibited a social-change policy orientation, whereas an equal fraction of Nixon voters displayed a diametrically opposed social-control orientation. Similarly, on the liberal-to-conservative scale a full 54 per cent of McGovern's voters identified themselves as clearly "liberal," while half of Nixon's voters saw themselves as strongly "conservative." These are large differences between the candidates' support groups since the total population was divided almost equally among three categories including a "middle-of-the-road" option in both the policy orientation index and the liberal-conservative scale. These differences are even greater than those between the Democratic factions because of the distinctive appeal of the two candidates to different groups of Independents. McGovern clearly captured the votes of the more liberal Independents, and therefore his total vote support group was generally more liberal than were the Democrats who voted for him. The more conservative Independents, on the other hand, voted for Nixon, joining conservative Republicans in a group slightly more conservative than the subset of Democrats voting for Nixon.

In general, McGovern supporters were sharply distinct from Nixon voters in their policy preferences, but they were also a distinct subset among Democrats. Since McGovern's supporters formed

58 per cent of all Democrats, however, it cannot be argued that they were just a splinter faction within the party; it can more reasonably be argued that they were the vanguard of a liberalizing trend occurring in the population as a whole and centered in the ranks of the Democrats. If so, McGovern's principal error in adopting his policy positions for the campaign may have been in overestimating the speed and the magnitude of the national liberal trend on questions of public policy.

The argument can be assessed with respect to shifts in attitudes that occurred between 1968 and 1972 toward contemporary social issues such as the Vietnam war and urban unrest. In 1968 the total eligible electorate took a policy position which was, on the average,¹¹ slightly closer to the hawkish alternative on Vietnam (see Figure 1). By 1972 a steady drift toward an antiwar opinion resulted in a population more inclined to prefer immediate withdrawal from Vietnam. A similar trend can also be observed with respect to the question of how to handle urban unrest. Voters as a whole were already predisposed in 1968 toward solving the urban problems of poverty and unemployment as a means of ending urban unrest (average value of 3.7 on the scale); by 1972 the population had moved even further to the left (3.1). A similar mild shift toward the left occurred on all the other issues monitored during this time interval.


This movement toward the left was not, however, equally sharp for the three partisan subgroups of Democrats, Independents, and Republicans. Between 1968 and 1972 the Democrats had become substantially more dovish. The Independents also moved toward withdrawal, but the Republicans on the whole still maintained their 1968 position. The four-year change on urban unrest was greatest among Independents. Both Democrats and Republicans moved in the same liberal direction, but the change was less than that noted

¹¹ Attitudes toward contemporary social issues were measured with 7-point scales in 1968, and again in 1970, as well as in 1972. In each of these studies the respondents not only placed themselves on these scales, but they also indicated where they perceived several political objects to be located relative to the policy alternatives represented by the scale extremities. Among the political objects placed on the scales were the presidential candidates and, after 1968, the parties, thus providing data for determining not only how the population has shifted on the issues but also how the perceived locations of various candidates and the parties compare over time.

It should be noted that the average values placed in Figure 1 de-emphasize the high degree of polarization existing in the attitudes toward these issues. While many of the values fall at the center of these scales, the data should not be interpreted to imply that the majority of the population prefers a centrist approach to these social problems. Only a brief glance back at the group distributions on these two issues in Table 1 is necessary to confirm this.

¹⁰ It should be noted, though, that of these three issues only on the question of amnesty did a majority of McGovern voters take a liberal position; 70 per cent were against busing and 52 per cent favored increasing the penalties for the use of marijuana.

Figure 1 : Mean Locations of Voters and Political Objects on the Vietnam Scale, 1968–72



Key to Symbols

V = Voters
H = Humphrey
N = Nixon

Mc = McGovern
D = Democratic Party
R = Republican Party

for Independents. This relatively large shift toward the left exhibited by Independents on these two issues was also noted for the several other issues.

A more complete picture of changes in policy preferences is revealed when the Democrats of both years are divided into subsets comparable to the candidate support groups depicted in Table 1. If Humphrey Democrats in 1968 are labeled loyal Democrats, and Wallace Democrats are treated as defectors, their policy preferences may be compared with the McGovern Democrats and Nixon Democrats in 1972. A comparison of these support groups demonstrates that the massive shift toward a policy of immediate withdrawal from Vietnam occurred among both the right and the left wing of the Democratic ranks. On the average, the 1968 Humphrey Democrats preferred a middle-of-the-road policy on Vietnam, whereas McGovern's Democratic supporters were staunchly in favor of immediate withdrawal. Wallace Democrats in 1968 were substantially more hawkish than Republicans, but by 1972 the Vietnam policy preference of defecting Democrats had converged with that of the Republicans. The shift in policy preference associated with "defecting" Democrats, however, was less than that observed for loyal Democrats. Thus, the 1972 discrepancy between the preferred policy position of defecting and loyal Democrats was greater than in 1968.

At the same time, between 1968 and 1972 defecting Democrats displayed a somewhat larger shift to the *left* in their choice of alternative policies for dealing with urban unrest than did loyal Democrats. Humphrey supporters in 1968 were already expressing fairly strong preferences for the eradication of root causes of urban problems as the best way of dealing with unrest in the cities, and in 1972 McGovern Democrats were only slightly more liberal. Wallace Democrats, on the contrary, were clearly to the right of center on the issue of urban unrest in 1968, but in 1972 defecting Democrats were ever so slightly to the left of center. And yet, despite this marked shift away from the use of force as the preferred way to deal with urban unrest, the defecting Democrats of 1972 remained significantly to the right of the Republicans on this issue and substantially separated from the loyal members of their party.

A still better understanding of the dynamics of attitudinal change can be gained when shifts both in attitudes and in popular perceptions of the policy alternatives offered by the candidates are examined together. For example, while the population was shifting to the left on the issues between 1968 and 1972, Nixon was, in general, being perceived as having remained relatively stable in his policies.

Although Nixon was generally perceived to have changed little on the issues, a substantial degree of

change was perceived in the Democratic candidates' positions, especially on Vietnam. There was a striking difference between the Vietnam policy position attributed to Humphrey in 1968 and that assigned to McGovern in 1972. McGovern's perceived issue location was consistently to the left of where Humphrey had been placed in 1968, a position also substantially left both of where the Democratic party was placed and of where Democrats placed themselves.

Indeed, McGovern was perceived as so far left on the issues that Nixon was generally closer to the electorate's average issue position. For example, when the average location of where respondents placed Nixon and McGovern on the 7-point issue scales were compared with where the respondents, on the average, placed themselves on these scales, it was found that Nixon's mean location was closer to the mean location of the electorate on 11 out of 14 separate issues. Those 3 issues on which McGovern's mean location was closer to the population mean than was Nixon's were urban unrest, inflation, and ecological pollution. It should be noted, however, that of the eight issues measured in a comparable study in 1970, Muskie was also placed closer than Nixon to the population mean on *only* these same three issues. Using the difference between the mean location of voters and the average location of the candidate to indicate distance, we find that McGovern was placed, on the average, a distance of 1.29 units from the mean issue position of the electorate, while the average Nixon distance was only .51 units. Among Democrats, McGovern and Nixon were almost equidistant from the group mean (distances of .92 and .89) but in opposite directions with McGovern to the left of the group and Nixon to the right of the group mean. Nixon's policy position was, however, far more similar to the issue preference of the Independents and Republicans than was McGovern's.

Investigating the perceptions of the various candidate support groups for 1968 and 1972 is also instructive. Both Humphrey and McGovern were much closer to the preferred policy alternative of loyal Democrats on the issues of Vietnam and urban unrest than were either Wallace or Nixon. Alternatively, defecting Democrats were distant from both Humphrey and McGovern but close to Wallace and Nixon. For example, on the more salient issue—Vietnam—the 1968 distance between the position taken by Wallace Democrats and the policies they associated with Humphrey was 0.9; the comparable distance to Nixon was 0.7 while Wallace was placed only 0.4 units away. In 1972 the defecting Democrats were, on the average, 2.4 units from McGovern and only 0.3 units from Nixon and Wallace. Since Nixon was not seen as having changed his Vietnam policy between 1968

and 1972, the convergence of the positions of the defecting Democrats and their perceptions of Wallace and Nixon can only be attributed to the leftward shift of the defecting Democrats noted earlier and to a substantial change in Wallace's perceived policy position. Given that right-wing Democrats had exhibited a marked shift toward a preference of withdrawal from Vietnam preceding the 1972 campaigns, the very large distance yet remaining between McGovern and the defecting Democrats is particularly notable.

Furthermore, this disagreement on the Vietnam issue was only partially the result of defecting Democrats perceiving McGovern as more liberal than did other Democrats. That is, the policy disagreement was not simply a matter of negative reaction to McGovern; it was instead a patent indication of the profound issue discordance existing within the Democratic ranks. These data clearly suggest that the configuration of positions attributed to candidates and taken by the public of 1972 had already been developing four years earlier. The main difference between the two elections, however, apart from the absence of a rightist Democratic candidate, was the greater issue distance perceived to separate the leading candidates.¹² Such sharp differentiation between the candidates clearly facilitates the translation of issue demands into a vote decision.

Although the data demonstrate a mild population shift toward more liberal issue positions, this change should not be overestimated. Within the Democratic ranks this trend was most evident with respect to Vietnam war policy. McGovern may have sensed this change and been able to tap it in the primaries, but he was less able to capitalize on it in the general election. Despite the general population shift to the left, McGovern was seen as quite distant from the population's policy preferences, Nixon being relatively much closer to the issue positions preferred by Americans on the average. The general population shift leftward, therefore, did little to increase the popularity of McGovern's proposed policy alternatives. In terms of candidate strategies, it appears that McGovern sensed but misgauged the changes occurring in popular attitudes and policy demands. The salient issues of the campaign, and those predominant in the rhetoric of both candidates, proved to be the

issues that were most divisive among the Democrats.

A Normal-Vote Analysis of Issues

The impact of public policy questions on partisan defection in the 1972 election can be assessed by a normal-vote analysis¹³ of several issues salient in that election. The concept of a normal vote originates in the earlier work of the Center which argues that both long-term and short-term partisan influences shape political behavior.¹⁴ It is the dynamic interaction of the long- and short-term forces which makes these concepts so useful in analyzing elections. For, as Converse argues, in order to establish and compare the relative magnitude of electoral shifts for various groups, one must state explicitly the baseline from which any shift is measured. The concept of the normal vote provides a theoretically meaningful and empirically reasonable method to establish the baseline for assessing vote defection from a theoretically "normal" expectation. The empirically derived baseline indicates the degree of support each party's presidential candidate could expect to receive from each subgroup in the electorate, if the short-term factors were causing an equal defection rate among Republicans and Democrats. The relative degree to which certain short-term forces operate in any election can then be ascertained with respect to this long-term factor. The mathematical difference between the percentage of the Democratic vote normally expected for any population grouping

¹³ A complete statement of the normal vote concept and computational methods can be found in Philip E. Converse, "The Concept of a Normal Vote" in Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, *Elections and the Political Order* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966), pp. 9-39.

The normal vote parameters used here are not those originally calculated by Converse. The empirical observations employed by Converse to determine the partisanship values and expected turnout parameters used in the normal vote computations were from the national elections of 1952 through and including 1960. Since the recent decade has witnessed several electoral anomalies, including a massive victory for each of the major parties and a third party insurgency, the normal vote parameters (both turnout and partisanship) were recomputed on the basis of the six national elections during the period 1962 to 1972. The baseline used here is therefore more representative of the contemporary partisan situation than one computed from Converse's original estimates of the normal vote parameters would have been. A complete report of the new normal vote parameters is now in preparation.

Applying the normal vote computations to the 1972 total sample provides an expected Democratic vote of 54 per cent. When this value is compared to the 36 per cent of the two-party vote that McGovern actually received (after excluding the few per cent voting for minor party candidates), a deviation of 18 percentage points below the expected Democratic proportion of the vote for the total sample is observed.

¹⁴ See in particular Angus Campbell et al., *The American Voter*, pp. 120-167.

¹² The very large difference between the two candidates on the issue of Vietnam is highlighted by the finding that 89 per cent of the population perceived McGovern as left of center on this issue whereas only 22 per cent saw Nixon as favorably disposed to a policy of immediate withdrawal. Large differences were also perceived between the candidates on the issue of government assistance to minorities: 32 per cent thought Nixon liberal on this issue, compared to 73 per cent for McGovern. Minor differences were perceived between the candidates on only the issues of inflation and pollution.

and the observed Democratic vote for that group provides an empirical statement of the degree of partisan defection exhibited by the group.


A normal vote analysis of attitudes on several salient public policy issues is presented in Figures 2a-h. Each figure contains two summary indices that indicate the relative importance of the long-term (traditional partisan differences) and short-term forces operating in the 1972 election. The first, an index of long-term partisan effects (labeled L in the figures), summarizes the differences in traditional partisan cleavages among the categories of the independent variable. The second index summarizes the short-term forces, that is, the deviations from the expected vote for each category of the independent variable (labeled S in the figures).¹⁵

¹⁵ These normal vote indices were developed by Richard W. Boyd, "Popular Control of Public Policy: A Normal Vote Analysis of the 1968 Election," *The American Political Science Review*, 66 (June, 1972), 429-449.





In general, positions on the issues presented in Figure 2 were correlated with long-term partisan

A long-term index value (L) of zero indicates the lack of any relationship between traditional partisan divisions and an independent variable. Non-zero values indicate the average absolute deviation of the expected vote for each category of the independent variable from the expected vote for the total population. For example, the relationship between campus unrest and partisan difference indicates an average absolute deviation of 4.54 percentage points from the expected Democratic vote for the total population, a relationship that is slightly stronger than that for government help to minorities ($L = 4.24$). For the short-term forces index (S), if there is no deviation from the baseline or if the deviation is in the same direction and equal for all categories of the independent variable, the variable would have no relationship to the defections from party and the short-term index value would be zero. Government help to minorities, for instance, has some relevance to the short-term forces in 1972 ($S = 8.63$). But compared to Vietnam ($S = 11.80$), its short-term index is relatively moderate. The short-term index value for Vietnam indicates an average deviation of 11.80 percentage points from the baseline vote normally expected for each policy group (i.e., each category of the issue variable).

Figures 2a-2h: Normal Vote Analysis of Self-Locations on Political Issue Scales, 1972 Only



(Figures 2a-2h continues)



Note: a) The Republican vote is always 100% minus the Democratic vote; b) the category N's below each figure are for the Expected Vote (top row) and the Observed Vote (bottom row) respectively.

differences. As indicated by the moderately large long-term index values and differences in the expected vote, those preferring policy alternatives on the liberal side could be expected to vote more Democratic, whereas those endorsing issue positions on the right end of the scales would be expected to vote Republican more often. Examination of the several issues also reveals the very substantial degree of short-term deviation of the observed vote from the baseline expected vote. Those who preferred liberal policy alternatives were typically self-identified Democrats, but they actually voted slightly more heavily for McGovern than expected. Those endorsing conservative policy alternatives voted Republican dramatically more often than predicted by the normal vote baseline. Short-term deviations from long-term expectations were strongly associated with issue preferences.

The most potent of the issues presented in Figure 2 are clearly the Vietnam war and amnesty (Figures 2a and 2b). Both the long- and short-term com-

ponents of the Vietnam issue were larger in 1972 than they had been in 1968 when the indices were $L=2.70$ and $S=6.12$ respectively.¹⁶ Apparently, by the end of Nixon's first term in office the Vietnam war had very much become Mr. Nixon's war, at least in the minds of the Democrats who were more predisposed toward immediate withdrawal. But even on the question of national policy in Vietnam, the issue most clearly associated with his candidacy, McGovern was capable of securing only slightly more than his expected proportion of the two-party vote from the minor part of the population that most intensely favored immediate withdrawal from Vietnam. The remaining 70 per cent, favoring a different solution, displayed extremely high "defection" rates, ranging from 20 to 35 per cent below the expected Democratic vote. Similarly, views on the legalization of marijuana and on campus demonstrations were also strongly related to the vote. The two issues differed, how-

¹⁶ Boyd, "Popular Control of Public Policy," p. 448.

ever, in that positions on the marijuana issue, a relatively new issue, had little relationship to enduring partisan differences. Campus demonstrations, on the other hand, had been a salient issue for a longer period of time and had produced moderate partisan differences between those sympathizing with protesting students and faculty and those who favored the use of force to quell campus unrest. Those who sympathized with the students were definitely more Democratic than those who preferred the use of force; they were also younger and relatively better educated. Despite the relative calm on the campuses prior to the election, the campus unrest issue had a substantial short-term component. Apparently the law-and-order attitudes and cultural cleavages underlying reactions to campus demonstrations had persisted in the absence of student riots, and the campus unrest scale is evidently an exceptionally good measure of these attitudes.

Attitudes related to race were also well developed and based on beliefs that might be expected to correlate with the vote and partisan defection. It is, therefore, interesting to note that the questions both on aid to minorities and racial desegregation have relatively lower short-term index values than the issues of Vietnam amnesty, marijuana, and campus unrest. Another question, not presented in Figure 2, dealing with assessments of the civil rights movement, showed even less relationship to the 1972 vote ($S=7.19$) than did the general desegregation question. This fits the pattern of diminution in the salience and potency of racial issues during the period from 1968 to 1972.¹⁷ This trend also coincides with an increase in positive white attitudes toward the civil rights movement, as well as an increased perception of the black movement as peaceful rather than violent. Over the four years of the first Nixon administration, among whites attitudes favorable towards desegregation increased throughout the United States. Yet despite this overall shift in opinion, racial issues continued to have a greater short-term impact in the South. When the data of Figure 2f are recomputed for South and non-South, a 48 per cent deviation from expected vote was observed for segregationists in

the South, as compared to a 27 per cent deviation in the non-South. The summarizing short-term index value for the non-South was only 6.76; in the South it was 9.44. Yet, even this somewhat larger short-term index value in the South falls shy of what might have been expected of the most heated and controversial issue in the region.

The general pattern observed for all the specific issues of Figure 2 is one in which McGovern did slightly better, or at least as well as "normally" expected, among the minority of the voters who intensely preferred the liberal policy alternative offered by each policy question. A great deal of "defection," however, occurred among the relatively large majorities favoring other alternatives. This pattern is vividly summarized by the liberal-conservative scale and the five-issue policy orientation index displayed in Figure 2. Respondents indicating a liberal political philosophy or a social change policy orientation voted more Democratic than normally expected. Pro-Nixon deviation from the normal vote among middle-of-the-road respondents was about 25 percentage points, and respondents with a conservative or social control policy orientation voted anywhere from 28 to 34 per cent above the Republican proportion of the vote expected for each group. These marked deviations from the traditional partisan baseline bear witness to the importance of the issues as short-term factors in the 1972 election.

Perceptions of Candidate Policy Positions

The data of Figure 2 display an impressive array of relationships between issues and the vote. However, those data reveal but one aspect of the issue-to-vote relationship since they deal only with the respondent's issue preference. They do not incorporate another important ingredient in issue voting, namely an assessment of which candidate is closer to the voter's policy preference on salient issues. Such an assessment is needed if we expect that voters will evaluate the policy positions of the candidates with respect to salient issues on which they themselves take a stand and then vote for the candidate who is closer to them on those issues. Evidence on this point has been used recently to argue that voting is a rational act.¹⁸ The discussion here will not be concerned with the concept of rationality; rather, it will focus on the conditions under which policy voting will occur.

If voting is to be viewed as policy voting, issues influencing the vote must be salient, the candidates must be perceived to take different issue positions, and the voters must have real issue preferences that

¹⁷ The issue of government aid to minority groups does not, however, elicit only racial attitudes. The primary component of this item is the degree to which the individual, rather than society, is to be blamed for the social and economic misfortunes of certain segments of society. It also refers to the extent of social change necessary to alleviate the adverse socioeconomic conditions of blacks and other minorities. While one aspect of this social attitude is definitely racial in nature, it is not as clearly racial in content as is the desegregation item of Figure 2f.


The Gallup Opinion Index shows that mention of racial problems as the most important issue facing the country today had dropped from 40 per cent in mid-October, 1967 to 5 per cent in early 1972. See *Gallup Opinion Index*, Report No. 78, December, 1971.

¹⁸ The rationality of the voter has been debated heatedly in the literature of late, and while we believe that the data presented here deal directly with this controversy, it is not the purpose of this report to review it.

are established prior to their vote and that are not easily manipulable by political leaders. Under these criteria the policy voter is the individual who casts his ballot for the candidate most proximate to him on those issues about which he holds an attitude before the election. The ranks of the policy voter do not include individuals who are either persuaded by the candidate to take a particular issue position or those who rationalize their vote by projecting their own policy preference onto their preferred candidate, thus presenting a perfect correspondence between their own policy preference and the issue position of their preferred candidate.¹⁹ Unfortunately, without data measuring individual-level issue attitude change over time we cannot distinguish rationalization and persuasion effects from policy voting. What we can do with a single cross section, however, is determine if the proximity measure provides additional predictive power beyond that obtained with the individual's own issue position.

The analysis reveals that an assessment of the relative proximities of the voter to the candidate does indeed provide a far better explanation of the vote than does a measure of the respondent's policy preference alone. This is strikingly demonstrated by Figure 3, which presents a normal vote analysis of the Vietnam and liberal-conservative "proximity indices."²⁰ These two items had displayed exceptionally strong short-term index values in Figure 2 which used the respondent's stated issue position rather than the proximity measure. The measures of proximity presented in Figure 3, however, show even larger short-term components than those found earlier. The short-term index for Vietnam increased from 11.80 to 16.52, while the value for the liberal-conservative item rose from 11.95 to 16.45. McGovern received 75 per cent of the vote from those who perceived him as the closer of the two candidates on

Figures 3a-3b: Normal Vote Analysis of Vietnam and Liberal/Conservative Issue Proximity Indices



Notes—*a*) The Republican vote is always 100% minus the Democratic vote; *b*) the category N's below each figure are for the Expected Vote (top row) and the Observed Vote (bottom row), respectively.

the Vietnam issue; he obtained only 44 per cent of the vote from those who placed him and Nixon equidistant from themselves; and he was supported by only 13 per cent of those who perceived Nixon as closer. Similar results from an analysis of the liberal-conservative measure indicate a stronger covariation between "issue proximity" and vote than between stated policy preference and vote.²¹

²¹ It may be suggested, however, that the stronger relationship between the proximity measure and vote is simply a spurious relationship arising because individuals locating themselves on the left systematically placed McGovern closer to themselves and Nixon farther away, while those on the right did just the opposite when responding to the survey instrument. Relationships such as those between the Vietnam proximity and vote (presented in Figure 3a) persist even after controlling for left and right self-placement on the issue. This is clearly revealed by the partial correlations between vote and the proximity measures for each of 14 separate public policy issues. The partial correlations remain virtually identical to the zero-order corre-

¹⁹ These criteria are dealt with in Richard A. Brody and B. J. Page, "Comment: The Assessment of Policy Voting," *The American Political Science Review*, 66 (June 1972), 450-458.

²⁰ Two features of the 7-point issue scales allow us to operationalize this linkage. First, all issues are screened for saliency to the individual respondent. The survey questions utilizing the 7-point scales have a self-contained saliency screen which asks, "Or haven't you thought much about this?" This helps in meeting the saliency requirement of the proximity model of issue voting. Secondly, the respondent is asked to locate each candidate on each scale. Thus, for every issue a trichotomous proximity index parsimoniously reveals which candidate is seen as closer to the voter or if the two alternatives are equidistant.

The proximity measures are computed by simply comparing the absolute differences between the individual's self-location and the candidate position on the 7-point issue scale and assigning to the individual respondent a score of -1 if closer to McGovern, +1 if closer to Nixon, and zero if equidistant from both candidates.

With more than a dozen specific issue items available for analysis, a simplification of the data pertaining to issues is obviously desirable. The search for a parsimonious assessment of policy voting led to a factor analysis of the numerous issue questions included in the study. This analysis disclosed four general issue dimensions defined by policies concerning the *war*, and *economic, social, and cultural issues*.²² The war domain included the issues of Vietnam withdrawal, amnesty for

draft dodgers, and reducing military spending. The issues of government health insurance and a government guaranteed standard of living were the best representatives of the economic dimension. Attitudes toward urban unrest, campus unrest, protecting the rights of those accused of crime, and government aid to minorities formed the social issue domain. Finally, the issues of equal rights for women, abortion and the legalization of marijuana composed the cultural issue dimension. A normal vote analysis of the proximity measures for these four issue domains is presented in Figure 4 and reveals an exceptionally strong short-term component for each issue domain. The data of Figure 4 show that by aggregating issues into general domains and employing the proximity format, the objectives of analytic parsimony and predictive power are maximized.

Ideological Politics in 1972

The normal-vote analysis of the four issue domains documents a substantial relationship between issues and the vote.²³ The implications of the factor analysis four-factor solution, however, go well beyond the simple relationship of the four issue domains to the vote. In addition to the structuring of attitudes implied by the solution, the voter's self-location on the liberal-conservative scale was clearly relevant to all four factors. This suggests a degree of consistency in issue attitudes that has traditionally been associated with an ideological interpretation of politics.²⁴ Indeed, a multivariate analysis of the role of issues in determining vote preference with the liberal-conservative proximity measure included as an "issue" demonstrates that the liberal-conservative measure is as strong a predictor of the vote as the most potent issue proximity measure based on any one of the four issue domains. This relative importance of the liberal-conservative measure implies that a broad segment of the population in 1972 was reacting to politics in a fairly ideological manner.

lation after controlling for the respondent's stated policy preference on each issue. However, when the proximity measure is used as the statistical control in computing the partial correlations, the resulting partial between vote and policy preference is always either very close to zero or at least much smaller than the zero-order relation between self-location and vote. These findings demonstrate that it is almost entirely the proximity model that explains the relationship between an individual's own policy preference and his vote decision. Regardless of an individual's own position on the issues, he is considerably more likely to vote for the candidate he believes to be closer to him on the salient issues than for the candidate he perceives as relatively further from his own policy preference.

Other data, however, suggest that rationalization and/or candidate persuasion may have inflated the correlation between the proximity measures and the vote. For instance, the *long-term* index values for the Vietnam and liberal-conservative proximity indices of Figure 3 were larger than those for the comparable self-location items of Figure 2. This indicates that party identification may have been inducing congruence between the vote and candidate proximity. That is, Democrats who were not entirely aware of McGovern's position on the issues may have been placing McGovern closer to themselves on the issues simply because he was a Democrat and they eventually voted for him because of that, not because of the issues.


Other analysis also suggested that there was some tendency for positive candidate affect to result in closer proximity to a candidate despite the respondent's own issue position. Thus, positive attitudes toward a candidate or his party may have caused respondents with unclear perception of the candidate's policy position to place their preferred candidate closer to themselves on the issues. This in turn would have increased, spuriously, the relationship between the proximity measures and vote. A similar result would have occurred if the respondent had not formulated an attitude on the issue but had simply placed himself at the issue position he believed to coincide with his preferred candidate or party. The rationalization and persuasion effects may have inflated the correlation between proximity measures and the vote, leading to an overestimate of the rational policy voting that did indeed occur. This problem is, however, greatly reduced when conducting multiple equation analyses that include measures of the factors presumed to cause the rationalization or persuasion effects. That is, if these effects are the result of affect toward the candidate or party loyalty, then their spurious relationship to the vote will be removed from the direct relationship between the issue proximity and the vote by including the assessment of candidate affect and party identification in the same explanatory equation containing the issue measures. This is exactly the strategy that was pursued when assessing the relative importance of the several factors affecting the election outcome.

²² A factor analysis of some twenty issues was employed to ascertain the dimensional structure of the issue space. The loadings of the items on their respective common factors were all above .6.

²³ The results of a multivariate analysis with the two-party vote as the dependent variable and the several individual issue proximities excluding the liberal-conservative scale but including party identification revealed the seven most important single issues. These were, in order of importance as determined by a step-wise regression: Vietnam, a government guarantee of a job and good standard of living, dealing with campus unrest, protecting the rights of individuals accused of crimes, legalization of marijuana, the use of busing to achieve racial integration of schools, and urban unrest. These seven issue proximities explained roughly 60 per cent of the variance in the vote. The last four mentioned issues, however, each added only 1 per cent of explained variance and only 2 per cent more explained variance is achieved after adding eight other issues to the regression analysis.

²⁴ Philip E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," Chap. 6 in *Ideology and Discontent*, ed. David Apter (New York: Free Press, 1964).

Figures 4a-d: Normal Vote Analysis of Issue Proximity Measures for Major Issue Domains



Notes a) The Republican vote is always 100% minus the Democratic vote; b) the category N's below each figure are for Expected Vote (top row) and the Observed Vote (bottom row), respectively.

As Converse points out,

... The use of such basic dimensions of judgment as the liberal-conservative continuum betokens a contextual grasp of politics that permits a wide range of more specific idea-elements to be organized into more tightly constrained wholes. ... There are many crucial consequences of such organization: With it, for example, new political events have more meaning, retention of political information from the past is far more adequate, and political behavior increasingly approximates that of sophisticated "rational" models, which assume relatively full information.²⁵

The relationship between the liberal-conservative proximity measure and the vote in 1972 is, of course, only inferential evidence of the tightly constrained attitude sets that Converse has equated with ideology. What must be added to authenticate a role for "ideology" in the 1972 election is a direct investigation of the interrelatedness of preferences on public policy questions and of the consistency

between the respondents' self-location on specific issue questions and the respondents' self-location on the liberal-conservative continuum.

Table 2 provides data on such interrelatedness of attitudes. The interrelatedness of attitudes on issues can be inspected in terms of correlations both within the clusters of issues that constitute the four issue domains and between the several items forming the separate clusters.

The entries in Table 2 show within-domain and between-domain correlations that are quite high for mass public survey data. These data are consistent with findings reported in previous studies²⁶ that show relatively higher levels of attitude constraint than were found prior to 1964. This temporal change in the level of ideology has paralleled,

²⁶ Norman H. Nie and Kristi Andersen, "Mass Belief Systems Revisited: Political Change and Attitude Structure," *The Journal of Politics*, 36 (August, 1974), 540-591; Gerald M. Pomper, "From Confusion to Clarity: Issues and American Voters, 1956-1968," *The American Political Science Review*, 66 (June, 1972), 415-428.

²⁵ Converse, "Nature of Belief Systems," p. 227.

Table 2: Ideological Constraint: Inter-Item Correlations for Issues and Liberal/Conservative

		Vietnam	Amnesty	Military	St of Living	Insurance	Urban	Campus	Accused	Minorities	Women	Abortion	Marijuana	Busing	Lib/Con
WAR	Vietnam														
	Amnesty	.42													
	Military	.38	.30												
ECONOMIC	St of Living	.22	.27	.15											
	Insurance	.22	.23	.14	.33										
SOCIAL	Urban	.14	a	a	.25	a									
	Campus	.22	a	a	.25	a	.39								
	Accused	.20	.28	.16	.18	.12	.37	.41							
	Minorities	.23	.30	.22	.38	.23	.39	.42	.35						
CULTURAL	Women	.12	.08	.09	.04	.08	.08	.17	.17	.18					
	Abortion	.09	.17	.18	.02	.06	.10	.16	.11	.10	.24				
	Marijuana	.22	.27	.24	.06	.16	.19	.40	.29	.25	.28	.37			
BUSING	Busing	.26	.30	.23	.30	.16	.25	.34	.25	.35	.13	.10	.25		
IDEOLOGY	Lib/Con	.31	.42	.31	.32	.31	.27	.41	.32	.38	.19	.12	.32	.37	
Average Correlations															
Within-domain:		.36													
Between-domains:		.18													
With Lib/Con:		.31													
Total Matrix:		.24													

^a Note—Correlations between Insurance, Amnesty, and Military Spending on the one hand, and Urban and Campus Unrest on the other, are unattainable, since these sets of questions were on opposite half-samples on the study design.

^b The within-domain interitem correlations are contained within the triangles circumscribed by the solid lines. The between-domain interitem correlations as well as the correlations of individual items with the liberal-conservative scale, are circumscribed by the broken lines.

if not produced, the change in issue polarization in the population. Furthermore, the change in indicators of ideological structuring of political attitudes coincides with the upgrading in the quality of political rhetoric and debate that has occurred since the 1960 presidential campaign. It doubtless reflects the fact that the past 12 years have witnessed an increased articulation of the ideological differences between the parties, as well as political interpretations of the pervasive social and cultural turbulence that has been so widely transmitted by the mass media. In short, the increase in the ideological nature of public opinion can be understood to be the consequence of spokesmen, and movements, utilizing public—and often out-of-the-ordinary—channels for airing their grievances.

The increased clarity of both policy disagreements and ideological constraint is particularly well documented by the apparently consistent meanings associated with the liberal-conservative

scale. Studies investigating the meaning of liberal-conservative differences in mass populations have often found contradictory, confused, and unclear images associated with those two terms. The rather substantial correlations in the bottom line of Table 2 suggest that there is much less confusion today in translating certain political issues and events into a liberal-conservative framework.

The Impact of Issues and Party

Richard Nixon won a truly impressive electoral victory on November 7, 1972. Not only did he obtain 94 per cent of the vote among self-proclaimed Republicans and 66 per cent among Independents, but he also captured 42 per cent of the vote among self-identified Democrats. This feat seems even more impressive when it is recalled that in 1952 Dwight Eisenhower, perhaps the most popular and personally appealing candidate since Franklin

D. Roosevelt, attracted only 28 per cent of the votes cast by Democrats.

By the simplest of logic, party identification, which has traditionally been seen as the most important determinant of American voting behavior, must have been seriously challenged by other causal factors in 1972. For several years, voting researchers have argued that issue concerns have escaped the low levels of saliency in which they languished during the "issueless" fifties. The evidence we have just reviewed supports that argument. But how does one measure the relative weight of issue concerns and partisan predispositions in deciding an election? Even the most naive test must compare the direct effects of the various explanatory factors in a single multivariate analysis.

The results of one such multivariate analysis demonstrate that the liberal-conservative and war indices were by far the most important of the "issue proximity" measures, while the economic and cultural issues showed relatively weaker independent effects. Most crucially, however, the proximity measures, when taken together as reflecting ideology and policy voting, were substantially more important as direct explanations of the vote than was party identification. At the same time it must be noted that party identification has been theoretically interpreted as a perceptual screen or predisposing attitude that is much further removed, in a causal sense, from the actual vote decision than are either candidate assessments or attitudes on issues as measured with proximity indices.²⁷ For many respondents, this implies that party identification has a predisposing effect that forces images of candidates and attitudes or issues to be consistent with party attitudes which, in turn, are the factors that directly affect the vote decision. Therefore, since party identification is not coordinate in a causal sense with candidate assessments and issue attitudes, its total effect on the vote cannot be ascertained from a simple regression analysis based on one point in time. Follow-

²⁷ It might be suggested that if self-placement on the issues were used in place of the proximities, party identification might appear to be relatively more potent because these measures are more coordinate in the causal sense in which they are treated by Angus Campbell et al., *The American Voter*, p. 128. A multiple regression was therefore performed using the 1972 self-placement issue measures instead of proximities. The calculations show that some of the issues were still as important as party identification in predicting the vote. But as Kessel has pointed out, comparisons of the relative magnitude of relations using different types of question formats are fraught with methodological difficulties. The relationship between these different types of issue questions and party identification along with possible shifts in the relationship over time is quite difficult to discern. See John H. Kessel, "Comment: The Issues in Issue Voting," *The American Political Science Review*, 66 (June 1972), 460-461.

ing this argument, however, the total effects of partisan attachment may be better estimated and compared with those of the proximity measures through stagewise regression analysis or from a limited causal modeling analysis using path coefficients.


In a stagewise regression²⁸ analysis, party identification was the first entered predictor of vote. Other variables were allowed to operate only on the remaining unexplained variance. This procedure maintains the theoretical notion that party attitudes are long-term central attitudes that heavily influence reactions to specific issues and candidates. This analysis revealed that 31 per cent of the variance in the vote was explained by party identification as the first variable in the equation. After party identification, the issue proximity measures were entered into the equation and they explained an *additional* 31 per cent of the variance in the vote. The beta coefficient for party identification in the equation that included the proximity measures was .19, whereas the largest single beta among the policy indices was .21—for the social index. Thus, the proximity measures of issue attitudes were exceptionally potent predictors of the vote even after controlling for party identification.

This conclusion was further strengthened with the computations of a path analysis.²⁹ Using a simple three-variable model with the vote, party

²⁸ The stage-wise regression employed here operated on a "case deletion" procedure, that is, a case was excluded from the analysis if missing data was encountered for any single variable used. The order of the variables entered and the beta coefficients for each variable in the final equation was as follows: party identification (.13), the liberal-conservative proximity (.11), war (.08), social (.16), economic (.03), and radical indices (.01), a measure of reaction to McGovern's campaign performance (.06), McGovern (-.26), and Nixon (.25) thermometer ratings. The multiple *R* was .82 and *R*² equaled .68.

²⁹ For a concise statement of path analysis see Donald E. Stokes, "Compound Paths in Political Analysis," in *Mathematical Applications in Political Science V*, ed. James F. Herndon and Joseph L. Bernd (Charlottesville, Virginia: University Press of Virginia, 1971), pp. 70-92.

A four-variable, multiple equation, path analysis including party identification, a single composite issue proximity measure, a composite candidate thermometer and the vote confirms the results of the stage-wise regression and the limited causal analysis presented in the text. The path coefficients and total effects summed from the several equations for the three independent variables are presented below.



It should be noted that the total effects are only for the

identification, and a single composite proximity measure based on 15 specific issues (but excluding the liberal-conservative item), we found the total effect of party identification to be .51, whereas the issue effect was .55. *As an explanation of the vote in 1972, issues were at least equally as important as party identification.*³⁰ Of course, since party identification is a preconditioning factor influencing political behavior over a long period of time, it is still somewhat inappropriate to gauge its total effect on national electoral behavior with a single cross-sectional survey. This problem simply cannot be circumvented with the present data. Nevertheless, the comparison of the party identification and issue effects clearly demonstrates the significance of policy-related evaluations as an explanation of the 1972 election outcome.

This finding is consonant with the issue polarization so clearly found, particularly among Democrats. During a period of issue consensus or strong alignment between issue orientation and traditional partisan divisions, party ties can be expected to have a significant impact, both directly and as a predisposing agent, on the vote decision. However, during periods when questions of policy attain new levels of public salience and divide the population in a fashion that is orthogonal to traditional partisan differences, other political stimuli, such as new candidates and especially candidates associated with the new issues, may become relatively more important in explaining voting behavior. If a series of new issues endures and develops a profundity and centrality that competes with the predisposing potential of party identification, a good deal of inconsistency between traditional partisan attitudes and behavior will be observed. This inconsistency may simply endure until (1) either the attitudinal differences are resolved through the disappearance of the new issues, (2) or the new issue attitudes gain ascendancy and erode the previously central partisan attitude so that it may be changed to coincide with the new issue orientation, or (3) party leaders reorient the parties and resolve the conflict. Under any circum-

stance other than the last, partisan realignment may occur at an ideological or cultural attitudinal level, rather than as change originating in the sociological bases of party support. Of course, the degree to which realignment could possibly occur at only the attitudinal level depends on the strength of association between new issue alignments and sociological cleavages. Furthermore, such a realignment would occur only to the extent that new partisan cues emanating from leaders and policies correspond with the new issue cleavages. A systematic investigation of the realignment question will not be entertained in this paper, but the point to be made here is that the 1972 data indicate that the direct results of the inertial, or predisposing, effects of party identification are for the first time in at least 20 years slightly less potent in determining voting behavior than are issue attitudes.

Without exploring the topic of sociocultural cleavages, it should be noted that the relative importance of party identification in the 1972 vote varied among different demographic subgroups. Comparisons across education levels are particularly interesting, for they help to explain the predominance of ideology and issues in this election. As the focus of analysis moves across educational levels from grade school to college, the bulk of the explanatory power shifts from candidate image to issues and ideology. Voters with a college education are better informed politically, generally more cognizant of policy differences between the candidates and, therefore, more likely to make a vote decision on the basis of policy preferences than are less well educated individuals. It is apparently far easier for college-educated individuals to translate issue attitudes into a vote decision than for the relatively less well educated who use the candidate as an intervening focus for their ideology. The relatively greater importance of issues as an explanation of the 1972 election may, therefore, be partially a delayed reflection of the changing composition of the electorate. This hypothesis is supported by the finding that since 1964 turnout rates among the relatively less well educated have been declining, while turnout for the college educated group has remained rather stable and, indeed, actually *increased* between 1968 and 1972.³¹

The net result of these turnout trends was a voting population (that is, those who reported actually

model presented. This model assumes that issue attitudes are not determined by candidate ratings; thus it corresponds to the requirements for policy voting as stated in the text.

³⁰ A preliminary attempt to determine the effects of issues on the vote was made by D. M. Kovenock, P. L. Beardsley and J. W. Prothro, "Status, Party, Ideology Issues, and Candidate Choice: A Preliminary Theory-Relevant Analysis of the 1968 American Presidential Election," paper delivered at Specialist Meeting B: XI ("New Approaches to the Study of Social Structure and Voting Behavior"), Eighth World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Munich, Germany, August 31–September 5, 1970. It should be pointed out that contrary to what we treat as issues Kovenock et al., included reactions to individuals such as the vice-presidential candidates as an issue.

³¹ Turnout in presidential elections from 1964 to 1972 was as follows:

Turnout by Education, 1964–1972			
	1964	1968	1972
Grade School	68%	60%	58%
High School	78	77	70
College	89	84	87

These data are from the CPS national election surveys for the indicated years.

voting) in which 37 per cent had at least some college education in 1972, compared to only 26 per cent in 1964. Given their generally higher level of formal education, the population of actual voters in 1972 was better prepared to respond to the candidates in terms of policy preferences than were the voters in 1964.

An additional explanation for the decreased predictive power of party identification is that partisan attachment itself had declined significantly in the population by 1972 as evidenced by an increase in the percentage of self-identified Independents between 1964 and 1972. In 1964, some 23 per cent of the eligible electorate described themselves as Independents; by 1968 that figure had risen to 30 per cent; and in 1972 it was 35 per cent.³² Given this increase in Independents, party identification was a meaningful predisposing factor for a much smaller proportion of the electorate in 1972 than it had been in earlier elections. With the shrinking of partisan attachment, party loyalty could, in turn, be expected to account somewhat less powerfully for the vote decision.

If these trends in turnout and partisan identification continue, issues can be expected to play an increasingly significant role in future elections. This circumstance would obviously have a long-lasting, major influence on political behavior, particularly at the level of presidential elections.

Candidate Preferences

At the outset it was suggested that the growth of issue polarization in the electorate, and the increased importance of issues as determinants of the vote decision have been, at least in part, a response to a new policy-oriented style of elite leadership. One test of this contention can be derived from the variation in candidate preferences that characterize voters with different policy orientations.

Before the election, the respondents in the national survey were asked to give a global, affective reaction to a number of political leaders. They were asked to locate the presidential and vice-presidential candidates, as well as a number of other national political figures, on a "feeling thermometer."³³

³² It should be noted that the Independents Category includes those individuals who lean toward one of the parties as well as those who have no tendency to identify with a party. When "leaning" Independents are excluded, the per cent of Independents increased from 8 per cent in 1964 to 13 per cent in 1972. Most of this increase in Independents appeared, in the aggregate, to be at the expense of the Democrats since their proportion of the electorate declined from 52 per cent in 1964 to 41 per cent in 1972. At the same time the proportion of Republicans remained quite stable at about 25 per cent.

³³ The feeling thermometer is a measure that allows the respondent to indicate his feelings or affect toward the candidates. The measure runs from zero degrees as most un-

Table 3. Average Ratings of Major 1972 Political Figures
(In "Degrees" on "Feeling Thermometer")

	Total	Policy Orientation		
		Left	Center	Right
Richard Nixon	65.5	54.4	67.8	72.8
Edward "Ted" Kennedy	55.3	67.1	54.3	44.6
Spiro Agnew	54.3	41.6	56.0	62.9
Thomas Eagleton	53.9	57.2	54.8	51.5
Hubert Humphrey	53.1	58.5	54.0	48.0
R. Sargent Shriver	50.0	59.1	49.9	42.5
Edmund Muskie	49.9	55.6	49.9	45.5
George Wallace	49.4	33.4	49.7	60.7
George McGovern	48.9	61.9	46.7	39.4
Henry "Scoop" Jackson	48.5	46.6	50.7	48.1
John Lindsay	47.9	54.9	46.9	43.1
Shirley Chisholm	45.6	57.8	43.0	37.2
(Range of N's)	(1306- 2633)	(332- 706)	(389- 735)	(456- 912)

Although there were predictable partisan biases and racial differences in the ratings given to the candidates, the largest variations were found with respect to the general left-right policy preference typology.³⁴ Mean thermometer ratings, based on the five-issue policy orientation index defined earlier have been entered in Table 3 for advocates of the left, center and right. These comparisons reveal marked differences in attitudes toward the candidates. McGovern, obviously the preferred candidate among individuals in favor of changing the social order, received little positive support from the right. Nixon, on the other hand, received his highest mean ratings from the law-and-order, social control advocates; the centrists were slightly less supportive of the President, and those on the left even less so. Vice President Spiro Agnew's popularity followed essentially the same pattern as that found for the President but was approximately

favorable to 100 degrees as most favorable; 50 degrees is the neutral response.

³⁴ There were sharp racial differences underlying the overall candidate ratings. When whites are examined separately, Nixon's rating goes up while McGovern's drops to where only Chisholm's mean rating is lower—and Wallace replaces Kennedy as the most popular Democratic political figure. This latter reversal basically reflects partisan differences in the assessment of Kennedy and the highly positive attitude of Republicans toward George Wallace. Among white Democrats, Wallace rated sixth, behind Kennedy, Humphrey, Shriver, McGovern, and Muskie, in that order. While Wallace's popularity increased dramatically among whites between 1968 and 1972, blacks remained steadfastly and strongly negative toward him, no doubt in reaction to the segregationist and strict law-and-order image popularly associated with Wallace. Black ratings of Kennedy, on the other hand, were exceedingly high. McGovern also rated relatively much higher among blacks, surpassing even civil rights champion Hubert Humphrey.


10 degrees lower. Wallace emerged as the only Democrat preferred on the right, falling only slightly below Agnew. The total population means of Table 3 reveal a substantially higher rating for Nixon than for any other political leader included in the list. The second highest ranking political leader, Ted Kennedy, was rated a full 10 degrees lower than Nixon. McGovern was rated exceptionally low, even in comparison to other Democratic leaders. McGovern's mean rating was not only 16 degrees below Nixon's, but it was also slightly higher than that of only three political leaders: Jackson, Lindsay, and Chisholm.³⁵ Nixon's mean thermometer rating in 1972 was virtually unchanged from what it was in 1968,³⁶ but in light of the data from Table 3, the notion that he was only a moderately popular candidate in 1972 becomes largely myth. The data strongly suggest that Nixon would have been a formidable opponent for even the most popular of Democratic political leaders.

Most instructive of all comparisons is the discovery that Nixon alone was rated positively (above 50 degrees) by all three groups on the policy preference spectrum. The ratings of the policy preference groups also suggest why a candidate such as McGovern who may represent only one segment of the national policy preference spectrum may capture control of a political party that shares his policy preferences but can not go on to win an electoral victory under contemporary conditions of polarization.

In many respects the 1968 Wallace candidacy, and the strongly conservative issue orientation of the Democrats defecting to vote for him, may have foreshadowed the 1972 presidential contest. If so, however, the strongest argument is not necessarily based on the presumption that past voting behavior is a more important determinant of a current vote decision than is a vestigial psychological identification with a particular party.³⁷ A previous vote that was contrary to an individual's party identification may itself lead to further defection. But the argument of the present era rests on the persistence of policy preferences that were not well matched by the stands of official party candidates either in 1968 or 1972. The Wallace vote in 1968 constituted a halfway point for individuals on their

way out of the Democratic ranks and into the Republican party, and the 1972 vote of former Democrats may have represented solidification of this realignment. The 1972 normal vote expectation for Wallace supporters of 1968 was still strongly Democratic, however, and the 1972 outcome was seemingly set by voters who still called themselves Democrats, despite a two-election pattern of voting against both Humphrey and McGovern. The common element seems to have been the policy preferences of the Democratic defectors. As Figure 5a demonstrates, almost 8 out of 10 individuals who said they voted for Wallace in 1968 cast their ballot for Nixon in 1972; a full 40 per cent below their expected Democratic proportion of the two-party vote. Yet McGovern secured the vote of almost as many of the 1968 Humphrey voters as he normally could have expected, only a 3 per cent deviation below the expected 77 per cent.

Figures 5a-b: Normal Vote Analysis of Wallace Support Indices



Note: a) The Republican vote is always 100% minus the Democratic Vote; (b) the category N's below each figure are for the Expected Vote (top row) and the Observed Vote (bottom row) respectively.

³⁵ The Eagleton ratings appear to be aberrantly high and were apparently inflated by a sympathy factor; they tend to vary only slightly across otherwise analytically useful population subgroups and were therefore ignored in the various comparisons discussed.

³⁶ Converse et al., "Continuity and Change in American Politics," Table 2 on p. 1088.

³⁷ Walter DeVries and V. L. Tarrance, *The Ticket-Splitter: A New Force in American Politics* (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1972) places primary importance on past voting behavior as an explanation of the individual electoral decision.

The overwhelming defection rate of the 1968 Wallace supporters does not necessarily substantiate the claim that the 1968 voting act was the cause of the 1972 defection. Many Democrats who voted for Wallace in 1968 probably did not perceive that vote as contrary to their Democratic party identification and were not, therefore, consciously beginning a move to Republican voting. Furthermore, self-identified Democrats in general who rated Wallace higher than McGovern or any other Democrat, *regardless of previous voting behavior*, also defected heavily from their partisan identification. Figure 5b reveals that McGovern received only 16 per cent of the vote from the Democrats who rated Wallace higher than any other Democratic leader, an amazing 65 per cent less of the two-party vote than he could, on the basis of the normal-vote, have expected from that group. McGovern obviously was exceptionally unpopular among these Wallace supporters who represented more than one out of every four Democrats. Nixon on the other hand, was very warmly regarded. It appears that the absence of a preferred Democratic candidate in 1972 may be the more parsimonious explanation of the massive defection by 1968 Wallace supporters. That is, these conservative individuals, in the absence of Wallace and the presence of McGovern, chose their next most preferred candidate—Nixon. Policy orientations and *candidate* coalitions thus began to emerge.

The 1968 data have already illustrated that the polarization among Democrats existed at least four years prior to 1972, and that the availability of two Democratic candidates in 1968 gave these cleavages an electoral embodiment that did not have to involve massive defection to the Republican candidate. In many respects, then, the two presidential contests seem to have been defined by quite similar confrontations between left- and right-oriented Democrats. A deliberately oversimplified view of 1972 as a rerun of 1968, minus the right-wing Democratic alternative provided earlier by Wallace, is of no small use in understanding what happened. Two factors plainly depressed McGovern's electoral performance relative to Humphrey's. First, McGovern was not a personally appealing candidate—a very important factor under conditions of issue polarization, for it allowed issue differences to gain maximal importance. And second, his emergence to the left of Humphrey evoked somewhat more policy disagreement from the conservative segment of his own party than Humphrey could have expected.³⁸

³⁸ The 1972 study did not have respondents place Humphrey on the issues; thus we cannot directly assess the difference between him and McGovern. Differences perceived between candidates can, however, be determined from analysis of the candidate thermometers. The general

Nevertheless, the coalition structure of the Democratic party suggests that a more centrist nominee would still have found himself more distant from his conservative co-partisans than was Nixon. This enduring schism within the Democratic ranks signals future difficulties in partisan strategies that the Democrats will have to overcome. It raises the possibility that both the attitudinal and demographic basis of the Democratic party have been eroded by the short-term forces operating in the 1968 and 1972 elections and thus suggests, in turn, the continuing possibilities of partisan realignment.

The Democratic Coalition

Much of the popular debate over the election outcome and the obvious disarray among the Democrats has focused on McGovern as the cause of both these phenomena. He was, after all, personally unpopular and, more important, on vital policy questions his stance was perceived as far to the left of his party's mainstream. Electorally Mc-

methodology of multidimensional scaling that provides this information, as well as a similar analysis of the 1968 presidential candidates, can be found in Herbert F. Weisberg and Jerrold Rusk, "Dimensions of Candidate Evaluation," *The American Political Science Review*, 64 (December, 1970), 1167-1185.

Weisberg and Rusk found that a two-dimensional space provided a "good" solution with a stress of .05 using Kruskal's formula one for stress. In 1972 the two-dimensional solution has a stress of .05 with formula two which gives larger stress values than does formula one for the same solution. The two-dimensional solution places the political figures at the following locations:

Political Leader	Dimension:	
	One	Two
George McGovern	.030	.864
Edward Kennedy	.089	.807
R. Sargent Shriver	-.018	.733
Shirley Chisholm	-.254	.681
Hubert Humphrey	.297	.634
Edmund Muskie	-.034	.582
John Lindsay	-.389	.538
Henry Jackson	-.142	-.263
Spiro Agnew	.072	-1.501
George Wallace	.417	-1.525
Richard Nixon	-.068	-1.551

The solution indicates a clear differentiation between the Democratic cluster of leaders and the Republicans plus Wallace on the second dimension and very little difference between any of the political leaders on dimension one. This suggests what the stress value of .08 for a one-dimensional solution confirms, namely, that a one-dimensional solution fits the data nearly as well as a two-dimensional solution. This finding strongly supports the argument that the public was reacting to these political leaders in a highly ideological fashion. Furthermore, the solution demonstrates that while voters perceived a definite difference between McGovern and Humphrey, that difference is not strikingly great. Indeed, the only middle-of-the-road politician according to this solution was Henry ("Scoop") Jackson. Finally, the configuration vividly displays the convergence between Wallace and Nixon that was discussed earlier with respect to the issues.

McGovern did very poorly among traditional Democratic voting groups—less well, in general, than Hubert Humphrey had four years earlier. McGovern received only 41 per cent of the working-class vote, 40 per cent of the Catholic vote, 43 per cent of the union-household vote, and 40 per cent of the votes from those with grade-school educations. He did not attain even half of the Northeastern vote or the urban vote. He did relatively well among blacks and young people, but among whites, the middle-aged, and older people, his vote was exceptionally meager.

A normal vote analysis, however, puts McGovern's losses in a somewhat different perspective. In Figure 6, we see that although the long-term associations of sociological variables with party identification run in the traditional directions, they are not exceedingly high in the first place; the highest Long-Term Index (L) value is 4.79, for Religion. In the short run, we find that voting in 1972 accentuated the traditional relationship between partisan differences and place of residence, religion, and race; maintained the relationship with occupational class and union affiliation; and deviated only slightly from the tradi-


tional relationship with education and region. McGovern's failure was thus more a case of shortfall among all major white demographic groups than of disproportionate losses among traditionally Democratic groups.³⁹

Throughout the 1972 campaign and after the election the McGovern coalition was referred to as an "elite"—both in the sense of holding unrepresentative views and in the even more pejorative sense of being socially distinct and seeking unfair influence in party decision making. The implication of this argument is that the 1972 Democratic vote contingent was not only very different from

³⁹ McGovern, in fact, did better among some traditionally Democratic groups than was predicted prior to the election. Jews, for example, voted 3 per cent more Democratic than normally expected, a rather interesting finding since prior to the election there was much journalistic discussion of the Israeli urging that American Jews vote for Nixon because of his foreign policy.

For a more extensive discussion of how the voting in 1972 for various demographic groups compared to the expected and observed voting patterns of these groups since 1952 see Arthur H. Miller and Warren E. Miller, "Issues, Candidates and Partisan Divisions in the 1972 U.S. Election," *The British Journal of Political Science*, (September, 1975).

Figures 6a-h: Normal Vote Analysis of Demographic Groups



(Figures 6a-h continues)


that which voted for Humphrey in 1968, but that it was also quite distinct demographically from the traditional Democratic coalition. It has already been demonstrated that on a wide array of divisive issues McGovern supporters were, indeed, so liberal as to be unrepresentative of aggregate Democratic attitudes. Yet it cannot be forgotten that a majority of Democrats (58 per cent) still voted for McGovern, albeit a smaller majority than that secured by Humphrey in 1968. When the 1972 Democratic electorate is divided according to recalled 1968 vote, and these support groups are examined for issue positions, a coalition structure emerges that is highly similar to that associated with the 1972 candidate choice.

The social component of the "McGovern elite" myth is even more thoroughly contradicted by the data. The 1972 support-group structure is displayed in Table 4. While blacks were removed from the analysis of Table 4 so that any observed differences would not be confused with racial effects, it should be noted that McGovern's support group had a substantially larger proportion of blacks than did his nonsupport groups. For instance, of the Democrats voting for McGovern, 26 per cent were black, compared to only 3 per cent

of the Democrats voting for Nixon. Among the total population, Nixon received slightly less than 2 per cent of his vote from blacks, while 20 per cent of the McGovern voters were black.

Among whites, McGovern's early support was quite similar to his final Democratic vote contingent. McGovern primary voters were, however, somewhat more likely to fall in the 30-59 age range and less likely to be 60 or older than Democrats voting for McGovern in the general election. They also tended to be slightly better educated, to come from middle income families, and to live outside the South more often than did the Democrats who cast their ballots for McGovern on November 7. Thus, while his primary supporters may be labeled as unrepresentative in terms of some sociological characteristics, on the whole McGovern appears to have been able to broaden his constituency during the campaign. It should be noted, however, that an unrepresentative set of partisans can be expected to vote in primaries, and that, with the exception of age,⁴⁰ their characteristics generally correspond to those cited above.

⁴⁰ Austin Ranney, "Turnout and Representation in Presidential Primary Elections," *The American Political Science Review*, 66 (March, 1972), 27. Ranney's findings



Note: 1) The Republican vote is always 100% minus the Democratic vote; 2) the category N's below each figure are for the Expected Vote (top row) and the Observed Vote (bottom row) respectively.

McGovern's early supporters were, however, quite distinct in some characteristics from those who voted for other Democratic primary contenders. McGovern primary voters were indeed more likely to be young, to be college educated, and to have a relatively high family income compared to those voting for some other Democrat in the primaries. But they were also more likely to have an urban background, to live in the Northeast, to be Catholic, and to come from a union household. Thus, while there were demographic differences between McGovern's supporters and nonsupporters in the primaries, these differences by no means always conform to the popular descriptions of McGovern's early coalition. When McGovern primary voters are compared to all self-identified Democrats, we find that although the same differences remain evident, they are generally not as large, revealing that McGovern's early supporters were not exceptionally distinct from the traditional Democratic coalition.

In short, the data of Table 4 provide only erratic confirmation of the hypothesis that McGovern's support, in either the primaries or the general election, was composed of a social minority sharply distinct from most Democrats. His supporters were, of course, disproportionately more black than his nonsupporters. And although the whites were to varying degrees relatively younger, better-off financially, better educated, and more nonsouthern, his support was not disproportionately composed of women or suburbanites as some political analysts were predicting prior to the election. On the contrary, some of the differences found tend to give the McGovern forces a demographic complexion that is fairly representative of the traditional Democratic coalition—namely, more Northeastern, urban, blue-collar, union-affiliated, and Catholic and Jewish. Whatever the composition of McGovern's visible backers, the data do not show that his rank-and-file supporters constituted a social elite.

A comparative look at the 1968 recall data reveals similar differences between the Humphrey and Wallace support group as were found between McGovern supporters and nonsupporters, except on the age variable. The age pattern fails to emerge because the youngest McGovern supporters were not in the 1968 electorate and because Wallace attracted a disproportionate share of the young vote in 1968. Otherwise, in addition to the fact that blacks fell almost entirely in the Humphrey group, we find that white Humphrey loyalists were better educated, less rural, and better off financially than

Wallace Democrats. But, they were also more Northeastern, urban, Catholic, and Jewish. It need not be argued that this demographic similarity between the coalition structures of the two elections extends to the micro level, although it perhaps does. The aggregate parallelisms are enough to dismiss the notion that the McGovern candidacy of 1972 was supported by an elite radically unrepresentative of the groups that supported Hubert Humphrey four years before. Furthermore, although the data imply that a slightly more centrist Democratic candidate might have narrowed the margin of victory, there is little evidence to suggest that such a candidate would have done significantly better in absolute vote-winning terms than Humphrey did in 1968 with 43 per cent of the total vote.

In summary, there remain abiding and predictable partisan differences between the sociological groupings defined along economic, racial, religious and residential class lines. Generally, the groups popularly associated with the Democratic and Republican parties tended to cast their vote in proportions consistent with their long-standing attachment to either of the two parties. The short-term influences in the 1972 election had relatively little differential impact by economic class; they cut across traditional socioeconomic and demographic differences. After the affective ratings of the candidates, the next most important short-term factor accounting for the voter's decision was a liberal-conservative ideology, that is, response to the candidates in terms of a single left-right dimension. This continuum provided a simple policy yardstick by which the presidential candidates were evaluated with respect to the voters' own policy orientation. For others who were less consistently liberal or conservative in their policy orientation, particular issues proved more important in explaining the vote than did the liberal-conservative summary measure.⁴¹ The war issue—including Vietnam policy, amnesty, and cutbacks in military spending—and the social issue—incorporating policy alternatives for dealing with urban problems and unrest, government aid to minorities, protection of individual civil liberties in criminal cases, and alternative modes

⁴¹ That the liberal-conservative scale is a summary policy measure is evident from its relation to the issues in Table 2. Further evidence is derived from the finding that as more and more issues are added to a composite proximity measure, the correlation between the composite index and the liberal-conservative measure increases up to a value of about .7.

One reason why certain specific issues had an important impact on the vote in addition to the liberal-conservative effect is that about a quarter of the voters could not place themselves on that continuum. The bulk of these respondents could, however, place themselves as well as the candidates on the more specific issue questions.

indicate that those who typically vote in state primaries are usually older and have a higher status in terms of income and occupation categories than the rest of the voting population. They are also more likely to participate in civic, religious and political organizations.

Table 4. Demographic Composition of the Candidates' Support Among Whites

	McGovern Primary Voters	Other Primary Voters	Democrats Voting for McGovern	Democrats Voting for Nixon	All Democrats	McGovern Voters	Nixon Voters
(N)	(67)	(98)	(279)	(262)	(807)	(445)	(1000)
AGE:							
18-24	19%	5%	19%	7%	13%	19%	10%
25-29	10	8	10	8	9	14	11
30-59	55	62	47	58	51	48	54
60+	16	25	24	27	27	19	25
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
EDUCATION:							
Grade School	13%	18%	21%	21%	25%	16%	14%
High School	45	50	45	55	51	44	49
College	42	31	34	24	24	40	37
INCOME:							
Less than \$4,000	12%	17%	17%	16%	19%	15%	12%
\$4,000-\$7,999	22	21	24	21	25	21	19
\$8,000-\$14,999	45	42	37	43	38	39	41
\$15,000 or more	21	20	22	20	18	25	28
SEX:							
Male	40%	38%	43%	42%	42%	41%	47%
Female	60	62	57	58	58	59	53
RESIDENCE:							
Urban	33%	16%	29%	21%	25%	29%	21%
Suburban	36	41	33	37	35	37	43
Rural	31	43	38	42	40	34	36
REGION:							
Northeast	33%	11%	25%	17%	20%	29%	22%
Midwest	30	29	31	23	27	32	32
South	13	41	23	46	37	20	29
West	24	19	21	14	16	19	17
RELIGION:							
Protestant	50%	73%	53%	61%	61%	57%	74%
Catholic	41	23	41	38	35	37	25
Jew	9	4	6	1	4	6	1
OCCUPATION:							
White Collar	55%	55%	49%	54%	47%	54%	59%
Blue Collar	45	45	51	46	53	46	41
SOCIAL CLASS ^a							
Working Class	51%	59%	49%	58%	58%	46%	48%
Middle Class	49	40	51	42	42	54	52
UNION HOUSEHOLD:							
Yes	38%	28%	35%	28%	30%	33%	23%
No	62	72	65	72	70	67	77

^a Respondent's self-perceived social class.

for dealing with student demonstrations—were the issue domains that contributes significantly to the explanation of the vote. The economic issues and the cultural issues (abortion, equality for women, and the legalization of marijuana) proved relatively less potent. The most important revelation of the foregoing analysis was the substantial impact of the polarizing effects of specific issues relevant to the election. Indeed, when the relative contributions of the three general factors explain-

ing the vote, namely, the candidates, parties and issues, are compared to previous elections, it becomes clear that not only was this an issue election but that it may more appropriately be labeled an ideological election. Above all else, the outcome of the election was the result of the ideological polarization within the Democratic ranks that pitted the left-wing Democrats against those on the right.

Comment: What Have You Done for Me Lately? Toward An Investment Theory of Voting*

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A resuscitation of the assumptions buried under the gravestones 'hence,' 'therefore,' 'because' and the like will often reveal that the explanation offered is poorly bounded or downright unacceptable.

—Karl Popper—

"A Majority Party in Disarray: Policy Polarization in the 1972 Election," by Arthur H. Miller, Warren E. Miller, Alden S. Raine and Thad A. Brown, the latest Survey Research Center/Center for Political Studies quadrennial election study offers a portrait of the American electorate which is in stark contrast with that which emerges from the *American Voter*, the classic product of the SRC's researches into voting behavior.¹ In effect, the authors of the latest version now declare the original account to be—in one of the more memorable phrases of recent political discourse—inoperative.

We agree strongly that the portrait presented in the *American Voter* is gravely flawed, but not be-

* We particularly want to thank Robert P. Abelson, Hayward Alker, Pauline Bisky, Roy D'Andrade, William A. Galston, Robert Jervis, Ithiel De Sola Pool, Howard Rosenthal, Susan Shirk, Leon Sigal, and Aaron Wildavsky for their advice and help. We are deeply in debt to Norman Frohlich and Joe A. Oppenheimer for guiding us through some of the more intricate problems of this paper.

¹ Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1960). In citing this and other works from the SRC corpus, we are attempting to outline the *central verbal model* underlying the work. We are fully aware that alternative quotations that qualify and sometimes even contradict can be found. For a similar effort, see Walter Dean Burnham, "Contributions of the SRC to the Development of Voting Theory" (paper presented at the Fall 1975 APSA convention.) As Burnham notes, "... it is fair to say that there is no single place in any of this immense (SRC) corpus of work where a comprehensive set of theoretical propositions concerning voting behavior is laid down, with each proposition linked with the next in a closed analytical framework. The problem therefore arises that any effort by an outside scholar to provide an approximation to such a summary is likely to be challenged as misleading or incomplete" (Burnham ms. pp. 4-5).

cause, as is now argued, the behavior of American voters in 1972 differed fundamentally from that of voters in past elections. We contend that the portrait is inaccurate because the model of political behavior used to construct it is flawed and inadequate. In this paper, we will outline an alternate framework, drawing on the economic approach to the study of politics pioneered by Anthony Downs.² In our view this framework makes it possible to account for electoral behavior over two decades in a more consistent and persuasive way than is achieved either by the original SRC approach or by this revision.

The *American Voter* described the elections of 1952 and 1956 as contests centered on candidate personality; it concluded that "the major role played by candidate appeal suggests the absence of overriding public concern to judge the policies of the candidates and their parties against the standards received from well-elaborated political ideologies."³

After the 1960 election, it was still believed that the voters were personality centered and not concerned with ideology: "The electorate seems quite capable of expressing its intolerance of circumstances it finds exasperating and it sometimes responds strongly to the personal qualities of an attractive candidate, but it is not well enough informed to follow a deliberate program of choice between conservative and liberal alternatives in government policies."⁴

² Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1957). Other examples of the rational-economic approach are: William H. Riker and Peter C. Ordeshook, "A Theory of the Calculus of Voting" *American Political Science Review* 63 (March 1968) 25-43; Arthur S. Goldberg, "Social Determinism and Rationality as Basis of Party Identification," *American Political Science Review* 62 (1969), 5-25; and Norman Frohlich, Joe A. Oppenheimer, Jeffrey A. Smith and Oran R. Young, "A Test of Downsian Voter Rationality: 1964 Presidential Voting," *American Political Science Review* (forthcoming).

³ Campbell et al., *The American Voter*, p. 550.

⁴ Angus Campbell, "Voters and Elections: Past and Present," *Journal of Politics*, 26 (November 1964), 756.

After the Johnson-Goldwater clash of 1964, the conclusion was, "The public may become aroused by current circumstances such as the Korean War in 1952 or by some attribute of the candidate such as Kennedy's religion, but is typically unconcerned about the inter-party debates over specific positions which agitate the party leadership and command copious space in the newspaper."⁵ And, in 1968, the SRC found that "... pushing beyond the expression of narrow and superficial attitudes in the mass public to the cognitive texture which underlies the attitudes is a rather disillusioning experience."⁶

The findings of "Majority Party" are in stark contrast to previous SRC/CPS findings. They state that, for the first time in 20 years, issues were more potent than party as a determinant of the vote (p. 770), that a "spectacular change in the quality of mass attitudes towards questions of public policy" (p. 754) has occurred and that voters are now becoming ideological. (p. 766) Repeatedly, in numerous passages of their paper the authors of "Majority Party" describe changes in the nature of the electorate or the nature of voting a change from party and candidate to ideology and issues, and claim an increased ideological content to the act of voting. The basis for these claims of change lies in comparisons with the findings of past Survey Research Center studies, but these past studies employed different *models, methods, and standards*. Since, when we compare the old and new models, the changed model produces massively different results for 1972 than does the older model for 1972, can anyone suppose it would produce the same results for 1964 or 1952?. To arrive at these new findings, the authors of "Majority Party" have introduced a model of voting that differs distinctly from the traditional model of voting that Survey Research Center analysts have used since the early 'fifties. This new model—and its associated methods and standards—generates conclusions about the 1972 election radically different from those produced for 1972 by the old "American Voter" model. The "American Voter" model and the school of voting research based on it have their roots in group theory. But now, in order to account for findings which the "American Voter" model cannot explain, the authors of "Majority Party" have incorporated ideas into their model from what is often described as the economic-rational school of voting research,

exemplified by the work of Anthony Downs. Yet in trying to repair the older model the authors have adopted those parts of Downs's work primarily concerned with the nature of policy voting and the aggregation of individual preferences into one-dimensional "ideological space." Some of these concepts are ill-suited to the study of actual voting because they fail to take into account the context of American politics; in other cases, they are simply incorrect as originally formulated. A different aspect of Downs' work which we will emphasize here is the analysis of the costs of information with its implications for the role of informational shortcuts and the origins and nature of issue concerns.

The first section of this paper presents in brief form the six-factor model that was used in earlier SRC/CPS election studies and employs it to test claims of change made both directly and obliquely in "Majority Party." The second section begins to develop a theory of voting based on the idea of the voter as an investor and of each vote as *an investment in one or more collective goods under conditions of uncertainty with costly and imperfect information*. Particular attention is directed to four areas where the investor-voter model highlights problems of the central verbal models which underlie "Majority Party" and previous SRC work: the cost of information, the role of parties, the role of candidates in a system like ours, and the role of ideology.

Section three provides some evidence from the 1972 McGovern election studies suggesting that the size of McGovern's defeat was not the foregone conclusion it is now assumed to have been, that the campaign made a difference, that voters did differentiate between various aspects of the candidates and that McGovern's perceived incompetence was extremely costly to him. Finally, in our conclusion we point out the directions that voting research ought to follow in future years to answer the questions raised by the investor-voter approach.

The 1972 Election in Historical Context

The 1972 election, according to "Majority Party," was "very different from the presidential elections of the fifties" because of the "increased importance of issues as predictors of the vote decision" and the "increased impact of policy preferences on partisan defection." (p. 754) In addition to these explicitly comparative statements we are also told that in 1972 there was "relatively greater importance of issues" (p. 770) and that proximity measures of issue attitudes were "exceptionally potent predictors." (p. 769) These assertions are made without supporting data from elections before 1968. In this section we make the historical comparisons and show that there is

⁵ Angus Campbell, "Interpreting the Presidential Victory," in *The National Election of 1964*, ed. Milton C. Cummings, Jr. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1966), p. 269.

⁶ Philip Converse, Warren Miller, Jerrold Rusk, and Arthur Wolfe, "Continuity and Change in American Politics: Parties and Issues in the 1968 Election," *American Political Science Review* 63 (December 1969), 1096.

little or no support for comparative claims of "Majority Party."

Two major problems emerge in testing the claims that issues in 1972 were of greater importance than were issues in past elections and that issues were more important in 1972 than were candidates or parties in 1972. The first problem is to clarify what is meant by "importance" and to use valid, defensible criteria. When "Majority Party" says that proximity measures were exceptionally potent predictors of the vote (p. 769) and when it lists the most important issues (p. 766, fn. 23) the criterion of importance employed is "effect on R^2 ," in the former case within a stage-wise regression procedure and in the latter within a step-wise regression procedure. There is never any justification for using stage-wise regression procedures, and even within standard multiple regression procedures, "effect on R^2 " is not an appropriate criterion of importance.⁷ In making our assessments of the importance of individual factors such as issues or candidates within a multiple regression model, therefore, we substitute three different and defensible criteria of importance: the weight of individual factors in the voters' decision calculus, the net impact of a factor on the outcome of an election, and the partisan or vote-related polarization arising from differing positions on a factor within the population.

While it is a straightforward matter to substitute different criteria of importance for those used in "Majority Party," there is a second and more difficult problem involved in testing the historical claims made about the 1972 election. Their new multivariate model requires respondents' self-placements on multi-position issue scales and the respondents' perceptions of candidate placements on similar 'left-right' scales for each issue in order to derive the issue-specific proximity measures used in this new model. Previous SRC/CPS surveys have not included the measures needed to use this new proximity model and, therefore, no straightforward historical assessment of the claims of "Majority Party" is possible. Instead, an indirect technique is needed.

The indirect technique by which the claims of Majority Party can be tested relies on the SRC/CPS archive of election surveys, surely the finest in the world, and the SRC six-factor model, which has been used so extensively in the past. The six-factor model can be used for every presidential race since 1952 and thus can be used to test assertions about historical trends. In addition, the older six-factor model can be compared directly

with the proximity model in 1972. If the six-factor model shows the asserted trends and if the six-factor model for 1972 agrees with the new proximity model for 1972, then we can be assured that the new findings are not due to the use of new instruments. In fact, the older model does not show the trends asserted to hold in "Majority Party," and the two models do not agree for 1972.

The six-factor model for evaluating presidential elections was developed by Campbell, Stokes and Miller.⁸ The basis for this model is a series of eight broad, open-ended questions covering likes and dislikes about the Democratic and Republican presidential candidates and likes and dislikes about the two parties. The responses to the eight questions are regrouped into six separate scales constituting the dimensions of partisan attitudes:

- (1) Attitudes toward the Democratic candidate, incorporating all references to "experience, abilities, personal qualities of relation to his party."⁹
- (2) Identical attitudes for the Republican candidate.
- (3) Attitudes related to groups, incorporating all comments on specific groups in the population.

⁸ Donald Stokes, Angus Campbell, and Warren E. Miller, "Components of Electoral Decision," *American Political Science Review* 52 (June 1958), 367-387; Angus Campbell and Donald E. Stokes, "Partisan Attitudes and the Presidential Vote," in *American Voting Behavior*, ed. Eugene Burdick and Arthur J. Brodbeck (Glencoe, Ill: Free Press, 1959) pp. 353-371; Donald Stokes, "Some Dynamic Elements of Contests for the Presidency," *American Political Science Review* 60 (March 1966), 19-28; and Campbell et al., *The American Voter*, pp. 524-531.

⁹ This short description of the scales is from Stokes et al., "Components of Electoral Decision," p. 380. Although the exact coding methods used by the SRC in their works have never been published, the assignment of responses in most cases is indicated by their code book. Using our best judgments on appropriate grouping procedures we were able to replicate all published results accurately enough to ensure that the original coding scheme would not produce any non-trivial changes in our results. There was, however, a change in format in the 1972 survey which limited respondents to three rather than five evaluative comments for and against each party and candidate. Therefore, in these tables we have employed only the first three responses for each question in our estimation of the six-factor models for past elections. This means that these tables do not correspond directly with tables using all five responses. Michael R. Kagay and Greg A. Caldeira, ("I Like the Looks of his Face: Elements of Electoral Choice, 1952-1972," paper delivered at the 1975 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, California, Sept. 2-5, 1975) have performed a remarkably similar analysis with slightly different coding schemata (based on three different coding schemata supplied them by the SRC) and using all five responses for the earlier years. Although their results do not accord exactly with those reported here, this is largely due to our use of three responses in earlier years. Neither paper's coding schema, and neither five- nor three-answer procedures supports the assertions of "Majority Party." We wish to acknowledge collegial assistance of the highest order from Kagay and Caldeira.

⁷ Glen G. Cain and Harold W. Watts, "Problems in Making Policy Inferences from the Coleman Report," *American Sociological Review*, 35 (April, 1970), 228-242, deal most elegantly with the fallacies and pitfalls of "effect on R^2 " type measures; see especially their Table 1.

- (4) Domestic issues, including all references to domestic policy.
- (5) Foreign issues, including all references to foreign policy.
- (6) Party management, including all references to corruption, leadership and the capacity of a party to govern.

Given these six scales, with the score for each respondent equal simply to the number of pro-Republican responses minus the number of pro-Democratic responses, a linear model is estimated for all voters using least squares techniques, with a dichotomous dependent variable scored 1 for a Republican vote and 0 for a Democratic vote. The dependent variable thus estimated is interpreted as the probability of a Republican vote (R) for each voter.¹⁰

$$P(R) = B_0 + \sum_{i=1}^6 B_i X_i$$

Once this model has been estimated for all voters in the 1952, 1956, 1960, 1964 and 1972 presidential elections,¹¹ three types of comparisons corresponding to three criteria of importance are possible within and between elections:

- (1) Comparisons of the raw, unstandardized regression coefficients, which show the weight applied to a factor by voters;
- (2) Comparisons of the products of the weights and the population means of the variables, which indicate the net impact of a factor on the overall outcome of an election; and
- (3) Comparisons of the products of the weights and the standard deviations of the factors which indicate partisan, vote related polarization in the electorate due to differences among the population on the factor.

Trends In Weights. The unstandardized regression coefficient (B) is a measure of the unit "clout" or weight associated with a given factor. An unstandardized B of .05, for example, means that a one-unit change in the score of a given factor is associated with a five per cent change in the probability of a Republican vote.

¹⁰ While the truncated nature of the dependent variable means that probit analysis is preferable to regression analysis, we have adhered to the original SRC method. Kagay and Caldeira (Ibid.) have used probit analysis as a check and found no serious changes from the regression results.

¹¹ The SRC's 1968 election survey provides a rich set of data which has been underutilized by political scientists because of the very element which makes it unique: the presence of a viable third-party candidate. The SRC's six-factor model is explicitly based on two-way comparisons, because three-way elections raise the issue of strategic voting so we have concentrated on the two-way elections.

The authors of "Majority Party" imply that over time there has been a decline in the value of the weights associated with candidates, reflecting the decline in their importance, and a rise in the value of weights associated with issues, reflecting their increasing role in voters' decisions.¹² Yet, Table 1, which displays the five relevant equations, shows that this model, the only model for which there are data spanning two decades, does not support the assertions of "Majority Party" and, in many cases, actually contradicts them. Never before in the period under review have two candidates been so dominant in the voting equation, and domestic issues are by no means at a high in 1972.¹³

The most notable contradiction to the pattern described by "Majority Party" is the general increase over the years in the weight of candidate evaluation scores. The weights for candidate-centered considerations are higher for the 1972 election than for either of the two Eisenhower elections which are often painted as paradigms of the popularity contest type election. When the coefficients are compared with those of later years, it would appear that the weight given domestic issues, group concerns and general party management were about as high in 1952 as in any subsequent election. The election of 1972 shows a low weight for domestic issues, while the weight of foreign issues in 1972 differs only trivially from 1952, when there was also a major war. A definite decline in 1972 in the weight accorded to considerations of the parties as managers of government lends definite support to the "decline of the parties" thesis, but the weights show the 1972 election to be no more issue-oriented than 1952 and more candidate-oriented than the 1952 race.

Furthermore, "Majority Party" implies that we should expect a decline in the weight attached to the group concerns factor, since group-oriented responses have traditionally been considered less articulate and less "ideological" than references to the domestic policy variable.¹⁴ The analysis of

¹² "The 1972 election . . . exposed the pervasive consequences that follow from dislodging party loyalty and candidate appeal from positions of dominance in the mass electoral process and complementing them with a widespread concern over policies intended to resolve very real national problems" (p. 753).

¹³ The large candidate weights for 1972 might be explained away by arguing that respondents were actually reacting to the candidate solely in terms of his issue positions, so that the candidate is merely a surrogate for issues. The correlations between the issue factors and the candidate factors, however, are less than .2 and are among the lowest in the correlation matrix.

¹⁴ In describing group-oriented concerns as a second level, lesser articulation of interests, Campbell et al. argue that " . . . there is little comprehension of long-range plans for social betterment, or of basic philosophies rooted in postures toward change or abstract conception of social

Table 1. Regression equations for Campbell, Miller, Stokes, six-factor model

(Maximum three responses) Based on voters								
	<i>Bo</i>	Democratic candidate <i>B</i> (<i>t</i>)	Republican candidate <i>B</i> (<i>t</i>)	General management <i>B</i> (<i>t</i>)	Groups <i>B</i> (<i>t</i>)	Foreign issues <i>B</i> (<i>t</i>)	Domestic issues <i>B</i> (<i>t</i>)	<i>N</i> <i>R/R</i> ²
1952	.52268	.04206 (5.16)	.05845 (7.36)	.07877 (12.29)	.07601 (9.05)	.07901 (8.08)	.06655 (9.43)	1181 .75123/ .56434
1956	.54811	.05947 (8.05)	.08311 (10.75)	.05460 (7.80)	.07500 (10.46)	.06502 (6.80)	.05842 (7.30)	1266 .72337/ .52327
1960	.48692	.07148 (11.42)	.09338 (12.15)	.05402 (8.42)	.06300 (8.56)	.06770 (7.68)	.04546 (6.50)	1406 .77083/ .59418
1964	.45691	.07223 (10.02)	.08733 (11.28)	.06238 (9.53)	.04815 (6.42)	.05684 (5.57)	.05940 (10.05)	1111 .75572/ .57112
1972	.54808	.09625 (8.55)	.10680 (9.74)	.02495 (2.63)	.06689 (7.73)	.07901 (8.43)	.03449 (4.15)	827 .69622/ .48473

the coefficients in Table 1, however, does not bear out this expectation, showing rather that group concerns have relatively consistent importance over time. Nor has the increased education of today's electorate produced more sophisticated articulation of these group concerns. On the contrary, in 1972 nearly 60 per cent of such references were coded as allusions to the "common man" (33.3 per cent) and to big business (26.2 per cent)—traditional concerns since the New Deal. Other significant concerns mentioned were the "poor" (10.9 per cent), age groups (8.4 per cent) and "labor" (4.6 per cent).

Since the higher level of education is invoked by the authors of "Majority Party" to explain much of the claimed shift in the basis of the voting decision from party and candidates to ideology and issues, we must give this possibility full attention. The authors of "Majority Party" argue that

and economic structure of causation. The party or candidate is simply endorsed as being 'for' a group with which the subject is identified or as being above the selfish demands of groups within the population. Exactly how the candidate or party might see fit to implement or avoid group interests is a moot point, left unrelated to broader ideological concerns. But the party or candidate is 'located' in some affective relationship toward a group or groups, and the individual metes out trust on this basis." Campbell et al., *The American Voter*, pp. 234-235. In addition, see the discussion of mass political concepts, pp. 218-225.

voters with a college education are better informed politically, generally more cognizant of policy differences between the candidates and, therefore, more likely to make a vote decision on the basis of policy preferences than are less well educated individuals. It is apparently far easier for college educated individuals to translate issue attitudes into a vote decision than for the relatively less well educated who use the candidate as an intervening force for their ideology. The relatively greater importance of issues as an explanation of the 1972 election, may, therefore, be partially a delayed reflection of the changing composition of the electorate . . . Given their generally higher level of formal education, the population of actual voters in 1972 was better prepared to respond to the candidates in terms of policy preferences than were the voters in 1964 (pp. 770-771).

The electorate of 1972 was significantly better educated than that of 20 years before. Over that period, the proportion of individuals in the SRC sample with at least some college education increased from 14.6 per cent to 29.2 per cent, while the proportion who had not progressed beyond the eighth grade declined from 41.3 per cent to 19.9 per cent. It has already been shown, however, that the shift discovered by the authors of "Majority Party" did not occur in the aggregate population. Furthermore, even when we estimated the model separately for different educational levels, candidate weights for the grade school, high school

Table 2. Net Importance as measured by $B_i\bar{X}_i$

(Maximum Three Responses)												
Democratic Candidate			Republican Candidate		General Management		Groups		Foreign Issues		Domestic Issues	
$\bar{X}$	$B\bar{X}$		$\bar{X}$	$B\bar{X}$	$\bar{X}$	$B\bar{X}$	$\bar{X}$	$B\bar{X}$	$\bar{X}$	$B\bar{X}$	$\bar{X}$	$B\bar{X}$
1952	-.3124	-.0131	.6384	.0373	.9331	.0735	-.6765	-.0514	.4242	.03352	-.3116	-.0207
1956	.0348	.0021	.8223	.0683	.4700	.0257	-.8389	-.0629	.4573	.0297	-.2504	-.0146
1960	-.3101	-.0222	.6216	.0581	.3428	.0185	-.6650	-.0419	.2568	.0174	-.2134	-.0097
1964	-.5968	-.0431	-.3492	-.0305	.0801	.0050	-.6994	-.0037	-.0522	-.0030	-.4500	-.0267
1972	.5490	.0528	.4087	.0436	.3930	.0098	-.7146	-.0478	.4510	.0356	-.0036	-.0001

Note: + means pro-Republican
 - means pro-Democratic

and college level respondents were higher in 1972 than in 1952.¹⁵

Trends in Net Impact. In addition to comparing the factor weights, we can also use them to calculate the net impact of each factor for each election. Given the regression equation

$$\bar{Y} = B_0 + \sum_{i=1}^6 B_i \bar{X}_i$$

then each product $B_i \bar{X}_i$ can be interpreted as the net contribution of a factor to the overall outcome of the election. A product for a particular $B_i \bar{X}_i$ of +0.05, for example, means a given factor has in the aggregate benefited the Republican candidate in that election by five percentage points. A product of -0.05 would mean that the factor has benefited

the Democratic candidate by five percentage points. The $B_i \bar{X}_i$ product combines a measure of the overall mean of attitudes in a particular area ($\bar{X}_i$) with the unstandardized coefficient (B_i), which is the weight given to the factor in voter decision making processes. As such, $B_i \bar{X}_i$ is a measure of the "importance" of an issue not at the level of the individual voter but at a macro- or systemic level.¹⁶

The data in Table 2 show that, in terms of net impact on the election, it is still the candidate factors that dominate the outcome. Again, we see the combined candidate factors more important in 1972 than in any other year, and we see domestic issues with a low net impact. The net impact of foreign issues, namely the war in Vietnam, was only slightly greater than the Korean war in the "issueless" 'fifties.

Trends in vote-related polarization. The authors of "Majority Party" lay great stress on the "stark issue differences that separated the total group of

¹⁵ Two recently published studies using the same data sets in somewhat different contexts have produced similar conclusions. Declercq et al. report a four-factor model including party identification, issue orientation, candidate image and party image predicting vote for five presidential elections (1956-72). Candidate image produces the largest unstandardized regression coefficient for 1972, with issue-orientation second. Both of these variables have increased in this measure of importance over the five elections while the two party variables have decreased. Eugene Declercq, Thomas L. Hurley, and Norman R. Luttbeg, "Voting in American Presidential Elections, 1956-1972," *American Politics Quarterly* Vol. 3 (July, 1975), 222-246. Kirkpatrick et al., employ total candidate and party attitude scores in a regression on vote for 1952-72. Only the standardized regression coefficients are recorded, with the weight of candidate attitudes monotonically increasing over this period, and party monotonically decreasing. A three-factor model, including party identification, shows similar results, with candidate declining only for 1968. Samuel A. Kirkpatrick, William Lyons, Michael R. Fitzgerald, "Candidates, Parties and Issues in the American Electorate: Two Decades of Change," *American Politics Quarterly*, 3, (July, 1975), 247-283.

¹⁶ The combined term, however, has often been confused in presentation with the meaning more properly associated with the unstandardized coefficient itself. This distinction can be clarified by consideration of a pair of polar cases. If a particular factor had, for a given election, a very large regression coefficient—indicating that it was an important highly salient factor in voters' decisions—but had a mean of zero—indicating widespread disagreement on the issue within the electorate—the $B\bar{X}$ for the factor would be zero, indicating that its net effect on the election was nil. On the other hand, widespread agreement in a particular area would produce a very large mean, and consequently a large $B\bar{X}$, *ceteris paribus*. This accounts in large part for the great deal of importance attached to the electorate's candidate evaluations during the fifties, when there were few negative comments recorded about Eisenhower, especially in 1956. In fact, though, the candidate weights (B) themselves were not nearly as dominant in the fifties as the focus on their net effect ($B\bar{X}$) suggested at the time.

McGovern voters from the Nixon voters" (p. 758) and subtitle their paper "Policy Polarization in the 1972 Election," Polarization was, in their view, a reflection of "a deep policy schism among the Democrats" (p. 757). This implies that the extent of disagreement within the electorate as a whole, and particularly within the Democratic party, was extraordinary in 1972.¹⁷ The basis for this conclusion, however, is not operationally specific; an unjustified, possibly *ad hoc*, set of issues is examined for 1972 with no historical comparisons. Because there are differences in the aggregate positions of various subgroups on these issues, the inference is made that an extraordinary level of "polarization" exists between these groups.

This approach presents two problems. First, there is no measure of the salience of each issue or the intensity of the position taken on that issue. The implicit assumption, apparently from a model of the ideal democratic citizen, underlying this procedure is that every issue is of equal importance to every respondent. A second difficulty is the absence of any precise measure of the extent of disagreement in a particular area.

The six-factor model, however, does provide a way to measure the partisan polarization of any group of voters arising from a given factor. Just as $B_i\bar{X}_i$ measures the net aggregate impact of a given factor in a given election, $B_i\sigma_i$ is a measure of the difference in the probability of a Republican vote for any two members of a group because of differences between them on a specific factor.¹⁸

¹⁷ In *The American Voter* widely disbursed issue positions within the parties were described as lack of congruence or lack of consensus and were used as inferential evidence that issues were not important. Now widely disbursed issue positions within the party are described as "polarization." See Campbell et al., *The American Voter*, pp. 185-187.

¹⁸ If Δ_{jk}^i is the difference on factor i between two individuals (j, k) (i.e., $X_{ij} - X_{ik}$) the difference between them in

$B_i\sigma_i$ provides a meaningful operationalization of polarization since it combines a measure of the extent of disagreement over a particular factor with a measure of the weight attached to that factor by the voters.

Again, an analysis based on the six-factor model provides data that are not consistent with the account of electoral change presented by the authors of "Majority Party!" Table 3 presents the $B_i\sigma_i$'s for each of the factors and each of the elections under discussion.

The table indicates that the value of $B_i\sigma_i$ for domestic issues is lower for 1972 than for any previous election. Only foreign policy attitudes—i.e., on Vietnam—show greater vote-related polarization in 1972 than in any other election; every other factor of the model has experienced greater polarization in at least one previous election than in 1972. There is no generally greater level of vote-centered, partisan polarization in 1972 than in other elections.

Table 4 shows this measure of polarization calculated only for Democratic respondents and, again, 1972 does not appear strikingly different. The major bone of contention among Democrats

the probability of a Republican vote due to their difference on factor i will be: $B_i\Delta_{jk}^i$. Over the entire population (for all j, k) the average value of this measure $B_i\Delta_{jk}^i$ will always be zero. Therefore a mean square measure is employed so that over the population we have

$$B_i\sqrt{(\Delta_{jk}^i)^2}$$

for j, k or

$$B_i\sqrt{(X_{ij} - X_{ik})^2}$$

which is equal to

$$B_i\sigma_i\sqrt{2}$$

For convenience $\sqrt{2}$ has been dropped, Kagay and Caldera, *op. cit.* also investigated several other ingenious and noteworthy measures of partisan polarization.

Table 3. Polarization

(Maximum Three Responses)												
	Democratic Candidate		Republican Candidate		General Management		Groups		Foreign Issues		Domestic Issues	
	σ_x	$B\sigma_x$	σ_x	$B\sigma_x$	σ_x	$B\sigma_x$	σ_x	$B\sigma_x$	σ_x	$B\sigma_x$	σ_x	$B\sigma_x$
1952	1.4797	.0622	1.4708	.0860	1.8203	.1434	1.2421	.0944	1.0095	.0798	1.5164	.1009
1956	1.4964	.0890	1.5346	.1275	1.5918	.0869	1.4854	.1114	1.0270	.0668	1.2704	.0742
1960	1.6773	.1199	1.4899	.1391	1.6181	.0874	1.3343	.0841	1.0223	.0692	1.3227	.0601
1964	1.5554	.1123	1.3990	.1222	1.6931	.1056	1.3054	.0629	.9382	.0533	1.6704	.0992
1972	1.1997	.1155	1.2698	.1356	1.3880	.0346	1.4608	.0977	1.3622	.1076	1.5463	.0533

Table 4. Polarization among Respondents with Democratic Party Identification Only.

(Maximum Three Responses)													
	Democratic Candidate		Republican Candidate		General Management		Groups		Foreign Issues		Domestic Issues		n
	σ_x	$B\sigma_x$	σ_x	$B\sigma_x$	σ_x	$B\sigma_x$	σ_x	$B\sigma_x$	σ_x	$B\sigma_x$	σ_x	$B\sigma_x$	
1952	1.3641	.0759	1.3956	.0536	1.5653	.1326	1.3565	.0680	.8871	.0477	1.4565	.0848	532
1956	1.3787	.0821	1.4545	.0773	1.2763	.0653	1.5585	.0907	.8199	.0443	1.3310	.0782	554
1960	1.4768	.1473	1.3442	.0552	1.2658	.0422	1.4458	.0683	.9264	.0334	1.3113	.0532	640
1964	1.2593	.0849	1.1211	.0617	1.3261	.0451	1.4264	.0447	.8096	.0106	1.7210	.0721	581
1972	1.1816	.1543	1.1698	.1141	1.1946	.0322	1.5151	.0849	1.2867	.0975	1.7008	.0583	343

in 1972, by this measure, was the candidate, George McGovern. In the two areas that can be construed to relate to domestic affairs—domestic issues and group concerns—there was more vote-related polarization among Democrats in 1956 than in 1972.

Finally, the data in Table 5 also show comparative figures for Democrats in 1972 and Republicans in 1964. These indicate that there was greater vote-related domestic issue polarization among Republicans in 1964 than among Democrats in 1972.

Thus, while the lack of comparable questions makes it impossible to look back on previous elections with the new SRC/CPS “issue proximity” model, we can compare the new and the old models for 1972. These two models seem to provide divergent conclusions about 1972, and the six-factor model shows historical patterns that do not support the assertions in “Majority Party.”

The war in Vietnam was important and divisive—though it divided the electorate as a whole more than it divided Democrats. Other issues, however, do not appear to have been particularly high by the criteria of weight, net importance and partisan polarization. The American electorate may be far more educated today than 20 years ago, but this growth of education has been paralleled by an in-

creasing emphasis in the decision calculus on individual candidates, not by a shift from candidates to issues.

The Investor-Voter

The massive differences between the findings of “Majority Party” and the findings of earlier SRC studies are not only due to changes in the American electorate; they reflect changes in the models, methods and standards by which voters are assessed. Such differences call for a careful re-examination of past studies for a comparison of the two approaches. We contend that both approaches are flawed, that neither can provide a consistent explanation of American voting, and that a new approach to the study of voting is needed, an approach which takes a different view of the voter and a different view of politics.

To that end, we will propose a view of voting that sees the voter as an investor and characterizes each vote as *an investment in one or more collective goods made under conditions of uncertainty with costly and imperfect information.*

Elections are by their nature collective enterprises; both the outcome of the election and the subsequent performance of the government are collective goods for the entire electorate. Given the

Table 5. Comparative Party Polarization among Democrats in 1972 and Republicans in 1964

	Democratic Candidate		Republican Candidate		General Management		Groups		Foreign Issues		Domestic Issues		n
	σ_x	$B\sigma_x$	σ_x	$B\sigma_x$	σ_x	$B\sigma_x$	σ_x	$B\sigma_x$	σ_x	$B\sigma_x$	σ_x	$B\sigma_x$	
REP 1964	1.0975	.1396	1.2022	.0723	1.2189	.0723	1.4347	.1171	1.1911	.0644	1.6449	.0856	127
DEM 1972	1.1816	.1543	1.1698	.1141	1.1946	.0322	1.5151	.0849	1.2867	.0975	1.7008	.0583	343

size of the electorate and the privacy of the voting act, there are great incentives for the individual to abdicate the responsibility for the outcome to others, certainly to a greater extent than would be the case if his vote were decisive. The collective aspect of elections reduces the value of the vote in so far as it affects the provision of collective goods, and consequently makes the expected returns from investment in voting decisions small relative to the opportunity costs of such investment.

An instrumental voter applies information relevant to the choice between alternatives, i.e., information which bears upon the expected returns to the voter of the election of particular candidates. The accumulation of information always involves the expenditure of resources by individuals. These costs are directly affected by the quality of the information available; the problem of assessing the credibility of information; the difficulty of distinguishing between campaign rhetoric and actual position statements; the question of interpretation of vague positions; the difficulty of assigning responsibility for collective outputs; and simple gaps in the available information. Under such conditions, we would expect voters to employ information cost-saving devices, such as party and ideological labels and demographic characteristics of the candidates, and to be satisfied with incomplete information.

If the voter is viewed as an investor, an account of the 'fifties, 'sixties, and 'seventies is possible within the framework of a single model. The roots of such an approach, which is developed in the remainder of this paper, lie in the work of Anthony Downs.

We will elaborate the implications of this approach by examining four critical aspects of voting and illustrating the problems of both the old SRC theory and the newer theories of "Majority Party." In so doing we will begin to develop the notion of an instrumental investor-voter, drawing upon Downs but modifying his ideas for the American context and correcting him in those places where he is wrong. The four aspects of voting are the cost of information, the role of parties, the role of candidates and the role of ideology.

Information Costs. The accumulation of information involves the expenditure of resources, if only the time required for its procurement, analysis and evaluation. Since information is costly, voters will obtain only limited amounts. There are, of course, individuals who find politics so fascinating that they will inform themselves even when they have no personal interest in or cannot affect the outcome of a political event. In general, however, the investor-voter will be informed when he:

- (1) Is able to apply "free" information, i.e., information gathered for other purposes

which is also applicable to the vote decision.

- (2) Is immediately and personally affected by a particular issue, e.g., a student estimating the draft as part of his career plans.

An investor-voter model which incorporates the understanding that information is costly leads to expectations about the voter which differ from those of the SRC, or citizen-voter, model. Whereas citizen-voters are expected to have well-developed opinions about a wide range of issues, a focus on information costs leads to the expectation that only some voters—those who must gather the information in the course of their daily lives or who have a particularly direct stake in the issue—will develop a detailed understanding of any issues. Most voters will only learn enough to form a very generalized notion of the position of a particular candidate or party on some issues, and many voters will be ignorant about most issues. The investor-voter will use partisan and ideological labels as practical solutions to the problem of costly information.

Whereas the citizen-voter model gives interest in politics causal priority over issue concern, consideration of information costs reverses the direction of causality; political involvement becomes a product of the perception of the individual stakes and costs involved.

Thus, while the citizen-voter model assumes that the individual's level of political involvement is invariant during adult life and is internal to the individual, i.e., unaffected by changes in the political context¹⁹, the investor-voter model predicts that involvement will vary as the voter's life situation changes and as he responds to new opportunities and political events.

How well informed should we expect the voter to be? Previous SRC studies of voting have graded the voter against an exacting standard. The (ideal) voter-citizen was expected to hold informed opinions on all the crucial issues of the day and to exhibit a high level of interest in politics. When the voters of the 'fifties were found not to meet these standards, it was assumed that the problem lay with the voter. Specifically, a low level of political information, narrow range of expressed issue concerns, lack of perceived party differences, and lack of interest were traced to a lack of education.

When voters were shown to be issueless in the 'fifties, the standard used in order to ascertain whether or not a voter was issue-oriented was very different from the one used today: "If a person goes on record in favor of leaving electric power

¹⁹ Campbell, "Voters and Elections: Past and Present," p. 746. See also Philip E. Converse, "The Concept of the Normal Voter," in *Elections and the Political Order*, ed. Angus Campbell, Philip Converse, Warren Miller, and Donald Stokes (New York: Wiley, 1966), pp. 9–39.

production to private industry, but has no idea what the Administration is doing about the question, we may deduce that his opinion is not based on substantial familiarity with the subject. He has an opinion but knows so little about the topic as to deprive the opinion of significance for his subsequent political behavior." The application of this standard led to rather pessimistic conclusions about voters: "An example of public indifference to an issue that was given heavy emphasis by political leaders is provided by the role of the Taft-Hartley Act in the 1948 election. . . . Almost seven out of every ten adult Americans saw the curtain fall on the Presidential election of 1948 without knowing whether Taft-Hartley was the name of a hero or a villain."²⁰

"Majority Party" bases its findings of heightened issue orientation upon very different standards. As noted above, in the 1972 questionnaire format, voters were allowed to express general preferences rather than precise policy choices on particular items of legislation. It was just such generalized preferences or concerns that were so strongly disparaged in past writings. In the 'fifties, when Campbell reported that "there were no great questions of policy which *the public* saw as dividing the two parties," he meant that instead of being concerned about well-defined issues and items of legislation, people cared about the "mess in Washington and the stalemate in Korea."²¹ By changing standards, "Majority Party" leaves unresolved how many of our "new" voters, by the more stringent standards of the past, knew whether Cooper-Church was a fast-food chain or a rock group.

Few voters can be expected to have issue opinions which are sufficiently detailed to satisfy the stringent standards of earlier SRC studies. Because gathering and digesting such details about the fate of specific bills and particular administration programs is a costly process, we expect the only voters to bear the cost will be those who need the details for other than voting purposes: e.g., a farmer who needs to know about trade legislation in order to determine what proportions of his land should be planted in what crops.

Voters do, however, acquire much political information in the course of their daily lives. Such information then helps voters to form political opinions and make vote decisions. It is not surprising that voters make use of such "free" information and feel most comfortable dealing with political choices in terms of these "mundane" life experiences, and there is no need to ignore such "gut" voting as a subject of serious analysis.

Philip Converse, in discussing his interviewing

experience, provides some support for this aspect of the voter-investor model. He notes that many respondents show clear discomfort when asked certain survey questions and that there seems to be a pattern to this discomfort: "I should make very clear that such events were rare to non-existent when questions dealt with the immediate terms of the respondent's life, such as whether the respondent was satisfied with his housing or how he would feel about blacks moving in next door. But they began to mount significantly in questions concerning politics, and hit something of a maximum on the national issue items of the structured kind . . ."²²

Usable political information is acquired in the process of making individual economic decisions; housewives learn about inflation of retail prices, homebuyers find out the trends in mortgage loan interest rates, and owners of stocks follow the Dow-Jones averages. On the basis of this information, voters can gauge the economy, and apply this data when they vote. In the past, SRC analyses discarded such economic views as insignificant. And even in 1972, when the SRC transformed its measure of issue concern to a more realistic "gut-level" general issue preference, they still failed to ask voters their impressions of and prognosis for the national economy, asked no questions about taxes, inflation and unemployment, and thus failed to tap significant levels of voter concern and information about economic issues.

The citizen-voter model assumes that a well-educated electorate will be a well-informed electorate: "The educated citizen is attentive, knowledgeable and participatory and the uneducated citizen is not."²³ However, as "Majority Party" points out, while there has been an enormous increase in the educational level over the past two decades, the proportion of people caring who wins the election has not increased and there is no reason to believe that knowledge about specific legislation has increased either. The investor-voter model suggests that it is the amount of "free" daily life information and individual need to know—motivation rather than just education level—which explains how informed about issues voters will be.

Given the cost of gathering information solely for the purpose of the vote decision, we should not expect issue consensus within parties. Where candidates are engaged in assembling a coalition of output-oriented voters, it is to be expected that

²² Philip E. Converse, "Comment: The Status of Non-attitudes," *American Political Science Review* 68 (June 1974), 650.

²³ Philip E. Converse, "Change in the American Electorate," in *The Human Meaning of Social Change*, ed. Angus Campbell and Philip Converse (New York, Russell Sage Foundation, 1972), p. 324.

²⁰ Campbell et al., *The American Voter*, p. 172-173.

²¹ Campbell, "Voters and Elections. . . ." p. 752.

people in every coalition will be ignorant of the candidate's stand in many areas not central to their primary concerns. Without sorting the voters into "issue publics" on the basis of the salience of various issues to them, one cannot expect to find high levels of interest or of information. Similarly, within every coalition there will be people who disagree with the candidate or party stand in some area and still support the candidate or party. It is not essential that in 1964 a black Democratic voter whose primary concern is civil rights support or even be familiar with Lyndon Johnson's Vietnam policy in order to qualify as an issue-oriented voter.²⁴ We ought not to be surprised if we find that the most vocal advocates or opponents of busing or of the Vietnam war are totally ignorant about farm price support policy or revenue-sharing distribution criteria.

This emphasis on the conditions under which voters will inform themselves about issues brings the notion of issue publics to the forefront of public opinion and voting research. As Converse has noted: "We have come a step closer to reality when we recognize the fragmentation of the mass public into a plethora of issue publics."²⁵

The investor-voter model assumes that voters have issue interests but expects those interests to be generalized because of the cost of information. Where such issue interests are related to vote decisions, they need not be relegated to insignificance simply because they are lacking in detail. An individual facing a choice situation like voting, where the number of alternatives is limited, need only gather enough information to determine which alternative is preferable. Any expenditure of resources for additional information which does not

have a high probability of changing his preference is superfluous. Thus, a generalized notion of the position of a particular candidate or party will usually prove sufficient for the vote decision. This suggests that a proper criterion for evaluating issue-orientation is the existence of relationships between issue position and vote decision, not a judgment about the "richness" of the voter's expression of his issue interest.²⁶

Because information is costly, most voters will save time and energy by using informational shortcuts to the vote decision. In this way we can explain the widespread reliance on party identification and ideological labels. So long as the actions of candidates appear consistent with the generalized notion the voter attaches to a particular label, the voter is able to save considerable costs associated with keeping track of all the various activities of government. By employing such a cost-saving strategy, the voter does not sacrifice his basic issue-orientations; he simply deals with them in a more economical way.

The citizen-voter and investor-voter perspectives have strikingly different implications for evaluating the voters' level of participation and involvement. According to the citizen-voter model, voter apathy and general levels of interest, involvement, and participation depend solely on education and internal motivation. The SRC precluded the possibility that voter behavior was a realistic response to the actual political context rather than an expression of internal psychological states.

For example, Converse equated voter involvement with comprehension: "We tend to use involvement as a surrogate for comprehension because it is a fair assumption that there is a high correlation between involvement (motivation to attend to information about matters political) and breadth of comprehension about what is going on in politics."²⁷ Furthermore, involvement is defined operationally as concern over the outcome of the election and interest in the campaign.²⁸ The implicit assumption of this linkage is that there are always meaningful differences between the parties or candidates for all to see. Given these assumptions, if a person does not care who wins, he obviously does not comprehend politics.

In the investor-voter model, interest, involvement, and participation depend on the voter's calculation of the individual stakes and costs involved

²⁴ This possibility was recognized but not pursued in 1968: "Indeed, this irony is compounded when the role of the Vietnam issue is jointly taken into account. We have indicated above that the public was deeply impatient with the Johnson Administration, in part, because of the handling of the war. Blacks stood out as the major demographic grouping most exercised about the entanglement in Vietnam. They were more likely than whites to opine that the government should never have undertaken the military commitment there. They also were more likely to feel that American troops should be brought home immediately, a position not generally associated with the Johnson Administration. None the less. . . . Negro enthusiasm not only for Hubert Humphrey, but for Lyndon Johnson as well, remained high to the very end. It seems quite evident that when black citizens were making decisions about their vote Vietnam attitudes paled into relative insignificance by contrast with attitudes toward progress on civil rights within the country. . . ." Philip E. Converse et al., "Continuity and Change in American Politics" (p. 1085).

²⁵ Philip Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," in *Ideology and Discontent*, ed. David Apter (Glencoe, Ill: Free Press, 1964), p. 245; note also that when Converse screened for "self-starting" issue concern, turnover correlations approached the level of stability shown for party identification!

²⁶ Michael Shapiro, "Rational Political Man: A Synthesis of Economic and Social-Psychological Perspectives" *American Political Science Review*, 63 (December 1969), 1106-1119.

²⁷ Philip E. Converse, "Information Flow and the Stability of Partisan Attitudes," in *Elections and the Political Order*, ed. Campbell et al., pp. 138-139.

²⁸ Campbell et al., *The American Voter*, pp. 102-103.

in the election; included in this calculation are the voter's issue concerns and his estimates of his opportunities for participation. As a result, much of the stigma of "apathy" is transferred from the voter to the electoral system.

The SRC also assumed that the major barriers to participation were internal to the individual. In 1960 they stated, "The greater impact of restrictive electoral laws on Negroes is, in part at least, a function of the relatively low motivational levels among Negroes."²⁹ The increase of participation among black voters in the 1960's is, of course, a clear example of a situation where political participation as well as political interest and involvement, rather than being fixed expressions of individual motivation, responded instead to an increase in investment opportunities and a legal decision by Congress to reduce the cost (or more aptly, to provide subsidies to aid blacks in paying the costs) of voting.

Political Parties. The difference between the investor-voter approach and the SRC approach is sharply illustrated when views of political parties and party identification are compared. For the SRC, party identification was attachment to a group:

In characterizing the relation of the individual to party as a psychological identification we invoke a concept that has played an important if somewhat varied role in psychological theories of the relation of individual to individual or of individual to group. We use the concept here to characterize the individual's *affective* orientation to an important group-object in his environment. Both reference group theory and small group studies of influence have converged upon the attracting or repelling quality of the group as the generalized dimension most critical in defining the individual-group relationship and it is this dimension that we will call identification.³⁰

This concept of party as affective group identification devoid of political policy content is different from that presented by Downs, for whom parties constitute "ideal teams" that attempt to gain elective positions through an appeal to the voters which is based on a platform that is composed of issue positions.³¹ This perspective emphasizes an instrumental rather than an affective relationship between voter and party. The most useful way to conceptualize party for this purpose is as a coalition of voters coordinating their efforts to pursue a set of collective goods. While the coalition may

exhibit a great deal of stability over time, the basis of the attachment of each individual to the party is instrumental, which is to say that affective attachment depends on rewards received.

The view one holds of the relationship between individual and party has a significant impact on how one sees the voting act. The person who sees an affective relationship interprets the casting of a vote as primarily an act of group loyalty. On the other hand, the person who sees an instrumental relationship finds that the vote is cast as a contribution to a set of collective goods. It follows from the instrumental view that when a voter uses party label as a principal determinant of his vote preference, the label is used as an informational shortcut.

It is important to note the coalitional structure of parties. While there may at times be widespread agreement within a party on general goals, there is no reason to assume that all voters have the same priorities and saliences. Viewing political parties as coalitions of minorities has two important implications for voting research. First of all as noted earlier, the multiplicity of group and individual interests suggests that one should not expect consensus of attitudes across a number of issues within the party. There also is no logical inconsistency in the attitudes of a black Democrat who is pro-civil rights and anti-labor or even any logical reason to suppose such an individual experiences any significant crosspressure when casting a vote for a Democrat. Furthermore, seeing the parties as coalitions of minorities makes it illogical to assume that any significant number of voters should be able to locate the party on some hypothetical "continuum" that summarizes party positions for all issues.³²

The authors of "Majority Party" summarize the role of parties as it developed in the work of the SRC during the 'fifties when they state, "... Party identification has a predisposing effect that forces images of candidates and attitudes on issues to be consistent with party attitudes which in turn are the factors that directly affect the vote decision." (p. 769) In this view of party, there is no instrumental component to membership, no feedback from party performance to party support, and no serious consideration of autonomous interests or values by which voters might judge—even roughly—the performance of their party and occasionally reconsider their support.

A review of the literature shows that many assumptions about party loyalty and the absence of instrumental relationships that are commonly supposed to rest on empirical SRC "findings" are without foundation. They were read into the data

²⁹ Campbell et al., *The American Voter*, p. 279.

³⁰ Campbell, et al., *The American Voter*, p. 121, emphasis added.

³¹ Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy*, p. 26. It must be noted that Downs is speaking of an "ideal-team" party system, which speaks clearly with *one well-defined voice*, a point which obviously has crucial implications for any attempt to apply his theory to the U.S.

³² These conclusions are elaborated later in this paper. See also the excellent discussion by Donald Stokes, "Spatial Models of Party Competition," in *Elections and the Political Order*, pp. 161-179.

or were assumed at the time of the earlier studies on the basis of group theory. One assumption that illustrates this problem is clearly stated in *The Voter Decides*: "... Our concept of party identification leads us to assume that a person who associates himself strongly with a party will conform to what he sees to be party standards and support party goals."³³ This notion of party identification as a psychological force on the individual to conform to standards and support party goals found expression in the cold-war view of the Communist party and what might be called the "loyalist" model of the party member as party follower, following every twist and turn of the party line. Obviously, issue agreement or support for a party's positions was simply the result of following the party line; belonging to a party exerted considerable influence on an individual "to conform to what he sees as party standards."³⁴

Yet the original empirical evidence for "willingness to conform" to party positions is not very strong. In 1952, for example, less than 40 per cent of self-identified "strong" Democrats and "strong" Republicans felt that they would vote for their party's candidate even if they didn't like him or agree with him; less than 60 per cent of the "strong" identifiers even felt that a person should vote for the same party for President and for Congress.³⁵

A more important assumption was that party identification was actually a psychological hindrance to issue voting. In *The American Voter*, an analysis of farmers revealed "spectacular links between simple economic pressures and partisan choice."³⁶ An investor-voter explanation of these "spectacular links" would follow these general lines: The collective nature of the vote means that there is low incentive for an individual to collect information solely to cast one of many millions of votes. Farmers, however, gather the information on their own businesses in great detail—not because they are better citizens than urban laborers, for example, but because they are independent managers and the information necessary for management is directly related to government policy in many cases. Laborers, not being economic managers and thus not collecting the information for their daily use, would be more likely to rely on past

performance, using party label as an informational shortcut.

How does *The American Voter* explain the "spectacular links" its authors observed? The spectacular links exist because farmers have weaker partisan identification than laborers, and thus are "psychologically free to march to the polls and vote the rascals out . . ."³⁷

Two arguments buttressed the contention of *The American Voter* that there was no causal relationship between party identification and the instrumental goals of the voters:³⁸

- (1) The lack of congruence within parties on the central issues of the day.
- (2) The belief that allegiances had formed early and endured over time.

Yet a lack of congruence within parties is hardly proof that there is no issue-based switching from party to party. There is no reason to expect congruence on every issue unless one assumes that all voters have exactly the same issue preferences and saliences and the same information. A voter without concerns in a particular area would seldom gather information on that area.

Moreover, party allegiances over time are not as stable as had previously been assumed. Between 1956 and 1960, certainly not regarded as a period of dynamic or unprecedented change, one out of every four persons in an SRC panel survey shifted his or her allegiance on a Democrat-Independent-Republican scale.³⁹ In addition, one out of three people who stated his identification as "strong" Democrat or "strong" Republican, no longer so identified himself four years later, and one out of twelve voters changed parties.

Furthermore, it is an empirical fact that the "weight" attached to party performance varies from election to election; even if there were no switching from party to party, the weight the voters accord to party in the complex of factors in the decision calculus varies according to party performance and according to variations in information possessed by the voters.

The large amount of movement found on panel surveys between partisan strength categories means *it no longer follows that* "responsiveness of the vote decision to short-term partisan forces varies inversely with the mean strength of party identification."⁴⁰ Instead, Democrats become strong Democrats when they strongly intend to vote Democratic or agree strongly with the Democratic position on an issue. In other words, there

³³ Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin, and Warren Miller, *The Voter Decides* (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson, 1954), p. 107. Emphasis added.

³⁴ See for example Angus Campbell and H. C. Cooper, *Group Differences in Attitudes and Votes: A Study of the 1954 Congressional Election* (SRC, 1956), p. 95, as cited in Peter B. Natchez, "Images of Voting: The Social Psychologists," *Public Policy* 17 (Summer 1970) 564. This paper was aided by Natchez's stimulating analysis.

³⁵ Campbell et al., *The Voter Decides*, pp. 95-96.

³⁶ Campbell et al., *The American Voter*, p. 430.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 430.

³⁸ Ibid., pp. 185-186.

³⁹ SRC 1956-58-60 panel reported by John C. Pierce and Douglas D. Rose, "Non-attitudes and American Public Opinion: The Examination of a Thesis," *APSR* 68 (June 1974), 626-650, esp. p. 632.

⁴⁰ Converse, "The Concept of a Normal Vote," p. 21.

is feedback from issues and performance to partisan identification. Strength of partisanship is a running tally of current party assessment.

The existence of feedback and shifting changes in the strength of partisan identification, contradicts a fundamental assumption behind the Normal Vote, namely that the vote can be separated into long term and short term forces where the short term forces are the "response to transient election circumstances which do not materially affect the abiding division of party loyalties."⁴¹

In fact, the analysis of the 'fifties provides considerable evidence of "feedback" from performance affecting party image in voting. The traditional associations between the Republican party and the Depression and between the Democratic party and war have been the subject of much comment in voting research. Even these associations, however, do not appear to have been immutable in the minds of the voters. Stokes et al. in analyzing the 1956 election note that "... four years of Republican prosperity destroyed the major part of a fourteen-to-one margin the Democrats had had in the partisanship of these responses. After haunting the Republicans in every election since 1932, memories of the 'Hoover Depression' had receded at least temporarily as a direct force in American politics."⁴²

On the other hand, the experience of the first four years of the Eisenhower Administration amplified and reinforced another set of associations. It was found that "... references to war and peace in 1952 were pro-Republican or anti-Democratic by a ratio of greater than seven to one. By 1956, the virtual disappearance of comments favorable to the Democrats or hostile to the Republicans had increased the ratio five times."⁴³

By 1968, the election that seems to have provoked a re-examination of past theory, an important caveat appeared in discussions of party in the SRC election study: "... in the moment of truth in the polling booth, party allegiance seems the most relevant cue for many voters *if conditions*

permit it to be used."⁴⁴ The authors of "Majority Party" offer yet another statement of the role of the party:

During a period of issue consensus or strong alignment between issue orientation and traditional partisan division, party ties can be expected to have a significant impact, both directly and as a predisposing agent, on the vote decision. However, during periods when questions of policy attain new levels of public salience and divide the population in a fashion that is orthogonal to traditional partisan differences, other political stimuli, such as new candidates and especially candidates associated with the new issues, may become relatively more important in explaining of voting behavior ... (p. 770).

In other words, sometimes party and issues will be correlated and sometimes they will not. Apparently, what the authors of "Majority Party" wish us to believe is that when issues correlate with party, people are following the party line—as in the "loyalist" model—and issues do not matter. But now that issues do not correlate, they do matter.

A much stronger and clearer statement is needed. If partisan attachment were "affective" and "psychologically predisposing," as the SRC theory of voting originally postulated, orthogonality would not have developed. If orthogonality has developed, the theory is wrong. Indeed, it is notable that while the party has been discussed as a "group" and party identification as "willingness to conform," when the authors of "Majority Party" introduce "liberal-conservative" measures, they are beginning to employ significantly different terminology. To be a liberal, a moderate, or a conservative is to have a "... simple policy yardstick by which the Presidential candidates were evaluated with respect to the voters' own policy orientation." (p. 776)

If the liberal/moderate/conservative labels are now to be treated as yardsticks, then why not also treat party as a yardstick and reject the notion of party as a psychologically given group identification with no instrumental content?

Candidates. The structural context in which voters are operating is as crucial to their actual behavior as is the costliness of information and the attendant use of informational shortcuts. There are crucial differences between the American political system and the idealized world which Anthony Downs was modeling. These differences affect both how well the system can be expected to respond to voters' preferences, *ceteris paribus*, and where the voters themselves will focus their attention.

Downs explicitly assumes an "ideal team"

⁴¹ Converse, "Religion and Politics: 1960" p. 101 in *Elections and the Political Order*. Turnout as a separate variable was ignored in the conception of the normal vote on the grounds that the "frequency of 'dynamic' nonvoting is negligible in high turnout presidential elections..." (Converse, "The Concept of a Normal Vote," p. 24, fn. 18.) Further, the actual relations between turnout and closeness to the normal vote estimate have been the opposite of those which were predicted. By SRC reckoning, the smaller the turnout, the closer to the normal vote. (Campbell, "Voters and Elections," p. 748, Converse, "Stability and Change in 1960" in *Elections and the Political Order*, p. 91.) See also Richard A. Brody, "Change and Stability in Partisan Identification: a Note of Caution" (unpublished ms.).

⁴² Stokes et al., "Components of Electoral Decision," p. 373.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 375.

⁴⁴ Converse et al., "Continuity and Change in American Politics. . . ." p. 1099 (emphasis added).

party that behaves as if it is a single, unified point. Furthermore, he implicitly assumes that the parties have equal ability to carry out the programs they advocate. American parties do not even approximate these assumptions. The American federal system is characterized by widely dispersed patronage centers, local primaries, local fund raising and national party organizations which have few resources at their disposal.⁴⁵ In this context voters will rely less on party and party platforms and more on candidate assessments. In addition, voters will use different criteria for evaluating challengers and incumbents.

The American Political system is a system that vests power in a single individual who has no formal ties to his party. The unity of the executive branch, the separation of the executive and legislative branches, and the weakness of the American party system combine to give the American president a degree of power and independence unknown in a parliamentary system, and certainly not envisioned in a Downsian "ideal-team" system. This causes the investor-voter to focus on the presidential candidate rather than just the party, since the party is an unreliable cue for predicting the performance of individual candidates.

In the American system, party labels are poor predictors of actual output because:

- (1) The independence of the party member from the party means that a party candidate is free to adhere or not to the party platform, and further, that a candidate might conceivably adhere to the platform for purposes of election but follow a different course in office.
- (2) With a multiplicity of offices and levels of government, assessing individual credit or blame for the total party output becomes important, but very difficult.
- (3) Finally, where parties are coalitions of minorities, it is to be expected that the relative strength of different groups within the party will vary over time, with consequent effects on the party output.

While social scientists have worried for years about operationalizing their indices, few have recognized that voters are faced with similar problems of operationalization. Being instrumental in the American system places much greater burdens on the voter than it would in an "ideal-team" system: there is much higher variance associated with measures of one man than with the performance of a "single-point" party over time. Indeed, there is empirical evidence that in the American system there is substantial difference between asking

voters which party can do the better job on an issue and which candidate can do the better job. A Cambridge Survey Research election study conducted in September of 1972, asked voters which issue, if any, they personally considered most important in the election; then asked which party can do the better job on the issue; and finally asked them which candidate, Nixon or McGovern, could do a better job on the issue. On no issue did more than 65 per cent of the voters pick the same party and party candidate.⁴⁶

It is important to stress that there is a very significant difference between asking "who can do the best job?" in a particular policy area and the approach of "Majority Party," which asks respondents to place themselves and the candidates on scales of abstract preferred positions. This latter approach, while more appropriate in the Downsian "ideal-team" world (if there is single-peakedness) precludes the possibility that the voter cares less about which candidate is the closest to his ideal position on issues for which he has information and preferences, but cares more about which candidate can deliver the most. This raises a particular dimension of candidate evaluation—competence.⁴⁷

⁴⁶ While Cambridge Survey Research (CSR) conducted numerous statewide studies for McGovern for President Incorporated, this reference and all of the analysis presented in the third section of this paper are based on the two principal election studies. The first of these, CSR 159-147, was an 11,000 interview national survey which provided stratified statewide readings of 11 states. An underlying national sample of about 1,300 interviews was obtained, through the use of weighting. This survey was conducted in person the last week of June 1972. Sampling, interviewing, and data processing were all conducted using the professional standards commonly employed, although these standards are necessarily less rigorous than those employed by the Survey Research Center.

In the third week of September 1972, a panel of 1,000 respondents from the June survey were recontacted by telephone (labeled by CSR as survey 159-180). This panel survey constitutes the basis for most of the analysis presented in section three of this paper. The data collected by CSR for McGovern for President Incorporated remains through contractual arrangements and other agreements the joint property of the company and the client. The authors regret that because of the expressed wishes of the client, no copies of the data set can be distributed for the time being. Luckily the Survey Research Center data are available to test all the assertions made in this paper.

⁴⁷ The context of public opinion within which the election is held must play a role in the instrumental investor's evaluation of the candidates as well. For example, when a voter's position on key issues could be described as utopian (e.g., absolute equalization of income or nuclear war with Russia) he might very well not support a candidate with similar positions, but instead choose a candidate more likely to be able to deliver at least some of his important desired outputs. Of course, an instrumental voter in this situation who regarded the expected output of the alternative candidates to be trivial or negative, or who believed that he could affect the output of the political system in the long run by casting a protest vote in a particular election,

⁴⁵ An extremely stimulating account of the influence on Congress can be found in R. Mayhew, *Congress: The Electoral Connection* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974).

Competence is a relevant dimension of candidate evaluation for three reasons:

- (1) The candidate's competence directly affects the probability of his being able to deliver output from the system once he is elected.⁴⁸
- (2) Much of what both the President and Congress do involves the general management of the country. Since the voter has only limited information he may vote for a candidate who seems capable of managing the country even if that candidate is not the "closest" to his specific issue preferences.
- (3) Finally, numerous problems will emerge during a candidate's term of office that he will have to solve but that neither he nor the voters can anticipate on election day. Competence in unfamiliar areas may be inferred from the perceived competence of the candidate in other areas.⁴⁹

The relevance of the competence factor to the 1972 election seems to have been entirely overlooked by the authors of "Majority Party," who merely state that "... McGovern was not a personally appealing candidate—a factor that allowed issue differences to gain maximal importance" (abstract). Whatever "not appealing" means, it seems to imply that voters will care more about what a candidate says on the issues when they don't like him. As is indicated below, this "lack of appeal" was in great part a perception of McGovern incompetence, a perception that led to loss of votes not only among voters in general but even among voters who agreed with him on the issues.

When the voter has to obtain an estimate of competence, the process can produce an asymmetry between candidates—e.g., if one is an incumbent or someone who has spent a long period of time in a prominent position,⁵⁰ the voters can

would be behaving consistently with our model by voting for the utopian candidate. A similar calculation would be appropriate where the agreement occurred on less utopian issue positions.

⁴⁸ We are indebted to Professor Joe Oppenheimer for pointing out a paper that lends weight to the idea that the instrumental investor uses competence measures rather than simply proximity measures. Jerome S. Bruner and Sheldon J. Korchin argued in "The Boss and the Vote: A Case Study in City Politics," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 10 (Spring 1964), 1–23, that many Boston voters chose to vote for James Michael Curley despite the fact that they felt closer to other candidates on the issues, because they believed that he could deliver more to them than the other candidates.

⁴⁹ Trust, a generalized sense that a candidate has your interests at heart and is concerned about people like you, clearly is a second major dimension of candidate evaluation and consideration. The simultaneous relations between trust and competence will be explored in future work. See also, Benjamin I. Page, *Choices and Echoes in Presidential Elections* (forthcoming).

⁵⁰ Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy*, p. 107.

make judgments based on actual observation of behavior.⁵¹ An incumbent president deals with "real" events; the challenger can be judged only by those he "manufactures." Thus, for the newcomer—or newcomer to the larger stage of presidential politics—public estimates of competence must be based on less substantial criteria, such as how he talks, how he looks, and how he campaigns. And these criteria are susceptible to more varied interpretation than the actual job performance of an incumbent.⁵²

When this uncertainty and information costs are taken into account, the investor-voter might well focus on the candidates' demographic characteristics, including localism. Demographic characteristics (e.g., race, ethnicity, age) are important cues because the voter observes the relationship between these traits and behavior as part of his daily experience. Where demographic characteristics are closely aligned to the interests of the voter, or provide cues to the general competence of the candidate, they provide reliable, accessible and economical estimates of candidate behavior. Furthermore, the demographic characteristics of a candidate's supporters may also be taken into account. McGovern, for example, may have been hurt by voters' perceptions of the people standing by him: too many young people, too many blacks, too many welfare mothers.

While social scientists recognize many demographic traits as good predictors of certain sorts of behavior, much of the literature disparages voters

⁵¹ The authors of *The Voter Decides* recognized this about the 1952 election: "Eisenhower, because of his background and experience seems to have been perceived as a person peculiarly able to cope with the nation's international problems." Campbell et al., *The Voter Decides*, p. 58.

⁵² The transcripts show that the Nixon campaign recognized this explicitly:

Haldeman: . . . So little is known about McGovern, you'll have a better chance of changing people's mind about him . . .

Haldeman: . . . to start with, you got 40 per cent of the people who will vote for you no matter what happens . . .

President: . . . I agree.

Haldeman: . . . and you got 40 per cent of the people who will vote against you no matter what happens, so you have got 20 per cent of the people left in the middle who may vote for you or may not and that 20 per cent is what you've gotta work on. His argument is that you're so well known, your pluses are clear, clear as well as your minuses; that getting one of those 20 who is an undecided type to vote for you on the basis of your positive points is much less likely than getting them to vote against McGovern by scaring them to death about McGovern; and that, that's the area that we ought to be playing.

Published transcript of a recording of a meeting between the President and H. R. Haldeman on June 23, 1972 from 2:20 to 2:45 PM.

who use these traits as predictors. Yet, demographic traits have a distinct advantage in that not only do they predict, but they are also highly verifiable—hard for an individual to fake or hide.⁵³

Stokes and Miller have argued that localism is not only a hindrance to strong responsible parties, but that the “friends and neighbors” vote is strong evidence of a noninstrumental political orientation unconcerned with legislative outputs: “. . . the irrelevance of local appeal to legislative issues is probably as great (for Congress) as it is in the wide-open, one-party primary.”⁵⁴

Once again, at least some of the onus can be shifted from the voters to the system: Instead of arguing that irresponsible voters lead to irresponsible parties, we argue that a fragmented system with weak parties leads to information problems for the individual voter which make the best possible decision-making strategies less than ideal. Particularly on distributive issues—which neighborhood to tear up for a highway, where to put the post office, where to disburse patronage—localism may be a very effective operating procedure for the voter to use. At least a voter has some chance of knowing whether or not a neighbor is a blatant crook or an obvious fool. Given the problems of expensive, scarce, and unreliable information about the candidates, the voter is more likely to have confidence in a neighbor with local reputation for competence than in an unknown.⁵⁵

⁵³ So many demographic traits are good behavioral predictors that social scientists routinely scrutinize attitudinal data for the “relevant” demographic breaks: when a question occasionally does not fit into the usual pattern, it may even be taken as a scientific breakthrough: “The point is that in absence of the ordinary guidelines of group position that would allow the citizen to adopt the position of those like him or the guideline of group-relatedness that would allow the citizen to adopt a position he perceives as relevant for the groups with which he identifies, cognitive and affective relationship to the events themselves may structure attitudes.” From Sidney Verba, Richard A. Brody, Edwin B. Parker, Norman H. Nie, Nelson W. Polsby, Paul Ekman, and Gordon S. Black, “Public Opinion and the War in Vietnam,” *American Political Science Review* 61 (June 1967), 331. There has been a change in attitudes toward the relevance of demographic variables in assessing candidates. In the 1960 election, Kennedy’s Catholicism was considered an irrelevant, illegitimate topic by voting commentators. Yet by 1974, there was considerable serious discussion about whether an individual as personally wealthy as Nelson Rockefeller was qualified to be a vice-president. Should an Arab-American or a Jewish-American be President?

⁵⁴ Donald E. Stokes and Warren E. Miller, “Party Government and the Saliency of Congress,” in *Elections and the Political Order*, ed. Campbell et al., p. 290.

⁵⁵ The strategies appropriate for voters under conditions of uncertainty have recently been the subject of some analysis. See, for example, Benjamin I. Page, “The Theory of Political Ambiguity,” *American Political Science Review* (forthcoming). The concept of a risky candidate is related to—but distinct from—the concept of candidate competence. See Kenneth A. Shepsle, “The Strategy of

One objection that might be raised to our discussion of “competence” would be that “competence” is nothing more than issue agreement or disagreement. Thus, we find “competent” those with whom we agree and “incompetent” those with whom we disagree. While there is certainly some substance to this idea, it is subject to empirical verification, and one of the questions this paper addresses is how to develop measures that separate disagreement over positions from personal judgments of the candidate. McGovern campaign survey data clearly indicate that voters can react differently to different aspects of a candidate image. The task of separating those aspects from each other and from hard positions on issues is on the agenda for future voting research.

Ideology.* Anthony Downs said that under conditions of costly information and uncertainty, voters would apply an ideology—or yardstick—to the problem in order to reduce their costs. At one point, the authors of “Majority Party” adopted the “yardstick” metaphor for their liberal/moderate/conservative measure, a metaphor with which we agree. The authors, however, have then elaborated on the idea to produce the conclusion that “. . . the 1972 race could be labeled ‘ideological’ ” (abstract).

The authors further indicate that they found evidence of an “increase in the ideological nature of public opinion” (p. 768). This seems to be a different use of the word “ideological.” Do the authors of “Majority Party” mean perhaps that yardsticks are used more than in the past? It is doubtful that “yardstick” could be substituted in either of the quoted passages and still retain the intended meaning.

Whereas Downs argued that voters employ ideology as a *substitute* for information.⁵⁶ Philip

Ambiguity: Uncertainty and Electoral Competition,” *American Political Science Review* 66 (June 1972), 555–568.

* The arguments in this section are, for the most part, distilled from recent work by Joe A. Oppenheimer and Norman Frohlich. See Joe A. Oppenheimer, “Relating Coalitions of Minorities to the Voters Paradox, or Putting the Fly in the Democratic Pie,” paper given at the 1972 meeting of the Southwest Political Science Association, San Antonio, Texas, March 30–April 1, 1972; Joe A. Oppenheimer, “Some Political Implications of ‘Vote Trading and Voting Paradox: A Proof of Logical Equivalence’: A Comment,” *American Political Science Review* 69 (September 1975); Norman Frohlich and Joe A. Oppenheimer, *Modern Political Economy* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, forthcoming), Chapter 7.

⁵⁶ Downs argued that under conditions of uncertainty “. . . many a voter finds party ideologies useful because they remove the necessity of his relating every issue to his own philosophy. Ideologies help him focus attention on the differences between the parties; therefore they can be used as samples of all the differentiating stands. With this short cut a voter can save himself the cost of being informed upon a wider range of issues.” Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy*, p. 98.

Converse argued that the use of a single dimension of issue evaluation like the liberal-conservative continuum required "relatively full information."⁵⁷ Thus, because the American electorate exhibited low levels of political information, ideology would not be a major factor in American politics. Or, in other words, the American electorate was too uniformed to be Downsian. Ideology was transformed from an information cost-saving device into a criterion for telling when a voter was using relatively informed, sophisticated reasoning, and the use of ideology came to be seen as a sign of growth and enlightenment.

Despite this important difference in the two conceptions of ideology, the authors of "Majority Party" have adopted notions about the implications of ideology which were originally formulated by Downs; they adopt these notions directly from Downs's work without reference to the corrections and modifications which have appeared since 1957. A major and incorrect Downsian assumption is that all the various "yardsticks" a voter might employ would aggregate over the electorate to a one-dimensional issue space, as in the traditional notions of left-right or liberal-conservative continua. Donald Stokes, in a critique of Downs's spatial modeling of party competition, pointed out that voters, in fact, use multiple dimensions for evaluation of issues and argued that the multidimensional issue space itself was a variable to be studied rather than assumed.⁵⁸ When issues are not single-peaked, or when different issues have different salience for different voters, or when there is more than one issue or when abstention is high, there is no reason to expect party convergence to a "central" position and indeed there may not even be a "center." The important and enduring aspect of Downs's work—his focus on information costs—remains vital to understanding politics, but it is necessary to move away from simple notions of convergence.

The SRC's search for ideology was motivated not only by a desire to find "good citizens," but also by the belief that the existence of a unidimensional structure had major implications for the political system. "If an electorate responds to public affairs in terms of one or a few well-defined and stable ideological dimensions on which there is little movement of opinion, political controversy will be relatively tightly bounded and the possibilities of party maneuver—and alteration in office—relatively circumscribed."⁵⁹ Downs also made this argument for a two-party system.⁶⁰ He as-

sumed that voters always vote for the party closest to their position on the continuum. If voters were symmetrically distributed along this single dimension and the parties or candidates engaged in vote-maximizing strategies, then both parties would converge on the center of the continuum. Neither party would have an incentive to deviate from the center because, by doing so, it would increase the distance between itself and some of its centrist constituents, thus throwing the election to the opposition. The implications for the political system were

- (1) that each party would adopt an ideologically consistent platform or set of issue positions which could be designated by a point on a one-dimensional issue space
- (2) that there exists a unique, vote-maximizing platform
- (3) that this platform is located at the center of the issue space
- (4) that the platforms of the two parties would, therefore, converge toward stable points near the center or median, *ceteris paribus*.

A body of theory and a methodology has evolved to aid in the search for this "ideological" continuum.⁶¹ Ideological attitude structure is first equated with tightly constrained attitude sets. Tight constraint, in turn, is evidenced by high correlations, across the electorate, between attitudes on different political issues. Constraint, or consistency, is operationalized by the size of the inter-issue correlations in a population. And, finally, as in "Majority Party," these correlations are interpreted as a measure of the facility of the electorate in ordering political issues within a liberal-conservative framework.

When the authors of "Majority Party" find higher correlations between issues than in the past (and despite the different measures employed in the past), they call this evidence of increased constraint—i.e., an "increase in the ideological nature of public opinion." They trace this increase to the increased educational level of the population, which they apparently feel has filled the information gap identified by Converse. Whatever the theoretical problems of such a claim, they are bold indeed when placed against the results of the "Majority Party" factor analysis of issue positions. Here the authors find four distinct dimensions of policy preference. How does "Majority Party" get four dimensions from a unidimensional space?

Furthermore, "Majority Party" notes that

⁵⁷ Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," p. 227.

⁵⁸ Stokes, "Spatial Models of Party Competition."

⁵⁹ Campbell et al., *The American Voter*, p. 550.

⁶⁰ For the sake of simplicity, the authors will always assume two parties or two candidates in this analysis.

⁶¹ See, for example, Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," or Norman H. Nie with Kristi Andersen, "Mass Belief Systems Revisited: Political Change and Attitude Structure," *The Journal of Politics*, 36 (August 1974), 540-591.

nearly a quarter of their sample could not place themselves on a single summary liberal-conservative scale, despite the fact that they could use issue-specific scales to place themselves and the individual candidates. (p. 776, fn. 41) Indeed, the claims made by the authors of "Majority Party" to have provided evidence for the determinate nature of the issue dimension in 1972 are best seen as projections by the analysts. The attempt to find an "ideological" continuum is misdirected conceptually, normatively, and theoretically.

Conceptually, it is important to understand what is being measured by the interissue correlation matrix, the traditional tool for the search. Specifically, the correlation matrix does not measure the extent to which individuals employ the liberal-conservative continuum, or any other continuum, in their issue space. For example, in a two-issue world where everyone in the electorate perceives each issue in liberal-conservative terms and lines up at one of the "extremist" positions on each issue, the populations can be distributed in a two-by-two matrix with four groups being defined by their issue positions: those who are conservative on both, those who are liberal on both, those who are liberal on the first and conservative on the second, and those who are conservative on the first and liberal on the second. Each group is perfectly "ideological" on each issue, but the correlation between the positions on the two issues for the entire population can range from -1.0 to $+1.0$, depending entirely on the relative sizes of the four groups.

Clearly, it cannot be argued that individuals holding one liberal and one conservative position are internally inconsistent. Such an argument would require a demonstration that the liberal-conservative continuum has a logical basis rather than an empirical one. Consider the application of such a dimension to the broadest possible division of issues into foreign policy and domestic policy. Further, suppose that every individual in the electorate perceives the issues within each broad category in ideological terms. Suppose the liberal ends of the domestic and foreign policy dimensions were, respectively, welfare statism and isolationism, while the conservative ends were free enterprise and interventionism. Can it be demonstrated that there is a logical inconsistency in the holding of any pair of positions on these issues?

Of course, there is a sense in which "consistency" could be used. An economist might argue, for example, that two "liberal" goals—such as the minimum wage and full employment—are, in practice, contradictory. In this sense, a person who embraces both is fooling himself and behaving inconsistently. Thus, a consistent program would be one in which the macro-consequences of its different policy preferences would not be contradic-

tory. This use of inconsistency is surely not what the authors of "Majority Party" are talking about. The correlation matrix approach to the search for ideology measures the extent to which everyone in the electorate lines up in agreement on all issues; it is not a measure of the extent to which individuals recognize or employ ideologies.

Normatively, it is ironic that the authors of "Majority Party" greet supposed evidence of one-dimensionality as a positive development. Apparently, this line of reasoning comes from the Converse position that relatively full information is a prerequisite for ideology and the association of information with education. The implication of the argument, however, is that more educated people tend to become simple-minded and view the world in terms of a single liberal-conservative dimension, while the less educated have a multi-dimensional view of the world and are thus confused. Perhaps the authors believe there is one "real" underlying issue which the "liberal-conservative" axis has a tendency to approximate as information increases.

Theoretically, the critique can be pushed a step further to the underpinnings of the model of one-dimensional politics. The conditions necessary for a single dimension to provide a summary scale on which every voter's position on a number of issues can be located are so restrictive as to render the very idea empirically meaningless.⁶²

First of all, even if only one issue were facing the electorate, there might, in fact, be multiple dimensions of evaluation for that issue. In order for a single dimension to emerge, and so serve as a continuum over which voter preferences vary as a direct function of distances, opinions on the issue must be single-peaked—that is, there must be a unique ordering of the alternatives such that, for every individual, there is a point from which his preferences fall off in both directions never to rise again. The Vietnam war is a classic case of an issue that is not single-peaked and that has often, therefore, been misinterpreted in voting studies. It has often been assumed that for all voters there was a Vietnam continuum with withdrawal at one end, escalation at the other and the status quo in the center. Therefore, when a number of "hawks" voted for Eugene McCarthy in the 1968 primaries, it was assumed that these people were voting "directly counter to their own policy preferences,"⁶³

⁶² Of course, there is another model under which a single dimension, such as the pro-Democratic to pro-Republican continuum described in *The Voter Decides*, would arise. That is the "loyalist" model, where the electorate is incapable of ordering issues in any way which is not defined by the party but follows the "party line" slavishly.

⁶³ Although our disagreement here is with the logical basis of the assumption that hawks for McCarthy were obviously and clearly misguided, this example has assumed so much importance that its empirical basis needs

because Lyndon Johnson, positioned at the status quo, would have been closer to their position. In fact, however, there existed throughout the war a number of people whose preference ordering was: (1) escalate, (2) withdraw, and (3) maintain the status quo.⁶⁴

It is trivial to show that the absence of single peakedness destroys any possibility of a determinate outcome.⁶⁵ Suppose, for example, that in the single-issue Vietnam example above, one-third of the electorate prefers withdrawal to maintaining the status quo but maintaining the status quo to escalation, a second third prefers maintaining the status quo to escalation but escalation to withdrawal, while the remainder prefer escalation to withdrawal but withdrawal to the status quo. Under these conditions, even though there is but one issue, there is no party platform that can command a majority of support over all other party platforms. Similarly, there is no "centrist" position on the issue. Suppose one party adopts a withdrawal platform. Under the assumptions of this model, the other party can command two-thirds of the votes with an escalation platform. This platform, in turn, could be beaten by a party that advocated the status quo, and the latter party would lose to a party advocating withdrawal. This absence of a stable vote-maximizing strategy for the parties will be referred to as "cycling" in the arguments to follow.

Even if all the issues are single-peaked, however, and even if there is perfect "consistency" as measured in "Majority Party"—i.e., an issue correlation matrix where every entry is +1.0—there is still no determinate outcome, and a winning strategy for party will not necessarily be a "consistent" strategy, because not all voters will weigh each issue identically. Suppose, for example, that there are three issues and the electorate is evenly divided into strict liberals, conservatives, and moderates, with "consistent" positions on all three issues. Now suppose further that liberals care most about

issue one, moderates feel most intensely about issue two, and conservatives are most intense on the third issue.⁶⁶ Then, a party which adopts any "consistent" platform on the three issues can be defeated by a party that adopts a platform with liberal, moderate and conservative positions on the three issues, respectively. The cycling can continue in a number of ways. A party which adopted a liberal, moderate, moderate platform, for example would beat the liberal, moderate, conservative party, and would lose in turn, to a party with a "consistently" moderate platform. Again, there is no stable vote-maximizing platform.

Even if all issues were single-peaked, and even if all voters had the same intensity on all issues, it can be shown that there still would not be a determinate outcome to the maneuvering of vote-maximizing parties.⁶⁷ And even if there were but one issue or dimension and that one were single-peaked, vote-maximizing parties would not necessarily converge as predicted. In this simplest of all cases, the dime-store analogy that Downs adapted from Hotelling and Smithies for his work is simply not an appropriate model for the political problem at hand.⁶⁸ In the Hotelling-Smithies work, the two stores converged at the geographic center of the market area because this was the point at which each store could maximize the number of symmetrically distributed customers who would find each store closest. If either store moved from the center, the other could move to a position to which all of its former customers and some of its competitor's customers would be closer. The stable solution, then, was an equal division of the marketplace by convergence, and Downs adapted this model for his theory of spatial party competition.

When applying this model to voting, however, the cost of voting has nothing to do with the distance between the voter and the party, or even with the distance between the two parties. The cost of

to be reviewed. When Phillip Converse talks of the widely noted paradox that "many voters across the county had moved from a 'leftist' McCarthy vote in the primaries to a 'rightist' Wallace vote in the general election" or when Converse talks of voters for whom McCarthy was the "wrong" candidate (the wrong McCarthy?) he is referring to the SRC's 1968 election analysis and its reference to "a major McCarthy to Wallace transfer." The empirical basis offered for these statements is fourteen (14) voters. See Converse et al., "Continuity and Change in American Politics . . .", pp. 1093-1095; Philip Converse, "Public Opinion and Voting Behavior," *Handbook of Political Science*, ed. Nelson Polsby and Fred Greenstein (Reading, Mass.: Addison Wesley, 1975), pp. 81, 100, 120, 124.

⁶⁴ Cambridge Survey Research 159-147 showed 6.2 per cent of respondents volunteered this preference order in June 1972 when it was *not offered* to them by interviewers who presented only the common scale.

⁶⁵ Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy*, pp. 60-62.

⁶⁶ No justification is presented for the assumption, implied several times by the authors of "Majority Party," that voters in "extreme" positions are most intense about issues, or that such voters "intensely favored," "intensely preferred" their positions.

This is the familiar myth of the moderate centrist and the intense extremist. However, it is simply not the case that people in the middle of a scale are *necessarily* less intense about their position than are those on the extreme. Consider, for example, a scale with "no tenure" for university professors at one end, "status quo" in the center, and "student determination of tenure" at the other extreme. Would the people with the most intense feelings be the extremists? Miller et al., "A Majority Party . . ." (pp. 763, 764).

⁶⁷ See for example: William H. Riker and Peter C. Ordeshook, *An Introduction to Positive Political Theory* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973), p. 107.

⁶⁸ Harold Hotelling, "Stability in Competition," *The Economic Journal* 39 (1929), 41-57; and Arthur Smithies, "Optimum Location in Spatial Competition," *The Journal of Political Economy*, 49 (1941), 423-439.

voting for each voter depends on the time involved, the opportunity costs, risks, etc. All these are independent of party positions. A voter votes if his perceived costs are lower than his perceived benefits—that is, if the costs are lower than a measure based on party differential. As the parties converge, the party differential goes to zero, and there is no incentive to vote related to the outcome of the election because it will not matter who wins, regardless of the costs of voting. As parties diverge, the party differential increases, and more voters will find it worthwhile to vote. The ideal place to be is where the party differential is larger than the cost of voting for the greatest number of people who favor you. Once abstention is introduced, a candidate is not guaranteed a winning position with a centrist strategy even if there is only one issue and even if that issue is single peaked. Especially with the low turnouts now common, a noncentrist strategy could have a differential impact on turnout rates sufficient to defeat any centrist strategy.

In sum, the notion of the “safe” maximizing center is without foundation. The Scammon and Wattenberg notion that “Wallace’s strength, like the strength of any national political figure is in direct relation to his proximity to the center,” is incomplete and misleading.⁶⁹ Centrist positions are not necessarily vote-maximizing positions. Many issues, we have seen, do not even have a center, but even when they do, there is surely no foundation for such views, especially when only 55 to 60 per cent of the electorate votes. Given recent turnouts, it is highly plausible that in 1976 less than 30 per cent of the over-18 population can make someone President. Noncentrist candidates can win, and the lower the turnouts, the more possible this becomes.

The 1972 Election

Why did George McGovern lose the 1972 election to Richard Nixon? More pointedly, why did George McGovern lose by so much? Were his perceived issue positions too extreme for the majority of American voters? Did he lose the natural advantage of a Democratic candidate because “partisan defection” helped to “suppress the impact of party identification” (abstract)?

Without claiming that the 1972 election studies conducted for the McGovern campaign provide definitive answers to any of these questions, some points from the data do provide insights into the campaign, into the reasons Nixon beat McGovern, and into the relationship of evaluations of candidate competence and issues. Equally important, they help focus on questions that need to be asked in future election studies.

⁶⁹ R. M. Scammon and B. J. Wattenberg, *The Real Majority* (New York: G. P. Putnam & Sons, 1970).

At this point, it should be abundantly clear that we disagree with the thrust of the discussion of the 1972 election presented in “Majority Party.” Our approach points to a different analysis of McGovern’s dramatic descent in the polls between June and November and his substantial defeat in the election. It suggests that this reversal was due in great measure to McGovern’s perceived incompetence rather than to his issue positions. Applying the investor-voter model, the data show that the size of McGovern’s targeted issue-publics and the strength of his personal ratings gave him at least a chance to win. (This contention is supported both by aggregate poll data and, more directly, by analysis of panel data on particular support groups.) The election started out as a “race.” The data also show that during the course of the campaign, McGovern’s issue constituency remained competitive, while ratings of his performance plunged.

In McGovern’s apparent failure to motivate the support of his natural constituency, we find evidence for our contention that the voters’ evaluation of the candidate’s ability to deliver—or competence—constitutes a separate and independent dimension of the vote decision. Voters clearly differentiated between issue proximity and competence.⁷⁰ To be sure, McGovern did lose many votes because people did not like his policies. The major reason that a “race” turned into a “rout,” however, was that McGovern was deserted by large numbers of his own issue publics. They left him because of the widespread perception of his incompetence, a perception fostered largely by the Eagleton affair in July and August, problems of general campaign style, and the constant campaign crises of July and August 1972.

The six-factor model points to an increase in the role of candidates as factors in the vote. But the candidate factor is not merely a reflection of a candidate’s positions; it is also an independent measure of a candidate’s perceived ability, which—in George McGovern’s case—appears to have made five points difference in the outcome of the election.⁷¹

⁷⁰ Evidence of this is that unprecedented ticket-splitting took place. If one is to believe “Majority Party,” millions of people simultaneously rejected George McGovern’s issue positions, then turned around to vote for candidates holding basically the same positions. The victory of Jim Abourezk in South Dakota as McGovern lost his home state and the victories of Dick Clark, Joe Biden, or Walter Mondale must raise some questions concerning pure proximity measures.

⁷¹ Other surveys in which we repeated the policy questions verify for us that McGovern was losing the “liberal” constituencies and not that the “liberal” constituencies were shrinking. The effects observed were clearly not regression to the mean or any other statistical artifact of the panel format. Nixon simply held his r_1 issue and demographic constituencies in every single case far better than did McGovern.

Any view that McGovern was foreordained to defeat because of his "extreme" positions on the issues or that there was never a "horserace" in 1972 simply does not agree with the polls taken for the campaign in late June or independent polls by Gallup and Harris. To begin with, in June it was not certain that George Wallace, despite the shooting, would not be able to run for President again, and so voters were questioned about numerous two- and three-way presidential contests. The results in Table 6 show that George McGovern was a stronger candidate than a "centrist" like Edmund Muskie and, at a time when over 15 per cent of the registered voters still knew too little to rate their impression of him as favorable or unfavorable, was only four points weaker than Edward Kennedy.

Table 6. Standings in the Election Race
(Late June—CSR #149-157)

<i>With Wallace</i>		<i>Without Wallace</i>	
Nixon	41%	Nixon	51%
McGovern	30	McGovern	38
Wallace	18	Undecided	11
Undecided	12		
Nixon	42%	Nixon	49%
Kennedy	36	Kennedy	40
Wallace	14	Undecided	11
Undecided	8		
Nixon	43%	Nixon	53%
Muskie	27	Muskie	32
Wallace	19	Undecided	16
Undecided	12		

(N = 11,000)

Furthermore, a McGovern-Kennedy ticket trailed Nixon-Agnew by just one point—45 per cent to 46 per cent—and a McGovern-Muskie ticket trailed Nixon-Agnew by 42 per cent to 48 per cent.

While Kennedy was clearly the strongest candidate as of the end of June, McGovern at that time had some strengths and sources of support available to no other Democrat. On the one hand, McGovern was weaker than Kennedy and slightly weaker than Humphrey had been among the urban ethnics traditionally so important to Democratic victories. On the other hand, McGovern was considerably stronger than Humphrey had been and was as strong as Kennedy among the young voters. In addition, George McGovern in June was considerably stronger than any other Democratic candidate among the suburban white collar voters of all parties. In fact, McGovern had a sizable, unique constituency—amounting to almost six per cent of the total registered voting age popula-

tion—that would vote either for George McGovern or no other candidate of either party, and this was roughly equivalent to the size of George Wallace's unique constituency.

Three months later, at the end of September, McGovern was further away than ever from victory, the race having gone from 51 per cent versus 38 per cent to 57 per cent versus 32 per cent (a margin that on election day became 61 per cent to 39 per cent) during a period when he had been expected to gain. What happened? Did the voters find out that he was a radical and vote against him because he was an extremist? Did voters prefer peace with honor in Vietnam to a hasty pullout or bloodbath? Or did "middle-America" turn away from McGovern because he looked indecisive and incompetent during the campaign, and because of his inability to handle attacks launched from all sides by the Nixon "surrogates"?

Survey data throughout the period of the campaign show that voters were extremely unclear about where McGovern stood on a number of issues and had very little knowledge of the content of McGovern's programs, particularly taxes and welfare. When questioned about them, they often volunteered things such as "He's confused, how should I know?" or simply said they would not listen to what he had to say. Low evaluations of McGovern's competence apparently diminished his ability to get across information on his positions. This seems to have resulted in people who were "actually" closer to McGovern perceiving themselves as closer to Nixon, and—more commonly—people choosing to support Nixon despite perceiving themselves as closer to McGovern on issues.

Our own panel data show that major changes from June to September took place among what should have been McGovern issue-publics. For example, among those who supported a guaranteed annual income, McGovern led 51 per cent to 39 per cent in June; Nixon was ahead 46 per cent to 45 per cent in September. The voters who thought that the military budget should be reduced drastically went from 54 to 35 per cent for McGovern to 45 per cent to 44 per cent against him. The 25 percent of the registered voters who thought that Vietnam was the most crucial issue and that the U.S. should withdraw immediately and who were also in favor of a guaranteed annual income were for McGovern 65 per cent to 25 per cent in June but only 52 per cent to 38 per cent in September. First-time voters, roughly 8 per cent of the electorate, were for McGovern 56 per cent to 38 per cent in June and had completely switched to favor Nixon 52 per cent to 37 per cent by September. These last two changes alone account for 5 per cent of the total vote. Clearly, McGovern was losing his "natural constituencies" as much as he

Table 7. Issue Heats and Attitudes toward Nixon*

Which candidate do you personally feel can do a better job of finding a solution to:

	Vietnam		Nixon	Neither	McGovern
June			40%	28	32
September			54%	13	32
	Improving Economy				
June			40%	30	33
September			51%	17	32
	Tax Reform				
June			29%	43	28
September			57%	10	33
Nixon's Job Performance Rating					
	Excellent	Good	Don't know	Fair	Poor
June	12%	39	1	33	16
September	11%	41	2	32	15
(Agree or Disagree:)					
Richard Nixon really cares about people like me.					
			Agree	Don't know	Disagree
June			47%	10	43
September			50%	7	43

* All data in this and subsequent tables from Cambridge Survey Research National survey #159-147 in June and #159-180 in September

was losing undecided voters, Wallace supporters, and traditional "New Deal" Democrats.

Among the whole population, Nixon increased his lead over McGovern as the person who could "do the best job" on a number of issues.

Moreover, while the incumbent's ratings were stable, McGovern's personal ratings changed drastically during this critical period of the campaign. Although, as Table 8 shows, the McGovern campaign successfully increased the perception of

Table 8. George McGovern Rating—Concern and Competence

	Agree	Don't know	Disagree
<i>George McGovern really cares about people like me.</i>			
June	41%	30	29
September	55%	14	31
<i>George McGovern is not qualified to be President.</i>			
June	27%	24	50
September	42%	9	49
<i>McGovern has the vision to provide solutions to the country's problems.</i>			
June	35%	32	33
September	39%	12	49

McGovern as a concerned individual—McGovern actually had higher concern and care ratings than did Nixon—the voters showed substantial ability to differentiate among candidate traits. While McGovern's concern-care ratings were steadily rising during this period of his falling political fortunes, Table 8 also shows that his ratings on the questions used to index basic presidential competence plummeted.

In view of the idea that McGovern lost because he was a "Goldwater of the left," it is instructive to look at the answers given in September, when voters were asked what they most disliked about George McGovern. Comments that could be described as having issue content—welfare, Vietnam, tax program issues in general, too liberal, abortion, amnesty, drugs, etc.—amounted to 24 per cent of all these references. Twice as many voters said things like "indecisive" or "unqualified." One out of every ten voters specifically referred to the Eagleton affair in pointing out what was most disliked about George McGovern as a possible president—more than the total who mentioned Vietnam or welfare. This same preponderance of personal criticisms over issue criticisms was found among defecting Democrats and voters who were for McGovern at time one and then switched. Of course, increased awareness of McGovern's issue positions played a part in the decline, but the fall in his perceived competence was a major crippler.

A look at the changes in vote preferences be-

tween June and September for the various demographic and issue-publics among whom McGovern's early strength was located emphasizes the importance of perceived competence or the ability to deliver. When McGovern began to look as if he lacked the capability to manage and administer, numerous people whose ideal issue positions were "close" to his, shifted to Nixon on the question of which man they thought could do a better job in a particular area. We are forced to settle for this indirect, inferential and less than entirely satisfying method because it simply is not clear how to specify the functional form relating voter issue positions, perceived candidate positions, and the two candidate ratings. Without a valid functional form, the indirect effects of competence on the policy preferences cannot be calculated. For purposes of this initial investigation however, we use a regression model to calculate the direct effect of competence.

While our main interest here is in demonstrating the substantial effect of competence on the vote decision, it is necessary, of course, to estimate a complete equation. In addition to party identification, a Nixon performance rating and a McGovern competence rating, the three major issues (by way of salience criteria) were included. Obviously, there were countless other issues of importance to a few or more voters, but the specification bias introduced by a truncated issue array was observed to be trivial and virtually unnoticeable. Because party is included directly, and because we use the strongest "most likely to be significant" technique for issue proximities, there is a minimal chance of any bias in the writing of the equation that would make the candidate variables appear significant. That is, the deck is stacked against the candidate variables in this equation. But they are, in fact, clearly non-zero, statistically significant, and of considerable clout at both time one and time two.

In both equations, the presence of three strong issue measures has not masked the two candidate performance and competence variables. There is a direct and significant impact on the vote of candidate ratings. Equally important, further tests revealed that no additional issue inclusions weakened that impact, and no "affect-type" candidate variables (i.e., "warmth" or favorability thermometer) had as strong an effect as the measures of performance and competence, given even the weak and preliminary nature of our competence measure. In addition, it is interesting to note that as the campaign developed and more information became readily available and thus, less costly for the voter—the party weight declined. Also, as Vietnam was heating up again, the war issue became more salient, and as McGovern collapsed, the issue of tax reform lost considerable weight.

The straight economic management issue (unemployment, inflation and business conditions) was accorded more weight by voters overall than was Vietnam.

Looking at the $B_i\bar{X}_i$'s in Table 9 in order to assess the net effect of each factor on the vote, we can see McGovern lost more between June and October on competence than on any other single issue. That is, the direct impact of competence, ignoring the difficult-to-measure effects of competence on issue heats, was larger than that of any single issue. Almost a third of McGovern's loss was a direct function of the decline in his competence ratings, apart from any change in issue assessments. In other words, it is entirely possible that if the Eagleton affair had not paralyzed McGovern at a crucial state of the campaign, and if he had been able to deal with the panoply of Nixon surrogates (the cabinet and subcabinet level officials who took part in a well-choreographed assault on McGovern issue by issue) all of whom had to be answered by McGovern, McGovern might have lost by only 55 per cent to 45 per cent. If this had occurred, George McGovern would now be the odds-on favorite for 1976 instead of living proof that "extremists" never win.

Conclusion

On one point, we are in total agreement with the authors of "Majority Party": a fresh approach to the study of voting is needed. The disagreement is on what that approach should be. The authors of "Majority Party" claim to have found a "new" voter, whose increased education is changing the basis of his vote from parties and candidates to issues and ideology. The authors of "Majority Party" have crossed the line in the debate between those who see voting as based on candidates, parties, and psychological motivations and those who see it as based on issues, ideology, and rational choice. Yet when crossing the line, they have failed to recognize that the dichotomy was false in the first place. It was produced by mistaken standards and theories used in analyzing the whole body of SRC election studies.

The authors of "Majority Party" gloss over the discontinuity of their work with the past by implying that the voters rather than the theory, have changed (i.e., that the voters have outgrown the framework in which *The American Voter* placed them). Where previously voters were too uninformed to be Downsian, education has now enabled them to behave in a sophisticated way. We want to state plainly that we see the old theories as inapplicable not because they are outdated, but because they were wrong: the standards they applied to the voter were misleading and the tests they applied faulty.

In particular, the old theories were wrong about

Table 9. Regression Equations for June and September, 1972^a and Changes^b in $\bar{X}$, $B\bar{X}$

	B_0	Party (t)	Nixon Perform- ance (t)	McGovern Compe- tence (t)	War policy area (t)	Economy policy area (t)	Tax policy area (t)	N	R/R^2
June	-.43	.39 (5.83)	-.43 (9.64)	.28 (7.14)	.46 (5.74)	.72 (7.68)	.43 (4.58)	1009	.82/.67
September	-.39	.24 (3.87)	-.36 (8.31)	.38 (11.27)	.66 (8.66)	.72 (8.66)	.22 (2.65)	1009	.84/.71

	Party $\bar{X}$ $B\bar{X}$		Nixon Performance $\bar{X}$ $B\bar{X}$		McGovern Competence $\bar{X}$ $B\bar{X}$		War Heat $\bar{X}$ $B\bar{X}$		Economy Heat $\bar{X}$ $B\bar{X}$		Tax Heat $\bar{X}$ $B\bar{X}$	
June	.17	.066	.034	-.013	.32	.09	-.09	-.05	-.114	-.08	-.005	-.002
September	.17	.042	.014	.005	-.02	.008	-.212	-.13	-.197	-.14	-.13	-.06
Difference*	-.024		+.018		-.082		-.08		-.06		-.058	

^a Dependent variable was a scale from +3 (McGovern) to -3 (Nixon). Nixon's performance was scored so + = pro-Nixon, all other scales were scored so that + = pro-McGovern. Mean of the dependent variable at time one was -.42 and at time two it was -.67.

^b In the seven-point dependent variable positive = McGovern; negative = Nixon.

* Difference = $(B\bar{X}_{i2} - B\bar{X}_{i1})$.

the nature of party, seeing the affective and ignoring the instrumental. They were wrong about the invariance of interest and involvement over a life-time. They were wrong when they assumed that there was little feedback from party performance to party identification. They were wrong when they assumed that voters took their cues from party and candidate lines and ignored cues from their daily lives and self-interest. More than anything that we can say, the events of the 1960s proved them wrong: the changes of party, the growth of black participation, the success of issue-based protest movements in toppling at least one president from within his own party, and certainly the rise of George Wallace—perhaps even the rise of George McGovern.

The authors of “Majority Party” are almost always wrong, or at least without foundation, when they talk about “change” but use a new proximity model; the new findings on 1972 are produced by new instruments, and where direct comparisons are possible the new and old instruments do not agree. “Majority Party” is wrong, for example, when it argues that candidates have decreased rather than increased in importance.

Moreover, the new “Majority Party” approach to voting is misguided in several important respects. It is wrong about ideology—particularly

when it sees the use of ideology as a manifestation of sophistication rather than as a cost-saving device. It is also wrong about the relation between candidate and issues. For example, it is a mistake to imply, as they do, that the voter will take the promise of proximity on issues in lieu of predictions of actual performance, and it is wrong for them to portray candidate concerns as antithetical to issue concerns, elements to be neutralized so that issues can shine through. And finally, the authors of “Majority Party,” in their rush to modernize, have erred by embracing parts of the Downsian model which are either inapplicable to the American political system or simply wrong.

Rather than attempt patchwork revisions as the authors of “Majority Party” have done, one must challenge the old theories at their core—their view of the American voter. Using concepts from group theories and standards based on democratic ideals, the old theories developed expectations, hypotheses, and more than a few normative judgments—in particular, placing all the onus for apathy or poor performance on the voter and reifying “consistency.” The authors of “Majority Party,” while incorporating other methods, do not seriously challenge the old view of the voter.

As we suggest, one fresh approach may begin with the idea that the voter is using his vote as an

investment in one or more collective goods, made under conditions of uncertainty with costly and imperfect information. As an investor the voter is concerned with outputs, and because the outputs are collective goods, there is incentive to be a free-rider and pass the responsibility to others to inform themselves. Combined with the costliness of information, this leads to the use of informational cost-saving devices like party, ideology or demographic characteristics and an expectation that voters will be most informed when information is "free" or when it is obtained not to prepare for voting but for use in daily life. Combined with the weak nature of the American party system and the power of the President, this leads to a focus on the candidate himself and not just on his party. As an investor, the voter is concerned not with abstract policies of the candidate, but rather with what the candidate can be expected to "deliver" and, thus, the voter looks for signs of competence.

We feel this approach points the way toward questions for further research, questions whose answers are critical to the analysis of candidate strategy and voter behavior. Among the most intriguing of these are the following:

- (1) To what extent is the competence component of candidate evaluation independent of issue positions and what is the nature of the interaction? We have argued that there is a competence dimension to candidate evaluation. Clearly, there will be an interaction between the positions that a candidate takes on issues and the voter's evaluation of his competence, but equally clearly, this is not all. What else goes into the evaluation of competence? The ability to handle hecklers? Reporters? Looks? Reputation? Success in business? Has this changed with television? How substantial is the "halo" effect, where competence is ascribed to the candidate with acceptable positions and denied to the candidate with unacceptable ones? What is the relation between trust and competence?
- (2) What tests does the voter use in different contexts? We have argued that voters will base their evaluations of candidates on the most visible and reliable cues available to them, which are often demographic characteristics. This suggests a field of voting research in what might be called cueing or attribution theory. When the voter "interviews" a candidate for the job of president, what questions does he use? Does he test in areas he, the voter, feels he knows well, like social problems? Does he test on issues such as abortion and corporal punishment, and infer capability elsewhere to those who agree with him?
- (3) Do voters adopt different information strategies for different races and different tests for different jobs? A related area of inquiry is raised by the federal structure of the American system and its effect on candidate evaluation. For example, competence may be a more important dimension for evaluation of candidates for administrative offices, such as president and mayor, than for legislative positions. Furthermore, since the "legislator" can't be expected to deliver as much, straight "proximity" without consideration of competence may be used more than in an executive race. Would the McGovern/Nixon vote have been the same in a race for the Senate?
- (4) To what extent do the media contribute to de-emphasis or relocation of the focus of political parties? We have argued that party labels may be employed by voters as information shortcuts. Modern media coverage of contests for the presidency, however, makes available to the voter a wealth of information about the candidates beyond the party label. Such extensive coverage does not characterize most other races. This raises an important question, then, about the impact of the media on the structure of the American political system.
- (5) What effect does modern media coverage have on voters' evaluation of the trustworthiness of candidates and on the long-run stability of coalitions? In addition to expanding the information available to voters, extensive media coverage of modern elections has the further effect of opening up the smoke-filled rooms and revealing the coalitional nature of candidate support groups. What happens, for example, when a white Southern Democrat discovers that he is in the same coalition with Eastern liberals and blacks? "If you're good for them," a voter might reason, "can you possibly be good for me?"
- (6) How do voters evaluate the economic management performance of Presidents and other leaders? The investor-voter model would lead us to expect that economic issues will be of near-universal concern to voters, because information about one or more economic variables—such as inflation, price supports, parity levels, unemployment benefits, social security increases—is obtained in planning daily life. Indeed, our analysis of the 1972 election showed economic management to be a policy area of high impact, whereas "Majority Party," by looking at social security type economic items, and ignoring inflation, unemployment and busi-

ness conditions, found economics to be an *unimportant area for the voters*. The entire economic area has, as our treatment suggests, been heavily underplayed, and future voting researchers would be well advised to study popular perceptions and evaluations of various different kinds of economic conditions and taxes. How and in what ways do voters most notice inflation, and do they see any contradictions between fighting inflation and unemployment? What are the causal models voters have of the relations between government policy and their own economic condition?

We have discussed three different models of the American voter: the original SRC model for the citizen voter, the more educated, ideological "Downsian" voter of "Majority Party," and our investor-voter. The differences in the models are summed up by the main question they suggest is in the minds of the voters. The old SRC model suggests that the voter asks, "Where do my affections lie?" The "Majority Party" revised model suggests that the voter asks, "What promises are closest to my ideals?" We instead suggest that the American voter goes beyond affect and promises to ask, "What have you done for me lately?"

Comment on "A Majority Party in Disarray"

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Market Opinion Research

We agree that issue voting was a very important factor in the 1972 presidential election. We do not agree, however, with two consequences seen by CPS in the rise in issue voting: (1) that the 1972 patterns portend great ideological battles for future presidential elections and (2) that the political parties must change their issueless ways in order to cope with an increasingly polarized electorate. Those grand consequences could be taken more seriously if the increased issue voting reflected *enduring* polarizations in the electorate and not *candidate-induced* polarizations. Miller et al. instead use both causes in explaining the increase in issue voting without explicitly labeling the two causes and without mentioning the different implications each has for the strategies of political parties and the nature of future elections.

In addition to its unclear theoretical statements, we find CPS's running commentary on the Vietnam War issue to be almost totally erroneous. This is no small matter as the war issue was CPS's strongest example of a policy cleavage in 1972, and the war issue obviously bore the brunt of the high correlations involving the combined issue indices used throughout the analysis. The CPS analysis, generally, is guilty of overly dramatizing the meaning of the 1972 issue patterns, and our own findings on the Vietnam War will serve as our empirical demonstration of this point.

The Vietnam War Issue

CPS found that the Vietnam War was a pivotal issue of great importance to the election outcome. With this important point we agree, but our agreement stops there. Basically, the CPS group makes two contradictory assertions about the war issue—both of which are incorrect. First, they present a picture of McGovern overestimating the speed of the electorate's drift to the left and consequently placing himself too far to the left for the voters to support him. In this view, Nixon, who was perceived to have changed little on the issues, became the closer candidate to a majority of voters virtually by default. The first interpretation wrongly assigns only minor importance to the impact that Nixon's perceived policies had on the vote. The dynamics of the issue lie only with the far left position staked out by McGovern and not with the voters' reactions to what they saw Nixon doing.

The second assertion presents Nixon as the candidate of those who "favored an escalation of

the war and renewed national commitment to achieve a military victory" (p. 756). In ascribing a rather startling bit of issue positioning to Nixon, the second interpretation is a gross distortion of how his supporters perceived his Vietnam policy.

The most widely held perception of Nixon's Vietnam policy was that he was "bringing the boys home." Incredibly *nowhere* in their entire review of this issue do the authors mention troop withdrawals as part of Nixon's policy. This is not a point of a fair representation of Nixon's policies; but, rather, one of analytically incorporating the paramount positive perception that the American voters had toward Nixon and the war. The impression CPS leaves with the reader that Nixon won a landslide victory based on a coalition of voters who favored an escalation in the war is directly contrary to what MOR was continually finding throughout the election year.

Across our surveys in 1972, we consistently found Nixon's biggest asset was that a clear plurality of voters perceived him as successfully *de-escalating* the war. For example, in January, 1972, the single most frequent perception of the "most important accomplishments of the Nixon administration" was his phased withdrawal of troops from Vietnam. Fully 38 per cent of the voters *volunteered* this as one of Nixon's chief accomplishments during his first term in office; no other response or set of responses came close to equalling the positive impact of the withdrawal perception. In eighteen states also surveyed during January, the same accomplishment was attributed to Nixon. The volunteered mentions of troop withdrawals ran no lower than 33 per cent (in Missouri) and reached a high of 49 per cent (in New Hampshire). In all eighteen states this single perception far outdistanced the others in the voters' minds.

As the CPS authors stated, the Vietnam War was the most salient issue in the election and, as such, was also most frequently cited as a failure of the Nixon administration. Nationally, however, a 38 per cent to 21 per cent plurality saw Nixon's handling of the war as an accomplishment rather than a failure. Only in California (35 per cent to 28 per cent) and in Missouri (33 per cent to 20 per cent) did Nixon's plurality fall below a 15-point margin.

Particularly damaging to the CPS interpretation, these volunteered responses do *not* indicate that the war was actively perceived as a position

issue demarcated by immediate withdrawal and military victory. Instead, they imply a milder dichotomy than the one used by CPS. Some voters approved of Nixon's phased withdrawal program while others judged it as being too slow. Almost everyone who mentioned it wanted the U.S. out of the war and, at issue, was the speed and conditions of the withdrawal. The positive responses, significantly, are not based on perceptions of Nixon winning the Vietnam War. Tables 1 and 2 represent the general tone of the Vietnam data the Nixon campaign was receiving throughout 1972, and given this tone, the issue loses much of its ideological content.

Tables 1 and 2 also reveal that Nixon's real vulnerability was the economy. By about a 17 per cent to 15 per cent margin, more voters pointed to his various economic policies as failures. Other findings in our surveys in regard to Nixon's perceived handling of the economy were even more negative than this result. Typically, MOR's issue handling ratings taken on Nixon showed "foreign policy" and "the Vietnam War" to be his strongest issue areas and "unemployment" and "inflation" to be his weakest issues with the voters.¹

Given these and similar findings it should be obvious that McGovern's "principal error" in 1972 was not his "overestimating the speed" of the "drift toward an anti-war opinion," as CPS advises us (p. 758). It was more simply his emphasizing the Vietnam War rather than economic problems as the issue upon which the voters should base their voting decision. The Nixon strategists could not have been happier.

But how do we account for the formidable array of CPS data which seems to support conclusions so different from ours? First, there is a matter of data manipulation. When using a seven-point scale, the analyst is faced with the arbitrary choice of defining the left as points 1 and 2 or points 1, 2, and 3. The same follows for defining the right. Most significantly, the size of the center will expand or collapse depending on the choice made.

CPS uses the broad definitions of the extremes and, consequently, 40 per cent of their pre-election respondents, the modal group, are in favor of immediate withdrawal from Vietnam. Only 23 per cent are in the center. If the narrow definition is used, the mode changes to the center (45 per cent) with 28 per cent at the left favoring immediate withdrawal. The modal perception of Nixon's position also shifts from the right polar extreme to the center when the tighter definition of favoring a military victory is used. Significantly, only the

meaning of McGovern's perceived position is unaffected by this unavoidable shell game. (See Table 3.)

The broad definition of the polar positions does support the CPS picture of McGovern standing on the plurality side of the Vietnam issue with his principal error being only that he is too frequently seen as supporting immediate withdrawal (75 per cent). Nixon, on the other hand, is on the wrong side of the issue. In spite of this, Nixon is closer to a majority of voters only because McGovern is perceived so far to the left, or so goes the CPS analysis.

However, the centrist description of Nixon and the electorate on Vietnam is the more accurate one and is much more consistent with our other measures on the subject. We would guess that if CPS checked other results in their interview, the centrist description would be validated and the polarization pattern would be revealed as a serious distortion of their other Vietnam issue findings.

The second source of their misrepresentation of the Vietnam issue lies in the content of their question. No doubt in the interest of gathering data comparable to those of their previous studies, CPS stayed with their verbal anchors of "withdrawal" and "victory." Unfortunately, this dichotomy was not as appropriate in 1972 as it had been in previous years. To measure the voters' basic orientation toward an issue there is a good argument for stating the two sides in the most extreme terms. But, the CPS authors take their subsequent results too seriously: they try to have us believe that in the perceived national debate on Vietnam, voters saw the choices as immediate withdrawal versus military victory. As our unprompted, open-ended data show more clearly, this simply was not the case.

In addition to the volunteered responses, we also used a seven-point scaling question but with the extremes being (1) "withdraw all troops immediately in the belief that North Vietnam will then release our prisoners" and (2) "we should continue to withdraw our troops gradually but not withdraw them completely until our prisoners of war have been released." The proof of the greater relevance of this dichotomy to the actual campaign is the significant level of agreement it uncovered in the voters' perceptions of Nixon's position. An average 80 per cent of the voters in seven states surveyed placed Nixon on the side of conditional withdrawal broadly defined, and 68 per cent placed him in favor of conditional withdrawal even when narrowly defined. Table 3 shows the contrasting results obtained by the CPS and MOR issue scales and the change in meaning of the CPS results when their extremes are defined more strictly.

At the time these data were collected (June 13-

¹ These ratings used the question, "How well do you think President Nixon has handled the following issues—extremely well, very well, fairly well, not very well, or not at all well."

Table 1. What Are the Most Important Accomplishments of the Nixon Administration?

	East				Midwest				South				West					
	New Hampshire	New Jersey	New York	Pennsylvania	Ohio	Indiana	Wisconsin	Iowa	Maryland	Virginia	North Carolina	Kentucky	Tennessee	Florida	Texas	Missouri	Oregon	Calif.
National																		
War/Handling of Vietnam																		
Trying to end Vietnam War/Withdrawal of troops/Bringing our boys home/Getting our men home/De-escalation of Vietnam War/Withdrawal without defeat/Toned Vietnam situation down	38%	49%	39%	39%	42%	38%	39%	41%	40%	41%	40%	40%	48%	39%	38%	33%	42%	35%
Wage/Price control program/Phase I																		
Price freeze program/Wage freeze helps a lot. Phase II was good/Phase I sure helped	8	9	9	9	9	14	9	13	10	8	11	7	9	6	9	7	6	7
Control inflation/Economic strides																		
Inflation is better now/Trying to curb inflation/Controlling our economy/Stabilizing our economy	7	9	8	8	7	6	8	6	7	7	8	5	6	5	9	10	5	11
Improved foreign relations																		
Recognized Red China/Maintaining position of U.S. in world affairs/Opened relations with Red China	6	5	4	8	4	6	4	3	6	5	4	4	2	2	3	5	6	11
All others																		
Nothing good/No accomplishments																		
Just don't approve of him	17	8	18	10	12	15	12	16	9	16	10	14	7	11	15	10	17	13
Don't know/Refused/No Mention																		
Don't know/Refused/No Mention	12	8	11	18	15	11	18	10	13	11	13	17	18	18	11	18	18	14
Number of cases	100% (1019)	100% (608)	100% (807)	100% (1007)	100% (799)	100% (797)	100% (800)	100% (800)	100% (604)	100% (799)	100% (796)	100% (803)	100% (806)	100% (801)	100% (805)	100% (800)	100% (599)	100% (1003)

Table 2. What Are the Major Failures of the Nixon Administration?

	East			Midwest			South			West									
	New Hampshire	New Jersey	New York	Pennsylvania	Ohio	Indiana	Wisconsin	Iowa	Maryland	Virginia	North Carolina	Tennessee	Florida	Texas	Missouri	Oregon	Calif.		
War/Not ending Vietnam War																			
Not ending the Vietnam War/Slow in getting out/He hasn't done anything/Peace/Having our boys slaughtered/Misled a lot of people on Vietnam/Hasn't stopped activity in Vietnam	21%	12%	19%	25%	26%	22%	18%	19%	23%	22%	17%	13%	16%	12%	22%	20%	19%	28%	
Inflation/Economic policy																			
Waited too long to stop inflation/ Could have come earlier/Economy is bad/ Should control our economy better	8	9	6	9	8	10	7	11	8	9	9	4	7	6	10	7	12	8	
Unemployment/Lack of jobs																			
Too many people out of work/Create more work	5	5	7	5	6	8	6	5	5	7	4	2	6	4	2	6	14	8	7
Wage/Price control program																			
Phase II of the price freeze/Put freeze on too late/Don't like how he did it/Wage control	4	4	3	4	6	5	5	10	3	4	4	3	15	4	2	7	5	5	5
Foreign relations/Foreign aid																			
Don't like the way they play footsie with Red China/His policy with Russia/Too much foreign aid	2	5	2	4	2	4	3	2	3	2	3	2	1	2	3	3	2	4	4
Everything bad/All failures																			
No good/Doing a terrible job	3	2	2	3	4	3	3	3	2	3	3	2	—	4	3	5	7	8	4
All others	16	17	13	—	7	6	10	11	19	9	10	12	12	2	16	2	6	1	2
Nothing bad/No failures																			
He hasn't failed/Done as well as he could /Can't think of any failures	12	15	12	10	9	12	14	9	9	9	11	12	14	18	17	8	8	7	8
Don't know/Refused/No Mention	13	19	20	16	19	14	20	16	19	14	15	29	28	27	22	16	17	17	11
Number of cases	(1019)	(608)	(807)	(1007)	(799)	(797)	(800)	(800)	(604)	(799)	(798)	(803)	(806)	(801)	(805)	(1003)	(800)	(599)	(1003)

Table 3. Alternative Descriptions of the Voters' Positions and Their Perceptions of Nixon and McGovern on the Vietnam War^a

	CPS Data: Immediate Withdrawal/ Military Victory			Nixon Data: Immediate Withdrawal/ Conditional Withdrawal ^b		
	Self (1333)	Nixon (1214)	McGovern (1214)	Self (7 States)	Nixon (7 States)	McGovern (7 States)
<i>Broad Definition of Extremes</i>						
Left	40%	21%	75%	30%	6%	58%
Center	23	26	6	9	12	11
Right	28	45	6	54	80	12
Don't know	2	*	13	1	2	19
<i>Narrow Definition of Extremes</i>						
Left	28	9	69	24	3	49
Center	45	53	14	24	27	24
Right	18	28	4	45	68	8
Don't know	2	*	13	1	2	19

^a Proportions for respondents' self locations are based on total samples with percentage for uninterested voters not shown.

^b Nixon data are based on the average result across seven states: California ($N=1,000$), Illinois ($N=800$), New Jersey ($N=897$), New York ($N=1,000$), Ohio ($N=800$), Pennsylvania ($N=800$), and Texas ($N=1,000$); with each state weighted equally. The interviewing was done during June, 1972.

29, 1972) the voter's perceptions of McGovern were less clear than were their perceptions of Nixon. In California, however, where the highly salient presidential preference primary had been held a week earlier, the perceptions of McGovern were close to the national perceptions found by CPS in the fall. Sixty-three per cent of the California voters perceived McGovern as unambiguously in support of immediate withdrawal, and an additional 9 per cent saw him as at least leaning toward that position.

In summary, there were exceptionally high levels of agreement by the voters about the positions taken by Nixon and McGovern on the war. Nixon was perceived not as favoring a military victory but as favoring conditional withdrawal. Moreover, Nixon's *past actions* on Vietnam had generated considerable support for his re-election, a point completely omitted by the CPS analysis. The Vietnam issue served to catalyze voters in two ways: the voters were significantly *attracted to Nixon* based on his past record and his policy for the future as well as being *repelled by McGovern* based on his perceived policy for the future.

The Vietnam War also served the CPS authors as a major example of the alleged "national liberal trend on questions of public policy" (p. 758). Imputing an ideological meaning to the shift of opinion on the Vietnam War is overdoing it; it is one further example of their tendency to exaggerate the implications of their findings. A true shift to a liberal orientation on foreign

policy would mean that more Americans than before felt that displays of good will on our part were a better way to elicit positive responses from a communist government like North Vietnam. CPS shows us no data that suggest so fundamental a change. A counter-hypothesis for the change is that the American people had become appalled by the persistence of an ugly war and wanted it over one way or the other. Such a feeling could grow, and with it the support for immediate withdrawal, without touching the voters' more ideological beliefs about the trustworthiness of Communist governments. In fact, Nixon's position incorporated a record of troop withdrawals (ending our participation) with a *distrust* of the good will of North Vietnam (conditional withdrawal) and, thereby, hit the most responsive chord in the electorate.

Because of their misrepresentation of the Vietnam War issue, Miller et al. miss completely a major irony about the 1972 campaign. McGovern's issue strategy played directly into Nixon's hands. Nixon was most vulnerable on his perceived handling of the economy, while his strong suits were Vietnam and foreign policy. But guided by his personal convictions rather than good political sense, McGovern missed his opportunity to call Nixon to task on the economy. Instead, he threw down the gauntlet exactly where the Nixon strategists wanted it thrown, i.e., on the war issue and the candidates perceived abilities to handle foreign policy generally. We wonder how much dis-

array there would have been among the Democrats if they had had a candidate who had summoned them to battle with their familiar bugle-call of more jobs and higher wages.

Types of Polarization of the Electorate

As we stated at the outset, we find running through the CPS analysis two explanations for the high levels of issue voting and, by implication, two types of issue polarization. One is induced by elite behavior, and the other originates in the existing policy demands of the voters. Whether or not the CPS authors recognize the differing implication which each holds, they never explicitly tell us. They simply cite one and then the other in no apparent systematic fashion. This is unfortunate because the difference between the two is indeed crucial to their generalizations about the strategies of our political parties and the nature of future elections.

To understand the difference between the two polarizations presented by CPS, consider two types of voters. The first is the voter who intensely favors a particular solution to a problem and offers his vote to the candidate who supports his solution. To this voter the issue is, above all, a position issue. In favoring his own solution, he typically opposes competing solutions as intensely as he supports his own. His chief significance for the formulation of campaign strategy is his demand that the candidates take clear positions on his issue. The advocates of immediate withdrawal, of complete military victory in Vietnam, of stiffer penalties for criminals, and of the legalization of marijuana are examples of such voters and examples of the types of issues which define them.

The second type is the voter who essentially reacts to a candidate's proposed solution to a problem although this voter *may not* have considered the problem itself of great importance. This is candidate-induced issue voting. The voter did not demand that the candidate take a position; but once he did, the voter perceived the position to be so outrageous that it immediately became an important factor to his voting decision. This second voter is reacting to the first voter. The issue would never have been an issue if the first voter and his candidate had not put it on the campaign agenda. At least the first two of the "three A's"—"amnesty, acid, and abortion"—were the foci of candidate-induced issue voting and probably characterize McGovern's role better than the statement that he was in the "vanguard" of emerging issue demands of a majority of Americans.

The two types of individual issue voting can obviously result in different types of issue polarization overall. Thus, there can be a polarization involving an issue which divides the electorate into two opposing camps, each actively demanding

that their solution be used to solve the problem, e.g., victory or withdrawal from Vietnam. Or there can be a polarization involving an issue that is important to *some* voters that only becomes important to others when an unacceptable solution to the problem is thrust upon them, e.g., busing to achieve school integration.

This distinction is extremely important because each of the two types carries different political implications. The first arises from an unresolved problem and will fade only when the problem is resolved. Faced with such an electorate, the parties and candidates have no choice but to address the problem or their platforms will be considered irrelevant by the voters. They may align themselves clearly in one camp or attempt to promote a compromise, but either way they must speak to the problem. Moreover, the parties and candidates will continually be confronted with these choices until the issue is resolved.

The second type of polarization, on the other hand, comes into being from elite behavior—that is, from a court ruling, an announced government policy, or the selection of a particular candidate. The last of these is the cause of chief interest, since it means that a *national party can choose* whether or not to polarize the electorate. They may choose to nominate a McGovern in 1972 or a Goldwater in 1964 in the belief that the resulting polarization will yield a majority coalition at their pole; or they may choose to do so in order to wage the good fight—win or lose. Whatever the reason for the choice, the party has the option the next time around *not* to nominate a polarizing candidate, without any disastrous repercussions for doing so.

As important as this distinction is, the CPS analysis uses both without comment. Its explanations of increased issue voting flip-flop between (1) the position that the change exists independently of particular candidates and elite behavior and (2) the position that the change can be directly attributed to the selection of ideologically oriented candidates who give the campaign a greater issue focus.

The authors made an excellent statement on the discipline's failure adequately to incorporate leadership behavior as "a major source of the observed change in the quality of mass attitudes" and, thereby, come down on the side of leader-induced polarizations. They specifically cite as sources of the increased issue voting in the '60's—Kennedy's legislative program, the nomination of Goldwater, the dogged efforts of national television during Johnson's administration, and Wallace's particular brand of articulated policy alternatives. All with the result "that national leaders were injecting a large element of policy-based controversy in American politics" (p. 754). The same types of statement return in their summation in which they

state that the greater ideological structuring of political attitudes "reflects the fact that the past 12 years have witnessed an increased articulation of the ideological differences between the parties [and] "can be understood to be the consequence of spokesmen, and movements, utilizing public—and often out-of-the-ordinary channels for airing their grievances" (p. 768). Finally, they say "the growth of issue polarization in the electorate, and the increased importance of issues as determinants of the vote decision have been, at least in part, a response to a new policy-oriented style of elite leadership" (p. 771).

This is very clear, and we heartily agree. We should like to add, however, that the primary agents of this "new policy-oriented style of elite leadership"—Goldwater, McGovern, and Wallace—also failed disastrously in the overriding goal of electoral politics—i.e., winning elections. The clear lesson to party strategists would seem to be that ideological candidates cannot win. In 1964, some claimed that a majority could be mobilized at the conservative pole, but it did not happen. In 1972, others claimed that a majority could be mobilized at the liberal pole; but again, it did not happen. Given this experience one would think the parties would be well advised to cease nominating candidates who "inject policy-based controversy" into elections and to go instead with centrist candidates. But another side to the CPS analysis does not allow the parties such an easy course.

Their lead sentence states that "the 1972 election marked the third term running that one of the major parties failed to cope with the polarization of policy demands among its supporters. . ." (p. 753). Instead of creating the defeating polarization by their own actions, we are now told they "failed to cope" with something that was presumably already there. Similarly, they state that political parties and political leaders face significant problems as a result of "constituents (who) have been aroused to a high concern over questions of government policy" (p. 754). (Perhaps all the ideological injections have created a monster that is out of control?) In a remarkably biased interpretation of McGovern's candidacy as being ahead of its time, their major criticism of him is only that he "sensed but misgauged the changes occurring in popular attitudes and policy demands" (p. 761), and not the possibility that he introduced issue positions or allowed issue perceptions of him to persist which contributed to his defeat.

This second view, of course, is important to CPS's most significant conclusion, namely that a realignment has become a realistic possibility. The present polarizations reflect the existence of "enduring social problems" (and not candidate statements?) which foreshadow the possibility "that

subsequent electoral contests will be fought along lines of deepening policy cleavages" (p. 754). Miller et al. indicate that the reduced relationship between voting and party identification will last until (1) the new issues disappear, (2) the party leaders re-orient the parties, or (3) the voters realign themselves. Nominating moderates who do not lose 50 per cent of the party faithful by creating divisive controversies is not a fourth option within this view.

Of course, nominating moderate or centrist candidates has become an anathema to CPS (Arthur H. Miller, "Political Issues and Trust in Government: 1964–1970" [APSR, Vol. LXVIII, September, 1974]). The normative theme, with a liberal slant, of "responsible party government" also runs throughout the present article. In the "issueless '50's," we are told Eisenhower "obliterated foreign policy as an arena for national partisan dispute" (p. 753). Attempts "to define new domestic policy goals for the Democratic party" were "thwarted" (p. 753). Real problems were left unsolved as "the national leadership of both parties deprived their followers of any great sense of urgency to define the problems and argue over alternative solutions" (p. 753).

Clearly the judgment is being made that the nation's "enduring social problems" can be better solved by placing their possible solutions in the political arena. We do not object to their taking a normative stand. But, we are suspicious of an analysis that concludes that party leaders will be electorally punished if they do not do what the authors think they *ought* to do.

Moreover, the record suggests just the opposite. For a candidate to follow what the CPS authors recommend—representation of previously glossed over problems—will, more often than not, result in the candidate's losing on an issue of his own making. This is partly what happened to McGovern on amnesty, marijuana, and the \$1,000 guaranteed income, and to Goldwater on a military victory in Vietnam, selling TVA, and criticizing social security.

Concluding Comments

In light of the growing relevance of issues to voting behavior documented by CPS, we have tried to draw attention to two alternative conceptualizations of the phenomenon which should guide future research strategy. Even the refinement presented here does not cover one of the most important roles that issues play in election outcomes. In our ongoing surveys for political candidates, we find a third role for issues which does not involve perceived *position* differences between candidates. In this instance, the effect of the issue on voting behavior is mediated by the voter's

general confidence or trust in a particular candidate "to handle" the problem.

The issue has CPS's "demanding" quality in it, i.e., the voter is demanding a solution to a problem and is judging the candidates on the probability that they will solve it. But this voter does not have a strong preference for any particular solution. In fact, he may be totally confused or ignorant about a solution—as in the case of inflation and unemployment. The key perceptions appear to be whether or not the candidate is genuinely "concerned" about the problem, will always do the "right thing," and can "get results." These are very diffuse feelings about the candidates and one could argue that we are crossing from "issue voting" into "candidate preference" as a factor in voting behavior. However, an issue concern is central to a voter's evaluation of the candidate rather than the candidates' personality or charisma.

We are suggesting that it is often an oversimplification to separate issues from candidate preference as the two can be meshed together. For example, two familiar long-standing stereotypes in the American voter's mind are that the Democrats

can handle the economy better than the Republicans and the Republicans can handle foreign policy better than the Democrats. There are no polarizing positions involved in these monumentally important perceptions, but they are certainly issue-related and do influence voting behavior. Or take as another example a person who votes for an Eisenhower or a Nixon because "he has more foreign policy experience." Is this issue voting or candidate preference? The dichotomy does not adequately handle these examples.

What further disturbs us is that voting based on *issue confidence* rather than *issue position* is the typical case in subpresidential elections which are the concern of most of our surveys. (Incidentally, we seldom find polarizing issues at the subpresidential level. If the CPS issue data reflect enduring issue cleavages in the electorate, it is curious that these cleavages fade quickly once one leaves the national scene.) The CPS paradigm, therefore, misses one of the major ways that issues can influence voting behavior. We hope that voting based on issue confidence will be explicitly incorporated in future research paradigms.

Comment: Political Methodologies in Disarray: Some Alternative Interpretations of the 1972 Election

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The analysis of American electoral behavior in recent years has produced a variety of divergent interpretations. While one author stresses party identification as the most important variable in presidential voting decisions, another finds candidates to be the most critical factor; other researchers demonstrate that issues are a vital ingredient in the electoral decision, and then still other analysts discover an ideological component, and so on.¹ Convergence upon a commonly accepted set of explanatory factors seems to have eluded us.

Perhaps these differing interpretations are a natural result of studying an electorate that is in an unsteady state—an electorate that is changing in significant ways, as Arthur Miller et al. imply. Or perhaps our instruments and methods have changed in such a way that we have obscured underlying continuities in the basic factors affecting

voters' decisions. I would advance the latter proposition. It is my contention that the factors affecting the electoral decision have changed relatively little in the past four elections. That is, the relative weight of the three principal factors in the voting decision—candidates, issues, and party identification—have remained quite steady over time, with candidates always the most important factor. Also, I believe that Philip Converse's fundamental finding—that relatively few voters conceptualize politics in terms of a liberal-conservative continuum—still holds true.² Miller et al. contend quite the opposite—they conclude that issue voting and ideology have become increasingly important in the 1960s and provide the principal explanations of the 1972 election. Such diametrically different interpretations cannot be fully resolved within the space of this comment, but at least I would like to indicate some alternative approaches to the analysis of the 1972 election and alert the reader to some of the misleading methodological applications that I believe are contained in the analysis performed by Miller et al.

I will, for the most part, be using the same data that Miller analyzed—the CPS 1972 national election study. But in order to gain perspective on the "new" developments in 1972 claimed by Miller et al. and to demonstrate similarities and differences in electoral behavior over time, I will make use of a number of previous election studies as well.³

Relative Importance of Candidates, Issues, and Party Identification

First, let us examine the relative importance of three major variables—candidates, issues, and party identification—in the past four elections. (Unfortunately, lack of continuity in measurement precludes comparison with the 1952 and 1956 elections.) Respondents' net attitude toward each of the candidates, their most salient issue concern (MSI), and their party identification (PI) were used

¹ The reader may wish to refer to some of the literature on voting behavior which contains these divergent interpretations. I have selected a few prominent examples of studies that have emphasized (1) party identification, (2) candidates, (3) issues, or (4) ideology as the major explanatory factor in voting decisions. The selected studies have all been published within the last ten years, and all are based on survey rather than aggregate data.

(1) *Party identification emphasis*: Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, Jerrold G. Rusk, and Arthur C. Wolfe, "Continuity and Change in American Politics: Parties and Issues in the 1968 Election," *American Political Science Review* 63 (December, 1969), see especially pp. 1096–1099. (2) *Emphasis on candidates*: Donald E. Stokes, "Some Dynamic Elements in Contests for the Presidency," *American Political Science Review* 60 (March, 1966), see especially p. 27. Stanley Kelley, Jr. and Thad W. Mirer, "The Simple Act of Voting," *American Political Science Review* 68 (June, 1974), 572–591. (3) *Emphasis on issues*: V. O. Key, Jr., *The Responsible Electorate* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966). Richard W. Boyd, "Popular Control of Public Policy: A Normal Vote Analysis of the 1968 Election," *American Political Science Review* 66 (June, 1972), 429–449. Others, such as Pomper, have studied issues, but have not related issues to voting behavior. See Gerald M. Pomper, "From Confusion to Clarity: Issues and American Voters, 1956–1968," *American Political Science Review* 66 (June, 1972), 415–428. (4) *The ideological factor*: Norman H. Nie with Kristi Andersen, "Mass Belief Systems Revisited: Political Change and Attitude Structure," *Journal of Politics* 36 (August, 1974), see especially pp. 580–583. John Osgood Field and Ronald E. Anderson, "Ideology in the Public's Conceptualization of the 1964 Election," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 33 (Fall, 1969), 380–398. John C. Pierce, "Party Identification and the Changing Role of Ideology in American Politics," *Midwest Journal of Political Science* 14 (February, 1970), 25–42.

² Philip E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," in *Ideology and Discontent*, ed. David E. Apter (New York: Free Press, 1964), pp. 206–261.

³ These data were made available through the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research. Computer time was provided by The University of Connecticut Computer Center. The analysis and interpretation of the data are my own.

in the following multiple regression equations to predict vote (V):⁴

1972

$$(1) V = .335 \text{ McG} - .307 \text{ Nix} + .187 \text{ MSI} + .124 \text{ PI} \\ (R = .75)$$

1968

$$(2) V = .271 \text{ HHH} - .244 \text{ Nix} - .128 \text{ Wal} \\ + .185 \text{ MSI} + .235 \text{ PI} \quad (R = .76)$$

1964

$$(3) V = .243 \text{ LBJ} - .325 \text{ GH}_2\text{O} + .198 \text{ MSI} \\ + .211 \text{ PI} \quad (R = .79)$$

1960

$$(4) V = .275 \text{ JFK} - .248 \text{ Nix} + .168 \text{ MSI} + .282 \text{ PI} \\ (R = .79)$$

The resulting beta-weights clearly indicate that the candidates were the most important factor in

⁴ The Most Salient Issue (MSI) variable in Equations 2, 3, and 4 is based on an open-ended question that asked, "What do you personally feel are the most important problems the government should try to take care of?" In 1972, the wording of this question was changed to read: "What do you think are the most important problems facing the country?"

The party identification measure (PI) is based on the standard SRC-CPS question that has been asked since 1952. See Miller et al. footnote 2 for the exact wording.

The measure of attitude toward each of the candidates in 1960, 1964, and 1968 was developed from open-ended questions that asked respondents' likes and dislikes about the two (or in 1968, the three) candidates. The measure is the sum of the positive comments about a candidate minus the sum of the negative comments. In 1972, the measure of candidate attitude based on open-ended comments was not available in conjunction with the MSI measure. (Two separate samples with two different questionnaires had been used in the 1972 election study.) Therefore, the measure of candidate attitude in Equation 1 had to be based on a pre-election feeling "thermometer" question. A careful check was made to see if the "thermometer" measure could validly be used as a close surrogate for the measure based on open-ended questions. I found that it could, with only slight adjustments necessary to make it comparable with previous election year measures. (Detailed information on the testing procedure and adjustments can be obtained from the author.)

For the 1968 equation (Equation 2), I used a dichotomous dependent variable (V) with both a Wallace vote and a Nixon vote scored as a non-Democratic vote. Alternative methods of dealing with the three-candidate race in 1968 were explored and this method was found to be the best.

The number of cases that each equation (1 through 4) is based upon is the total number of voters in each election study. Respondents who did not have an attitude on a particular variable were placed at the mid or neutral point of the attitude measure.

each of the elections—1960 through 1972. The importance of issues has remained stable throughout each of the past three elections (1964, 1968, and 1972), with issues playing a somewhat smaller role in the 1960 election. (The measure of issue concern that I am using here is a weakened version of the Strength of Issue Partisanship measure developed in my "Issue Salience and Party Choice" article. Had the more complete measure of issue partisanship been available, the beta-weight of the issue variable [MSI] would have been increased by about .03. Thus, it would probably be safe to assume that the issue coefficients in the above equations would really be .200 or a bit more if respondents' full range of issue concerns had been available for each election studied.)⁵

Finally, the direct effect of party identification on vote does vary from one election to the next.⁶ This change in the importance of party identification is in part explained by the extent of defection in an election. When there is a landslide—as in 1964 and 1972—and many party identifiers defect to the opposite candidate, obviously party identification is not going to be as strong a predictor of vote. The massive defection of Democrats to Nixon in 1972 is particularly noticeable in the low weight on party identification that year. A more fundamental alteration in the role of party identification may also be taking place, owing particularly to the increased proportion of independents (as mentioned by Miller et al.). Conclusive evidence of a long-term weakening of the party identification variable remains for future elections and further analysis to determine. We can see, however, that Miller's conclusion that "issues can be expected to play an increasingly significant role in future elections" has little substantiation when we look at Equations 1 through 4. In 1972, for ex-

⁵ See my article "Issue Salience and Party Choice," *American Political Science Review* 65 (June, 1971), 389–400, for a description of the Strength of Issue Partisanship measure. The measure was based on degree of concern and party preference on a *number* of issues. Since the 1972 election study recorded party preference on only one issue (the one problem the respondent thought was most important), the Strength of Issue Partisanship measure could not be built for 1972. The measure could not be calculated for 1960 either because the 1960 election study did not probe for degree of concern. To maintain comparability from one equation to the next, therefore, the MSI measure had to be based on only one issue—the single most important problem—in each election study.

I was able to build the Strength of Issue Partisanship measure for 1964 and 1968. When this multi-point measure, based on a more complete set of issue concerns, was substituted for the MSI measure in Equations 2 and 3, the beta-weight of the issue variable increased by about .03 in each equation.

⁶ I want to stress that I am talking here of the *direct* effect of party identification in explaining vote. The *indirect* effects of party identification in influencing attitudes toward candidates and perceptions of party differences on issue concerns is not examined in this comment.

ample, a decline in the importance of party identification was not accompanied by an increase in the importance of issues.

Turning to the 1972 election in particular—focusing on Equation 1—the reader should note the relatively high beta-weights attached to the candidate variables. Attitudes toward McGovern heavily influenced the overall electoral decision in 1972—indeed the McGovern candidacy had a greater impact on voting choice than any other candidate in the past decade. Attitudes toward Nixon also strongly influenced the 1972 electoral decision. *The 1972 election was, above all else, an election decided by the candidate factor.*

Miller et al. gave very little attention to this dominant candidate factor in their analysis of the 1972 election; rather they devoted much of their analysis to showing the importance of issues in 1972. The issue measures used by Miller et al. were based on preformulated seven-point scale questions. In order to test the overall effect of issues as measured by these preformulated questions, I made use of multiple regression analysis. Several of the issue measures used by Miller et al.—the questions on Vietnam, Campus Unrest, Urban Unrest, and Aid to Minorities—were substituted one at a time into my Equation 1 in place of the MSI variable.⁷ On the average, these issues—which Miller found to be of considerable import in 1972—produced beta-weights of scarcely more than .100. Only the Campus Unrest measure, with a coefficient of .148, came close to the .187 registered by the MSI measure. Thus, the preformulated issue scale questions which were used so extensively by Miller et al. were less predictive of vote than the MSI measure—a measure which is based on the respondent's freely selected choice of an issue. Once again we see that when issues are measured by open-ended questions, a greater degree of issue voting can be demonstrated than when preformulated questions are used.⁸

Given the evidence just presented, how is it that Miller et al. found issues, especially as measured by preformulated questions, to be of such great importance in 1972, and why did candidates not emerge more dominantly in their analysis?⁹ The answer to these questions lies in two basic

oversights in the Miller analysis: (1) a failure to control for the candidate variable at certain key points in the analysis, and (2) a reliance on the candidate proximity measure as a true measure of issue effect.

Using Controls in Normal-Vote Analysis

In their Figures 2a through 2f, Miller et al. use normal-vote analysis and present what appears to be an impressive demonstration of partisan defection based on issues. At best, normal-vote analysis presents certain problems for the analyst. As Brody and Page have pointed out, "Taking the issues one at a time means that the approach is continually reapportioning the same observed variation in the vote. In this way many factors can appear as indispensable in explaining the vote. Given the multifaceted nature of political reality, disciplined statements about the causes of behavior will be necessarily multivariate."¹⁰ Use of proper procedures and controls can help to overcome these problems. Developing a cluster of related issues into a combined index, instead of taking issues one at a time, will help minimize "continual reapportionment." One issue cluster can be controlled while examining another. This is especially necessary if several issues are correlated with each other as is true of items in Miller's Figure 2.

But more serious than not considering the overlapping effects of several issues is Miller's failure to control for the candidate variable. To illustrate this point, let us take the Vietnam issue—an issue that had a considerable short-term impact in 1972 according to Miller's Figure 2a. In my Figure 1, we can see what happens when attitudes toward candidates are taken into consideration. Here, I have divided the sample into those respondents who were, on balance, favorable to Nixon (Figure 1a), those who were favorable to McGovern (Figure 1c), and those who were neutral or had little difference in their feelings toward the candidates (Figure 1b).¹¹ When definite feelings toward the candidates were in evidence (Figures 1a and 1c), the expected vote and the observed vote

the next most important short-term [*sic*] factor accounting for the voter's decision was a liberal-conservative ideology But even in the original, the authors placed heavy interpretive emphasis on factors other than the candidates.

For reasons explained in my discussion of the candidate proximity measure, the beta-weights for the candidates in Miller's multiple regression equations were not as large as they should have been. Had the beta-weights for candidates in their analysis been at the high level that I found in my Equation 1, Miller et al. would probably have given the candidate factor more importance in their interpretation.

¹⁰ Richard A. Brody and Benjamin I. Page, "Comment: The Assessment of Policy Voting," *American Political Science Review* 66 (June, 1972), 455.




¹¹ Net attitude toward candidates was measured by si-

⁷ In order to keep these issue measures as similar to the MSI measure as possible, a *party proximity* measure was calculated for each preformulated issue used.

⁸ This reiterates an observation that was first made in my article "Issue Salience and Party Choice."

⁹ In all fairness, I should point out that in the original version of the 1972 election analysis by Miller et al., as reported in a paper presented at the 1973 American Political Science Association meeting, the candidate factor was more clearly identified and discussed than in their present article. About all that remains of that original discussion and analysis is a sentence near the end of the present article that says: "After the affective ratings of the candidates,

Figures 1a-1c: Normal Vote Analysis of Vietnam Issue with Attitude Toward Candidate Controlled



closely parallel each other regardless of respondents' position on the issue scale. Except for an unexpected 19 per cent vote for McGovern among the pro-Nixon extreme doves, the Vietnam question had relatively little impact when attitude toward candidate was controlled. Among those who were neutral or had little difference in their feelings toward the candidates—about 20 per cent of the sample—the effect of the issue was more noticeable, but even here the S (short-term effect measure) was not as high as in Miller's Figure 2a. Among this middle group (my Figure 1b), the observed vote line did not move in a steady slope from upper left to lower right as we would expect if the issue positions were exerting a consistent pull.¹²

When using a control variable in normal-vote analysis, a summary measure of the short-term effects of an issue can be obtained by taking a weighted average of the S values within each control group. Such a measure, which we might call S_c (Boyd's S when controlling), yielded a value of 3.45 for the data described by my Figures 1a through 1c.

In a similar fashion, I performed a normal-vote analysis controlling for the candidate variable on several other issue measures used by Miller in his Figure 2. The results were all very similar to those obtained with the Vietnam issue—relatively low S_c values. The strong pull of issues, as depicted in

multaneously observing respondents' affect toward both candidates. (Affect was measured by the pre-election feeling "thermometer" question.) Those who were relatively warm toward Nixon and cool toward McGovern were put in the "Nixon More Favorably Perceived than McGovern" group. To be included in this group, there had to be at least a 30° difference between the candidates in thermometer ratings. Similarly, the "McGovern More Favorably Perceived than Nixon" group was composed of those who were substantially warmer toward McGovern than Nixon. The "Little Difference in Feelings or Neutral" group were those who placed both candidates within about 10° of each other on the "thermometer," or who placed both candidates at the 50° or neutral mark.

¹² There are certain difficulties with Boyd's S measure. (See Richard W. Boyd, "Popular Control of Public Policy," *American Political Science Review* 66 [June, 1972], 448-449.) One problem stems from the use of *absolute values* in the computational formula. As a result, Boyd's S is unable to detect whether the observed vote line moves away from the expected vote line in an appropriate direction. For the data represented by my Figure 1b I have adjusted Boyd's measure to compensate for this shortcoming.

I should also point out that Boyd's S cannot be used as a measure to compare the overall impact of one issue versus another issue in an election. It lacks a standard base. Miller et al. do not try to use Boyd's S in this way. Boyd and others have attempted, however, to rank order the impact of issues in an election, using the S value as the indicator of impact. This is incorrect.

I have been working on modifications of Boyd's S to remedy these difficulties and will be happy to furnish further information on request.

* I have modified Boyd's S measure to fit this situation. See footnote 12.

Miller's Figure 2, is more apparent than real.¹³ What we are really observing in that figure is a strong overlay of the candidate factor.

The Candidate Proximity Measure

Issue questions, in a new format first introduced in 1968, were used extensively in the 1972 CPS election study. In these questions, respondents are asked in quick succession to locate their own issue position on a seven-point scale, and then asked to locate the position of the Democratic party, the Republican party, and the perceived position of each of the candidates on the issue. From such data, it is possible to calculate the relative distance or proximities between the position on the scale that the respondent chooses for himself and the position the respondent selects for the candidates and the parties. The political science literature has contained several warnings about the use of such proximity measures,¹⁴ and, indeed, Miller et al. recognize the problems inherent in this type of measure. (See especially their footnote 21, beginning with the second paragraph.) Nonetheless, Miller et al. do use a candidate proximity measure throughout much of their analysis.¹⁵

The difficulty with the candidate proximity measure is that respondents can either project their own issue positions onto their favored candidate,

or rationalize their issue responses by placing themselves close to their favored candidate. In either case, attitude toward candidate strongly influences the distance between the respondent's position on an issue scale and his location of candidates on that scale. For these respondents, attitude toward candidates, *not position on issues*, is the dominant factor being measured by candidate proximity measures. There is no way to determine how many respondents engage in this kind of psychological maneuvering when responding to this type of question, but the data presented below indicate there are sufficient numbers to create serious problems when candidate proximity measures are used as indicators of issue effects.

One indication of the extent to which psychological positioning (projection or rationalization) is taking place can be found in the very strong correlations between the attitude toward candidate and the candidate proximity measures calculated for several different issues (average $\tau_{ab} = .350$).¹⁶ This correlation remains quite high regardless of the respondent's position on the issue; this means that a considerable amount of inappropriate positioning of candidates is occurring, as we can observe in my Table 1 below. For example, doves who liked Nixon better than McGovern were not likely to put McGovern closer to themselves on that issue, and "hard liners" on the campus unrest issue who liked McGovern better than Nixon usually did not place Nixon closer to their own position. Such inappropriate placement of candidates is endemic when this type of question format is used, raising serious doubts about employing these measures in the study of policy voting.

Miller et al. first use the candidate proximity measures in their Figures 3 and 4. These figures present an impressive demonstration of short-term effects—but effects of what? In these figures, we are looking at a combination of both candidate attitudes and issue positions at the same time, and we have no idea how much each factor is affecting the resultant defection from party identification. Miller may have increased his "predictive power" through the use of the candidate proximity measure, but he has done it at the expense of clarity and at the risk of misinterpretation.

¹³ This conclusion should not be interpreted to mean that issues were unimportant in the 1972 election. The reader should bear in mind that we are working here with responses to a single item in a survey and that these issue items are measured by preformulated fixed-choice questions. The importance or salience of the issue to the respondent is unknown. Miller et al. refer several times to the issues represented in their Figure 2 as "salient" and they assume that, taken alone, these preformulated questions are a measure of "attitude." In their footnote 20 they point to the fact that a "salience screen" is used with these questions. (The screen question was: "Or haven't you thought much about this?") Such screening questions, which try to discourage respondents who do not have an attitude from answering the question, have been used in SRC-CPS studies since the 1950's. Yet these screens have not kept respondents who have only very casual or fleeting feelings about the questions from giving a response. The fact that in the normal vote analysis just presented (with candidate attitude controlled) responses to such preformulated issue questions were not strongly related to vote is evidence, once again, that salience is not detected by these preformulated questions.

¹⁴ Problems of projection and rationalization specifically related to these new issue scale questions have been discussed by Richard Brody and Benjamin Page in "Comment: The Assessment of Policy Voting" and also in their article "Policy Voting and the Electoral Process: The Vietnam War Issue," *American Political Science Review* 66 (September, 1972), 986-989. Gerald Finch worked extensively with proximity measures in his dissertation "Policy and Candidate Choice in the 1968 American Presidential Election" (Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Minnesota, 1973), see especially Chap. 3.

¹⁵ See footnote 20 in Miller et al. for the exact method of calculating candidate proximity. Whenever I use proximity measures, I follow the same method of calculation.

¹⁶ The candidate proximity measure for each of several different issues was correlated with the attitude toward candidate variable; the correlation varied to some extent depending on which issue was used. The resulting coefficients were averaged to arrive at the .350 figure.

Correlations were also calculated between respondents' party identification and party proximity measures for several issues. This yielded an average τ_{ab} of .250—a full point below the candidate attitude-candidate proximity link. Thus, although psychological adjustment takes place in locating party positions, the party proximity measure does not create as severe a distortion problem as the candidate proximity measure.

Table 1. Appropriateness of Perceived Candidate Position on Various Issues, Attitude toward Candidate Controlled^a

Net Attitude Toward Candidates	Respondents' Issue Position					
	Vietnam		Campus Unrest		Aid to Minorities	
	Dove ^b	Hawk ^c	Pro- student ^b	Use force ^c	Government help ^b	Leave on own ^c
Pro-Nixon	36% (74)	82% (130)	36% (28)	62% (241)	32% (88)	57% (167)
Pro-McGovern	79% (129)	47% (15)	78% (59)	17% (65)	84% (70)	28% (32)

^a Entry in each cell is per cent of those in the cell who placed the appropriate candidate closer to the issue position they selected. Only those respondents who placed themselves in the two most extreme positions on the seven-point scale (1, 2, or 6, 7) were used in this table.

^b McGovern was considered the appropriate candidate to be proximate to these positions.

^c Nixon was considered the appropriate candidate to be proximate to these positions.

Actually, much of what we see in their Figures 3 and 4 is the effect of the candidate variable. For example, let us take Miller's Figure 3a (Vietnam proximity measure) and control for attitudes toward candidates as I did earlier in my Figure 1. When this control was instituted, the candidate proximity measure for the Vietnam issue produced an *S* value of 0.71 among those who perceived Nixon more favorably than McGovern, and an *S* of 0.93 among those who liked McGovern better than Nixon. The *S* value for those with neutral or little difference in feelings toward the candidates was 10.07. This averages to an overall short-term effect (*S_c*) of 3.09 for the Vietnam proximity measure. Thus, if we control for the influence of candidate attitudes in Miller's Figure 3a, there is not much short-term issue effect left. Indeed, the effect of the Vietnam issue was slightly greater when the respondent's own position on the question was used. (Recall that the value of *S_c* for data in my Figure 1 was 3.45.)

Later in Miller's article, multiple regression analysis is introduced, again using the candidate proximity measure to test issue effects. Miller contends that by including attitude toward candidates and party identification in "the same explanatory equation containing the issue [proximity] measures," any spurious relationship arising from rationalization and projection effects of the proximity measure can be "removed" (see his footnote 21). Let us see what happens if we introduce candidate proximity measures into a multiple regression equation with attitude toward candidate and party identification already in the equation. When the candidate proximity measure for two of the issues (Vietnam and Campus Unrest) were added to my Equation 1, the beta coefficient for the attitude toward McGovern variable went down by

.06, the coefficient for the Nixon variable went down by .07, and the multiple correlation coefficient (*R*) increased by just .02 (from .75 to .77). The more proximity measures that were added to the equation, the lower the candidate beta coefficients became, with virtually no further increase in explained variation (*R*²). For example, adding five proximity measures to the equation reduced each of the candidate beta-weights by a full point (minus .100)—about a thirty per cent reduction from the initial values. The rationalization and projection effects latent in the candidate proximity measure cannot be "removed" by the multiple regression technique; rather such a regression equation simply transfers explanatory power from the explicit measure of candidate attitude to the proximity measure in which candidate attitude is imbedded.

Miller et al. combined a number of candidate proximity measures into composite indices and used these compound proximity measures in a multiple regression analysis. (See their footnote 28.) No wonder candidates did not look very important to them; they had pulled much of the explanatory power away from the candidates by using these compound proximity measures in the same equation with the candidate variable. Miller et al. conclude that "the proximity measures of issue attitudes were exceptionally potent predictors of vote" in the 1972 election. Actually, candidate attitudes were ascendant and had strong collateral effects on the proximity measures.¹⁷

¹⁷ The reader should also be aware that when Miller uses path analysis to demonstrate the combined effect of party identification and issues on the vote—concluding that "the total effect of party identification was .51 whereas the issue effect was .55"—he leaves the candidate variable out of the model entirely. Miller's footnote 29, however,




Interdependence between Issue Positions and Attitudes toward Candidates

It might be argued that attitudes toward Nixon and McGovern were in large measure formed on the basis of voters' issue concerns. This is certainly the assumption behind much of the Miller et al. interpretation. If attitudes toward candidates were strongly shaped by issue concerns in 1972, then controlling for the candidate variable, as I have done in the preceding sections of this comment, may have inappropriately reduced the importance of issues.

Without a multiwave panel study that could have monitored change in responses from a time prior to the conventions through election day, it is hard to tell how much issues were determining attitudes toward candidates, how much attitudes


does show a causal model that includes the candidate variable. Thus, the picture we see (the arrow diagram in footnote 29) and the discussion in the text are based on quite different models.

In addition, Miller's measure of "Total Effects" in his footnote 29 is questionable. The usual method of measuring the contribution of each path in a model of this sort is as follows:

Path 1		$(.46)(.31) = .14$
Path 2		$(.46)(.59)(.45) = .12$
Path 3		$(.23)(.45) = .10$
Path 4		$.13$
	Total =	.49

Miller apparently ascribes the variance in these four paths to the effects of party identification (PI) alone despite the fact that three of the paths include issues or candidates or both.

Miller's Issues effect (.58) and Candidate effect (.45) are apparently based on a different, three-variable model:



This three-variable model drops the party identification variable, yet the only way that this variable could properly be eliminated is if the coefficient for the direct path between party identification and vote (Path 4) were close to zero. Obviously this is not the case. See Donald E. Stokes, "Compound Paths in Political Analysis" in *Mathematical Applications in Political Science*, V, ed. James F. Herndon and Joseph L. Bernd (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1971), p. 82.

Finally, the direction of the arrow between Issues and Candidates in Miller's model should probably be reversed so that it goes from Candidates to Issues. The Issues measure is a compound of a number of candidate proximity measures, and we have seen how candidate attitude affects proximity.

toward candidates were influencing placements on issue scale questions, or what combination of these phenomena were taking place. Some voters undoubtedly developed attitudes about the candidates based on issue concerns, others may have rationalized their issue positions to align with their already preferred candidate, and still others may have based their assessments of candidates on considerations unrelated to issues. Given a single interview, no mathematical or statistical technique could possibly disentangle these different types of behavior. Some data from the 1972 election study, however, may permit us to check for each of the three types of behavior.

One opportunity to test for these types of behavior lies in the structure of the 1972 CPS study. Because there was a pre- and a postelection interview, and because there were twin samples, a means is available, in some measure, to demonstrate whether or not rationalization was taking place. One sample was asked the Vietnam scale question in the pre-election interview; an identical sample was asked that question in the postelection interview. Both samples contain a pre-election measure of attitudes toward candidates. Now, let us take just those respondents in both samples who indicated in the pre-election interview that they liked McGovern better than Nixon. If rationalization (persuasion) were taking place, those voters who answered the Vietnam question in the postelection interview would be more likely than those answering in the pre-election interview to align their position with the candidate they favored. Indeed, the pro-McGovern respondents who answered the Vietnam question in the pre-election interview were 77 per cent doves and 11 per cent hawks, while the postelection responders were 84 per cent doves and 5 per cent hawks. This net difference of 13 per cent lends support to the hypothesis that rationalization was taking place.¹⁸ Of course, some of the pro-McGovern respondents who had been asked the Vietnam question in the pre-election interview may already have rationalized their Vietnam position prior to or during the pre-election interview. Thus, when we see a skewed distribution of responses to issue scale questions among voters with a definite preference for one candidate, as we did in my Figure 1c, we can surmise that the response pattern is in part due to rationalization.

On the other hand, an attempt to use a similar pre- and postelection design to demonstrate that

¹⁸ Among pro-Nixon respondents, the distribution of responses to the Vietnam question were the same in the pre- and the postelection question. Perhaps with negotiations under way and the outcome uncertain, Nixon's position was not perceived as clearly as McGovern's; thus rationalizing responses would not tend to move toward a definite position on the scale.

issues had an effect on attitudes toward candidates proved to be unproductive. Both the pre- and postelection interviews in 1972 contained a "thermometer" question to measure attitudes toward candidates. Thus, change in candidate attitude between the first and second interview could easily be ascertained. If issue position did have an effect on feelings toward candidates, then hawks should have become less favorable to McGovern. Or, perhaps with peace negotiations under way, doves would look more favorably on Nixon and hawks feel cheated of total victory. In any event, no such effects could be found. Those respondents who gave their position on the Vietnam scale in the pre-election interview showed no tendency to change their feelings toward either of the candidates in any way that related to their position on the issue. Of course, attitudes toward candidates may already have been rather fully developed by the time the pre-election interview was conducted, and there are a number of other methodological weaknesses in this approach. A well-designed multiwave panel study is needed. It is interesting to note, however, that by using the pre- and postelection interview as a modified panel design, evidence that attitudes toward candidates effected change in issue positions was detected, but no trace of the reverse process (issues determining candidate attitude) was found.

Let us now turn to another kind of datum found in the 1972 election study. So far we have worked principally with the affective component of candidate attitudes as measured by the feeling "thermometer." In addition to this measure of affect, respondents were also asked open-ended questions about what they liked and disliked about the two candidates. From these comments, we can get an idea of the major cognitive elements in attitudes toward the candidates. Table 2 presents a summary tabulation of the various kinds of comments made in response to these open-ended questions.

Looking for issue content, we see, first of all, that a sizeable number of comments (14 per cent) were made about the Vietnam issue. In contrast, very few comments made in reference to the candidates had anything to do with busing, law and order, drugs (acid), amnesty, abortion, or military spending. Added together, this set of issues made up only 3 per cent of all the comments about both candidates. Yet these are the issues that form the basis for many of the preformulated questions used in the analysis by Miller et al.

The data in Table 2 indicate that the Eagleton affair was an appreciable factor in the development of attitudes toward McGovern. Eighty-three respondents explicitly mentioned it. Also, there were large clusters of comments having to do with McGovern being weak, indecisive, vacillating, undependable, insincere, and someone who breaks

promises. Many of these cognitions can probably be attributed to the impression people gained of McGovern as a result of the wavering support he gave to his initial running mate.

A number of comments about McGovern were also recorded in the welfare and tax policy categories. Although it is not possible to tell from the coded data, many of these comments probably had to do with the "\$1000 per year" welfare program that was attributed to McGovern.

Attitudes toward Nixon (generally positive) were almost as important a factor in the 1972 election as attitudes toward McGovern. (See my Equation 1.) Favorable comments about his foreign policies (not just Vietnam, but detente with Russia, recognition of Red China, and other foreign policy comments) account for a large part of the responses made about Nixon. Another important cluster of attitudes toward Nixon were nonissue comments about his experience and performance in office. There were also a number of references, both positive and negative, to inflation and other economic policies. (Miller et al. do not include economic variables of this sort in their analysis.¹⁹)

Looking over the entire array of comments in my Table 2, we see that the bulk of cognitive elements toward both candidates—about 60 per cent of them—had to do with leadership abilities, personal qualities, group and party references, or general like and dislike responses. Certainly not many cognitions meshed with the preformulated issue questions studied by Miller et al. Only the Vietnam issue used by Miller et al. drew a substantial number of comments.

Let us test for the effect of the Vietnam issue when it formed an explicit part of a respondent's cognitions toward either candidate. (About half of all respondents mentioned Vietnam when commenting on the candidates.) Theoretically, if the Vietnam issue (as measured by the respondent's position on the preformulated Vietnam question) was influencing attitude toward candidate, then those who made a specific reference to the issue when discussing candidates should show a higher correlation between issue position and attitude toward candidate than those who did not refer to the issue. There is some support for this issue-candidate attitude link in the data, but not enough to make us think that the Vietnam issue was a major factor in determining overall valence toward candidates. The Pearsonian correlation between self-placement on the Vietnam question and net pro and con comments about candidates increased

¹⁹ I am referring here to the economics of the business cycle, not the cluster of issues that Miller et al. labeled "economic." Their "economic" dimension had to do with questions of general social welfare.

Table 2. Attitudes toward the Candidates, 1972

McGovern		Nixon		
Pro	Anti	Pro	Anti	
9	27	330	19	Leadership abilities, personal qualities
7		30		Performance in office, experience
9	23	25	5	Hard working, conscientious
				Intelligence, ability to understand nation's problems
3	21	14	4	Dependability, reliability, impulsiveness
92		85		Honest, sincere, keeps promises
	109		146	Dishonest, insincere, breaks promises
7		39		Strong, decisive, have confidence in him
	212		9	Weak, indecisive, vacillating
	83			Eagleton affair
			21	Watergate
			21	Dishonest; corrupt government
	15		30	Lacks principles, ideals; too much of a politician
17		13		Man of high principles, ideals; not a politician
50	64	125	80	Other abilities and qualities
				General approaches, philosophy
	105			Too idealistic, impractical
23	73	3	2	Liberal, favors social change
		11	1	Conservative, against social change
	32			Soft on communism; extremist, too far out
	3			More liberal than most Democrats, would change Democratic policies
14	20	14	24	Other specific references to government programs and approaches
	62			Too negative, tears down other side, no solutions of his own
42	51	19	14	General, vague comments about ideas, policies
				Domestic policies
20	126	13	20	Welfare, poverty problems
35	25	11	26	Tax policy
7		41	35	Inflation
49	32	70	93	Other economic
4	16	24	10	Busing
1	2	12	12	Law and order
	13	4	4	Drugs
3	35	10		Amnesty
	3			Abortion
24	19	22	26	Other domestic issues
				Foreign policies
144	151	298	176	Vietnam
		62	8	Policy toward Red China
		41	8	Detente, relations with Russia
5	35			Weaker military position, Pentagon spending cuts
6	36	117	52	Other foreign policy comments
				Group references
67	12	13	22	Common man, "People like me"
9	5	3	64	Big business, the rich
47	4	18	17	Poor; old people
17	17		2	Young people
41	18	10	32	Other groups
35		7	21	Traditional Dem/Rep, always been a good Dem/Rep; he's a Dem/Rep

Table 2. (Continued)

McGovern		Nixon		
Pro	Anti	Pro	Anti	
1	22	9	13	Men around him (staff); followers
7	10	4	2	Connections with people in party, other leaders, bosses
7	29	11	10	Other party-related comments
				General
56	107	184	51	Like/dislike him; will do good/bad job
41	110	23	29	Appearance, speeches, campaign tactics
49	12	76	25	Other miscellaneous
948	1739	1791	1135	Total

by .07 when those who did mention Vietnam were compared with those who did not make an explicit reference to Vietnam when discussing candidates.²⁰ In general, then, we can say that attitudes toward candidates in 1972 were based on a variety of considerations and that these attitudes were not strongly related to the issues examined in Miller's study.

Finally, we should note that less than 9 per cent of the sample (96 people) talked of McGovern as being a liberal, and only a handful of respondents chose to talk about Nixon in liberal or conservative terms.²¹ Also, there were 32 comments suggesting that McGovern was "too far out." Yet Miller et al. conclude that the left-right dimension "provided a simple policy yardstick by which the presidential candidates were evaluated." If so, relatively few articulated it.

Measuring Ideology

For many years, political scientists have tried to measure the presence of ideology—particularly a liberal-conservative ideology—among the American electorate. Converse's seminal work on "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," based on data from the 1956 to 1960 period, produced compelling evidence that a large majority of Americans did not have a coherent recognition or understanding of liberalism and conservatism. A little more than a decade later, Miller et al. conclude that the 1972 election may "more appropriately be labeled an ideological election." They present a long quote from Converse's earlier work and presumably have Converse's definition in

²⁰ If net feeling toward candidates is measured by the thermometer questions and is used in this correlation instead of net attitude toward candidates as determined by open-ended questions, the Pearsonian *r* goes up by only .04.

²¹ Prior to this, when discussing comments made about candidates, I have given proportions based on the *number of comments*. Here I am considering the proportion of *respondents* who made certain references. There were 1119 respondents in this sample.

mind when they say that they have found a "broad segment of the population in 1972" who are ideological.

Converse defined ideology or belief system as "a configuration of ideas and attitudes in which the elements are bound together by some form of constraint or functional interdependence."²² Elaborating on this concept, Converse emphasized that people with an ideology should have "contextual knowledge"—should know what idea-elements go together and why. Converse also said that when cognizing such a term as "liberal" or "conservative," "the actor must bring a good deal of meaning to the term, which is to say that he must understand the constraints surrounding it."²³

I do not believe that the data presented by Miller et al. support their general statements about ideological sophistication among the public in 1972. The reader will recall that Converse relied heavily on open-ended materials in assessing the extent of ideological understanding among the electorate. Miller et al. use entirely different measures to reach their conclusions, relying on (1) a new liberal-conservative scale question (first introduced in 1972)²⁴ and (2) a matrix of intercorrelations among issue scale responses. (See Miller's Table 2.) Let us deal with the new liberal-conservative scale measure first.

The New Liberal-Conservative Measure. In examining responses to the liberal-conservative scale question, I found, first of all, that more than 30 per cent of the sample did not place themselves on the scale at all, suggesting that these respondents either were not liberals or conservatives, or that they were totally unfamiliar with those terms. Among the approximately 70 per cent of respondents who did venture onto the scale, 18 per cent placed one of the candidates on the wrong side of

²² Converse, "Nature of Belief Systems," p. 207.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 214.

²⁴ The exact format of the liberal-conservative scale question is as follows:


the scale—that is, pūt McGovern on the conservative end or Nixon on the liberal side—and another 9 per cent misplaced *both* candidates. A little more than half (52 per cent) of those who chose a position on the scale for themselves correctly placed both candidates. The rest (about 20 per cent) placed one candidate correctly and saw the other candidate as in the middle. Given the proportion of known error, we can surmise that some of the “correct” placements of the candidates may have been chance occurrences. Unfortunately, frame-of-reference materials were not gathered with this question, so we have no idea of what meanings respondents were supplying to the terms “liberal” and “conservative.”²⁵

Miller et al. fail to take sufficient account of the problems inherent in this new question. First, they do not inform the reader that the 30 per cent of the sample who did not choose to place themselves on the liberal-conservative scale were omitted in their analysis. About half of these respondents voted. Thus, whenever Miller presents findings based on this scale, and uses it to predict vote, only a subset

of the electorate has been analyzed.²⁶ But there is a more serious problem in Miller’s analysis; he calculated a candidate proximity measure based on this liberal-conservative scale question, apparently including those who placed one or both of the candidates incorrectly. I have already discussed the problems inherent in the use of candidate proximity measures. It is upon the basis of this proximity measure—and not upon the respondent’s self-location on the scale—that Miller rests his conclusions about the great importance of ideology in voters’ decisions in 1972.

Using a regression analysis that simultaneously tested the effects of party identification, feelings toward the two candidates, several issue clusters (measured by proximity indices) and the liberal-conservative *proximity* measure, Miller found that the liberal-conservative and the “war” indices were quite important in explaining the vote. When I tested the liberal-conservative variable by adding it to my Equation 1—using the respondent’s *self-placement* on the liberal-conservative scale—the measure was found to add virtually nothing to the explanation of the vote. (The multiple *R* did not increase at all, and the beta-weight was .039.) Thus, this new liberal-conservative scale contributes very little to our repertoire of predictive variables.

We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. I’m going to show you a seven-point scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal to extremely conservative.



Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this?

Where would you place Richard Nixon?

Where would you place George McGovern?

²⁵ We do know from previous survey materials that people often bring meanings to the terms “liberal” or “conservative” that fall short of the concepts political scientists would supply to those terms. For example, Converse found a Stratum II that contained a rather large number of people who defined liberalism-conservatism in terms of a simple “spend-save” dimension. Others equated conservative with “conservation” and some even talked of conserving natural resources. (See Converse, “Nature of Belief Systems,” pp. 222–223.)

George Gallup has also asked a national sample to state what “comes to your mind when you think of someone who is a (liberal) (conservative)?” “Spending too freely,” “generous,” “permissive”; “saves,” “cautious,” “careful” are some of the terms used in Gallup’s codes to describe many of the responses to his question. (Incidentally, over 35 percent in the Gallup survey could not even begin to supply a meaning to the term “liberal” or the term “conservative.”) See The Gallup Opinion Index, Report No. 59 (May, 1970), pp. 6–7.

Has Ideological Awareness Increased? In light of Miller’s claim of increasing ideological awareness among the American electorate, it is important to compare the ideological orientations of the American electorate in 1972 with those in previous elections. The best method of measuring this change would be a thorough contextual analysis of open-ended materials, following the example set by Converse. Since this method is very time consuming, such data could not be developed for inclusion in this comment. Another measure, however, can be used to assess change in ideological attachments over the past three elections. This measure is based on respondents’ feelings toward various groups including “liberals” and “conservatives” as measured by thermometer questions that have been included in SRC-CPS election studies since 1964. John Pierce has called this “affective ideology.”²⁷

²⁶ In his footnote 28, Miller says that he uses the “case deletion” procedure when performing computer analysis. This would eliminate any respondent who did not answer a question. Not only were the many respondents who did not place themselves on the liberal-conservative scale left out by this procedure, but others who failed to answer any one of the many issue questions examined by Miller were also dropped. Thus, the multiple regression analysis upon which he bases conclusions about the entire electorate contains only that subset of respondents who gave an opinion on all issues presented to them in the interview. Miller should have reported the number of cases remaining in his analysis and generalized only about that subset.

²⁷ John Pierce, “Changing Role of Ideology in American Politics,” p. 30.

If we cross-classify each respondent's feelings toward "liberals" with his or her feelings toward "conservatives" and examine the resulting pattern of responses, we find that some respondents are very warm toward liberals and very cool toward conservatives, or vice versa. Others have somewhat less intense reactions, but still fall into a consistent pattern—warm toward one group and cool toward the other. Another set of respondents are inconsistent—they are warm toward both groups or cool toward both—a pattern that suggests that the liberal-conservative continuum is not a meaningful dimension for these respondents. Still others are neutral toward both groups, indicating either lack of familiarity with the terms "liberal" and "conservative" or indifference.²⁸ Table 3 shows the distribution of these combined response patterns in 1964, 1968, and 1972.²⁹ Note that there has been no significant change in affect toward "liberals" and "conservatives" during this period. Certainly the proportion of voters who seem to be attuned to a liberal-conservative dimension (i.e., do not have neutral or inconsistent reactions to the terms "liberal" and "conservative") has not increased significantly.³⁰

²⁸ A few respondents may have been cold toward both "liberals" and "conservatives" not because of indifference but because they have a strong ideology which is neither liberal nor conservative. (They may be "moderates," "radicals," "socialists," etc.) This would not create a problem for our analysis here, however; it is the change in the proportions of "liberals" and "conservatives" over the past decade that is being investigated.

²⁹ When 1972 respondents who had placed themselves on Miller's liberal-conservative scale were compared with those I identified as liberals or conservatives through the use of the thermometer questions (reported in Table 3), it was found that about 11 per cent more placed themselves as liberals or conservatives on Miller's scale. Interestingly, of those who were "Inconsistent or Neutral" as measured by the thermometer procedure, 17 per cent placed themselves as liberals, and 18 per cent as conservatives on Miller's scale—a 50-50 division that suggests randomness.

³⁰ Other studies beside Miller's, may have led political

The Matrix Method of Testing for Ideological Constraint. In addition to the use of the liberal-conservative proximity measure, Miller et al. attempt "to authenticate a role for 'ideology' in the 1972 election" by presenting a table which shows clusters of intercorrelations among issue items and the relation between these issue items and the liberal-conservative scale. (See their Table 2.) Miller et al. assume that the intercorrelations in this table demonstrate the kind of constraint and consistency of attitude that Converse equated with an ideology or belief system.

In Figure 2, I have attempted to diagram Converse's definition of a belief system. The diagram depicts one individual who has a central belief that he is a conservative and who has a rather wide range of interconnected idea-elements that are consistent with and cluster around this central concept. For such individuals, responses to various issue questions would, of course, be highly intercorrelated. Although Miller's Table 2 shows the existence of several intercorrelated issue responses, this is not necessarily proof that ideology exists.

The basic method used by Converse was *individual level analysis*—the examination of individual responses to open-ended questions to determine the proportions of individuals in various

scientists to conclude that there has been an increase in the number of ideologically oriented people within the mass public. In particular, Norman Nie's article "Mass Belief Systems Revisited: Political Change and Attitude Structure" lends support to that conclusion. The reader is advised to take a careful look at the change in content of the questions Nie used in that analysis, particularly the marked difference in items that make up the "Cold War" dimension before 1964 and those used from 1964 onward.

In "Party Identification and the Changing Role of Ideology in American Politics" John Pierce found no increase in the proportion of "informational" ideologues in 1964. It was the "informational" ideologue that Converse was searching for in his "Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics."


Table 3. Liberal-Conservative Feelings, 1964-1972, Voters Only

Liberal		Conservative		Inconsistent or Neutral	Total
Strong ^a	Weak ^b	Weak ^b	Strong ^a		
2.3%	13.2	1964	17.7	60.3	100%
1.7%	12.3	1968	21.6	58.0	100%
3.2%	11.9	1972	19.4	58.0	100%

^a Strong = highly differentiated; large distance between feelings toward liberals and conservatives

^b Weak = less strong but consistent feelings.

Figure 2. Ideological Model



ideological levels or strata.³¹ In Miller's Table 2, we are looking at correlations between one item paired separately with each of the other items; consistency of *individual* responses across several items cannot be demonstrated by this method. Also, as we shall see, the fact that a broad range of *items* correlates with a liberal-conservative scale is not proof that substantial numbers of *individuals* are "translating certain political issues and events into a liberal-conservative framework" as Miller et al. contend.

For example, let us take the four intercorrelated items that Miller labels the "social" domain. Locating a cluster of this sort is only the first step in the analysis. We need to follow each individual and note how he or she answered each of the four questions in order to find out how many respondents answered the items in a consistent or "constrained" fashion. The results of this type of analysis showed that 15 per cent of the sample gave consistently "liberal" responses, and 15 per cent gave consistently "conservative" responses—30 per cent consistent respondents in all in this "social" domain.³² (I am, of course, using the terms "liberal" and "conservative" here as a

literary convenience.³³) Of this 30 per cent who responded consistently "liberal" or consistently "conservative" to the "social" items, only about half located themselves on the appropriate side of Miller's liberal-conservative scale. About 10 per cent misidentified—placing themselves on the wrong side of the scale given their stance on the four "social" issues, and the rest either placed themselves in the middle (22 per cent) or chose not to place themselves on the scale at all (18 per cent). Thus, of the entire sample, only about 15 per cent were consistent "liberals" or "conservatives" in the "social" issue domain who also identified themselves with the appropriate liberal or conservative label.

In addition to the "social" issue cluster, I also examined individual respondents on a four-item "economic" cluster. The four items in the cluster had to do with (1) government seeing to it that every person has a job and a good standard of living, (2) government action to control inflation, (3) government insurance to cover all medical and hospital expenses, and (4) a more steeply graduated income tax rate. (Miller did not include two of these items in his Table 2—the question on inflation and the one on the income tax.) Using the same methods that were applied to the "social" issue items, I found that 4 per cent of the sample gave consistent "conservative" responses and 16 per cent gave consistent "liberal" responses in the "economic" domain. Of this 20 per cent who gave consistently "liberal" or "conservative" responses in this "economic" domain, only 38 per cent placed themselves appropriately on the liberal-conservative scale. This means that just 7 per cent of the sample answered these four economic items in a pattern consistent with their self-located position on the liberal-conservative scale. The "economic" domain in 1972 was less connected with

³¹ At one point in his "Nature of Belief Systems" article Converse did present matrices of interitem correlations. The purpose of that analysis was to compare a political elite with the general public. This use of the matrix method by Converse was ancillary and was not his principal method. See Converse, pp. 227–231.

³² To be considered consistently "liberal," the respondent had to give "liberal" responses (scale positions 1, 2, or 3) to at least three out of the four questions. Failure to answer one question, or responding in the middle (4 position) on one question, was accepted, but the respondent could not have given a "conservative" response and still be considered consistent. The same criteria were used to determine consistent "conservatives," except of course here we search for responses on the other side of the scale (positions 5, 6, and 7).

It is interesting that in the "social" cluster in Miller's Table 2, the average correlation was .39. With that degree of intercorrelation, only 30 per cent of the sample had "constrained" or consistent responses across the four items.

³³ See John Kessel, "Comment: The Issues in Issue Voting," *American Political Science Review* 66 (June, 1972), 463.

liberal-conservative terminology than other issue domains were.

Finally, I looked at the three-item "war" cluster shown in Miller's Table 2. In this case, a much larger subset of consistent respondents emerged—perhaps partly as a result of statistical probability (fewer questions to be inconsistent on). Thirty-six per cent of the sample gave consistently "conservative" responses in this issue domain, and 17 per cent gave consistently "liberal" responses. (Taking the Vietnam question by itself, the dove or "liberal" position was favored ten to seven over the hawk or "conservative" position, but the addition of the amnesty and military spending issues that are in this cluster revealed the above two-to-one edge of consistent "conservatives" over "liberals.") Of the consistent "conservatives," only a little more than a third (36 per cent) placed themselves on the conservative side of Miller's liberal-conservative scale, while about half (48 per cent) of the consistent "liberals" chose the liberal side of the scale. In all, 21 per cent of the entire sample were consistent "liberals" or "conservatives" in the "war" domain who also selected an appropriate position on the liberal-conservative scale.

Thus, a number of respondents whose consistent response patterns indicated that they held an attitude in an issue domain also appropriately placed themselves on the liberal-conservative continuum. But even then we have no way of knowing whether or not these respondents who appropriately located themselves did so with an understanding of what term went with what policy position. For example, of the Vietnam hawks who were against amnesty and for military spending, how many placed themselves on the conservative side of Miller's scale because they had a contextual understanding that it was appropriate to be a conservative given their stand on the war issues? Without frame-of-reference materials, we do not know the meanings these respondents attached to the terms "liberal" and "conservative," and without this kind of cognitive information, contextual analysis is not possible. It seems incorrect, therefore, to call these respondents ideologues. We might, however, call them "quasi-ideological."

The largest subset of "quasi-ideological" respondents—21 per cent—were found in the "war" domain. This is a sizeable number of potential voters, but certainly not a "broad segment," as Miller et al. assert. As we have seen, other domains contained fewer "quasi-ideological" respondents: 15 per cent in the "social" domain and 7 per cent in the "economic" area. (These percentages should not be added together, since some of the same people would be in two or more different clusters.)

Locating Ideologues. If we were to try to use the data available to locate ideologues within Converse's definition (as diagrammed in my Figure 2), we could first take a self-identified liberal or conservative and test for constraint among a "relatively wide range"³⁴ of idea-elements. For example, let us take all those who placed themselves on the liberal side of Miller's scale. They compose 18 per cent of the sample. About half of these self-located liberals were consistent "liberals" in the three-item "war" domain, but if, in addition, we look at their responses to the question on health insurance and the one on aid to minorities, the number of respondents who remain consistently "liberal" diminishes. Only a little more than one-fourth of our original pool of self-located liberals gave consistent "liberal" responses to these five items—the three military items, health insurance, and minority aid. We are left with less than 5 per cent of the sample and have not incorporated all the issues suggested by my Figure 2. In the same manner, we can take self-located conservatives and follow their response patterns across these five issues. Here we start with a larger group—27 per cent of the sample—who placed themselves on the conservative side of Miller's scale. About half were consistent "conservatives" in the "war" domain, but on the other two items "conservative" responses fell off rapidly. We end up with only 4 per cent of the sample who placed themselves as conservatives and who gave consistently "conservative" responses to the five items. If we look for constraint across a range of idea-elements, or across issue domains, we find very few who are ideologues as depicted in Figure 2.

We can observe, then, that when individual-level analysis is performed on the data subsumed by Miller's Table 2, relatively few respondents exhibit the degree of consistency in attitudes that Miller's matrix is supposed to demonstrate. In short, *a matrix of correlations does not an ideology make.*

Interpreting Issue Clusters. Perhaps the belief system described in my Figure 2 is too wide ranging and complex. Some political scientists might wish to relax the assumptions of Converse's definition of ideology by not requiring individuals to think of themselves in liberal or conservative terms. These analysts might be satisfied to define a belief system or ideology as simply a constrained configuration of ideas or attitudes. We have observed that responses to a number of issue questions in the 1972 election study did cluster. In particular,

³⁴ Converse explicitly prescribed a "relatively wide range" of idea-elements in his concept of a belief system. "Nature of Belief Systems," pp. 208–209.

we have noted that issue items intercorrelated to form issue domains in Miller's Table 2, and, when I performed individual level analysis on these data, we saw that significant proportions of respondents did give consistent responses to the items in the "war" domain and the "social" domain. One might interpret these constrained sets of responses as limited belief systems or "attenuated ideologies" (where the range of idea-elements is limited and a broader concept such as "liberal" or "conservative" is not included). Perhaps many political scientists assume such an "attenuated ideology" exists when they see a set of issues cluster as in the case of the "war" domain and the "social" domain.

There may be another interpretation that could explain the existence of these clusters, however. First, we should make a clear distinction between a *set of attitudes* or idea-elements which are consciously bound together (a belief system) and a *set of responses* to several issue questions (a response pattern). In Figure 3, I have diagrammed a situation in which individuals form a general attitude toward a single kind of problem, series of similar events, or some fairly long-term historical occurrence (such as economic difficulties, rioting, war in Vietnam, etc.). If several similar questions—questions containing common object referents—are asked of these people, responses could intercorrelate not because of a conscious awareness of what-idea-elements go together, but because responses to different questions are triggered by a *single core attitude*. A single attitude would not be considered an "ideology" even under a relaxed definition.

Converse anticipated this second type of "constraint" when he discussed social groupings (viz., Negroes) as central objects in belief systems.³⁵ I am expanding his formulation to include major events and problems as central objects that could act in the same way as social groups did in his discussion. The point Converse made is that if you ask several questions all containing the same group referent, you will get highly correlated responses


because of a strong attitude toward the group.

Analysis of the "social" cluster indicates that when consistent responses were made to several issue items in the 1972 study they probably stemmed more often from a single attitude source than from an "ideology," although both of these phenomena were undoubtedly present. The four items in the "social" cluster had to do with urban unrest, campus unrest, government help to blacks and other minorities, and stopping "criminal activity even at the risk of reducing the rights of the accused." Perhaps many of those who responded in a consistent fashion to these four items had a single core attitude toward social disruption. In that case, individuals with this attitude would also respond in a similar way to other items in the 1972 interview having the same referent—the referent being people and activities that are perceived to be socially disruptive.

To test for this "response pattern," I developed a Social Disruption index which summarized responses to the four items in the "social" domain. (The index was built by scoring "liberal" responses as +1, "conservative" responses as -1, other responses as 0, and finding the net score for each respondent. The 30 per cent who had consistent response patterns in the "social" domain ended up, of course, at the extremes of the index.) This Social Disruption index was then correlated with a number of other issue questions and with feelings toward various groups. The highest correlations ($t_{au} > .300$) were with feelings toward urban rioters, black militants, marijuana users, and feelings toward ministers who lead protest marches. Responses to issue scale questions on busing and legalization of marijuana also correlated very highly with this Social Disruption index. These findings lend strong support to the assumptions of the Single Core Attitude model (Figure 3). For many respondents, these various questions were probably tapping a core attitude toward social disruption—the rioting in cities, campus disturbances, Woodstocks, etc. of the late '60s and early '70s.

³⁵ Converse, "Nature of Belief Systems," pp. 234–238.

Figure 3. Single Core Attitude Model



As a further indication of this phenomenon, let us go back to 1970—a point in time closer to some of these events. The same four issue questions that form Miller's "social" domain and my Social Disruption index were also included in the CPS 1970 congressional election study. A greater crystallization or coalescing of responses is evident then. In 1970, 36 per cent of the sample were found to be consistent "liberals" or consistent "conservatives" on these "social" questions.³⁶ Furthermore, only 8 per cent in 1970 failed to respond to more than two questions, while 15 per cent in 1972 did not answer more than two of the four items. These data indicate that this issue domain was beginning to fade in 1972.

Apparently, once the stimuli (events, activities, etc.) fade, the attitude (response pattern) diminishes as well. An ideology—even an attenuated one—should have some durability and not be so subject to current stimuli. This is not to say that "attenuated ideologies" do not exist. The point is that issue clusters can result from a single attitude as well as from a belief system. *Political scientists should therefore be cautious in interpreting inter-correlations among issue items as prima facie evidence of ideological constraint.*

Another methodological observation should be made briefly about issue clustering. Interitem correlations can be found in data from the 1950s as well as in data from the 1960s and 1970s. Whenever two or more questions with the same referent have been asked in the same interview, these items usually correlate as well as any of the clusters in Miller's Table 2. In 1956, for example, only two questions were asked that had Negroes or civil rights as a referent.³⁷ Responses to these two questions correlated with a Pearsonian r of .33. In 1968, more questions pertaining to blacks and civil rights were asked and most of them intercorrelated.³⁸ In 1972, three questions were asked that had clear referents to the war in Vietnam; they clustered, as we have seen. No such war-related cluster could be found in previous studies since not as many war-related questions were asked. In

short, the increase in interitem correlations since the 1950s that has been noted by Norman Nie and reconfirmed by Miller can be attributed in large measure to the number of common referent questions in any given study.

Salient Issue Domains in 1972. Let us now take the major issue clusters found in the 1972 data and test their importance in the overall electoral decision. Whether we interpret issue clusters as "attenuated ideologies" or as single core attitudes, we do know that by asking *several* preformulated questions that are relevant to the same general issue and identifying those respondents who give consistent responses, we can locate subsets of the population who have a real attitude toward an issue. A Social Disruption index, which summarized responses to the four items in the "social" domain, was described earlier. Scores on this index represent the strength of each respondent's attitude toward that issue. I also developed a Military index from the three items in the "war" domain, and an Economic index from the four item "economic" cluster.

In my Equation 1, various issue concerns are represented by the Most Salient Issue (MSI) variable. People were, of course, concerned with a variety of problems in 1972, and thus the MSI variable contains a variety of "issue publics." If the Military index is substituted in Equation 1 in place of the MSI variable, the resulting beta-weight is .198—a bit higher even than the MSI measure. The Social Disruption index, substituted in Equation 1 in place of the MSI variable, produces a beta-weight of .114; the respondent's most salient issue concern in this case is a better predictor of vote than the Social Disruption issue. The Economic index did not fare well in Equation 1; this issue domain, at least as expressed in the preformulated CPS questions, was not important in 1972.³⁹ In general, then, I would agree with Miller's conclusion that the "war" issue and to some extent the "social" issue were issue domains "that contributed significantly to the explanation of the vote" in 1972. But bear in mind, this is only after the candidate variable has appropriately been taken into consideration.

Policy Differences among Democrats in 1972: A Deep and Enduring Schism?

Miller et al. stress the polarizing effects of certain individual issues and point to "deep policy schism" among Democratic identifiers. Their

³⁹ Fourteen per cent of the respondents mentioned inflation or high prices as the most important problem in 1972, and an additional 9 per cent referred to unemployment or general economic conditions as their top concern. Altogether these economic issues were second only to Vietnam—which 25 per cent mentioned as the most important issue.

³⁶ Twenty-two per cent were consistent "conservatives" and 14 per cent were consistent "liberals" in 1970.

³⁷ The two questions had to do with the government in Washington seeing to it that Negroes get fair treatment in jobs and housing, and the government in Washington staying out of school desegregation.

³⁸ About 40 per cent of the 1968 sample gave consistent responses to the following four items (about half were "liberal" and half "conservative"): government in Washington seeing to it that Negroes get fair treatment in jobs; government seeing to it that white and Negro children are allowed to go to the same schools; government support of the right of Negroes to go to any hotel or restaurant they can afford; and general favorable or unfavorable attitudes toward desegregation. An index built from these items strongly correlated with respondents' reactions to the speed of the civil rights movement, and the degree of violence they perceived in the movement.

Table 1, in particular, is offered as evidence of "a substantial degree of intraparty polarization." This is a very interesting and dramatic table, especially when we examine the differences between the Democrats who voted for McGovern and those who defected to Nixon. These data should be interpreted with some care, however. Again, rationalization of issue positions is a part of what we are seeing in Table 1.⁴⁰ We should also note that, although the table may give the impression of a "left-right" division among Democrats across a broad range of issues, the findings in Miller's Table 1 derive mostly from two basic attitudes that are reflected in a number of separate issue questions. We have previously identified a subset of respondents who had an attitude toward Social Disruption and another subset with an attitude in the Military domain. Removing either group of these respondents from Table 1 erases the differences between Democrats who voted for McGovern and those who voted for Nixon.⁴¹ Furthermore, the labeling of responses to these issue questions in the "left," "center," "right" terminology does not mean that a great many Democrats were responding to these issues in an ideological way; rather such labeling should be seen as a literary convenience—a shorthand description for the specific positions that were spelled out in the issue questions.

Most important, the data presented in Miller's Table 1 are essentially descriptive; that is, they describe how these Democrats responded to a series of issue questions. That the issues *caused* them to vote as they did is not demonstrated in Table 1—and I am sure Miller et al. did not intend the table to be so interpreted. For evidence of how important these issues were in voters' decisions, let us look at a multiple regression analysis examining *only the Democrats*:

⁴⁰ If Miller et al. had used just the pre-election responses to the Vietnam question in Table 1, they would have been less likely to have incorporated rationalized positioning on this issue item. Looking at pre-election responses only, the Democrats who voted for McGovern were 63 per cent dove and 15 per cent hawk—a 48-percentage-point spread rather than the 57-point difference shown in Miller's Table 1. Democrats who voted for Nixon were 32 per cent dove and 37 per cent hawk if only pre-election responders are included—a 5-percentage-point difference rather than the 9-point margin shown in Miller's Table 1.

⁴¹ When those with consistent "liberal" and "conservative" attitudes on Social Disruption were removed from Miller's Table 1, differences in the percentages of "left" and "right" responses between Democrats who had voted for McGovern and those who had voted for Nixon disappeared on four items—marijuana, campus unrest, aid to minorities, and busing. Differences between "loyalists" and defectors also vanished on two other issues—Vietnam and amnesty—when those who had a core attitude in the Military domain were removed from Miller's Table 1.

$$(5) V = .426 \text{ McG} - .304 \text{ Nix} + .206 M$$

$$(R = .76)$$

$$(6) V = .486 \text{ McG} - .304 \text{ Nix} + .083 SD$$

$$(R = .71),$$

where M is the Military index and SD is the Social Disruption index. For Democrats, then, the Military issue was important in explaining vote, but the Social Disruption issue was not. Equations 5 and 6 also demonstrate that the relative qualities of the candidates, especially McGovern, had a lot to do with Democratic loyalty or defection.

Now, to test the "depth" of the "polarization," let us look at the *number*, of Democrats who held attitudes in the Military and Social Disruption domains and ended up in opposite camps. In the case of the Social Disruption issue, 18 per cent of all voting Democrats both were consistent "liberals" in this issue domain and voted for McGovern; 11 per cent were consistent "conservatives" in the Social Disruption domain and voted for Nixon. Even if all those who had an attitude on the Social Disruption issue had voted *because* of the issue—which is clearly not the case (see Equation 6)—a minority of Democratic voters (18 per cent versus 11 per cent) would have been responsible for the "deep schism" in the "social" domain. In the Military domain, 23 per cent of all voting Democrats gave consistently "liberal" responses on the "war" issues and voted for McGovern, and 23 per cent were consistent "conservatives" on these items and voted for Nixon. Thus, most of the real division among Democrats was based on a difference in attitude on the Military issue.

On the basis of data from the 1968 and 1972 elections, Miller et al. conclude that an "enduring schism [exists] within the Democratic ranks" which in turn suggests the "possibilities of partisan realignment." (When we talk of "Democratic ranks" I presume we are referring to party identifiers among the mass public, and not the elites who are the party itself.) If major issues endure for a period of time, the possibilities for realignment do indeed exist. But if we look at the nature of the two most important issue domains in 1972 and note the probable reasons for their saliency, we might well question the assumption of long-term or enduring cleavage based on these issues. The Military issue domain stemmed primarily from reaction to the war in Vietnam, and the Social Disruption domain apparently was seeded mostly by reactions to rioting by blacks and to the antiwar demonstrations. With the war over and the domestic incidents it spawned discontinued, there is little reason to believe that the Military issue do-

main will remain salient (unless, of course, the United States becomes involved in another such war). If rioting or other forms of social unrest should resume on a wide scale, however, the Social Disruption domain could become salient again.

Conclusions

Divergent findings, and assertions of "spectacular" (Miller, p. 754) change in the American electorate have brought confusion and needless digression to an important field of study. New measures and different techniques can lead researchers to perceive change in the electorate that is not there. In particular, this comment has stressed some of the dangers in the use of two new methodological applications: (1) the candidate proximity measure which basically transfers candidate attitude and makes it look like an issue attitude, and (2) new techniques for measuring ideology which differ greatly from Converse's original concept and method.

Another major purpose of this comment has been to refocus attention upon the relative weights of the three basic factors—candidates, issues, and party identification—in recent elections. My analysis indicates that attitude toward candidates remains of critical importance in the electoral decision, especially in 1972.⁴² Also, I have reexamined

the role of ideology in recent elections and have found once again that most of the public does not make systematic use of the liberal-conservative continuum in evaluating political events and issues. The importance of the ideological variable in explaining voting behavior is still minimal. This is not to say that specific issues are of little consequence in elections. Issues most certainly have weight in the predictive equations I developed at the beginning of this comment. I have had, perforce, to emphasize the candidate variable here because Miller et al. misplaced it and greatly exaggerated the importance of issues and ideology.

One further point should be made. Political scientists are all too prone to interpret ideological inconsistency and confusion among the public as electoral incompetence. Because most voters do not perceive the liberal-conservative continuum as political scientists have been trained to do, does not mean that voters cannot make competent assessments of candidates and issues.⁴³ Perhaps the political scientist should pay less attention to the liberal-conservative dimension, rather than expecting the electorate to pay more attention to it. Liberalism-conservatism is, after all, a limiting, single-track concept that cannot begin to explain multidimensional issue space, nor the diverse patterns of issue attitudes that have developed in individuals' minds.

⁴² This is the same conclusion I reached in my article "Issue Salience and Party Choice." There I pointed out that "candidate image emerges as the most important factor in individual voting choice in 1964, but issues had a strong independent effect as well" (p. 400).

⁴³ For a further discussion of this point see my paper "Levels of Rationality Among the American Electorate" presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association (1974), especially pp. 49–55.

Ideology in the 1972 Election: Myth or Reality—A Rejoinder*

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Broad conceptions of voting are not discovered; they are invented. Fundamentally different concepts of voting naturally direct attention to distinctly different political objects, questions and conclusions. When viewed as a process, the concept of voting leads to a concern with those factors which may affect relationships between the vote and such political objects as candidates, parties or issues or which may explain differences in these relationships, whether found at one point in time or across different time points. The conception of voting as a condition or a single act, on the other hand, suggests a preoccupation with a fixed set of relationships and can lead to the static interpretation that differences between previous and recent research findings arise because the earlier work was flawed or inadequate. We think the purpose of scientific inquiry is more adequately served by an approach that seeks to understand the conditions that depress some relationships while accentuating others. Knowing the relative weights for party identification, candidates or issues in the voter's decision-making rule, for example, is important for comprehending the results of a specific election. It is far more significant for the general study of voting behavior to know the cause of a shift in the relative weights across a series of elections than it is to know which factor was more important in a particular election.

"A Majority Party in Disarray" attempted to deal with the 1972 presidential election in terms of these broad questions and offered some preliminary findings of relevance to theoretical topics of voter preferences, party and candidate strategies. Few theoretical questions have been conclusively answered by studies of voting behavior, not because the field is lacking in careful studies or major advances in research, but because the number of cases available for investigation through modern empirical techniques is limited. We think voting can best be regarded as a process of interactions between voters and candidates that is affected by partisan and group loyalties, by issues of the day, by social and economic conditions, and by a number of other factors present in the political environment. Each new election offers an opportunity for broadening the evidentiary base for testing

theoretical statements and from which generalizations about elections may be made. An election thus provides a natural laboratory setting in which the reciprocal influence relationship that exists between politicians and citizens can be observed under the unique conditions of that particular election. The larger the number of elections available for study, the more confidence can be placed in generalizations about elections and electoral behavior, and the more refined will the theories become as they are confronted with empirical evidence.

The crucial task in this interplay of theory and data is the determination of how the unique characteristics of an election influence the relationships between more enduring political objects, attitudes and social cleavages. Paradoxically, new developments in the study of voting behavior often prove temporarily disruptive to the search for generalizable findings. As the study of voting behavior matures, new concepts and new theoretical questions are raised, prompting the development of new measurement techniques better suited for testing the hypotheses and operationalizing the new concepts. While findings derived from these new approaches and techniques may not be directly comparable with previous research, if they are found methodologically sound and produce meaningful substantive results, the study of voting behavior benefits in the long run.

Given these considerations, we welcome the opportunity that this symposium provides for further discussion of topics only briefly mentioned in "Majority Party." Our reply to topics raised in the "Comments" attempts to clarify some of the concerns with further analysis of CPS election study data. The length of the "Comments," however, prevents response to specific criticisms except as they relate to theoretical points of general interest.

The Meaning of Candidate Affect

Previous research findings¹ from the Center for Political Studies (CPS) have demonstrated that


¹ The early University of Michigan work most specifically focused on the impact of candidate attributes was reported in Donald E. Stokes, Angus Campbell, and Warren E. Miller, "Components of Electoral Decision," *American Political Science Review*, 52 (June 1958), 367-387; Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, "Some Dynamic Elements of Contests for the Presidency," *American Political Science Review*, 60 (March 1966), 19-28.

* We gratefully acknowledge the technical assistance of Peter Jofitis, the editorial assistance of Oksana Malanchuk, and the insightful comments of Herbert Weisberg on a preliminary draft of this rejoinder.

candidate-related attributes are short-term forces that have sharply affected the individual vote decision in the national presidential elections between 1952 and 1972. References in the commentaries² on "Majority Party" to the importance of the candidates in 1972 thus come as no surprise. What is mildly disturbing is the argument that the CPS research on the 1972 election overlooked and underestimated the importance of the candidates as a factor affecting individual vote preferences. This claim is something of a misrepresentation of the facts, and it certainly ignores the original version of "Majority Party"³ as well as previously published CPS research on the 1972 election.⁴

Misperceptions aside, a matter of broader interest and relevance is the empirical evidence, reported in detail elsewhere,⁵ which suggests that there have been substantial shifts in the importance of candidates, issues and partisan attitudes as predictors of the vote—contrary to the RePass position contending that "the relative weight of the three principal factors in the voting decision . . . have remained quite steady over time. . . ."⁶ Prior to 1972, partisan attitudes had been one of the most important factors explaining the vote decision. Yet, although the 1972 election marked the first occurrence of a substantial decline in the correlation between party identification and the two-party presidential vote,⁷ a long-term trend toward

Figure 1. Importance of Candidates and Parties in Predicting the Vote, 1952–1972



both decreased importance of partisan attitudes and increased importance of candidate images as predictors of the vote has been taking place. The regression coefficients graphed in Figure 1 indicate the relative importance of party and candidate images as independent variables predicting the two-party vote in the presidential elections between 1952 and 1972.⁸ The importance of affect toward the parties as a determinant of the vote decision has declined substantially over this twenty-year period. In 1956, affect toward the parties was a more potent explanation of the vote (beta = .47) than was affect toward the candidates (.33); by 1972, the importance of partisan attitudes had diminished to the level of having almost no independent effect on the vote (.08), whereas candidate images had strongly increased in potency (.74).

Clearly, the "Comments" are in agreement with our earlier report which shows the strong effect of candidate evaluations on the vote in 1972. Disagreement arises over the substantive interpretation that should be given to candidate affect. We do not believe that voting for a candidate on the basis of personal characteristics implies "irrational" voting behavior. A voter may make deliberate assumptions both about types of policy decisions and expected performance in office primarily on the basis of a candidate's personal characteristics. A candidate who is perceived as decisive may be expected, once in office, to deal with national problems in a similarly competent

⁸ The candidate and party affect measures used in the regressions were based on a series of questions asking respondents what they liked and disliked about each party and candidate. The positive and negative comments about each party and again for each candidate were summed to provide two indices, one for the parties and the other for the candidates. The final indices are "net" affect measures, that is, they indicate the preponderance of positive or negative attitudes toward the Republican candidate or party over those toward the Democratic candidate or party. These indices are similar but not identical to those originally employed by Donald E. Stokes in "Some Dynamic Elements of Contests for the Presidency."

² "Comment on 'A Majority Party in Disarray'" by Frederick Steeper and Robert Teeter reached us after the major arguments for this rejoinder had been developed; we thus make no specific reference to their piece. Their main discussion, which focused on the Vietnam issue, rests heavily on their interpretation of marginal distributions rather than on a cogent test determining if their Vietnam variables correlate with the vote or other criterion variables differently than did those used by CPS. As we did not have access to their data, and because their data apparently does not include questions about actual vote, further elaboration seems unnecessary. Our rejoinder does, however, deal with many of their arguments, especially their concluding comments.

³ "Comment: What Have You Done for Me Lately? Toward an Investment Theory of Voting" by Samuel L. Popkin, John W. Gorman, Charles Phillips and Jeffrey A. Smith will be referred to as the Popkin "Comment" for purposes of brevity (pp. 779–813).

⁴ The original version of "Majority Party in Disarray" was presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association in September, 1973. An initial evaluation of the paper by the *Review* produced specific instructions for shortening. The deleted material focused primarily on the candidates and the question of partisan realignment and has been published previously. See Arthur H. Miller and Warren E. Miller, "Issues, Candidates and Partisan Divisions in the 1972 American Presidential Election," *British Journal of Political Science*, 5 (October 1975), 393–434.

⁵ Miller and Miller, "Issues, Candidates and Partisan Divisions," p. 422.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ David RePass, "Comment: Political Methodologies in Disarray," p. 814.

⁸ Miller and Miller, "Issues, Candidates and Partisan Divisions," p. 422.

fashion; if perceived as honest and empathic, he may be seen as unlikely to initiate policy decisions calculated to advantage one group to the detriment of another. Consideration of such personal attributes as these may, therefore, lead to an overall positive or negative evaluation of the candidate and an eventual vote decision that reflects this candidate valence.

The types of personal characteristics and political factors that determine candidate valence, however, still remain in question. Popkin⁹ has suggested that perceived candidate competence and demographic characteristics of both the candidate and the candidate's supporters are major determinants of candidate evaluations. Weisburg and Rusk¹⁰ have demonstrated the importance of issue orientation as a correlate of candidate affect, although RePass¹¹ argues that attitudes toward the candidates were not related to issues in 1972. Still other research¹² suggests the possibility that personality attributes may determine how citizens relate to candidates and political leaders.

Personality Characteristics. Popkin has suggested that voters may simply evaluate political leaders on the basis of either their demographic traits—age, race and ethnicity—or those of their supporters.¹³ This hypothesis can be tested directly by means of responses to open-ended questions in the election studies which inquire about what people like and dislike about the candidates.

In 1972, the thirty-four separate and distinct characteristics mentioned for each of the candidates were factor analyzed to determine the major personality dimensions that voters had used in evaluating the candidates.¹⁴ The factor analysis

revealed five basic dimensions of candidate attributes. The first dimension, labeled "competence," includes comments about the candidate's experience and ability. The second deals with "trust" and incorporates statements about the candidate's honesty and integrity. "Reliability" seems to capture the essence of the responses on the third dimension: responsibility, decisiveness, and stability. "Leadership appeal" is characterized by comments about the candidate as inspiring, communicative, warm and likeable, and the final dimension focuses on the candidate's personal appearance: age, health and other types of demographic features.

About 30 per cent of the voters referred to the candidates in terms of personal attributes and they distributed their remarks unequally across the five dimensions. Evaluations of the two candidates were sharply differentiated by only the competence and reliability dimensions. Competence was mentioned most often (31%) by voters as an expression of what they liked or disliked about Nixon, and these remarks were predominantly positive (89%) among voters whose positive and negative statements were not equally balanced. Trust (21%) and reliability (12%) were cited less frequently in reference to Nixon but were also generally positive (43% and 73%, respectively). Reliability was the most salient perceived candidate personality dimension used by voters (25%) when discussing McGovern, but almost all such statements (91%) were *negative*. Some voters (19%) made reference to the trust dimension when commenting about McGovern and many of these were favorable (51%); those mentioning competence (16%), however, were much less so (only 13% made positive comments). Very few voters (5–6%) referred to the leadership appeal dimension for either candidate and fewer still (1% and 4%, respectively) referred to the demographic characteristics of Nixon or McGovern. The candidates apparently offered the voters a clear choice with respect to the personality attributes of competence and reliability, with Nixon perceived as far more competent and reliable.

The relative impact that these different personality attribute dimensions had on the vote also varied. Using the ten separate attribute dimensions in the components analysis, rather than combining them into Democratic and Republican candidate components as in the original six-components analysis,¹⁵ reveals that only the McGovern trust

⁹ Popkin, "Comment," pp. 793–795.

¹⁰ See Herbert F. Weisberg and Jerrold G. Rusk, "Dimensions of Candidate Evaluation," *American Political Science Review*, 64 (December 1970), 1167–1185; and Jerrold G. Rusk and Herbert F. Weisberg, "Perceptions of Political Candidates: Implications for Electoral Change," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 16 (August 1972), 388–410.

¹¹ RePass, "Comment," p. 823.

¹² James D. Barber, *The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972) is most suggestive on this topic.

¹³ Popkin, "Comment," p. 794.

¹⁴ The factor analysis was accomplished by forming a series of dummy variables from the codes to the likes/dislikes questions that deal with candidate attributes. These dummy variables were coded "1" if the respondent mentioned a particular candidate characteristic and "0" if no mention was made. A tetrachoric *r* correlation matrix was then computed for the 34 resulting dummy variables and subjected to factor analysis; the resulting five dimensions accounted for 65 per cent of the total item variance. Tetrachoric *r* was considered the appropriate coefficient for this analysis because we sought information about the underlying dimensional structure. See Herbert F. Weisberg, "Models of Statistical Relationship," *American Political Science Review* 68 (December 1974), 1638–1655 for a discussion of Tetrachoric *r*.

¹⁵ The six-components analysis as originally conducted by Stokes in "Some Dynamic Elements" employed six indices that were constructed from responses to the open-ended questions asking the survey respondents what they liked and disliked about the parties and the candidates. The six components or indices refer to (1) the personal characteristics of the Democratic candidate, (2) the personal characteristics of the Republican candidate, (3) party management, (4) domestic issues, (5) foreign issues, and

and reliability dimensions among the Democratic candidate components were statistically significant explanations of the vote (regression coefficient b 's = .16 and .12, respectively). In contrast, Nixon's competence was the most important Republican candidate component (b = .13), while trust (b = .11) and reliability (b = .09) were slightly less important.

These findings, which provide a refinement of the single general personal attributes measure usually employed in the traditional six-components analysis, suggest that while competence and reliability were the most salient attribute dimensions in 1972—and leadership appeal and demographics, the least salient—perceptions of McGovern's lack of trustworthiness and Nixon's competence had the largest impact on the vote decision in the 1972 election. Contrary to Popkin's suggestion that earlier CPS research had ignored the "competence" dimension, the analysis clearly indicates that candidate competence was subsumed by the personal attributes components used in the six-components analysis. Furthermore, additional analyses disclose that the Nixon competence, trust and reliability dimensions and the McGovern trust, reliability and leadership appeal dimensions were significantly related to the candidate thermometer measures used in "Majority Party," even after controlling for issue differences and party identification. The thermometer measure used in "Majority Party" therefore captured not only competence but the other personal attribute dimensions as well.

Our initial research on the 1972 election also included a more direct measure of competence than the thermometers used in "Majority Party."¹⁶ Since the competence of a nonincumbent may be best assessed through the voter's judgment of the candidate's campaign performance—a possible explanation for the insignificant findings with the McGovern competence dimension in the components analysis—we asked voters to tell us how well they thought McGovern had run his campaign. Of the 30 per cent of all voters who thought that McGovern had done a "good job" in managing his campaign, 53 per cent voted for him; only 25 per cent of those who felt he had done a "poor job" did so. This relationship remains significant even after controlling for party identification and issue orientation. This judgment about McGovern's competence during the campaign was also associated with his general affective rating on the feeling thermometer: those who thought McGovern had

managed his campaign well tended to evaluate him more positively (Pearson r = .30).

The association between perceived competence and evaluations of McGovern, as well as the relationship between competence and the vote, are strongly affected by education. Among the grade school educated, these correlations were much higher (.41 and .46, respectively) than they were among those with at least some college education (.18 and .14). This is not to say that those voters with some college education were less inclined to criticize McGovern's campaign performance, but rather that they simply did not translate this perception into a candidate evaluation or vote decision as readily as did the less well educated. It would appear that those subgroups of the population with only a grade school education use different criteria and information when evaluating candidates and casting votes than do voters with more formal education; their concerns seem more concentrated on the manner in which a candidate would conduct the affairs of the office, while the substance of the problems a president would confront and his proposed solutions for them appear of higher priority to the better educated voter.

Issues and Candidate Affect. As suggested by "Majority Party," evaluations of the candidates may also reflect the impact of policy orientations. Voters may like or dislike particular candidates because they agree or disagree with the policy positions of the candidate. RePass has called into question the connection between candidate appraisal and issue orientation by arguing that issue salience does not increase the correlation between the voter's issue position and candidate evaluations. After an analysis of open-ended material, he concludes that there is not enough evidence "... to make us think that the Vietnam issue was a major factor in determining overall valence toward candidates" and that "in general, ... attitudes toward candidates in 1972 were based on a variety of considerations and these attitudes were *not strongly related to issues*."¹⁷

In "Majority Party" (see Table 3), we concluded that the issue orientation of voters was clearly associated with affective ratings of the candidates. Not only were both candidates evaluated differently with respect to the issues—especially one as important as Vietnam—but, as the data of Figure 2 demonstrate, this relationship was influenced to some extent by the saliency of the issue, as well. As the size of the correlations (η)¹⁸ indicate, attitudes toward both McGovern and Nixon were more systematically related to issue positions


(6) group benefits. Each index is scored to indicate the preponderance of negative or positive comments by subtracting the number of "dislike" statements related to the specific index from the number of "like" comments that the respondent volunteers.

¹⁶ See Miller and Miller, "Issues, Candidates and Partisan Divisions."

¹⁷ RePass, "Comment," p. 823; italics added.

¹⁸ Eta is the appropriate statistic to use here because the theory leads to an expectation of a nonlinear relationship. Eta is sensitive to nonlinearity whereas Pearson's r is not.

Figure 2. Mean Thermometer Ratings of the Candidates by Vietnam Policy Preference and Issue Salience



among respondents who readily discussed the candidates in terms of the Vietnam issue than among those who did not. There is a linear decline in affect toward McGovern as one moves along the Vietnam scale and away from an immediate withdrawal position, which McGovern was perceived to favor (average placement of McGovern on the Vietnam scale was 1.7). On the other hand, Nixon was perceived as taking a position located near the center of the scale (average placement of 4.6) and thus received a higher rating from those voters who expressed policy preferences near the center positions on the scale. Both the linear pattern for McGovern and the curvilinear pattern of affect toward Nixon emerge most clearly for those voters whose open-ended responses indicated concern over the Vietnam issue.

Clearly the level of voters' information is a continuing and critical concern for theories of voting behavior. It is not surprising that there are more systematic relationships between candidate assessments and policy preferences among those better versed in the topic area—even one that had so thoroughly permeated public awareness as had Vietnam. These findings suggest the importance of studying factors that affect the flow of information from the political environment (such as media content, candidate speeches, and campaign literature) to the voters (media exposure, indirect information sources, factors affecting misperception), variables that deserve increased attention in future studies.

In summary, affect toward the candidates in 1972 was related to the issue orientation of both the voters and the candidates, as well as to assess-

ments of the candidate's personal attributes.¹⁹ Perceived candidate competence was only one dimension used by voters to evaluate the 1972 candidates, and not necessarily the most significant one. Trust and reliability were also important. Leadership appeal was considerably less significant; the demographic characteristics of the candidates were rarely mentioned by voters and therefore had no significant relationship with candidate affect.

The Role of Issues

The role that "Majority Party" attributes to issues in affecting the outcome of the 1972 election has also been questioned by the "Comments." The Popkin comment states that the six-components analysis they performed and the analysis performed in "Majority Party" provide divergent results and thus at least one of the approaches must be "flawed." This presumed discrepancy, which revolves around the relative importance of issues as a factor affecting the electoral decision, is the primary basis for their critical attack on both *The American Voter* and "Majority Party." Popkin's replication of the six-components regression analysis suggests an all time low effect on the electoral outcome for domestic issues in 1972 and a vote impact for foreign issues that differs only trivially from that obtained in the 1952 election.²⁰ "Majority Party," on the other hand, while not making explicit comparisons with previous elections, primarily because method innovations limited such comparisons, concluded that in 1972 the *direct* impact of the candidates was relatively more important than issues²¹ but that issues had substantially more direct effect on the vote than did party identification. It was also implied in "Majority Party" that issues were particularly salient and important factors in 1972 relative to past elections.

Responses to the open-ended likes/dislikes questions employed in the components analysis

¹⁹ Miller and Miller, "Issues, Candidates and Partisan Division," incorporates a discussion that also explores the impact of party identification, the Eagleton affair and cultural orientation on candidate evaluations.

²⁰ Popkin, "Comment," p. 782.

²¹ The Popkin and RePass suggestion that "Majority Party" understated the relative importance of the candidate factor has already been discussed and therefore needs no further elaboration.

The four variable causal model presented in footnote 30 of "Majority Party" also showed a larger *direct* effect of candidates on the vote but a slightly larger *total* effect for issues. To clear the confusion evidenced by RePass' footnote 17, it should be noted that only the total effects for the causal model were presented in the footnote both to save space and because they were the only statistics of relevance to the substantive discussion. Given our theoretical model, candidates and issues would not affect the vote through party identification; the total effects presented were therefore appropriate for our model.


can be analyzed from various perspectives. Only two of these—the relative saliency of candidate, party, issue and group-related attitudes over time and the impact of these political objects on the vote—are of relevance here because they reflect upon the validity of “Majority Party” statements about issue awareness and the impact of issues on the vote.

First, how has the frequency of responses regarding each of these political objects varied over time? “Majority Party” suggested that issue saliency was particularly high in 1972. Figure 3 indicates that there has been a gradual increase during recent elections in mentions of foreign and domestic issues and a corresponding decline in references to the personal attributes of candidates, while the saliency of group ties to politics and questions of party management have not changed significantly over time.

Second despite the greater frequency of references to policy issues than to candidates attributes in 1972, regression analysis with the six-components model reaffirmed the earlier CPS finding that candidate affect had a more substantial direct effect on the vote in 1972 than did issues, just as had been true for the other five presidential elections between 1952 and 1972. Furthermore, the measures of partisan advantage ($b \cdot \bar{x}$) displayed in Table 1 clearly reveal that McGovern hurt his own vote more than any previous Democratic candidate has done. Nixon’s personal characteristics, meanwhile, were a definite advantage for him in 1972, adding nearly 4 per cent of the vote to his net partisan support. The positive reactions to Nixon, combined with the negative attitudes toward McGovern, resulted in a total net Republican advantage of over 8 per cent of the vote, the largest net impact of candidate images for any of the elections between 1952 and 1972.

At the same time, domestic and foreign issues had a much larger combined impact on the vote outcome in 1972 than was true for any previous election although, disregarding the direction of the impact of each set of issues, their separate importance (1.35 and 3.23, respectively) about

Figure 3. Saliency of Candidates, Issues, Group Benefits, and Party Management, 1952–1972



equaled their counterparts for 1952. These findings are similar but not identical to those reported by Popkin. One should note, however, an important pattern to the data displayed in Table 1 that runs contrary to Popkin’s suggestion that the outcome of the 1972 election was no more affected by issues than was the 1952 election.²² The two sets of issues must, of course, be combined if comparisons are to be made with the results of “Majority Party” because comments in that article about the overall importance of issues did not distinguish between foreign and domestic. The data of Table 1 demonstrate that the impact of both foreign and domestic policy issues favored the same party in 1972, as had been true for the last two elections, and that the combined impact had not been equaled in any of the five preceding elections. Prior to 1964, the effect of issues was split between the parties: domestic issues favored the Democratic party and foreign policy issues favored the Republicans. In 1964, however, both foreign and domestic issues advantaged the Democratic candidate, and in 1968 and 1972, both sets of issues advantaged the Republican candidate. The total net advantage accruing to the Democrats or Republi-

²² Popkin, “Comment,” p. 782.

Table 1. Net Impact ($b_i \cdot \bar{x}_i$) of the Six Components on the Vote, 1952–1972^a

Year	Democratic Candidate	Republican Candidate	Party Management	Groups	Foreign Policy	Domestic Policy
1952	−1.18 ^b	4.37	5.40	−4.29	3.30	−1.34
1956	0.17	7.60	1.18	−5.50	2.46	−0.88
1960	−1.99	5.70	1.20	−4.01	1.80	−0.54
1964	−3.93	−2.60	−0.30	−2.59	−0.25	−2.36
1968	0.90	1.60	1.50	−3.60	1.00	1.10
1972	4.29	3.98	0.04	−4.55	3.23	1.35

^a Computations were based on all five responses to the open-ended questions.
^b A negative value indicates a Democratic vote advantage; a positive value, a Republican vote advantage.

cans from both sets of issues combined is, therefore, a more accurate indicator of the *total issue impact on the outcome* of the election than are the separate figures of Table 1.


A measure of the total net partisan advantage accruing because of the candidates or because of issues (see Figure 4) indicates that, as implied by "Majority Party," issues had a far more substantial impact on the election outcome in 1972 than in any of the previous elections examined. Indeed, the total net impact of issues in 1964 and 1968 was also higher than in the elections of the 'fifties, but in both these elections the net vote shift advantaging a particular party was considerably less than the 4.58 percentage points found for 1972. A comparison of the impact of issues in 1972 with that of previous years clearly suggests a more substantial increase in "issue effect" than "candidate effect" for 1972 relative to previous elections. For example, the net impact of candidates on the election outcome was only slightly higher in 1972 than in 1956; but the net impact of the issues in 1972 was nearly double what it had been during the 'fifties.

Despite the relative increase in the importance of issues, the net impact of all issues was still less than the total net impact of the candidates in 1972. This relative net impact of candidates and issues, contrary to Popkin's suggestion,²³ was also sharply affected by education. The net impact of issues among those with only a high school (4.05%) or grade school (0.87%) education was much smaller than the net candidate impact (9.74% and 5.20%, respectively). The difference in the impact of issues and candidates was nearly nonexistent for those with some higher education (6.59% and 7.02%). Issues clearly had a disproportionately larger impact on the 1972 vote among individuals with at least some college education than for those with less education.

Briefly, this replication of the six-components analysis presents evidence that supports the major conclusions reached in "Majority Party" and other previously published CPS reports on the 1972 election. We fail to find any discrepancy between the six-components analysis and the findings of "Majority Party." On the contrary, the longitudinal comparisons allowed by the replication provide evidence on the importance of issues in 1972 relative to previous elections, thus going beyond the comparisons made in "Majority Party." They also provide support for the notion that the outcome of the election was far more dependent on

²³ Popkin, "Comment," pp. 783-784. It should be noted that the electoral impact of "group benefits" also varied by level of education in 1972. Group references had a larger impact (b_i : $\bar{x}$ of 5.04%) on the vote among grade school educated than among high school (4.81%) or college educated (3.96%) respondents. Party management was statistically insignificant and had a zero weight for all three levels of education.

Figure 4. Total Net Impact of Candidates and Issues Ignoring Party Direction



the issues than was any presidential election during the previous twenty years. One should keep in mind, however, that the importance of issues in 1972 was partially the result of the educational composition of the 1972 voters.

How are we to account for the obvious contradiction between the results of our six-components analysis and those obtained by Popkin? The principal explanation appears to be a difference in approach. It should be noted that Popkin²⁴ did not actually replicate the earlier SRC/CPS approach, as is acknowledged in their "Comment";²⁵ their analysis did not incorporate the fourth and fifth responses into the likes/dislikes questions.²⁶ These were, however, included in the analyses reported above and in the replication of the Stokes analysis conducted for the elections prior to 1972 by Kagay and Caldeira,²⁷ both of which—in con-

²⁴ The RePass approach to issue importance cannot be used for purposes of across-time comparisons because, as he indicates in footnote 5 of his comment, the 1972 measure of issue importance is not comparable to the previous studies.

²⁵ See Popkin, "Comment," footnote 9 (p. 781).

²⁶ Because funding for the 1972 CPS national election study was limited, several economizing measures were employed, one of which was to code only the first three responses to open-ended materials into the data file. For the purpose of this rejoinder, we returned to the protocols and coded the fourth and fifth responses into our data.

It should also be noted that contrary to Popkin's footnote 9, the assignment of responses to the specific components are not indicated by the codebook; coders work from individual codes, not from the subtitles presented in the user's codebook. The Popkin six-components analysis does not therefore replicate the collapsing of code categories into the components as they have been used in previous SRC/CPS work.

²⁷ Michael R. Kagay and Greg A. Caldeira, "I Like the Looks of his Face: Elements of Electoral Choice, 1952-1972." Paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, September 2-5, 1975. The Kagay and Caldeira piece not only uses the full five responses to the open-ended questions asked prior to 1972, but it is also an excellent replication of the original scheme used to combine codes into the specific components.

trast to the results reported by Popkin—not only confirm the conclusions reached by “Majority Party” about the 1972 election but also support the implicit comparisons between 1972 and previous elections therein.

The Theoretical Importance of the Proximity Measure

Given the high degree of similarity between the results of analyses performed with the six-components model and the measures applied in “Majority Party,” one might question the incentive for using the newer methods. Two reasons are offered: the first stems from a methodological limitation of the six-components model; the second reflects the substantive advantage of the newer measures.

The “likes/dislikes” questions are biased against both policy and group responses because they explicitly ask the respondent about parties and candidates, and *not* about issues. We wondered what a components analysis would demonstrate if respondents had also been asked open-ended questions from which an “issues component” might have been constructed. The additional impact of issues that might be demonstrated by such a technique can be at least crudely estimated by adding a general measure of the respondent’s social issue orientation and an index of the respondent’s own position on the war issues to the six-components regression. We found that the addition of two such variables increased the explained variance by 6 percentage points, with no significant decline in the regression weights assigned to the candidates. There was, however, an increase in the weight of domestic issues to near equivalence with the impact of the Democratic candidate and a new weight for foreign issues that was slightly larger than the Democratic candidate weight. Thus, while the six-components approach based only on the “likes/dislikes” questions has the advantage of the open-ended format which reduces somewhat the possibility that responses may simply be a reflection rather than a cause of the vote intention, it may underestimate the importance of the issue components.²⁸

The six-components approach is also limited in that it does not *explicitly* convey an explanatory model of the vote decision. How do issue, candidate and party responses get merged by the voters into an electoral choice? While the six-components analysis demonstrates the relative impact of these factors, it does not provide a theoretical model that describes how the components become linked

together.²⁹ The elements of a behavioral model linking candidates, issues and the vote choice have, on the other hand, been specified by *The American Voter*; they have been elaborated by Brody and Page;³⁰ and they have been operationalized with the proximity measures used in “Majority Party.” Briefly stated, the model specifies that voters have various issue preferences, that candidates are perceived to take differing policy positions, and that voters cast their ballot in accordance with some function that describes the relationship between their perception of the candidate positions and their own issue preferences. Such a model represents an attempt to combine a concern with candidate strategies, that is, how the candidates present themselves to the voters, with a concern for questions of voter perceptions and policy preference.

While the proximity measures appear to provide a methodological advance over previous approaches to issue voting, they also suffer from certain inherent problems, namely, persuasion and projection.³¹ Voters may not have firmly fixed policy preferences; indeed, their preferences may be easily manipulated by persuasive politicians. Similarly, issue proximity may be an effect of candidate evaluations or the vote intention rather than a cause of the vote decision. Respondents may project preferred policy stands onto the candidates either because they have decided to vote for a particular candidate or because they like the candidate for a reason unrelated to issues stands; they therefore simply assume, without supporting information, that he shares their policy position. An electoral choice that reflects a close issue proximity between the candidate and the voter would not, however, meet the definition of issue voting if the similarity of issue positions was simply the result of persuasion or projection. Yet, both persuasion and projection could inflate the relationship between an issue proximity measure and the vote, thereby leading to erroneous conclusions about the importance of issue voting. Indeed, RePass has argued that these problems are so severe that the proximity measures simply reflect affect towards the candidates and not issue related evaluations.³²

Several factors including issue saliency, the degree to which candidates actually take distinct issue positions, the costs involved in obtaining in-

²⁹ An excellent theoretical interpretation of the components model has been offered by Stanley Kelley, Jr. and Thad W. Mirer in “The Simple Act of Voting,” *American Political Science Review*, 68 (June 1974), 572–791.

³⁰ Richard A. Brody and Benjamin I. Page, “Comment: The Assessment of Policy Voting,” *American Political Science Review*, 66 (June, 1972), 450–458.

³¹ These problems are discussed in “Majority Party” and in Brody and Page, “Comment: The Assessment of Policy Voting.”

³² RePass, “Comment,” pp. 818–819.

²⁸ These results seem to contradict the RePass contention that “... when issues are measured by open-ended questions, a greater degree of issue voting can be demonstrated than when preformulated questions are used.” See RePass, “Comment,” p. 816.

formation about the candidate's policy positions, the length of time over which voters have held specific issue positions and the certainty with which their attitudes are held should all affect the relationship between candidate ratings and issue proximity. While an empirical exploration of how these factors influence this relationship seems very relevant to this discussion, our investigation will focus more narrowly on the one problem raised by the RePass "Comment," that of the direct impact of affect for the candidate on misperceptions of the candidate's issue positions and on shifts in the voter's own policy preferences.

That candidate evaluations were related to both the issue positions preferred by voters and the policy stands candidates were perceived to have taken in 1972 has already been discussed.³³ RePass contends, however, that affect toward the candidates should be viewed as a cause of voter issue positions and voter perceptions of candidate policy stands, rather than as a consequent of issue orientations, as argued in "Majority Party." RePass argues that a substantial degree of "inappropriate placement of candidates" results because voters attempt to bring the placement of the candidates into alignment with their affective ratings of the candidates.³⁴ Doves, for example, tended to place Nixon closer to their own position on the

Vietnam scale *if* they liked him more than McGovern, while those who were opposed to immediate withdrawal placed McGovern closer *if* they preferred him to Nixon. The analysis RePass presents on this point is at least somewhat misleading because it counts as accurate only those placements of candidates that result in the "appropriate" candidate being positioned *closer* to the voter than the other candidate. In effect, tied or equidistant placements are thereby considered errors in RePass' analysis. It seems to us that a voter who favors immediate withdrawal and who rates Nixon higher than McGovern on the feeling thermometer but places both candidates equidistant from his own issue position should not be considered as having positioned Nixon "inappropriately." Yet this is exactly how Table 1 of the RePass "Comment" has been constructed.

We reconstructed the RePass table using the criterion that an "inappropriate placement" occurs only when a respondent places closer to his own position the candidate that had been placed, on the average, further away from his own issue position. This produces far fewer "errors of placement" (see Table 2). The error rate for respondents whose policy positions were most mismatched with the average perceived position of the candidates remains quite high, ranging from 27 to 40 per cent. The data leave no doubt that, as RePass argues, misperception of candidate policy positions may occur as a result of non-issue-related affect toward the candidates. But the degree of "inappropriate placement" of candidates revealed by Table 2 does not seem to warrant "... raising

³³ For a more complete discussion of these topics related to the 1972 election, see Miller and Miller, "Issues, Candidates and Partisan Divisions in the 1972 Election," as well as Warren E. Miller and Teresa E. Levitin, *Leadership Change: New Politics and the American Electorate*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Winthrop Publishers, Inc. 1976).

³⁴ RePass, "Comment," p. 818.

Table 2. Appropriateness of Perceived Candidate Position on Issues with Attitude Toward Candidate Controlled^a

Net Attitude Toward Candidates ^b	Respondents' Issue Position					
	Vietnam		Campus Unrest		Aid to Minorities	
	Dove ^c	Hawk ^d	Pro- student ^c	Use force ^d	Government help ^c	Leave on own ^d
Pro-Nixon	71% (122)	97% (252)	65% (33)	94% (195)	73% (102)	95% (280)
Pro-McGovern	97% (233)	62% (21)	100% (48)	61% (28)	97% (155)	60% (50)

^a Entry in each cell is the per cent of those in the cell who placed either the appropriate candidate closer or both candidates equally close to the issue position they selected.

^b Respondents classified as favoring a candidate rated the particular candidate 30° higher than the other candidate on the pre-election feeling thermometers.

^c McGovern was considered the appropriate candidate to be proximate to these positions because on the average he was placed closer to them.

^d Nixon was considered the appropriate candidate to be proximate to these positions; on the average he was placed closer to them.

serious doubts about employing these measures in the study of policy voting."³⁵

The proportion of misperception that these errors represent for the total set of respondents should not be overstated. The cells in Table 2 that exhibit the highest error rates have relatively few cases.³⁶ When the per cent of inappropriate responses is calculated for all the respondents in the four cells corresponding to a particular issue of Table 2, an error rate of 9 per cent is found for the Vietnam issue, 8.9 per cent for campus unrest and 11.2 per cent for aid to minorities. Misperception clearly occurs among voters, probably as a consequence of several causes including candidate strategies of taking differing policy positions when addressing varying audiences, lack of information, and projection resulting from candidate affect or partisan ties. It is an important phenomenon that deserves far more attention and the issue proximity measures provide a useful set of indicators for its study.

Going beyond an investigation of misperception, RePass reports a substantial degree of rationalization of issue position on the Vietnam question. His argument is that "If rationalization (persuasion) were taking place, those voters who answered the Vietnam question in the post-election interview would be more likely than those answering in the pre-election interview to align their position with the candidate they favored."³⁷ His analysis of the pre- and post-election responses to the Vietnam scale appears to indicate significantly more support for immediate withdrawal among those post-election respondents who favored McGovern, thus presumably supporting his hypothesis. Theoretically, if such rationalization of issue position were occurring, we should expect to find a similar pre/post difference for the three other issue questions—government guarantees of a job and good standard of living, tax reform, and how to deal with inflation—as well as for the Vietnam issue. Likewise, if rationalization were occurring, and if it can be discerned with the pre/post comparisons suggested by RePass, it can be hypothesized that Nixon also had a persuasive effect on his supporters—popular opinion at the time suggests that he was far more persuasive than McGovern. The rationalization hypothesis would therefore predict pre- to post-election shifts in a liberal direction for McGovern supporters and shifts in a

conservative direction for Nixon supporters. A strict replication of the pre/post comparisons reported by RePass for the Vietnam issue failed to reveal any support for the hypothesis, regardless of the issue area—including *Vietnam*—and regardless of candidate preference (see Table 3). In fact, the minor differences between the pre- and post-election issue distributions show that McGovern supporters gave slightly less liberal responses in the post-election period than those who had reported their issue preferences before the election while no systematic shifts were found for Nixon supporters. In light of these data, the RePass findings seem inexplicable.

This should not, however, be interpreted to mean that the data of Table 3 argue definitely against the occurrence of rationalization. Rationalization of issue position or shifts in issue preferences caused by candidate persuasion cannot be ascertained from comparisons suggested by RePass. Conclusive evidence of either projection or persuasion effect on issue preferences could only be obtained from panel data spanning the entire campaign period from the early primaries to election day. Even with panel data, it might be very difficult to untangle the simultaneous interactions of party loyalty, candidate evaluations and policy preferences. Indeed, it is this problem of the mutual interaction between policy preferences, perceived candidates' stands, and candidate evaluations that produce yet another criticism of the proximity measures.

RePass argues that the correlation between the issue proximity measures and the vote is spurious because the actual cause of the relationship is affect toward the candidates.³⁸ The argument is buttressed with evidence from a normal vote analysis of the Vietnam proximity measure while controlling for attitudes toward candidates. His normal vote analysis, which reveals near zero short-term issue effects remaining for respondents after controlling for candidate thermometer ratings, is somewhat misleading, however, since it involves a curious combination of those respondents who rated one candidate 30 or more degrees higher than the other candidate on the feeling thermometer and those who rated the two candidates nearly the same (difference of 10 degrees or less). The 20 per cent of all respondents who rated one of the candidates anywhere from 11 to 29 degrees higher than the other candidate are eliminated from the analysis.

In fact, a normal vote analysis of the Vietnam proximity measure for those who rated Nixon 11 to 29 degrees higher than McGovern and for those who favored McGovern over Nixon by a similar difference, as well as for voters with little or no dif-

³⁵ RePass, "Comment," p. 818.

³⁶ It should be noted that the number of cases in Table 2 does not correspond to that in the RePass Table 1. We have investigated this discrepancy carefully and can only conclude that either there is an error in the RePass analysis or that he used a definition of issue position and thermometer ratings other than indicated in his table. Whatever the explanation for the discrepancy, Table 2 follows the definitions exactly as presented in the RePass "Comment."

³⁷ RePass, "Comment," p. 820.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 820.

Table 3. Pre- and Post-Election Issue Scale Distributions for McGovern and Nixon Supporters

Vietnam					Standard of Living				
Immediate Withdrawal	Pro-McGovern ^a		Pro-Nixon ^b		Govt. Aid	Pro-McGovern ^a		Pro-Nixon ^b	
	Pre	Post	Pre	Post		Pre	Post	Pre	Post
1	48	46	8	8	1	35	29	7	6
2	16	16	7	7	2	15	11	4	3
3	12	14	11	12	3	11	19	7	7
4	13	14	29	29	4	19	23	23	22
5	3	4	18	19	5	8	7	18	17
6	2	2	8	11	6	1	3	12	15
7	6	4	19	14	7	11	8	29	30
Victory (N)	100% (195)	100% (203)	100% (488)	100% (456)	Do on Own (N)	100% (224)	100% (146)	100% (492)	100% (390)
Tax Reform					Inflation				
Reform Taxes	Pro-McGovern ^a		Pro-Nixon ^b		Fight Inflation	Pro-McGovern ^a		Pro-Nixon ^b	
	Pre	Post	Pre	Post		Pre	Post	Pre	Post
1	36	29	19	19	1	58	50	42	31
2	14	16	9	12	2	12	21	14	19
3	9	13	10	13	3	12	13	17	21
4	10	11	17	15	4	10	12	19	21
5	2	1	6	7	5	3	3	5	5
6	3	6	5	7	6	2	1	1	2
7	26	24	34	27	7	3	—	2	1
No Change (N)	100% (222)	100% (140)	100% (479)	100% (391)	Leave Alone (N)	100% (187)	100% (184)	100% (471)	100% (399)

^a McGovern rated 30° higher than Nixon on thermometer.

^b Nixon rated 30° higher than McGovern on thermometer.


ference in their ratings of the two candidates, (see Figure 5) revealed short-term issue effects (*S*) of 6.98, 9.97 and 12.89, respectively. It is true that issue proximity on the Vietnam withdrawal question did not have a substantial effect on the electoral decision of voters who expressed *overwhelmingly* more positive affect toward one of the candidates (difference of at least 30 degrees). But for the 41 per cent of all voters who did not have extremely divergent attitudes toward the candidates, the issue proximity measure was quite important. Furthermore, the single-item Vietnam proximity measure represents the exception rather than the rule for the effect of candidate evaluations on the relationship between issue proximity and the vote. The issue proximity indices for the four issue domains (war, social, economic and cultural) used in "Majority Party" show more robust relationships with the vote even when controlling for extreme affect (difference of 30 or more degrees) toward the candidates. The short-term effect of the social proximity index was, for example, 4.65 for those

extremely more favorable toward McGovern and *S* = 3.50 for those extremely more favorable toward Nixon. Issue proximity, therefore, had a significant residual effect on the vote in 1972 even after controlling for the combined effect of candidate evaluation and party identification.³⁹ The relationship between issue proximity and the vote was not spurious, nor was it simply a reflection of candidate evaluations.

Again, it should be recognized that these findings do not disprove or untangle the simultaneous interactions that take place among issue, candidate, and party related attitudes. In 1972 particularly, evaluations of the candidates and the issues

³⁹ It should be noted that the normal vote short-term statistics incorporate a control for strength of party identification as part of the analysis approach. That is, the statistic indicates the degree of deviation away from the long-term or partisan baseline that is normally expected. Thus, RePass controlled for both candidate and party effects by using the normal vote analysis among subgroups defined by candidate ratings.

Figure 5. Normal Vote Analysis of Vietnam Proximity Measure Controlling for Relative Candidate Affect



^a Nixon rated 11–29 degrees higher than McGovern on thermometer.

^b McGovern rated 11–29 degrees higher than Nixon on thermometer.

were intertwined, making a complete statistical separation not only difficult but substantially meaningless. Still, the extent of this interaction should not be overstated. If the voter's own issue position, perceived candidate position, affect toward candidates and party loyalty are bound together by intensive simultaneous interactions, there simply should be stronger associations between these factors than the 15 to 20 per cent common variance (interitem r squared) that is found empirically.

An important point that seems to have been overlooked by the commentators, and which needs emphasis, is that the proximity measures operationalize a behavioral model that explicitly specifies the linkage between the voter and the vote. Analyses relying entirely upon the respondent's own issue preference as an indicator when measuring the impact of issues on the vote simply are

not able to answer the linkage question. The discovery of a relationship between the voter's policy preference and the vote leads to an inference that the voter's ballot was cast for the party or candidate believed most likely to support the preferred policy. But this remains an inference that the researcher makes about the correlation between the self-location type of question and the vote. The power of the proximity measure is that it explicitly tests this inference with a measurement model that incorporates the components of the theory under consideration. That the measurement of the issue voting model can be improved is obvious, every measure can be improved. Nevertheless, this approach has forced us to think in terms of the behavioral model and the explicit measurement of the linkages that are theoretically necessary for issue voting to occur. Proximity measures seem to us to constitute an important ad-

vance in the empirical examination and conceptualization of issue voting. To condemn the measure at this point is analogous to discarding the wheel because the first one sometimes falls off the axle or even breaks.

Ideology

According to "Majority Party," the importance of issue voting in 1972 was, in part, associated with the degree of ideology or attitudinal constraint evident among the voters. The strength and pattern of interitem correlations, and the correlation between the respondent's position on various issues and a subjective liberal/conservative distinction, were used as an indirect measure of the highly organized, tightly constrained set of attitude elements generally associated with the concept of ideological belief systems. No evidence was found to support the notion of a Downsian, one-dimensional left-right issue space. In fact, four distinct issue dimensions were extracted from the array of issues contained in the study and were demonstrated to have varying degrees of impact on the vote among different population subgroups.⁴⁰ However, a generally higher degree of attitude constraint in 1972 than in previous elections was suggested by the strength of the correlations among the items identified with each issue dimension, as well as by the correlations between the dimensions and self-placement on the liberal/conservative scale. These correlations, when considered in conjunction with other data,⁴¹ seemed to be clear evidence of the ideological nature of the 1972 electorate.


The commentaries on "Majority Party" question the validity of the evidence used to support the conclusion that ideology was an important factor in 1972. RePass contends that the issue items and the liberal/conservative scale used in the 1972 study are not sufficiently comparable to items used in previous studies and that therefore correlations among these items can not constitute evidence of an increase in ideology.⁴² The Popkin critique argues that interitem correlations do not measure the extent to which such basic dimensions of judgment as the liberal-conservative continuum are used in organizing attitude elements because

this evidence is "... best seen as projections by the analysts."⁴³

Trends in Ideology. The evidence provided by "Majority Party" was indeed indirect rather than conclusive support for the hypothesis that 1972 voters were more ideological than those in previous elections. More conclusive evidence could only be obtained through a comparison of the ideological constraint found in 1972 and that found in previous elections when exactly the same measurement procedures are applied. We have therefore turned to the "levels of conceptualization" coding originally employed by Converse to measure the incidence of belief systems reflected in open-ended responses.⁴⁴

A comparison of the proportion of "ideologues" and "near-ideologues" found with the very same levels of conceptualization coding for 1956, 1968 and 1972 reveals an unmistakably higher level of ideology in 1972 than in the two previous elections for which the coding has been done⁴⁵ (see Figure 6). By 1972, the proportion of the total sample classified as having an ideology (as defined in *The American Voter* with ideologues and near-ideologues combined) was more than twice the propor-

Figure 6. Levels of Ideology in the United States, 1956, 1968 and 1972



⁴³ Popkin, "Comment," p. 797.

⁴⁴ The same coding scheme previously used in *The American Voter* and by Converse to construct levels of conceptualization was employed in coding the 1972 levels of ideology. We have, however, collapsed the several non-ideology codes into a single category. The three resulting categories—ideologues, near-ideologues and non-ideologues—are sufficient for the substantive question under discussion here, namely, degree of ideology.

⁴⁵ The 1968 levels of conceptualization coding was performed by Hans Klingemann and William E. Wright and their results are reported in Philip E. Converse, "Public Opinion and Voting Behavior," Volume 4 of the *Handbook of Political Science*, Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson Polsby, editors, p. 102. "Unclassified" respondents have been excluded from the calculation of any percentages for 1972 so that our figures would be comparable to those reported by Converse.

⁴⁰ See Miller and Miller, "Issues, Candidates and Partisan Divisions in the 1972 Election," pp. 415-422 for a discussion of how important the four issue domains were for various population subgroups.

⁴¹ Other data suggesting the ideological nature of the 1972 electorate include the strong relationship between the liberal/conservative scale and the vote, the nearly one-dimensional solution for the candidate evaluation analysis summarized in footnote 38 of "Majority Party," and the trend toward more attitude constraint that has been reported by a number of scholars, including Norman Nie and Kristi Andersen in "Mass Belief Systems Revisited," *Journal of Politics*, 36 (August 1974), 540-591.

⁴² RePass, "Comment," pp. 823-825.

tion found for 1956 (27% compared to 13%). Among voters the 1956–1972 difference was even sharper. In 1956, only 16 per cent of the voters had been categorized as ideological; in 1972, this was true for more than a third of all voters (37 per cent).⁴⁶ These data then provide independent, strictly comparable and more direct evidence in support of our earlier inference that 1972, in comparison with previous elections, was an unusually ideological election.

Validation of Methods. Questions of ideology in the 1972 election, however, go beyond the simple frequency with which people display ideological constraint. The “Comments” also challenge the validity of the methodology used in “Majority Party” to measure ideological constraints. The levels of conceptualization coding provide an opportunity to test for convergent validity by determining if the interitem correlations presumed by “Majority Party” to indicate ideology were indeed larger among ideologues than among nonideologues.⁴⁷ But before we proceed to a validation of “Majority Party” methods with the levels of conceptualization coding, it is important to demonstrate that classification as an ideologue in 1972 was an indication of a rich contextual grasp of politics and not simply a reflection of education inasmuch as there was a moderate correlation ($Tau=.30$) between education and levels of ideology in 1972.

A series of questions asking about the liberal and conservative orientations of the Democratic and Republican parties permits at least one test of the validity of the ideology coding. When asked whether Democrats or Republicans were more conservative, nearly one-third of the nonideologues, compared to 10 per cent of near-ideologues and only 4 per cent of ideologues, responded that they did not even want to guess.⁴⁸ This hesitancy to deal with the concept of liberal and conservative

was evident even among college educated nonideologues: nearly 20 per cent would not guess. In addition to this reluctance to employ the general liberal-conservative distinction, nonideologues were considerably less likely than ideologues to designate the Republicans as the more conservative party (51% compared to 91%). A clear and accurate differentiation of the two parties in terms of a liberal/conservative distinction was far more prevalent among ideologues than nonideologues even after controlling for level of education. Among college-educated respondents, for example, 94 per cent of the ideologues and only 67 per cent of nonideologues designated the Republican party as the more conservative.

Having ascertained that ideological constraint is not synonymous with educational attainment, we can now reexamine the data in Table 2 of “Majority Party” for the relationship of ideology to the interitem correlations. The size of the interitem correlations were used by “Majority Party” as indirect measures of ideology, but the “Comments” claim that they are not an appropriate indicator of attitude structure or ideology as defined by Converse. A calculation of the interitem correlations and the correlations between the issue scales and self-placement on the liberal/conservative scale for all ideologues and for nonideologues separately provides contrary evidence. Not only are the average interitem correlations significantly higher for ideologues (.45) than for nonideologues (.24) within issue domains, but the between-domain correlations averaged .29 for ideologues and only .10 for nonideologues. Validation of the liberal/conservative-issue scale correlations as indicators of ideology was also established. Among ideologues, the average correlation between the issues and the liberal/conservative scale was again significantly higher (.49) than for nonideologues (.20). These differences in the strength of the interitem correlations not only substantiate the conclusions of “Majority Party” and confirm the interpretation of the correlations as indicating degree of ideology, but they provide a validation of the two methods as well.

The Electoral Effects of Ideology. Having reaffirmed the more ideological stance of the 1972 electorate, we can now review the impact this heightened ideology had on the electoral decision by means of a comparison of ideologues and nonideologues. The ideologues in 1972 were far more interested in politics, invested more time in following public affairs through several media sources, and turned out to vote at a much higher rate. Nonideologues, consequently, had a lower turnout rate than the total population rate, which was very low in 1972. Ideologues also perceived sharper policy differences between the candidates. Although

⁴⁶ The 1972 increase in ideology is even more interesting when it is noted that ideologues do not include the 5 per cent of all respondents who referred to McGovern as “too liberal” or “too radical” even if they could talk about being “too liberal” in terms of the issues. These individuals were not included in either level of ideology because we thought that the phrase “too liberal” might perhaps indicate a ritualistic criticism of McGovern rather than a developed, consistent understanding of politics in terms of broad dimensions such as a liberal to conservative distinction or a broad set of policy considerations.

⁴⁷ See Philip E. Converse, “Public Opinion and Voting Behavior,” in the *Handbook of Political Science* for a discussion of the theoretical relevance of this test among ideologues, and nonideologues, as well as for a discussion of how social conditions might affect the relationship between survey items.

⁴⁸ That the percentage of respondents refusing to guess which party was more conservative is lower than that of any previous election survey is also evidence in confirmation of the ideological nature of the 1972 election.

there was no difference between the two groups in the correlation of the vote and affect toward the candidates, the vote was much more strongly related to the issues for ideologues than it was for nonideologues. The correlation between the vote and the respondent's own position on the several issue items in the survey ranged from .25 to .62 for ideologues and from .04 to .40 among nonideologues; the correlation between the social issue proximity measure and the vote was .69 for ideologues and .43 for nonideologues.

Finally, this relatively greater impact of issues on the vote decision of ideologues was independently validated with a six-components regression analysis for the two groups. The regression coefficients produced by the components analysis revealed that the issues (domestic and foreign) were more than twice as important for ideologues as for nonideologues: the net Republican vote advantage ($b_i \cdot \bar{x}_i$) accruing from issues was 8.45 per cent for ideologues and only 2.99 per cent for nonideologues. Conversely, candidate attributes had substantially less net impact on the vote than issues for ideologues (6.50 per cent) while among nonideologues candidate attributes were the predominant factor (9.72 per cent Republican advantage). The six-components analysis also provided a better overall explanation of the vote decision for ideologues (R squared of .55) than it did for nonideologues (R squared of .46). While issues clearly had a more substantial impact on the vote among ideologues, the perceived competence of the candidates was a crucial consideration for nonideologues. Ratings of how competently McGovern had conducted his campaign were significantly correlated with the vote only among nonideologues ($r = .42$). In general, these data suggest that ideologues had a highly consistent understanding of politics, a coherence of thought that promoted an efficient translation of policy preferences and issue-related candidate evaluations into a vote decision. As an added attraction, the similarity of the analysis results produced by the new-issue proximity measures and the six-components regression provides still further validation of the new methods.

As Converse has suggested, the levels of conceptualization and interitem correlations reflect different approaches to the study of ideology.⁴⁹ Our analyses demonstrate that while the two approaches are not identical, they are associated. The findings also indicate that levels of conceptualization are affected by political events and per-

ceived candidate policy stands in a manner that accentuates issue attitude consistency and heightens the impact of issues on the electoral decision and outcome. The prevalence of ideological predispositions among 1972 voters apparently increased the intercorrelation among the issues as well as the association between specific issues and a general liberal-conservative orientation, thereby helping to make the 1972 election uniquely ideological.

The principal effect of ideology in the 1972 election was to increase the relative impact of issues on the electoral outcome. Whether or not the 1972 data represent a trend toward an increasing impact of ideological conceptualization and issues on U.S. elections depends on what causes ideology and attitude consistency. As level of ideology was somewhat related to educational attainment, the long-term trend toward a more highly educated public may have a continuing influence on the increased incidence of ideological thinking about politics. This does not mean that nonideological voters are irrational or incapable of reaching a meaningful, informed vote decision. Indeed, up to now discussions of voter rationality have not seemed scientifically useful. For the most part, the concept of "rationality" has not been empirically operationalized and therefore usually remains part of the researchers subjective interpretation rather than a scientifically established distinction. What would be useful and relevant is further investigation of the possible contributions to an increase or decrease in attitude constraint. "Majority Party," for example, suggested that an increase in candidate articulation of the policy differences between the parties, widespread media coverage of events that provoked public debates between conflicting groups, and a general upgrading in the quality of the political rhetoric of election campaigns may be the most important causes of the growth in political attitude consistency because they help clarify the connections between various government actions, policy outputs and group benefits. Obviously, political leaders play an important role in determining which issues appear on the public agenda, the dimensionality of the issue space and the amount of policy relevant information available to the public. Similarly, the media can affect the public's grasp of politics as it provides a critical information link between the political environment and the voters. Monitoring all these factors over time is essential for explaining and understanding the dynamics connecting ideology and issues to voting behavior. At this writing, the future impact of ideology on elections remains uncertain, but the analysis presented here leaves little doubt about its substantial effect on the 1972 election.

⁴⁹ Philip E. Converse, "Public Opinion and Voting Behavior" contains a discussion of the difference between interitem correlations or attitude structure indicators and indicators bearing on more explicit use or recognition of ideological concepts.

Policy Polarization

An investigation of the issue-related polarization within the rank of Democratic identifiers was closely related to the discussion of issues and ideology in "Majority Party." The "Comments" attack the polarization notion through reanalyses that purport to show that in 1972 there was very little issue polarization among the Democrats.⁵⁰ We had thought that the polarization was quite obvious and that the evidence provided by "Majority Party" on this point was fairly conclusive. The explanation for the Popkin conclusion of *less* issue polarization in 1972 than in any previous election seems to be that their measure indicates vote-related partisan polarization and not issue polarization, a distinction made by Kagay and Caldeira⁵¹ that needs no further elaboration here.

Polarization can be defined in various ways, but perhaps the most straightforward datum on this topic is the percentage of party identifiers who defected to the opposite party. A higher defection rate occurred in 1972 than in any previous election during the past twenty years: one-quarter of self-identified strong Democrats and 49 per cent of weak Democrats voted for Nixon. This Democratic defection was even higher than the 1964 Republican defection (10 per cent of strong Republicans and 42 per cent of weak Republicans voted for Johnson). While these defection rates indicate divisions within particular party ranks, they, much like the Popkin data, do not describe the divisions with respect to policy differences. Kagay and Caldeira, on the other hand, have demonstrated that the high degree of vote defection in both 1964 and 1972 was more a result of polarization over issues than of polarization over candidates.⁵² Furthermore, their findings reveal that polarization over issues was higher in 1972 than in any of the elections previously studied.

The examination of policy polarization was not intended, however, only to explain vote defection. Our primary concern in "Majority Party" was to demonstrate that issue-related divisions exist within the Democratic party and that Republican candidates could employ campaign strategies that capitalize on these schisms. How enduring these or similar issues are thus becomes an important question. The issues important in 1972 had been debated for some time before the campaign; it therefore seemed reasonable to conclude that the issues, issue preferences, and divisions among voters had not been created by the particular candidates of the 1972 campaign. Given that the issues

had been salient for some time, the voters were aware of them and could evaluate the candidates in terms of their policy preferences on these issues. Similarly, the longevity of issues that were salient and divisive among Democrats in 1972 is also important for the outcome of immediate future elections. If 1972 issues are still on the public agenda in 1976, and if the Democrats remain polarized on these issues, they may affect the outcome of the 1976 election.

At the time this rejoinder is being written, it is too early to know with any degree of certainty what issues will be most salient in the general election campaign. Several have already emerged from the primary campaign: unemployment and general economic problems, the responsibility of government for guaranteeing everyone a job and a good standard of living, school busing to bring about racial integration, government assistance to minority groups, and the stance to take with individuals accused of committing a crime. All of these issues were, to some extent, salient in 1972 and 1974 and were therefore included in the CPS election surveys for both years.

Panel data from the CPS surveys comparing the 1972 and 1974 distributions of issue preferences among Democrats who had voted for McGovern and Nixon are presented in Table 4, and a comparison of the 1972 and 1974 distributions reveals only minor attitude shifts during the two years. On the question of how well the government was handling the economic problems of inflation and unemployment, a large and understandable change in attitudes had by 1974 eliminated much but not all of the difference on that item observed for McGovern and Nixon Democrats in 1972. Apart from this one exception, very little change occurred from 1972 to 1974. The other issue items and the liberal/conservative scale reveal only slight attitude shifts that basically do little to eliminate the policy polarization existing within the Democratic ranks, issue differences that could potentially divide the Democrats once again in 1976. The country remains divided on basic issues and the challenge of the '70's for political leaders is to see if the demands reflected by these divisions can be handled without a major change in the party system.

Voter Models

The Popkin "Comment" insists on comparing a "voter-citizen" and an "investor-voter" model of voters. It does not seem to us that the voter-citizen model, as described in the Popkin "Comment," is used either explicitly or implicitly in the work of "Majority Party," despite the assertions of Popkin et al. These models are Popkin's invention, and although the Popkin article provides a great deal of

⁵⁰ Popkin, "Comment," pp. 785-786, RePass, "Comment," pp. 829-830.

⁵¹ See Kagay and Caldeira, "I Like the Look of His Face," pp. 41-58, for a discussion of polarization.

⁵² *Ibid.*; see especially their Figure 6.

Table 4. Issue Polarization Within the Democratic Ranks, Panel Data 1972-1974^a

			1972		1974	
			Democrats Voting for McGovern	Democrats Voting for Nixon	Democrats Who Voted for McGovern	Democrats Who Voted for Nixon
	(N)		(261)	(201)	(261)	(201)
Busing:		Left	24%	2%	20%	4%
		Center	8	2	16	7
		Right	68	96	64	89
Rights of Accused:		Left	46%	29%	50%	29%
		Center	20	15	20	17
		Right	34	56	30	54
Govt. Help Minorities:		Left	51%	25%	52%	19%
		Center	24	27	21	29
		Right	25	48	27	52
Standard of Living:		Left	56%	20%	42%	23%
		Center	21	26	27	27
		Right	23	54	31	50
Govt. Handling Economy:		Good Job	7%	26%	3%	9%
		Fair	56	64	39	46
		Poor	37	10	58	46
Liberal-Conservative:		Left	52%	12%	52%	17%
		Center	37	42	38	47
		Right	11	46	10	36

^a These data are based on the panel component of the CPS 1972 and 1974 election studies; that is, they reflect responses from the same set of individuals in both surveys.

qualitative description of the two models, nowhere in the "Comment" are the models either operationalized or tested. Nevertheless, claims are made about how one of the models is "false" and "flawed," while the other presumably offers a more accurate description of the voter. More accurate according to what criteria? The empirical data provided toward the end of the "Comment" seem to have no bearing on an investor-voter model of voting. Indeed, the data are not entirely relevant to questions of *voting* behavior since the dependent variable was apparently a candidate rating scale and not the vote.⁵³ Moreover, the most immediate conclusion to be drawn from the Popkin data is that the issues were more robust predictors of possible vote intention than was candidate competence (see Table 10 in Popkin "Comment").

Still, while an empirical operationalization of the investor-voter model is not offered by the "Comment," the concept does raise questions about information costs, voting under uncertainty, misperception, and perceived candidate competence. These are important questions and parsimonious models are useful if they direct attention to new concepts or if they produce new generalizations. The Popkin "Comment" suggests that what is new about the investor-voter model is the concept of candidate competence. But the six-components analysis has always taken into account images of competence, and the CPS analysis of the 1972 election captured this concept as well through the "feeling thermometers" and through questions probing perceptions of McGovern's campaign performance.

Conclusion

When analyses and replications are performed carefully, further investigation of CPS election study data not only validate our methods but reaffirm the argument that voters were offered particularly clear and distinct candidate and policy related electoral choices in 1972; various attributes of the specific candidates weighed heavily in the vote calculus; issue-related differences factionalized the Democratic ranks, attenuating the effect of party loyalties on the total outcome; and the impact of broad policy orientations and ideology remained strong even after controlling for all other major explanations of the electoral decision. The

⁵³ The footnote on Table 10 of the Popkin "Comment" describes the dependent variable as "... a scale from +3 (McGovern) to -3 (Nixon)."

electoral effect of candidates and issues were clearly interrelated in 1972 and increased jointly in importance relative to the past, with issues increasing the most and partisan effects declining to an all-time low. Beyond these findings, the CPS 1972 election report emphasized the need for more investigation of those factors in the political environment that influence voters' perceptions and misperceptions, the agenda of social issues and individual policy preferences.

The study also raised questions of responsiveness that focused on the interplay between voter preferences, candidate strategies and political outcomes. That 42 per cent of self-identified Democrats voted for other than their preferred party in the 1972 presidential race indicates a crisis for a responsive party system. And while issue polarization was characteristic of the population in 1972, it was even more extreme among the activists who participated in the campaigns, primaries and conventions that eventually selected the candidates. Whether or not this condition will be changed in the 1976 election through a diminution of issue salience or a shift in candidate strategies remains uncertain at this time. What is clear, however, is that a lack of responsiveness arises because parties and candidates lead the public to expect one thing and then provide another. Imperfections in information can affect images much more than the reality of government outputs and political events. A lack of responsiveness obtains when the misinformed image contradicts the reality of political events; Watergate, for example, revealed that the voters' beliefs in Nixon's trustworthiness were based on misperception. Cues about candidate styles and attributes may be the most readily accessible information upon which voters can base their electoral decision, but these cues may also be the most easily manipulable.

Despite this concern, the belief that a leader is trustworthy and sincere may at times be more important for the functioning of a democratic system than agreement on the issues. The programmatic functioning of a democratic political system is greatly encumbered by leaders who do not have the confidence of the people. Leadership styles are important in this regard and can often be just as divisive as issues that polarize the population.

Policy and candidate considerations are not, however, independent. Indeed, McGovern's articulation of the issues not only brought policy questions to the forefront of electoral decision making in 1972, but also, ironically, increased the votes obtained by Nixon since he, rather than McGovern, was perceived as the candidate best prepared to deal with the issues. It is easy to overlook the formidable personal strength stemming from the perceived competence, reliability and trust that Nixon brought to the 1972 contest. His preeminence as the nation's political head stands above all else in a unitary explanation of his stunning electoral success in 1972.

Yet, when the relative importance of candidates and issues are compared with previous elections during the past twenty years, it becomes apparent that issues and ideology were the factors uniquely affecting the outcome of the 1972 election. Issues were not only more salient in 1972 than in prior elections, but the net electoral impact of foreign and domestic issues combined was substantially greater than ever before. The additional empirical evidence presented above demonstrates that issue awareness and policy preferences interacted with the clearly articulated candidate differences to produce a vote heavily laden with ideology and policy concerns. All the evidence supports and reaffirms our prior conclusion that 1972 was an ideological election.

Performance and Instability in Military and Nonmilitary Regime Systems*

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Military coups are a phenomenon which has been widespread during the past fifteen years and has attracted considerable research.¹ Military regimes established as a consequence of coups have, however, drawn little attention. This is unfortunate, for it is the *performance* of a regime, rather than its *origin* which is likely to affect the processes of economic and social change in the particular country. The relative lack of research on military regimes is understandable. Some time must elapse from the time of the coup before the performance of the military regime may be assessed. Now, however, a sufficient population of military regimes exists to permit the systematic examination of their performance.

Two sources have contributed to our knowledge of the performance of military regimes thus far. First, works on military intervention have, on occasion, made reference to the characteristics of military rule.² A second and smaller collection has focused directly on military performance, either

through case studies or through more general statements which tend to be largely unsubstantiated and overdrawn.³

This article is the first of a series of reports on a cross-national aggregate project designed to examine the performance of military regimes. Our objective in this first paper is to compare the performance of military regime systems with that of nonmilitary regime systems. A military regime system is any system in which the armed forces have made a coup and subsequently established a government whose main executive post is held by a military person and which lasts for at least the major part of one year. The focus of this first paper is not on military regimes themselves but on the more general topic of systems which have experienced military regimes compared with those which have not.

Research Design

It is inadequate to examine systematically the performance of military regime systems without comparing them with nonmilitary regime systems. The population for this study, therefore, consists of all independent countries of the world which have been categorized into two subpopulations, defined in terms of whether they have experienced a military regime.⁴ The time period chosen for this article was the decade 1961–70, since this period includes the majority of military regimes.

The performance of the two types of system is compared across twenty-five variables which are

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¹ The works vary substantially both in scope and method. The most common form consists either of individual case studies or anthologies of case studies. Examples are C. E. Welch, ed., *Soldier and State in Africa* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970); H. Bienen, ed., *The Military Intervenes* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1968); J. C. Hurewitz, *Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension* (New York: Praeger, 1969); E. Lieuwen, *Arms and Politics in Latin America* (New York: Praeger, 1961); J. J. Johnson, ed., *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962); J. Van Doorn, ed., *Armed Forces and Society* (The Hague: Mouton, 1968). There is also a smaller collection of synthesizing works. See, for example, M. Janowitz, *Military in the Political Development of New Nations* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964); S. E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback* (New York: Praeger, 1962); W. Gutteridge, *Military Institutions in the New States* (New York: Praeger, 1965); E. Luttwak, *Coup d'État* (New York: Knopf, 1969).

² See, for example, S. E. Finer (above); L. W. Pye, "Armies in the Process of Political Modernization," *European Journal of Sociology*, 2, no. 1 (1961), pp. 82–92. K. Hopkins, "Civil-Military Relations in Underdeveloped Countries," *British Journal of Sociology*, 17 (June, 1966), 165–182; A. R. Zolberg, "Military Rule and Political Development in Tropical Africa," in *Military Profession and Military Regimes*, ed. J. Van Doorn (The Hague: Mouton, 1969).

³ Examples of case studies are R. Luckham, *The Nigerian Military* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971); E. Be'eri, *Army Officers in Arab Politics and Society* (New York: Praeger, 1970); A. Stepan, *The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971). Examples of more general statements are E. Feit, "Pen, Sword and People," *World Politics*, 25 (January, 1973), 251–273; E. A. Nordlinger, "Soldiers in Mufti: The Impact of Military Rule Upon Economic and Social Change in the Non-Western States," *American Political Science Review*, 64 (December, 1970), 1131–1148; A. R. Wilner, "Perspectives on Military Elites as Rulers and Wielders of Power," *Journal of Comparative Administration*, 2 (November, 1970), 261–276; R. Pinkney, "The Theory and Practice of Military Government," *Political Studies*, 21 (June, 1973), 152–166; H. Bienen, ed., *The Military and Modernization* (Chicago: Aldine, Atherton, 1971).

⁴ Communist Countries were excluded because of non-comparability of economic data.

categorized into five main groupings. These variables were collected on an annual basis and, where appropriate, means or percentages or growth rates for the ten year period were calculated.⁵ The variables used in this study follow:

Political Activity and Political Change Variables⁶

1. Percentage of years the constitution is banned;
2. Percentage of years that the legislature is banned;
3. Percentage of years that political parties are banned;
4. Mean percentage of cabinet posts held by military personnel;
5. The number of constitution changes; and
6. The number of main executive changes.

Military Capability Variables⁷

7. Mean size of the armed forces per 10,000 population;
8. Mean military expenditure as a percentage of GNP;
9. The diversification of the armed forces measured in terms of the size of the navy and air-forces as a percentage of the total size;
10. The rate of growth of the size of the armed force; and
11. The rate of growth of constant military expenditure.

Background Economic Variables⁸

12. Constant *per capita* gross national product (GNP);
13. Budget as a percentage of GNP;
14. Gross domestic fixed capital formation (GDFCF) as a percentage of GNP;
15. Primary production as a percentage of gross domestic product; and
16. Number of doctors per 100,000 population.

⁵ Some of the recent standard data compilations such as C. L. Taylor and M. C. Hudson, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972) and A. Banks, *Cross-Polity Time Series Data* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1971) were not adequate, given the wide range of variables used.

⁶ The main data sources for the political variables were *Statesman's Yearbook* (London: Macmillan, 1950-70); *Europe Yearbook* (London: Europa Publications, 1958-70); Richard P. Stebbins and Alba Amoia, eds., *Political Handbook and Atlas of the World* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970); *Whitaker's Almanac* (London: Whitaker's Publications, 1950-70); and *Keesing's Contemporary Archives* (London: Keesing's Publications, 1950-70).

⁷ The main data sources were *The Military Balance* (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1960-72); Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *Yearbook of World Armaments and Disarmament* (Stockholm: Almqvist, 1968-72); Richard Booth, "The Armed Forces of African States," *Adelphi Papers*, #67 (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1970).

⁸ The main data sources were *United Nations, Statistical Yearbook* (New York, 1951-72); *United Nations, Yearbook of International Trade Statistics* (New York, 1950-72); *United Nations, Yearbook of National Account Statistics* (New York: 1964-72); and *International Financial Statistics* (Washington: International Monetary Fund, 1964-72).

International Economic Variables⁹

17. Exports as a percentage of GNP;
18. Imports as a percentage of GNP;
19. International liquidity as a percentage of imports;
20. Balance of payments position on goods and services;
21. Balance of payments position on private investment; and
22. Balance of payments position on central government capital.

Economic Performance Variables

23. Rate of growth of constant *per capita* GNP;
24. Rate of growth of cost of living index; and
25. Rate of growth of exports.

The basic design of this article is to compare the performance of military and nonmilitary regime systems across these five categories of variables. The general comparison between the two types of system, however, will be elaborated by the inclusion of four control variables: GNP; geographic area; duration of the military regime in military regime systems (in years); and the number of coups in military regime systems. The control variables are used in two ways. For the first type of control the variables have been categorized. GNP is divided into four levels, five geographic areas are used, and both duration and number of coups are divided into four categories.¹⁰ Thus, the two types of system are compared within the categories of each of the control variables. For example, military and nonmilitary regime systems are compared within the various GNP levels, and military regime systems of different regime duration are compared with nonmilitary regime systems. This type of control, which holds the control variable constant, permits us to examine whether aggregate differences between military and nonmilitary regime systems still occur when controls are introduced and whether such differences remain unchanged using the various control categories.

The second method of control involves the use of partial correlation and multiple regression which is based on adjusting rather than actually holding variables constant. It is used in two situations. When the number of cases is too small or the number of variables too large for constant type controls to be employed usefully, partial

⁹ The main area not covered is monetary transfers involving transactions of deposit money banks and central banks.

¹⁰ *Per capita* GNP is divided into the following categories: \$0-\$150, \$151-\$400, \$401-\$900, and \$901+. This last category is not used as it contains no military regime systems. The geographic areas are Central America and the Caribbean, South America, The Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, Central and Southeast Asia. Duration is categorized as 0-1 year, 1-2 years, 2-5 years and 5+ years. The number of coups is categorized as 0, 1, 2, and 3+.

correlation and multiple regression are adequate. When it is necessary to assess the importance of an independent variable, such as the occurrence of a military regime or the duration of the regime, in influencing any of the performance variables the above techniques permit the controlling of a large number of other variables.

Cluster Analysis

Given the large number of cases and large array of variables, we have constructed a simplified introductory picture of the population. The most appropriate multivariate technique for this purpose is cluster analysis. As a method of empirical typology formation, cluster analysis permits the construction of empirical profiles which help to simplify and categorize a large population. Cluster analysis specifically enables the researcher to determine which systems group together, i.e., how the cases are distributed, and which variables provide the defining characteristics of any such groupings. Thus, it is possible to examine in general terms whether military regime systems cluster separately from nonmilitary regime systems and which variables, if any, make the military regime systems distinctive.

The cluster analysis was run on 101 cases with 25 variables using an iterative or relocation method. This method is superior to a number of other hierarchical techniques because it permits relocation of cases once clustering has begun. The similarity coefficient used was the error sum, which is designed to minimize variance within clusters.

One of the main problems in cluster analysis is that clustering will occur even in the absence of empirical justification for such clustering. The accuracy of the clusters may be examined in two ways. First, the dendrogram gives a measure of the error scores at which clustering takes place. Second, examination of the *F* ratio and *t*-tests provides a measure of the degree of homogeneity of each of the clusters. By means of these criteria, five clusters appear to represent the optimal number to be extracted.¹¹

The first cluster is defined in terms of very low levels of political activity, high circulation of executives and poor economic performance. The second cluster is defined primarily in terms of weak positions on each of the three economic categories. The background economic variables have the lowest score of any cluster; the international trade profile is consistently lower than the overall mean but, comparatively, not as weak as the background factors, and economic performance is poor but not as low as in the first cluster. The third cluster is characterized by high military scores and high

Table 1. Distribution of Military Regime Systems and Nonmilitary Regime Systems by Clusters^a

Type of System	Cluster Numbers					(Total)
	1	2	3	4	5	
MRS	13 (7)	18 (17)	4 (4)	2 (7)	0	37
NMRS	3 (9)	24 (25)	5 (5)	13 (8)	19	64
(Total)	16	42	9	15	19	101

^a The bracketed figures are the expected scores if the fifth cluster level is removed.

rates of economic performance. The fourth cluster is defined by very high levels of political activity, a strong international trading position and very strong economic performance. Finally, the fifth cluster is characterized by very high levels of political activity and exceptionally high values on the background economic variables.

What is particularly interesting is that military regime systems do not constitute a homogeneous grouping. If cluster 5, which includes the high income systems of Western Europe, the U.S.A., Canada, Australia and New Zealand, and Japan is removed, the distribution of cases is not particularly skewed. Indeed, clusters 2 and 3 which contain 59 per cent of military regime systems contain the expected ratio of military and nonmilitary regime systems. Thus some 60 per cent of military regime systems cluster with nonmilitary regime systems. Clusters 1 and 4 are very skewed as cluster 1 is predominantly a military regime group and cluster 4 is mainly a civilian regime group.

Some preliminary observations on the nature of military regime systems may be made from this cluster analysis. Levels of political activity appear to play an important role in characterizing military regime systems. The first three clusters, especially the first one, are very different from the latter two. None of the military variables greatly assists in characterizing military regime systems. Indeed, in cluster 3, where the size and expenditure of the military are particularly significant variables, the ratio between military and nonmilitary regime systems conforms to expectations. In economic terms, clusters 1 and 2, containing 84 per cent of military regime systems, have the poorest rates of performance and also the weakest background position. Cluster 2, containing just under half the military regime systems also has the weakest international trade position.

These findings must be regarded as tentative, because the distribution of the cases within each cluster is unknown. But the observations on the profiles of each cluster and the distribution of cases within each cluster indicate that the five categories of variables do provide useful compara-

¹¹ The scores for each of the clusters are contained in the first appendix.

tive reference points. The remaining sections of this article will compare more rigorously the military and nonmilitary regime systems in each of the five categories of variables.

Political Performance

Military regime systems differ from nonmilitary regime systems in having substantially greater restrictions on a number of formal political institutions. As expected they also contain a larger number of military personnel in the cabinets. The occurrence of a military regime is, of course, the primary factor accounting for these differences.

T-tests between military and nonmilitary regime systems indicates that there are significant differences on all the levels of political activity variables, but the level of significance of the ban on political parties is not as high as on the other variables tested. Given that bans on civilian institutions are not associated with the high-income systems, it would be expected that the removal of these systems would increase the scores of low-income nonmilitary regime systems. This is, indeed, the case. But the increase of the scores of the low-income nonmilitary regime systems is not substantial, and the basic profile of differences remains unchanged.¹² The only difference is that the ban on political parties is no longer significant.

Because of the differences between military and nonmilitary regime systems, it is necessary to examine to what extent these differences may be attributed directly to the occurrence of a military regime. For this purpose multiple regression, introducing as a dummy variable the presence or absence of a military regime, can be used. Regression analysis on each of the four political activity variables shows that the occurrence of a military regime is a significant estimator (at the .01 level) of all the variables except the ban on political parties.¹³

¹² The basic comparison used throughout this paper is between all military regime systems and nonmilitary regime systems. In most comparisons we have removed the high-income systems. A high-income system is defined as one which has a mean per capita GNP of \$900 or more for the period between 1961–70. The eighteen high-income systems were removed primarily because they differ so markedly in economic terms from the rest of the world. This was confirmed by the cluster analysis. Since no military regime systems fall into the high income group the high-income system would distort the picture of the non-military regime system. In the aggregate comparisons, data on all nonmilitary regime systems and on low-income nonmilitary regime systems were included, but wherever comparisons using the various controls were done, the high-income systems were excluded.

¹³ The independent variables used in the regression analyses were: a dummy variable for whether a military regime had occurred, the percentage of the cabinet that was made up of military personnel, size of military, expenditure on the military, per capita GNP, rate of growth of GNP, and trade balance. All regression equations are

Table 2. Levels of Political Activity by Type of Regime^a

Type of System	Levels of Political Activity			
	Mean %	Mean %	Mean %	Mean %
	Years Constitution not full	Years Legislature Banned	Years Parties Banned	Military in Cabinet
MRS	34.7	36.0	22.1	22.3
NMRS	8.4**	3.2**	10.2*	3.1**
NMRS(900–)	11.5**	4.5**	14.2	4.2

^a The significance levels are for tests between military regime systems (MRS) and nonmilitary regime systems NMRS and between military regime systems and low-income nonmilitary regime systems (NMRS[900–]).

* Significant at .05 level.

** Significant at .01 level.

Thus it seems that while restrictions on the constitution and legislatures and a high percentage of military in the cabinet differentiate the military and low income nonmilitary regime systems, a ban on political parties does not. Several reasons may help to explain the lower incidence of political party bans. Such bans involve a larger number of aggrieved people and are thus likely to create more opposition to the military regime. Additionally, leading party personnel may be used outside the framework of constitutions and legislatures to aid the regime. Further, and related to the above, political parties may be used to provide mediating functions between populations and regimes.

Military and nonmilitary regime systems are again clearly differentiated in terms of political change. Even when the high-income systems are removed the profile remains essentially the same. The expected large number of executive changes in military regime systems may be a consequence of the coups by which military regimes were established. There is, however, also a high incidence of changes in the constitution. A constitution change normally indicates a substantial restructuring of government. Thus, military regime systems may be undergoing more extensive formal change, which in turn may indicate greater difficulty in establishing a viable formal structure.

significant at the .01 level. In the case of constitution ban 37 per cent of variance is explained; for legislature ban 53 per cent of variance is explained; and for military in the cabinet 58 per cent is explained. It is interesting to note that percentage military in the cabinet is a significant estimator of constitution and legislature ban; military size is a significant estimator of constitution ban and military in the cabinet; and military expenditure is a significant estimator of legislature ban. Thus a number of military variables, independent of whether or not there has been a military regime, seem to be related to restrictions on levels of political activity.

Table 3. Political Change by Type of Regime^a

Type of System	Political Change	
	Number of Constitution Changes	Number of Main Executives
MRS	1.7	4.1
NMRS	0.3**	2.4**
NMRS (900-)	0.4**	2.1**

^a The significance levels are for tests between military regime systems and nonmilitary regime systems, and military regime systems and low income nonmilitary regime systems.

** Significant at the .01 level.

The comparison between the two types of system may be refined by differentiating military regime systems in terms of number of coups and the duration of the military regime. Analyses of variance indicate that significant variation exists between regime duration and each of the political activity variables, with the exception of the ban on political parties. Extension of the analysis of variance shows a significant progressive increase in restrictions in the levels of political activity as the duration of the regime increases.¹⁴ In fact, only when the duration of the military regime extends for more than two years do the differences between low income nonmilitary and military regime systems become pronounced. With reference to polit-

¹⁴ T-tests on the constitution ban show that the ban in military regime systems (0-2 years) is significantly lower than the ban in military regime systems (2-5 years) at the .01 level and that the ban on the latter is significantly lower at the .05 level than the ban in military regime systems (5+). The same results hold for the percentage of the cabinet made up of military personnel. Difference tests on the legislature ban show the ban in military regime systems (0-2 years) is significantly lower at the .01 level than the bans in military regime systems (2-5 years and 5+).

ical change, there is again a significant relationship between regime duration and the political change variables; however, the progression, found in the case of the activity variables, is not repeated.

Additionally there is a significant relationship between the number of coups and the political activity and political change variables with the exception of the ban on political parties.¹⁵ Unlike the tabulations using regime duration, however, the political activity variables do not show a progressive increase with the number of coups. On the other hand, the political change indicators do show a clearer progression. In general, when military regime systems are classified by coups, they show a greater degree of homogeneity than when they are classified by the duration of the regime.

We can examine the relative impact of regime duration and the number of coups on political activity and political change by using multiple regression analysis. Although the number of coups does have a positive independent impact on some of the political activity variables, regime duration is the more powerful variable in explaining levels of political activity.¹⁶ It is the number of coups,

¹⁵ Difference of means tests show that there are significant differences between noncoup systems and each of the one, two and three coup categories at the .01 level on legislative ban, percentage military in the cabinet and number of constitution changes. For the constitution ban the differences are significant at the .01 level between noncoup systems and the one- and two-coup systems and at the .05 level between non-coup systems and the three-coup systems. On none of these variables are there any differences that are significant between the one-, two-, and three-coup systems. On number of executives there are significant differences between the noncoup and each of the different coup categories at the .01 level, but there are also some differences between the coup categories. The two-coup category has more executives than the one-coup category. This is significant at the .05 level. The three-coup category has more executives than the one- or two-coup categories (significant at the .01 and .05 levels respectively).

¹⁶ The multiple regressions contained the same variables as did the earlier ones except that the dummy variable of

Table 4. Levels of Political Activity and Political Change by Duration^a

Type of System	Levels of Political Activity and Political Change					
	Mean %** Years Constitution Not Fulfilled	Mean %** Years Legislature Banned	Mean % Years Parties Banned	Mean %** Military in Cabinet	Number** Constitution Changes	Number* of Executives
NMRS (900-)	11.5	4.5	14.2	4.2	0.4	2.1
MRS (0-2 Years)	8.5	9.0	19.1	11.4	1.1	4.1
MRS (2-5 Years)	31.1	40.2	24.4	20.2	2.0	4.5
MRS (5+ Years)	56.5	45.3	20.4	32.2	1.8	3.4

^a The significance levels relate to analysis of variance tests for each variable.

** Significant at the .01 level.

* Significant at the .10 level.

Table 5. Levels of Political Activity and Political Change by Number of Coups^a

Type of System	Levels of Political Activity and Political Change					
	Mean %* Years Constitution Not Fulfilled	Mean %** Years Legislature Banned	Mean % Years Parties Banned	Mean %** Military in Cabinet	Number** Constitution Changes	Number** of Executives
NMRS (900-)	11.5	4.5	14.2	4.2	0.4	2.1
MRS (one coup)	33.6	32.5	17.8	21.4	1.6	3.4
MRS (two coups)	44.2	41.2	34.3	21.2	2.3	4.5
MRS (three or more coups)	34.8	39.8	18.8	27.8	2.3	6.5

^a The significance levels relate to analysis of variance tests for each variable.
** Significant at the .01 level.
* Significant at the .05 level.

however, rather than regime duration that has the more powerful effect on political change. Thus, the greater degree of political change which characterizes military regime systems would seem to be attributable to the incidence of coups rather than to the duration of the subsequent military regime.¹⁷ Finally, partial correlations reveal that when regime system, and no transference of restrictions tween the existence of a military regime and levels of political activity drops dramatically. Thus restrictions on political activity would seem to be a function of the military regime in the military regime system, and no transference of restrictions to the civilian regimes in the military regime systems occurs once the military regime is terminated. Across the whole range of political indicators, the military and low-income nonmilitary regime systems of Africa and Asia are the most clearly differentiated; and the regimes of the Middle East and North Africa are quite similar to each other. Those of Latin America occupy an intermediate position.¹⁸

whether a military regime had occurred was replaced by the variables of duration and number of coups. All the regression equations were significant at the .01 level with 43 per cent, 60 per cent, and 67 per cent of the variance of constitution ban, legislative ban, and military in the cabinet being explained.
¹⁷ The simple correlations of number of coups with number of constitution changes and number of executive changes are .62 and .51 respectively, both significant at the .01 level. When duration is controlled, these correlations become .49 and .52, respectively, both still significant at the .01 level. The simple correlation between duration and number of constitution changes and number of executives are .45 and .17, the first of which is significant at the .01 level. When number of coups is controlled, these correlations become .14 and -.19, only the latter of which is significant at the .05 level.
¹⁸ In Africa there are significant differences on all political activity and political change variables. In Asia the same holds true with the exception of the ban on political parties. In the Middle East and North Africa significant differences occur only on the percentage military in the cabinet and party bans. In both Central and South America there are significant differences on the percentage military in the cabinet, party ban, and legislation bans.

Table 6. Total and Partial Correlations between Military Regime and Levels of Political Activity

Levels of Political Activity	Presence of Military Regime	
	Presence Military Regime	Presence of Military Regime Controlling for Duration
Mean % Years Constitution Banned	0.41**	-0.03
Mean % Years Legislature Banned	0.62**	0.19*
Mean % Years Parties Banned	0.23*	0.09
Mean % Military in Cabinet	0.65**	0.17

** Significant at the .01 level.
* Significant at the .05 level.

When GNP is controlled, the two types of system follow the aggregate profiles both with respect to levels of political activity and to levels of political change. Thus military regime systems are consistently different from low-income nonmilitary regime systems regardless of their particular GNP level. With reference to levels of political activity, however, GNP does seem to bear a different relationship to each of the two types of system. While restrictions on political activity in low-income nonmilitary regime systems increase slightly from low to middle GNP levels and then decrease substantially, the restrictions in military regime systems are fairly constant. Thus, while there is an expected downward trend in restrictions on political activity in low-income nonmilitary regime systems as GNP increases, this does not hold true for military regime systems where restrictions are generally uniform regardless of the particular level of GNP. The consequence of the varying influence of GNP on the two types of system is to make the

difference between military regime systems and nonmilitary regime systems (900-) most marked at high GNP levels and least marked at middle GNP levels.

Military regime systems consistently have a greater number of constitution changes regardless of GNP, although the number of changes in military regime systems declines as GNP increases making the difference between the two types of system least pronounced at high GNP levels. While the number of executive changes is fairly constant in military regime systems across GNP levels, executive changes progressively increase in low income nonmilitary regime systems as GNP increases. As a consequence there is no significant difference in the high GNP level. In contrast to levels of political activity, therefore, it is in the high GNP level that the differences between military and low-income nonmilitary systems are least marked.

Military Performance

Two contending hypotheses enjoy the status of widely held beliefs about the relationship between military regimes and the size of and expenditure on the armed forces. One hypothesis holds that military regimes increase both the size and expenditure on the armed forces. This would give military regime systems higher mean values on size, expenditure, and the rates of growth of size and expenditure than nonmilitary regime systems. The other hypothesis is that military size and expenditure tend to be higher in nonmilitary regime systems because civilian governments wish to inhibit the initiation of military coups through favorable allocations to the armed forces, thus giving higher mean values to the nonmilitary regime systems. Neither hypothesis appears to be valid.

Few significant differences exist between military and nonmilitary regime systems in the military dimension. The armed forces in military regime systems have expenditure levels which are quite similar to nonmilitary regime systems, and their

armed forces are slightly smaller. Further, the armed forces of the military regime systems are significantly less diversified than their nonmilitary counterparts. While the rate of growth of size is somewhat higher, the expenditure growth rate is slightly lower. Once high-income systems are removed, the two types of system become closer in size, growth rate of size, and diversification. The expenditure level is slightly higher in military regime systems, but the growth rate of expenditure is significantly lower. Thus, initially, military and nonmilitary regime systems are very similar in the military dimension.

This finding may be refined by introducing controls for GNP, by testing for differences between military and nonmilitary regime systems within GNP levels. The only variations demonstrated through GNP controls are that the military regime systems in low GNP levels have higher expenditure and higher levels of diversification than low income nonmilitary regime systems. But this higher rate of expenditure must be qualified by the lower rates of growth of expenditure in the military regime system. Thus, military and low-income nonmilitary regime systems do not differ significantly within GNP levels.

The failure to find any major differences between military regime systems and low-income nonmilitary regime systems both in aggregate terms and using GNP controls can be complemented by the use of multiple regression in which a larger array of variables is used. The results of multiple regression analysis on each of the military variables show that the occurrence of a military regime is not a significant estimator for any of these variables.¹⁹ Thus, it is clear that despite their en-

¹⁹ All regression equations are significant at the .01 level, but the amounts of variance explained for each of the rates of growth are not impressive. The independent variables used for each of the rates of growth are the dummy variable of whether a military regime has occurred, diversification, size, and expenditure of the military, GNP, rate of growth, budget, and international liquidity. The variance explained in each case is 21 percent. The amount of variance explained for size and ex-

Table 7. Military Size and Expenditure by Type of Regime^a

Type of System	Military Size and Expenditure				
	Military Size	Military Expenditure as % GNP	Diversification	Rate of Growth of Size	Rate of Growth of Expenditure
MRS	47.9	3.21	11.64	8.10	8.80
NMRS	56.4	3.15	16.42*	5.64	9.60
NMRS (900-)	44.9	2.76	8.60	7.85	11.74*

^a The significance levels are from tests between military regime systems and nonmilitary regime systems, and between military regime systems and low income nonmilitary regime systems.

* Significant at .10 level.

hanced political role, the armed forces in military regime systems are no more favored in terms of size and expenditure than the armed forces in low-income nonmilitary regime systems.

When the two types of system are classified by area, the main finding is that, unlike the case of political variables, hardly any deviations from the basic profile occur. Indeed, only four significant differences appear, and no area manifests more than one.²⁰ The most striking finding is related not to the difference between the two types of system, but to the substantial range in each of the variables across areas.²¹ Thus, while area, or more

penditure are 65 per cent and 59 per cent respectively. The independent variables for size are the dummy variable, diversification, expenditure, GNP, rate of growth of GNP, budget and international liquidity. The variables for expenditure are identical to the above except that size of the military is substituted for expenditure.

²⁰ The differences are the following: Sub-Saharan Africa, where the low-income nonmilitary regime systems rate of growth of expenditure is significantly higher at the .05 level; Central America, where the rate of growth of size is significantly higher in the military regime systems at the .10 level; South America, where the size in the low-income nonmilitary regime systems is significantly higher at the .10 level.

²¹ For example, military size in military regime systems and low-income nonmilitary regime systems ranges from 9.6 and 9.2 in Africa to 91.1 and 94.0 in Asia; expenditure ranges from 0.87 and 1.40 in Central America to 6.86 and 6.30 in the Middle East and North Africa. Diversification ranges from 2.34 and 1.94 in Africa to 29.0 and 32.0 in South America. Rates of growth of size range from 4.30 and 1.35 in Central America to 13.8 and 11.7 in Africa. Rates of growth of expenditure range from 3.10 and 1.70 in Central America to 12.3 and 19.3 in Africa.

precisely, factors contained within each area, have an important influence on military variables in general, it is of little utility in showing up differences between military and low-income nonmilitary regime systems within areas.

The main conclusion concerning the variables of regime duration and number of coups is that neither has a significant influence on the military variables. It might have been expected that a disposition to favor the armed forces would be most pronounced in the systems in which the military regime was of long duration or where more coups occurred. Neither of these expectations is valid. In contrast to the political variables category, therefore, regime duration and the number of military coups do not produce any important or independent variations from the general picture.

Economic Background

Significant differences between military and nonmilitary regime systems are found on all the background economic variables. These differences, however, are directly attributable to the influence of the high-income systems. Such differences disappear when the high income systems are removed from the analysis. Although the military regime systems do score consistently lower than the nonmilitary regime systems, none of these differences is significant. Further, when military and nonmilitary regime systems are compared across the background variables within GNP levels, no significant differences occur. There is, therefore, no indication that military regime systems have a

Table 8. Military Size and Expenditure by Duration

Military Size and Expenditure					
Type of System	Military Size	Military Expenditure % GNP	Diversification	Rate of Growth of Size	Rate of Growth of Expenditure
NMRS (900-)	44.9	2.7	8.6	7.9	11.7
MRS (0-2 yr)	45.8	2.7	11.2	10.8	7.4
MRS (2-5 yr)	41.5	2.4	9.6	8.2	9.6
MRS (5+ yr)	61.9	4.6	14.8	6.1	8.3

Table 9. Military Size and Expenditure by Number of Coups

Military Size and Expenditure					
Type of System	Military Size	Military Expenditure % GNP	Diversification	Rate of Growth of Size	Rate of Growth of Expenditure
NMRS (900-)	44.9	2.7	8.6	7.9	11.7
MRS (one coup)	51.6	3.1	12.3	6.1	8.2
MRS (two coups)	45.0	2.6	13.5	14.7	10.0
MRS (three or more coups)	42.5	4.4	11.3	5.6	7.3

weaker background economic position than the nonmilitary regime systems.

Area controls, however, do indicate some differences between military and low-income nonmilitary regime systems which was not the case using military variables. The military regime systems in Africa and Asia particularly seem to be located in the weaker economic systems of these two areas. The within-area differences correspond to the within-area political differences where Africa and Asia demonstrated the most pronounced differences between military regime systems and nonmilitary regime systems.²²

While there is no evidence that military regime systems are confined to weaker economic systems, the general literature on development indicates that some association exists between weaker economic systems and the number of coups or the duration of the military regime in military regime systems. However, analyses of variance both of regime duration and the number of coups on the five background economic variables yield no significant results. Further, all the correlations between regime duration or the number of coups and the economic variables have negligible values. Thus, once the high-income systems are removed, military regime systems are not located in the weaker economic systems. Nor are the systems characterized by multiple coups or long-term military regimes associated with weaker economies.

International Economic Performance

In contrast to the general background economic factors, there is some limited evidence to indicate the military regime systems are in a somewhat weaker international trading position than low-income nonmilitary regime systems.

Nonmilitary regime systems have more exten-

sive commitments to international trade (as measured by export and import levels) and better trading positions (as measured by the trade balance). International liquidity and direct investment are very similar in both types of system. Military regime systems have significantly higher central government capital balances. When the high-income systems are removed, the low-income nonmilitary regime systems still have a significantly stronger commitment to international trade; however, their trade balance, while stronger, is not significantly so. Both direct investment and central government capital balances change markedly. The low-income nonmilitary regime systems now have a significantly higher direct investment balance, but central government capital balances are similar. International liquidity similarities remain essentially unchanged. Thus in contrast to the background economic variables, the removal of the high-income systems does not eliminate all the significant differences between military and low income nonmilitary regime systems.

Controls for GNP, however, lessen the differences between military and low-income nonmilitary regime systems. Controlling for GNP, partial correlations do show a weaker relationship than the total correlations between the occurrence of a military regime and the six international trade variables. Even adjusting for GNP, however, there is still a significant negative relationship between military regime systems and international trade commitment.²³ Furthermore, although first-order partial correlations controlling for GNP do not show a significant relationship between military regime systems or direct investment balances, multiple regression analysis indicates that the occurrence of a military regime is a significant negative estimator of trade and direct investment bal-

²² In Africa, military regime systems have lower GNP, lower GDFCF and fewer doctors. Each difference is significant at the .10 level. In Asia, military regime systems have lower GNP, smaller budgets and fewer doctors. The differences are significant at the .05 level.

²³ The partial correlations between type of regime and exports and type of regime and imports controlling for GNP are -.23 and -.19, respectively, significant at the .01 and .05 levels.

Table 10. Background Economic Variables by Type of System^a

Type of System	Background Economic Variables				
	Constant GNP per capita	GDFCF % GNP	Primary Production % GNP	Budget % GNP	Number of Doctors
MRS	218.9	15.8	32.2	16.0	27.8
NMRS	724.9**	18.4**	22.9**	19.2*	60.7**
NMRS (900-)	272.6	16.2	29.1	17.8	29.8

^a Significance levels are derived from tests between military regime systems and nonmilitary regime systems and between military regime systems and low income nonmilitary regime systems.

* Significant at .05 level.

** Significant at .01 level.

Table 11. Background Economic Variables by Duration

Type of System	Background Economic Variables				
	Constant GNP per capita	GDFCF % GNP	Primary Production % GNP	Budget % GNP	Number of Doctors
NMRS (900-)	272.6	16.2	29.1	17.8	29.8
MRS (0-2 yrs.)	270.2	16.4	31.8	15.8	17.4
MRS (2-5 yrs.)	221.0	15.7	33.3	15.4	33.2
MRS (5+ yrs.)	182.5	15.7	31.1	17.7	24.7

Table 12. Background Economic Variables by Number of Coups

Type of System	Background Economic Variables				
	Constant GNP per capita	GDFCF % GNP	Primary Production % GNP	Budget % GNP	Number of Doctors
NMRS (900-)	272.6	16.2	29.1	17.8	29.8
MRS (one coup)	234.1	16.8	30.7	17.0	28.0
MRS (two coups)	207.8	13.7	37.7	12.7	30.5
MRS (three or more coups)	175.0	15.3	28.1	17.8	23.0

Table 13. International Trading Position by Type of System^a

Type of System	International Trading Position					
	Exports % GNP	Imports % GNP	Trade Balance % GNP	Direct Investment Balance % GNP	Central Govt. Capital Balance % GNP	Internat. Liquidity % Imports
MRS	18.2	20.7	-4.05	1.24	1.07	34.2
NMRS	26.4***	25.5**	-2.43**	1.47	0.76*	35.6
NMRS (900-)	27.2***	25.6**	-3.41	2.00*	1.03	34.1

^a Significance levels are derived from *t*-tests between military regime systems and nonmilitary regime systems, and between military regime systems and low income nonmilitary regime systems.

* Significant at .10 level.

** Significant at .05 level.

*** Significant at .01 level.

ances (at the .10 and .05 levels respectively).²⁴

When GNP is held constant, however, by comparing military and low income nonmilitary regime systems within GNP levels, the differences are not as clear as would seem from above. Al-

²⁴ The regressions on trade balance and direct investment balance are both significant at the .01 level. In the former, 58 per cent of variance is explained and in the latter, 40 per cent. The independent variables are the dummy of whether a military regime has occurred, GNP, rate of growth of GNP, exports, international liquidity, central government capital balance. Direct balance and trade balance were alternatively used where appropriate.

though military regime systems have lower levels of exports and imports than low income nonmilitary regime systems in each of the GNP categories, the differences are pronounced only in the middle GNP level. No significant differences appear on trade balance in any of the GNP levels, and military regime systems in the high GNP level have a stronger trade balance than their nonmilitary counterparts. Since the trade balances of the military and nonmilitary regimes in the middle GNP level are almost identical, the aggregate difference must be attributable only to the score of the

military regime systems in the low GNP level. The direct investment balances of both types of regime system in both the low and middle GNP levels are almost identical, thus, the aggregate difference in direct investment balance must be attributable largely to the significantly lower balance of the military regime systems in the high GNP level. No significant differences appear for central government capital balance and international liquidity.

Thus, when GNP controls are introduced, military regime systems in aggregate terms do seem to have a weaker commitment to international trade, but this weaker commitment is primarily restricted to the middle GNP levels. The evidence indicating that military regime systems have weaker trade balances is not particularly strong. The evidence indicating they have lower direct investment balances, however, is stronger, but this, too, seems to be restricted to only the high GNP level. The aggregate similarities in terms of central government capital balances and international liquidity remain unchanged.

The patterns established for each of the areas on the background economic variables are generally replicated on the international trade variables. Thus in Africa and Asia, once again, the clearest differences between military and low income non-military regime systems are found. In both cases the military regime systems are significantly less committed to international trade (at the .05 level for exports and the .10 level for imports), and African military regime systems have a significantly worse trade balance (at the .05 level), but on other variables there is little difference. Asian military regime systems are an exception, for they have a significantly better international liquidity position, but the other differences follow as ex-

pected. In Latin America, the differences between the two types of system are not as marked; indeed, in South America particularly there are no significant differences. The differences that do occur, however, are in the expected direction. In Central America, the differences again follow the general profile with the exception of the trade balance, which is significantly worse in nonmilitary regime systems (at the .05 level). In the Middle East and North Africa, international trade commitment and international liquidity are virtually identical for both types of system; however, the trade balance is worse, although not significantly, in the nonmilitary regime system and direct investment is significantly higher (at the .05 level).

Analyses of variance of the number of coups on the international trade variables yield no significant differences. Further, although there are some weak correlations between the number of coups and the six international trade variables, the correlations become negligible once GNP is controlled. Thus, multiple coups cannot be associated with a weaker commitment to international trade, nor do multiple coups adversely affect the various components of a country's balance of payments. Regime duration, however, is of greater importance. While analyses of variance do not yield any significant results, there are three correlations of interest. Significant negative correlations between regime duration and export and import levels are slightly reduced when GNP is controlled but still remain significant. A positive correlation between duration and international liquidity becomes significant when GNP is controlled, suggesting that longer duration military regime systems do seem to be characterized by lower export and import levels. On the other hand, duration does not have

Table 14. International Trading Position by Type of System and GNP Level^a

GNP Level	Type of System	International Trading Position					
		Exports % GNP	Imports % GNP	Trade Bal. % GNP	Direct Bal. % GNP	Central Bal. % GNP	Internat. Liquidity % Imports
Low Level GNP	MRS	15.1	19.7	-5.99	0.97	1.30	33.6
	NMRS	22.0*	19.7	-4.67	0.98	1.68	27.6
Middle Level GNP	MRS	19.6	20.4	-3.06	1.53	1.10	32.0
	NMRS	30.4**	27.4**	-3.01	1.66	1.03	31.7
High Level GNP	MRS	26.0	26.2	-0.96	1.28	0.42	45.2
	NMRS	28.0	29.7	-3.09	3.35*	0.57	46.6

^a Significance levels are derived from tests between military regime systems and nonmilitary regime systems within GNP levels.

* Significant at .10 level.

** Significant at .05 level.

Table 15. International Trade Position by Duration

International Trade Position						
Type of System	Exports % GNP	Imports % GNP	Trade Balance % GNP	Direct Investment Balance % GNP	Central Govt. Capital Balance % GNP	Internat. Liquidity % Imports
NMRS (900-)	27.2	25.6	-3.41	2.00	1.03	34.1
MRS (0-2 yr)	24.2	24.5	-3.37	1.68	1.11	34.8
MRS (2-5 yr)	16.2	21.2	-5.29	1.67	1.21	28.1
MRS (5+ yr)	17.8	17.8	-3.07	0.47	1.04	44.3

Table 16. Total and Partial Correlations Between Duration and International Trade Variables Controlling for GNP

Duration	International Trade Variables		
	Exports % GNP	Imports % GNP	Internat. Liquidity % Imports
Duration	-.24*	-.26*	.17
Duration Controlling GNP	-.21*	-.23*	.22*

* Significant at .05 level.

any pronounced effect on the balance of payments, and longer duration systems do have better international liquidity positions.

Economic Performance

Examination of the two categories of background economic and international trade variables demonstrates that although no extensive differences between military and low income nonmilitary systems are found, what differences do exist place the military regime systems in the weaker position. The economic analysis is completed by examining performance along three summary rates of growth.

The overall comparison between the two types of system indicates that the cost of living increase is significantly higher in military regime systems, but the rates of growth of GNP and exports are very close. The difference in the cost of living increase is significant only at the .10 level, and since GNP is measured in constant terms, not too much importance can be attached to this finding. When the high income systems are removed the basic similarity between the two types of system remains although the difference in the cost of living growth rate is no longer significant. Thus, military regime systems are marginally poorer in terms of background factors and weaker in some areas of international trade, but they perform generally as well as nonmilitary systems.

Table 17. Economic Performance by Type of System^a

Type of System	Economic Performance		
	Rate of Growth of Constant per capita GNP	Rate of Growth Cost of Living Index	Rate of Growth Exports
MRS	3.33	11.28	8.85
NMRS	3.66	5.22*	9.65
NMRS (900-)	2.71		9.20

^a Tests are between military regime systems and non-military regime systems, and between military regime systems and low income nonmilitary regime systems.

* Significant at .10 level.

Given the positive correlation between GNP and the rate of growth of GNP and the fact that military regime systems have a higher rate of growth of GNP, better performance by them would have been expected. However, partial correlations, controlling for GNP, do not reveal any significant relationships thus eliminating the possibility of better performance by military regime systems.

When the two types of regime are categorized by GNP levels, only two significant differences appear within these levels. These are both in the high GNP category and indicate that military regime systems at this level have higher rates of growth both of GNP and of exports (significant at the .10 level). The number of cases of military regime systems is too small, however, to permit any firm inferences, but the results do not support the conventional view that as GNP increases it is the systems having poorer rates of economic performance that are likely to be characterized by military regimes.

For four of the five areas, tabulations dealing with both the background economic and international trade categories show that the relationship between the two types of system follow the pattern

of the general comparison. Differences among areas do appear, however, in terms of the degree of difference between the two types of system. The area tabulations of economic performance indicators differ somewhat from this general picture.²⁵

African military regime systems have weaker background and international trade positions and do not perform as well as the equivalent nonmilitary regime systems. Asian military regime systems have weaker background and international trade positions, but perform as well as the low-income nonmilitary regime systems. Latin American military regime systems are marginally weaker on background factors, have similar international trade positions, but perform slightly better than the nonmilitary systems. Both types of system in the Middle East and North Africa are generally similar across all three categories of economic variables.

It might have been expected that systems characterized by multiple coups or by long-term military regimes would have the lowest performance rates. Generally, this is not the case, but regime duration rather than the number of coups has some slight relationship with the performance variables.

Analyses of variance of number of coups with the three performance indicators yield no significant results. In addition, all of the correlations between the number of coups and the performance

²⁵ The performance rates of the African military regime systems are consistently lower than their nonmilitary counterparts with the rate of growth of GNP being lower at the .10 level. The Asian military regime systems, which had a similar profile to the African military regime systems in the two previous categories, have poorer performance rates on cost of living and exports than the low income nonmilitary regime systems but a better rate of growth of GNP, but the differences are not significant. The military regime systems of Latin America have significantly higher export growth rates (at the .01 level) and lower cost of living increases (significant at the .05 level for Central America). The military regime systems of the Middle East and North Africa have better performance rates than the nonmilitary counterparts, but the differences are not significant.

Table 18. Economic Performance by Number of Coups

Type of System	Economic Performance		
	Rate of Growth of Constant per capita GNP	Rate of Growth of Cost of Living Index	Rate of Growth of Exports
NMRS (900-)	2.71	5.74	9.20
MRS (one coup)	4.01	13.19	10.61
MRS (two coups)	2.35	8.72	3.91
MRS (three or more coups)	1.70	4.60	8.33

Table 19. Economic Performance by Duration^a

Type of System	Economic Performance		
	Rate of Growth of Constant per capita GNP	Rate of Growth of Cost of Living Index	Rate of Growth of Exports*
NMRS (900-)	2.71	5.74	9.20
MRS (0-2 yrs.)	5.30	3.92	13.50
MRS (2-5 yrs.)	2.49	6.04	11.33
MRS (5+ yrs.)	3.29	21.66	2.73

^a Tests are analysis of variance for each variable.

* Significant at .05 level.

variables give negligible values even when GNP is controlled. It must be concluded, therefore, that there are no important differences in economic performance between the types of regime regardless of the number of coups.

Analyses of variance of duration with the performance indicators provide one significant result related to the rate of growth of exports. Here the deviant case is the long-duration military regime systems, which have a very low rate of growth of exports.²⁶

It will be recalled from the previous section that low levels of exports and imports were found to be related to long-duration military regime systems. The general relationship between export rates of growth and duration, however, must be interpreted with caution. The partial correlation between export rate of growth and regime duration, controlling for GNP, is insignificant, and multiple regression analysis does not show regime duration to be a significant estimator of the rate of growth of exports.²⁷ Total correlations and partial correlations, controlling for GNP, between regime duration and rates of growth of GNP and cost of living also yield negligible values. Thus, there is some evidence to relate long-term military regime systems to low export rate of growth, but the main conclusion must be that the two types of system do not differ from one another generally, even when considering the duration of the military regimes.

Conclusion

The primary concern of this article has been to examine, first, in what respects and to what degree

²⁶ Difference of means tests show that the military regime systems of 5+ years differs from low income nonmilitary regime systems, military regime systems (0-2 years), and military regime systems (2-5 years) at the .05, .10, and .01 levels respectively.

²⁷ The regression is significant at the .01 level and explains 34 per cent of variance of the rate of growth of exports. The independent variables are the number of coups, duration, GNP, rate of growth of GNP, exports, international liquidity, and GDFCF.

military and nonmilitary regime systems differ and, second, to deduce from such differences what the occurrence of a military regime may tell us about the question of instability.

It is clear from the cluster analysis that across a wide range of political, military, and economic variables, military regime systems are not universally different from nonmilitary regime systems. There is, however, some clustering of military regime systems. This picture has been clarified by comparing the two types of system across five categories of variables and by employing a number of controls for each of these comparisons. The consequence of these comparisons is to demonstrate that, as expected, the two types of system are clearly different from one another in what might be termed a political dimension and, to a lesser degree, they differ in terms of their international trading position, but they cannot be differentiated from one another by military, background economic, or economic performance criteria. Thus, systems which have experienced military regimes are not restricted to the weaker economic systems of the world once the small group of high income systems are removed. Their economic performance rates compare favorably with nonmilitary regime systems and, despite military rule, they do not, in general, have larger armed forces or greater military expenditure. While military regime systems do not have as firm a commitment to international trade, they are most clearly distinct from nonmilitary regime systems only in their lower levels of political activity and higher levels of political change.

Although classification by GNP levels indicate substantial variations within both types of system, any aggregate differences between the two types of system are generally constant across GNP levels. The same findings hold for the area controls that were utilized, but to a lesser degree. The main exception is the Middle East and North Africa, where very few differences exist between the two types of system. While each of the remaining areas generally follow the aggregate profile, area variations do occur largely in terms of the *degree* of difference between military regime systems and nonmilitary regime systems. Differences between the two types of system are most pronounced in Africa and Asia and much less pronounced in Latin America. Duration of the military regime and the number of coups explain little variance of the military, background economic, and economic performance variables. Thus, in these dimensions, military regime systems do not differ from nonmilitary regime systems regardless of the length of the military regime or of the number of coups that may have occurred. These variables, however, do have important influences on the political, and, to a lesser extent, on the international trade variables.

Regime duration is the more powerful indicator of the levels of political activity, as might be expected. On the other hand, the number of coups is indicative of more rapid political change.

Some observations concerning the connection between military regime systems and the general notion of instability may also be made by relating differences between the two types of system to some of the control variables. If instability is defined strictly in terms of levels of political activity and political change, then military regime systems are certainly less stable than nonmilitary regime systems. If, however, instability is defined in economic terms, so that economic weakness indicates instability, then military regime systems are no less stable than nonmilitary regime systems. Thus, if the occurrence of a military regime is used as an indicator of political instability in the sense of indicating lower levels of political activity and higher levels of political change, it must be emphasized that political instability does not explain the internal or external economic situation; nor does it tell us anything about the size and the expenditure of the armed forces. The absence of a connection between the political and economic variables is particularly important. If a relationship between political instability and economic performance had been established, then the question of the impact of the economic dimension upon the political dimension and *vice versa* would have been raised. In many instances, the two types of system are not dissimilar in terms of the political variables as many low income nonmilitary regime systems restrict political activity. Further, military regime systems do not constitute a homogeneous population; considerable variation is found among them. Some military regime systems have had just one coup; others have had several. Some have had long lasting military regimes; others have had regimes of very short duration. Some perform well economically, others display economic weakness. It is important to know both the regime duration and the number of coups before any statement concerning political instability can be made. A whole range of factors must be known to cope with economic weakness. Military regime systems which experience longer term military regimes are considerably more restrictive in the political activity dimension while those with a higher number of coups are less stable with regard to the question of political change. Simply postulating, therefore, political or economic instability on the basis of the incidence of a military regime is clearly inadequate and possibly misleading.

APPENDIX

List of Variables

1. Number of coups
2. Percentage of years constitution not fulfilled
3. Number of executives

4. Percentage of years the legislature is banned
5. Percentage of years political parties are banned
6. Mean percentage of the Cabinet made up of military personnel
7. Navy and Air Force as a percentage of the total military size
8. Mean size of military
9. Expenditure on the military
10. Rate of growth of military size
11. Rate of growth of expenditure on the military
12. *Per capita* Gross National Product
13. Rate of growth of GNP
14. Rate of growth of exports
15. Rate of growth of cost of living index
16. Budget as a percentage of GNP
17. Exports as a percentage of GNP
18. Imports as a percentage of GNP
19. International liquidity as a percentage of imports
20. Gross domestic fixed capital formation as a percentage of GNP
21. Primary production as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product
22. Trade Balance
23. Direct Investment
24. Central Balance
25. Number of doctors per 100,000 population

Mean Scores of Clusters

Variable	Cluster: 1	2	3	4	5	Population Mean*
1	1.88	.62	.56	.13	0	.63
2	53.44	14.02	23.22	2.00	0	18.41
3	4.81	2.52	3.00	2.67	3.32	3.09
4	51.75	13.17	14.44	2.00	0	15.74
5	27.13	14.70	33.67	7.93	0	15.26
6	29.56	9.24	17.00	1.93	.53	10.39
7	20.80	5.19	14.22	4.80	38.47	14.53
8	47.44	21.57	200.11	24.87	76.79	52.46
9	3.94	2.17	9.61	1.52	3.28	3.23
10	4.64	9.97	4.00	4.63	1.19	6.86
11	5.71	13.03	9.49	9.47	3.61	9.25
12	283.10	141.30	372.56	448.07	1760.58	534.56
13	1.75	1.77	6.61	9.38	5.20	3.27
14	5.73	7.89	13.63	13.84	10.15	9.37
15	18.81	4.63	9.20	3.07	5.19	7.16
16	17.31	14.74	22.78	21.20	21.26	1.81
17	21.19	18.60	16.78	38.60	23.63	2.28
18	18.38	20.17	26.22	38.33	23.21	23.70
19	43.13	26.48	53.44	37.76	37.84	35.31
20	16.44	14.19	17.22	20.73	23.26	17.50
21	26.75	39.86	26.00	18.93	8.89	27.61
22	-1.91	-4.26	-5.29	-4.07	-0.35	-3.21
23	1.09	1.09	1.43	3.48	.42	1.35
24	.73	1.29	1.38	1.01	.04	.93
25	-42.06	13.83	68.33	41.60	126.00	48.39

* The over-all population mean is included in order to present the general picture compared with the individual clusters.

Science and Rule in Bacon's Utopia: An Introduction to the Reading of the *New Atlantis**

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Modern utopian thought springs from the promise of modern science. It is the political expression of the claim of science to relieve man's estate and to enlarge the bounds of human empire.¹ The modern utopianism of modern science is nowhere more succinctly presented than in the claim Hobbes made for his novel political science. When founded on the principles of the new science with its "clear and exact method," the study of morals and politics would disclose a "true and certain rule of action by which we might know whether that which we undertake be just or unjust."² For Hobbes, the final victory of science over nature depended on the conquest of the problem of human nature, which Hobbes thought to be the problem of political rule. The aim of the new science of politics was to abolish the grounds of political controversy and thus to dissolve the problematic character of political discourse and life. The question of rule was reduced to the simple recognition of positive law; the new political science would guarantee that the precepts of natural law would be contained in the conventional precepts of civil law.³

The claim of the new science obscured the distinction between theoretical and practical speech, for the perfection of speech about man and nature

was to facilitate the perfection of practical life. As determined by Hobbes's application of scientific method to politics, modern scientific discourse about politics is inherently utopian. The development of modern utopianism is not simply the development of a particular mode of political thinking, but is, rather, "a perfect paradigm of the course of modernity." Thus unlike Plato's *Republic* and More's *Utopia*, modern utopia has "ceased to be ironical and has become oppositional."⁴ Whereas premodern utopia articulated human perfection by reflecting on the inherent delimitation of human nature, modern utopia illuminates present human defect from the standpoint of a future achievable human perfection. In modernity the literal meaning of utopia has been reversed; it no longer points to no place but, rather, lights the path to every place.

Bacon's *New Atlantis* is anomalous when seen in the light of the course of modernity. For the *New Atlantis* depicts a society formed by the rule of science, but it presents no explicit teaching about natural right or political rule. We wonder, then, why the political utopianism of modern science was not simply coeval with the origins of modern science. Though Hobbes was the first to proclaim the birth of political science, he was neither the first pioneer of science nor the first to proclaim modern teachings about morality and politics.⁵ According to Rawley, it was Bacon's intention to include an account of the best regime in the *New Atlantis*, but the labor required and the enticement of natural history diverted his attention.⁶ If Rawley is correct, the *New Atlantis* is incomplete simply because it lacks a political teaching. We might conclude, then, that the novelty of Hobbes's political science consists simply in his being the first to apply the new science of nature to

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¹ *The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury*, ed. Sir William Molesworth, 11 vols. (London: John Bohn, 1839-45), hereafter EW, I, 7; Bacon, *Novum Organum*, I, 3; II, 1-4; *Advancement of Learning*, hereafter *Advancement*, in *The Works of Francis Bacon*, ed. James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis, and Douglas Denon Heath, 14 vols. (London: Longman and Co., etc., 1857-74), hereafter BW, III, 294-95.

² EW I, 9. Cf. *De Cive*, Ep. Ded., EW II, i-viii; EW I, 8-10; EW IV, 1.

³ Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ed. C. B. Macpherson (Baltimore: Penguin, 1968), Ch. 26, p. 314. See *De Cive* VI, EW II, 85. The utopian legacy of the new science can be seen in both the realist or positivist and the idealist interpretations of the new science. Thus Kant argues that the pure notion of duty (*der Begriff der Pflicht in seiner ganzen Reinigkeit*) is simple and clear to a child of eight or nine even in complex situations. "Über den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht für die Praxis," *Kleinere Schriften zur Geschichtsphilosophie Ethik und Politik* (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1964), p. 82. Cf. Plato *Republic* 331c1-9. See also Kant, "Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre," 49, *Anhang*, *Beschluss*, *Metaphysik Der Sitten* (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1966) pp. 139-166, 205-208.

⁴ Eva Brann makes these last two points in her elegant and important study of More's *Utopia*. See "An Exquisite Platform: Utopia," *interpretation*, 3 (1972), 24-25. This is true for the modern anti-utopian utopia as well as for modern utopia simply understood. See also Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1954), p. 192; Robert Musil, *The Man Without Qualities* (London: Secker and Warburg, 1953-1961), I, ii, 62; Bertrand de Jouvenel, "Utopia for Practical Purposes," *Utopias and Utopian Thought*, ed. Frank E. Manuel (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1966), pp. 226ff.

⁵ See Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr., "Hobbes and the Science of Indirect Government," *American Political Science Review*, 65 (March, 1971), 97-98.

⁶ See Rawley's note to the reader, BW III, 127.

the human things.⁷ If Rawley is not correct, Bacon's motives were more complex, and the *New Atlantis* would present the promise of science in conjunction with a circumspect prudence toward any teaching about political rule. The *New Atlantis* would then be both oppositional and ironical, and for Bacon the relationship between science and political rule would be problematic. It might then be the case that the post-Baconian link between modern science and a certain, demonstrable political science sprang from the necessity to modify Bacon's teaching about science for the sake of moral and political perfection. The question of the *New Atlantis* is the question of its completeness, and the question of its completeness points to the roots of modernity. To study the *New Atlantis* is to study the coherence of the utopian promise of modern science.

The *New Atlantis* and the Coherence of Bacon's Corpus

Bacon's *New Atlantis* appears to be a strange choice of texts for an inquiry into the utopian character of modern scientific discourse about politics. It could be argued that since Bacon's works antedate Hobbes's political science, it is no wonder that the *New Atlantis* is not a serious reflection about politics at all. According to the traditional account, the *New Atlantis* is incomplete because it does not contain a teaching about government or political rule. This traditional account still obtains: most scholars accept the *New Atlantis* as a part of the plan of the *Great Instauration* because they take it to be a primitive description of a scientific academy and because it does not contain a thematic account of government.⁸ This must mean that there is no commonly accepted "most important" political treatise by Bacon because he wrote no political treatise. Particular advice about particular problems offered to particular men may be interesting, but especially in Bacon's case, they do not seem to constitute a coherent and comprehensive account of man's political nature. Bacon's political writings consist of several of the *Essays: Of Nobility, Of Seditions and Troubles, Of Empire, Of Counsel, Of the True Greatness of Kingdoms and Estates, Of Faction*; the fragment *Of The True Greatness of Britain*, and fragments, letters and speeches touching holy war, British domestic policy, and policy toward Spain. These writings treat some matters of political negotiation and policy and focus mainly on the enlarging of British political influence in the world. But they do not make up a treatise on the fundamental considera-

tions of political philosophy: the nature of the best regime, the ends of political life, and the nature and relations between the virtues of justice, moderation, wisdom and courage.

The lack of a political teaching in Bacon's works reflects a serious disunity in Bacon's teaching as a whole. Common knowledge justly reveres Bacon for his role in the birth of modern natural science. But if Bacon's importance is as a founder of modern science, his teaching can be but an interesting historical relic, for modern science doubtless has far surpassed its crude genesis with respect to method and content. The modern reader of Bacon's writings on natural history must find them to be quaint, and so only decent charity prevents them from being considered ridiculous. If the modern reader turns to Bacon's writings about method, he will find that they are incomplete and encumbered by metaphysical concerns now considered to have no place in the progress of scientific discovery. Indeed, these metaphysical concerns were so damaging as to blind Bacon to the crucial importance of mathematics for the interpretation and conquest of nature. If the modern reader is interested in the historical relics of modernity at all, he will be better served by turning his attention to Descartes and the origins of mathematical physics than to Bacon, who failed to recognize the importance of Copernicus and Galileo.⁹

If Bacon's writings are useless to one concerned with the method and content of modern science, the importance of his teaching about science must be his recommendation of practically useful science as the horizon for man's self-improvement. But surely this recommendation is a self-evident commonplace. The importance of this recommendation is again merely historical; its importance is visible from a contrast to its historical context that was unenlightened and darkened by the obscurities of prescientific thinking. Thus Bacon's importance is as a pioneer. But in the light of the urgent task of penetrating and conquering nature—Bacon's own view of the human project—pioneers deserve reverence but not serious reflection. Reverence does not necessarily deflect our time and energy from the scientific project; serious reflection most certainly does. It seems that on the basis of Bacon's only serious teaching, serious reflection on that teaching must be less than serious.

We are faced with a disconcerting alternative. Either Bacon's works are not important, or they are imperative for the serious student because the scientific project is problematic. Of course, by itself the latter possibility does not justify a reading of Bacon. Rather, we can profitably turn to Bacon if the scientific project is or may be problematic

⁷ Cf. Mansfield, p. 98.

⁸ See F. H. Anderson, *The Philosophy of Francis Bacon* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1948), pp. 24, 36, 40, 295; Francis Bacon, *New Atlantis*, ed. Alfred B. Gough (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1915), pp. xxvii–xxix.

⁹ See Paolo Rossi, *Francis Bacon* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968), pp. 138–39, 223; Bacon, *New Atlantis*, ed. Gough, pp. xvi–xvii; cf. Anderson, pp. 292–303.

and if Bacon's teaching illuminates *how* it may be problematic. This means that Bacon's teaching about science is important only if it is a part of a comprehensive teaching about science, human ends, and human perfection. But Bacon's writings do not appear to provide such a comprehensive teaching. Bacon's most famous writings about man's morals and manners are the *Essays* and the *New Atlantis*. But while the *Essays* treat manners, morals, and, in a cursory way, politics, they do not treat these subjects in relation to the project of a new science. The *New Atlantis* is incomplete, and, according to the traditional account, it is incomplete because it lacks a teaching about the "best state or mould of a commonwealth." The *New Atlantis* is incomplete because it fails to combine an account of the organization of the project of science with an account of the political rule necessary for the best form of human life.

A unified and comprehensive account of man and science appears to be lacking even in those works that treat the virtue of science thematically. In the *Advancement of Learning*, Bacon argues that piety requires the dignity of natural philosophy to be separated from the proscribed articulation of human ends and perfection.¹⁰ In concert with this piety, Bacon only hints at the virtue of knowledge as man's conquest of nature and argues that knowledge is useful for various human virtues without questioning the nature or status of those virtues as virtues. When Bacon discusses the human good, he makes several dogmatic assertions of the superiority of the "communicative good" over the "private and particular good" and the "active good" over the "passive good."¹¹ But in these very brief assertions, Bacon gives no systematic description of the nature or content of the human good and the human virtues, and, what is more important, he makes no mention of the human good and the human virtues in connection with the virtue of knowledge in general or natural science in particular.

In the *Wisdom of the Ancients*, *Masculine Birth of Time*, *Thoughts and Conclusions*, and the *Great Instauration*, Bacon declares the end of knowledge to be the human mastery of nature by means of practical natural science, but in none of these works is the nature of man as conqueror explicitly articulated. It seems that Bacon's works provide no complete and comprehensive account of science and human perfection. If modern utopianism is the political expression of the claim of science to determine the horizon of human possibilities, Bacon's writings hardly seem to be such an expression. Not only does the *New Atlantis* seem to lack a political teaching, but Bacon's works as a whole

appear to provide no unified basis from which we might infer such a teaching.

But the preceding argument may be much too hasty. If we are to search for the meeting of Bacon's teachings about science and man, we must proceed by taking our bearings from Bacon's own words, and there is a Baconian work that presents an explicit organization of his scientific project. Bacon's sole organizational work must be the start of any attempt to penetrate the comprehensive, unified whole of his teaching.

The *Great Instauration* announces Bacon's plan for the complete reformation of human science and knowledge, which will "lay the foundation, not of any sect or doctrine, but of human power and utility" in order to "command nature in action." Bacon's intention was to insure the harmony of theory and practice, of the "intellectual and terrestrial globes," which will guarantee man's power over nature.¹² Elsewhere Bacon argues that the noblest end of science is the preservation and restoration of the corruptible things.¹³ The *Great Instauration* is Bacon's public announcement of the whole of his project, and the conventional demands of piety prevent explicit identification of the commanding of nature with the conquest of nature's corruptibility. But since Bacon does hold the end of science to be the conquest of nature's corruptibility, and since the fullest commanding of nature must include overcoming natural decay, it is this highest conquest that in fact governs the plan of the *Great Instauration*.

A first glance at the *Great Instauration*, however, disappoints our hope of discovering a unified and comprehensive consideration of science and human perfection. For the most obtrusive characteristic of Bacon's great instauration is its incompleteness, an incompleteness acknowledged by Bacon himself. Part one is to be a division of the sciences, but it is declared to be wanting, although "some account of them will be found in the second Book of the 'Proficiency and Advancement of Learning.'"¹⁴ Part two is to present the new inductive method or the "art itself of interpreting nature" and is provided in the *Novum Organum*, but only as "a summary digested into aphorisms."¹⁵ Part three is to be a foundational natural history, or the actual "first food" or factual

¹² *Great Instauration*, hereafter *GI*, BW IV, Proem., 8, 21, 23–24; *Novum Organum* I, 3, 83, II, 1–4; *Advancement*, BW III, 294–95.

¹³ *De Sapientia Veterum*, XI, BW VI, 646, 720. Natural philosophy thus "proposes to itself as its noblest work of all, nothing less than the restitution and renovation of things corruptible, and (what is the same thing in a lower degree) the conservation of bodies in the state in which they are, and the retardation of dissolution and putrefaction."

¹⁴ BW IV, 35.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ *Advancement*, BW III, 265.

¹¹ *Advancement*, BW III, 417–445; cf. 421, 424.

material on which the new method will work. Although this part of the instauration is the most filled out,¹⁶ it is incomplete according to Bacon's description of its particulars in the *Great Instauration*.¹⁷ Part four is to "set forth examples of inquiry and invention" according to his method and is missing except for a very small fragment.¹⁸ Part five is to present Bacon's own provisional discoveries not "according to the true rules and methods of interpretation, but by the ordinary use of the understanding in inquiring and discovering." Like part four, part five is missing except for a very small fragment.¹⁹ Part six is to disclose and set forth the "developed and established" new philosophy that will be the "real business and fortune of the human race, and all power of operation."²⁰ But as a formally identified part of the plan, part six is missing altogether.

In view of the incompleteness of the project outlined in the *Great Instauration*, a unified and comprehensive consideration of the crucial questions of science and man seems to be lacking. This lack is all the more important since Bacon's discussion of scientific method is admittedly incomplete and but a "summary digestion." This confirms our earlier observation that it would be less than profitable to return to Bacon for any serious consideration of scientific method as we know it today. Again we find that the important theme is the way of the new science in the light of human ends and perfection. It is all the more dismaying, then, that there is no completed part of the plan that would present a thematic account of the virtue of the new science as a part of a comprehensive teaching about human ends and perfection. Although the *Great Instauration* projects such an account as part six, Bacon thwarts our search by failing to identify even a part or hint of its completion. At best the *Great Instauration* repeats and directs us to the dogmatic and incomplete remarks about the human and scientific virtues in the *Advancement of Learning*. It would appear that Bacon tells us nothing important about scientific method and tells us nothing about the crucial problem of the virtue or value of science itself. Small wonder it is that, in the absence of a substantial consideration of the latter problem, most scholars approach Bacon with an interest in the teaching about method. Small wonder it is also, then, that these scholars are hard pressed to demonstrate the importance of Bacon as anything other than a quaint relic of an age which was but the infancy of scientific enlightenment.

¹⁶ See Anderson, pp. 34–36, 40.

¹⁷ *GI*, BW IV, 27–31.

¹⁸ *GI*, BW IV, 31; *Scala intellectus sive filum labyrinthi*, BW II, 687–89.

¹⁹ *GI*, BW IV, 31–32; *Prodromi sive anticipationes philosophiae secundae*, BW II, 690–92.

²⁰ *GI*, BW IV, 32–33.

But perhaps the massive incompleteness of the great instauration as outlined in the work of that name is more apparent than real, and so perhaps the crucial question of the value of science constitutes a completed part of the plan. The plan of the *Great Instauration* presents a general picture of the end and method of the new science, rather than the step by step proceeding of the new science to its end. This cannot be otherwise, for parts three, five and six must be incomplete simply because of Bacon's personal mortality.²¹ Since part four is "in fact nothing more than an application of the second part in detail and at large,"²² the first and second parts, which are provided, present the thematic core of the plan, for the coherence and intelligibility of the plan does *not* depend on its being complete or immediately completable. Bacon makes this point in a subtle way when he explains the incompleteness of part six. Bacon says that part six would "disclose and set forth that philosophy by which the legitimate, chaste, and severe course of inquiry which I have explained and provided is at length developed and established."²³ In the light of Bacon's remarks in the preface and in the descriptions of parts three and five, it goes without saying that part six must be beyond hope of completion for Bacon. Bacon's personal mortality prevents his giving a full account of the completely developed penetration, understanding, and conquest of nature. But Bacon does *not* say that the picture of the end of science, the condition where "human knowledge and power do really meet in one," is inconceivable. Rather, he says that the fortune of the human race, which will give issue to Bacon's beginning, cannot *easily* be conceived or imagined.²⁴ This means, of course, that with difficulty man's fortune can be conceived or imagined. The human possibilities illuminated by the new science of nature can be articulated before the step-by-step way of the new science is fully presented or completed. By the implication of his own words, Bacon's claim that part six is simply incompletable is less than strictly true.

Since part six can be completed before the perfection of method and before the specific content of the new science is completed, then if it exists, it must be a description of human life liberated or being liberated in the way that the new science promises to liberate. If part six exists, it must be a description of human life liberated "to some degree" from the "necessities and miseries of humanity,"²⁵ and that degree will be measured by the preservation of the corruptible things. We must look to Bacon's corpus to see if such a de-

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 21, 29–33.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 31.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

scription exists, and the writing that is the obvious candidate is the *New Atlantis*. The *New Atlantis* presents the picture of a society of men dedicated to the pursuit of science and so to the end governing the pursuit of science. Other than the description of the scientific institution, the longest description of the society visited by the sailors is the description of the festival celebrating the procreation and preservation of the human body, surely the most important of the corruptible things.

However much the preceding argument may be true, it does not alter the obvious fact that the *New Atlantis* is incomplete. The work that would treat the virtue of science in the light of human ends and perfection is incomplete, and so all we have discovered is that the incompleteness of the *New Atlantis* reflects the crucial disunity of Bacon's teaching as a whole. But lest we give up the chase in disgust, we must be reminded of Bacon's remark in the description of part six. The imagining and conceiving of man's scientific fortune is possible but difficult. The pressing task must be to explore the way of this difficulty and the reason for it.

The *New Atlantis* and the Whole of Bacon's Teaching

Next to the title, obvious incompleteness is the most obtrusive characteristic of the *New Atlantis*. But what is omitted because of the formal incompleteness? According to the traditional account, the *New Atlantis* is incomplete because it does not contain a teaching about government or political rule. We noted that the traditional account still obtains, but if we have been correct so far, the very worth of Bacon's teaching depends on the falsity of this account. Since a comprehensive account of the human good must include an account of government, the question of the traditional view of the incompleteness of the *New Atlantis* becomes the most important question guiding any approach to Bacon's teaching.

A first glance at the *New Atlantis* both supports and subverts the traditional account. On the one hand, the *New Atlantis* is not simply silent about government. We learn that Bensalem is a monarchy, and much of the *New Atlantis* is an account of the origin of Bensalemite law and a description of its customs. On the other hand, this apparently sketchy information would hardly seem to be a comprehensive account of the best form of commonwealth. If we are to discern how the *New Atlantis* is a comprehensive description of human perfection facilitated by science, we must discern how the sketchy political information could possibly be a whole or complete part of a complete teaching about the true, scientific human good. A reconsideration of the place of the *New Atlantis* in the plan of Bacon's great instauration provides the necessary clue for this discernment.

If we are correct to view the *New Atlantis* as the image or pattern of human life where knowledge and power do really meet in one, then it must be the end that governs the articulation of parts one and two of the *Great Instauration*. The need for the new method and the announcement of the sufficient and deficient sciences is governed by human possibilities that determine the fortune of the human race, for it is this fortune that will give issue to Bacon's account of beginnings.²⁶ There must be a harmony between the content of the *New Atlantis* and the content of parts one and two of the *Great Instauration*. If there is a particular way in which these parts are incomplete, it must be reflected in the incompleteness of the *New Atlantis*. Thus if there is a particular way in which the *Novum Organum* and the division of the sciences are incomplete, it will provide a positive determination of just how the *New Atlantis* is incomplete. But if we find such a positive determination, is it not the discovery of fool's gold? Would not such a positive determination simply confirm the worthlessness of Bacon's work? We must hope that the positive determination of incompleteness provides the determination of the completeness of Bacon's teaching.

The positive determination of incompleteness is not to be found in the incompleteness of the *Novum Organum*, which presents the new inductive method in but a "summary" form "digested into aphorisms." In the light of Bacon's remarks about his personal mortality and hopes for the completion of his project, it is clear that the account of method need not be fully articulated in order for the plan of his instauration to be complete as an outline of proper directions and ends. This does not apply to the division of the sciences, however, because the particularization of the deficient and sufficient sciences is determined by the human possibilities that constitute man's fortune. The exact determination of the means to the perfection of these sciences, the actual fulfillment of their content, can and must wait for the labor of others. The positive determination of the incompleteness of the *New Atlantis* depends on the determination of the incompleteness of the division of the sciences.

In the *Great Instauration*, Bacon openly informs the reader that the division of the sciences is incomplete. The heading of the first part of the *Great Instauration* declares that the first part is "wanting," although "some account of them will be found in the Second Book of the 'Proficiency and Advancement of Learning, Divine and Human.'" ²⁷ But in the dedication of *An Advertisement Touching An Holy War*, Bacon asserts that the expanded, Latin version of his "book of Advancement of Learning" will "serve in lieu of the first part of the Instauration and acquit [his]

²⁶ *GI*, BW IV, 32.

²⁷ BW IV, 35.

promise in that part."²⁸ This contradiction is important for two reasons. First, the translation and expansion of the *Advancement of Learning*, the *De Augmentis*, does not significantly change the determination of the sciences judged to be lacking or insufficient.²⁹ Second, it is very curious that Bacon did not announce the completeness of part one in the *De Augmentis* itself. Rather, he chose to make this important announcement in a fragment that is apparently unrelated to the division of the sciences. Bacon was certainly aware of the importance of the announcement; although he did not include it in the *De Augmentis*, he instructed Rawley to translate and publish the *Advertisement* even though it was to remain as an incomplete fragment.³⁰ Bacon's strange indirectness can be understood only by understanding how the claim of the *Great Instauration* and the claim of the *Advertisement* can be consistent. That is, Bacon's strange indirectness can be understood only by discerning how the division of the sciences, and so also the *New Atlantis*, can be both complete and incomplete. It appears that we have begun to find our clue: however we find the division of the sciences to be incomplete, we must be prepared to discover that that incompleteness is a positive part of a whole or complete teaching about man's scientific fortune.

Bacon provides an explicit standard of completeness for part one in his description of that part in the *Great Instauration*. He says that in the division of the sciences it is his intention "not merely to set down a simple title or a concise argument of that which is wanting," but "(provided it be a matter of any worth) to take care to subjoin either directions for the execution of such a work, or else a portion of the work itself executed by myself as a sample of the whole: thus giving assistance in every case by work or by counsel."³¹ In the *Novum Organum*, Bacon asserts that his new method is "certainly meant" to apply to natural philosophy, logic, ethics, and politics.³² Of these important sciences, only politics is listed merely by mention of "simple title" in the *Advancement of Learning*.

²⁸ *Advertisement Touching An Holy War*, BW VII, 13–14.

²⁹ The *De Augmentis* expands, truncates, and rearranges parts of the *Advancement of Learning*. In the *De Augmentis* Bacon adds as a deficient science the noblest part of medicine, the prolongation of life, omits as a deficient "science" the laws to suppress the arts of sensual pleasure, and mentions the defective consideration of the relationship between the rational and irrational parts of the soul. BW IV, 391–97; cf. *Advancement*, BW III, 377–79. These changes strengthen the present case.

³⁰ The *Advertisement Touching An Holy War* was written while the *De Augmentis* was in the hands of translators. Spedding also wonders why the *De Augmentis* was not entitled "Division of the Sciences: Part One of the Great Instauration," BW I, 415–420; cf. BW VII, 3–7.

³¹ *GI*, BW IV, 23.

³² *Novum Organum* I, 127. BW IV, 112.

In the division of the sciences in the *Advancement of Learning*, the study of government is the third part of civil knowledge, the first two parts of which are knowledge of conversation and knowledge of negotiation. Knowledge of conversation is declared to be not deficient and is, therefore, not discussed. However, the two parts of knowledge of negotiation or business, wisdom of counsel and wisdom of pressing a man's own fortune, are explicated in great detail. At one point Bacon provides so many examples that he apologizes for dwelling longer than is "agreeable to the proportion of an example."³³ Thus in the contexts both of the division in general and of civil knowledge in particular, the mention or division of the science of government stands out by its conspicuous violation of Bacon's announced standard of completeness.

The reason for Bacon's silence is not because the science of politics is complete or sufficient, for we know that the new method must be applied to it. Rather, Bacon states explicitly that the study of government or political science is a subject "secret and retired." The reason for this secrecy is that political science is either too hard or not fit to utter.³⁴ It is easy to see why that which is not fit to be uttered must be unuttered, for to speak what must not be spoken is to cause damage or alarm. But why should the difficult be unuttered? There can be but one reason: if the speaking of the difficult is forbidden, it is because as spoken it will cause damage or alarm. The argument from difficulty is assimilated to the argument from unfitness since both are problematic because of possible damage or alarm.

In the *De Augmentis*, the secrecy of political science is demonstrated with even greater emphasis.³⁵ In the *De Augmentis*, Bacon underscores the secrecy of political science by distinguishing between those parts of civil knowledge which do not belong to the secrets of empire. Just as in the *Advancement of Learning*, political science is the third of three parts of civil knowledge. The first, knowledge of conversation, is sufficient. The second, knowledge of negotiation, is deficient and so many examples of such a doctrine are given. Unlike the *Advancement of Learning*, however, the *De Augmentis* emphasizes the secrecy of the third part, political science, by distinguishing between those parts of political science which are deficient and which can be treated, for which he gives examples "according to his custom," and those parts of political science which cannot be mentioned and so which cannot be divided. The reason Bacon gives for his silence is deference to King James who is "such a master"

³³ *Advancement*, BW III, 452; the discussion of Civil Knowledge covers BW III, 445–477.

³⁴ *Advancements*, BW III, 473–76.

³⁵ *De Augmentis*, BW V, 31–110.

in the art of government and to whom the *De Augmentis* and the *Advancement of Learning* were dedicated. But certainly in comparison to the *Advancement of Learning*, Bacon's stance toward the King in the *De Augmentis* is less than deferential. Brevity is not the same as silence, and even so, Bacon is not brief in his examples of the mentionable parts of political science. Again, with greater emphasis laced with audacity, Bacon argues that the reason for his silence is the secret nature of political science.

Bacon's clues disclose how the division of the sciences is incomplete. The division of the sciences articulates the "intellectual globe" that must become harmonious with the "terrestrial globe" for the issue of man's true fortune.³⁶ But although the new harmony between the intellectual and terrestrial globes must include a teaching about government or politics, any comprehensive pattern or plan of these globes, i.e., man's scientific fortune, must be outwardly incomplete because of the unmentionableness of dangerous political science. Since the *New Atlantis* is the image or pattern of man's scientific fortune, the division of the sciences and the *New Atlantis* stand together in a relationship of mutual dependence. Although the *New Atlantis* must be of highest importance as the outline of the human possibilities governing the particularization of the deficient sciences, the division of the sciences must be articulated and followed if true human fortune is to be given issue. Thus the image or pattern illuminated by the *New Atlantis* must be congruous with the principles of the division, and for this reason we must conclude that the *New Atlantis* is incomplete because of the unmentionableness of dangerous political science.

Bacon's clues disclose how the division of the sciences and the *New Atlantis* are incomplete, but they also insist that the division of the sciences is complete, that the duty of part one has been "acquitted," and so they insist that the *New Atlantis* is complete. This means that both the division of the sciences and the *New Atlantis* must contain a teaching about government, but that it must be presented in an informal and indirect way that conforms to the retiredness and secrecy of political science. The *New Atlantis* is incomplete because it presents an image or pattern of scientific perfection that lacks a formal, direct, and open account of political science. The *New Atlantis* is complete because it presents an image or pattern of scientific perfection that includes an informal, indirect, and secret teaching about government that is dangerous and problematic. Our attempt to reach the core of Bacon's teaching directs us to his teaching about human perfection based on man's rule over

nature. But before we can investigate that human utility, we are silently taught that in spite of man's rule over nature and the conquest of nature's corruptibility, the rule of men over men is problematic.

Bacon's articulate silence was governed by an extraordinarily circumspect prudence. This prudence is disclosed by reexamining the way we have come. In the *De Augmentis*, Bacon remarks that if his "leisure time shall hereafter produce anything concerning political knowledge, the work will perchance be either abortive or posthumous." In the meantime he presents those parts of civil knowledge "which do not belong to the secrets of empire" so that all the sciences being "ranged as it were in their proper seats," the seat of political science will not be left vacant.³⁷ In this description Bacon is unclear as to whether the alternative "abortive or posthumous" is meant to be inclusive or exclusive. On the one hand, it would seem that Bacon's description is inclusive, that is, that the political teaching will be either abortive or posthumous and possibly both. For the *New Atlantis* is both abortive and posthumous.³⁸ On the other hand, it would seem that Bacon's description is exclusive, for the division of the sciences, which must mirror the *New Atlantis*, is abortive but nonposthumous. Thus the description of his political teaching is both inclusive and exclusive. Although the *New Atlantis* must mirror the division of the sciences, and vice versa, the *New Atlantis* is the head of Bacon's teaching about man's scientific fortune because it presents an image or pattern of human life as it is lived according to the perfection of natural science. According to our way of discovery, guided by Bacon himself, the combination of the abortive and nonposthumous with the abortive and posthumous illuminates the complete and the posthumous. The combination of the division of the sciences with the *New Atlantis* makes available Bacon's complete teaching by means of the clue given in a political work, *An Advertisement Touching An Holy War*. The latter work is the key, but the door that it opens was presented only after Bacon's death. Bacon's extraordinary prudence underscores the serious importance of its cause: the completeness provided by Bacon's silent or secret political teaching is the completeness of Bacon's most important teaching—the teaching about the human ends and perfection that illuminate the new science of nature and that are facilitated by the new science.

We are now prepared to see how the sketchy political information in the *New Atlantis* completes a whole part of a comprehensive teaching

³⁷ *De Augmentis*, BW V, 79.

³⁶ *GI*, BW IV, 22–23, 32; *Novum Organum* I, 3, 84, II, 1–4, BW IV, 47, 81–82, 119–122; *Advancement*, BW III, 294–95.

³⁸ Although written in its final form in 1624, the *New Atlantis* was published by Rawley in 1627, after Bacon's death.

about the true, scientific human good. The danger of political science is the danger of Bacon's comprehensive teaching about science and man. The serious reader of Bacon must be open to the possibility that Bacon's political teaching is the core of his teaching about the human possibilities freed by the new science of nature. Since the noblest end of the new science is the preservation and resurrection of the human body, the most important of the corruptible things, the limit of that preservation and resurrection may consist in the relations between human bodies rather than in the nature of any or all particular human bodies. But if political science and so the full understanding of the possible relations between human bodies is so dangerous as to require Bacon's circumspect prudence, the serious reader of Bacon must be open to the possibility that the human possibilities freed by the new science are morally problematic in their very perfection. The ground on which Bacon's teaching about science and man comes together is his political science, and we know now why this ground must be elusive. But this elusiveness is ultimately important because of the coexistence of Bacon's explicit optimism and zeal for the conquests of science and the prudent, articulate silence of his central political teaching. Whatever the moral problems and dangers of the new science may be, Bacon intends for mankind to embrace them as a part of man's necessary fortune. Bacon intends for mankind as a whole to embrace a fortune that can be seen in its entirety only by those men who are the most courageous and resolute.

If the combined completeness and incompleteness of the *New Atlantis* issue in a dangerous teaching about government, just how is the *New Atlantis* complete and incomplete, and what does the *New Atlantis* reveal about the dangerous political problem of man's scientific fortune? The title and final line declaring formal incompleteness are the most obtrusive parts of the *New Atlantis*. "New Atlantis" is not an obvious title. "Bensalem," "Renfusa," or "Salomon's House" would all be more plausible titles, for Atlantis is mentioned only as the country defeated by the ancient Bensalemites and destroyed by natural catastrophe.³⁹ The title calls our attention to another important account of the ancient Atlantis in a way that suggests the reformation or perfection of the ancient Atlantis. The other account, to which Bacon explicitly refers, is that of Plato. Since Bacon's title is less than obvious, the connection between the ancient Atlantis and Bensalem is obscure. But the less than obvious title openly directs our attention to Plato's account in the *Timaeus* and *Critias*, and so to the ends of the old and new stories. For like Bacon's story, the *Critias* is incomplete. Plato's dialogue breaks off

just as Zeus, angered by the prideful insolence of Atlantis, prepares to announce his intended chastisement of Atlantis to the assembly of the gods. Thus we are uninformed of Zeus' punishing that was to moderate and harmonize the Atlantians.⁴⁰ That Bacon repeats the incompleteness of the *Critias* appears strange in the light of the title. Since the title suggests the reformation or perfection of the ancient Atlantis, one would expect the opposite of what in the *Critias* insures the imperfection or defectiveness of Atlantis. One would expect the *New Atlantis* to be finished so as to illuminate the true perfection of Atlantis.

In comparison to the *Critias*, however, the *New Atlantis* is a finished story. Whereas the speech of Zeus that would describe the defect and future perfection of Atlantis is omitted, the speech of the Father of Salomon's House that describes the "true state of Salomon's House," the "noblest foundation" ever upon the earth and the "lanthorn" of Bensalem, is provided to reveal the perfection of the new Atlantis for "the good of other nations."⁴¹ So although the story is declared to be incomplete, it is not transparently clear in what the incompleteness of the *New Atlantis* consists, how the title is related to the final line, and how the new Atlantis is related to the old. As directed by Bacon's circumspect prudence, we know that to penetrate the *New Atlantis* is to penetrate the unity or completeness of Bacon's comprehensive teaching about science and man, and we know that the core of that teaching may be a teaching about political science. We can determine the latter possibility only by working through the *New Atlantis* to see if the directions and content of a political teaching can be found. But whatever the directions and content may be, we can pursue them only by careful attention to Bacon's prudent and circumspect way. In the *New Atlantis*, Bacon teaches by what he does not say as guided by what he does say, and by the careful combination of his articulate silence with an indirect but available structure of allusions.

Arrival in Bensalem

The story narrated in the *New Atlantis* consists of two overlapping major themes. The first major theme depicts the changing character of the sailors who visit Bensalem and who ultimately become the announcers of Bensalem's virtues. This first theme is itself twofold: its first section tells of the plight of the sailors, who are at the mercy of nature's necessity and chance and who consider themselves to be unfree; the second section tells of the sailors' experiences after they come to regard

⁴⁰ δίκην ἀντοῖς ἐπιθεῖναι βουληθεῖς, ἵνα γένωντο ἐμμελέστεροι σωφρονισθέντες *Critias* 120d6–121c4; cf. 106a–b8. See *Timaeus* 22a, 25a–25b6; *Phaedrus* 278d7; *Laws* 676ff.

⁴¹ *NA*, BW III, 145, 156, 166.

³⁹ *New Atlantis*, hereafter, *NA*, BW III, 141–44.

themselves as free men.⁴² The second major theme of the story depicts the revelation of Bensalem to the sailors. It is composed of four sections. The first section portrays the way the sailors are received by the Bensalemites; the second section presents a history of Bensalem that explains its Christianity and laws of secrecy; the third section describes the current practices that extol and control Bensalemite erotic behavior; and the fourth section presents a description of the House of Salomon by the Father.⁴³ The two major themes overlap and intersect. The cut between the two sections of the first major theme is also the cut between the second and third sections of the second major theme. This shared cut is the sailors' declaration of their liberation. Taken together, the two major themes combine to form a third major theme that springs from the story as a whole. This third theme presents the revelation of Bensalem to the rest of the world, and since the intersection of the first two constituent themes is the sailors' declaration of their liberation, we must wonder whether and why liberation is necessary for their becoming the announcers of Bensalem.

Although the liberation of the sailors and the revelation to them of Bensalem come together to form the universal revelation of Bensalem, the two revelations are not identical. The difference between them consists precisely in the degree or fullness of revelation. Although the sailors, through the narrator, tell all that they know, the Bensalemites do not tell all that *they* know.⁴⁴ The sailors are not told all there is to know of Bensalem's laws of secrecy, and this must seem strange in the light of the central deed of the story. This deed is the unveiling of Bensalem and its exposure to the rest of the world, which eliminates the need for the laws of secrecy. The universal revelation that subverts the reason for secrecy is itself limited by secrecy. Thus, only a careful study of the story will provide a complete revelation that unveils the secrecy inherent in the revelation of Bensalem to the sailors and the world. Only a comprehensive understanding of this secrecy illuminates the true nature of the sailors' liberation and the liberation of their worldwide audience.

The sailors are speakers of Spanish and English and are, therefore, representatives of the early European masters of exploration. The narrator begins by relating how the men became subject to the vicissitudes of wind and sea, which they take to be the product of God's providence.⁴⁵ Their

predicament is not their fault, for they have taken care to make "good spare of their victuals." In response to God's inhospitable providence, the men display lax or superficial piety and pray only when their bodies are in danger. No mention of prayer is made in describing their departure; we are not told if a priest is on board, and the men pray only for survival, not for the forgiveness of sin. The prayer, beseeching God, who "showeth His wonders in the deep," makes obvious reference to Psalms 107:23–32, where God rains great storms to terrify men in ships only to redeem them and bring them to their "desired haven." A close look reveals that Bacon reverses the Psalmist's story. Though strong winds afflict the sailors, it is these same strong winds, not calm, that bring them to a haven that is at first not desired. While the men of the psalm do nothing to help themselves, and "reel and stagger" and come to their "wits' end," Bacon's sailors do all in their power to save themselves, turning to prayer only as a last resort. Although the sailors refer to God as creator, His creating is mentioned in the context of scarcity of victual and hostility of sea. Comparison of Bacon's "psalm" to that of the psalmist underscores the superficial piety of the sailors and suggests a contrast between their own prudent responsibility and the irresponsibility of divine providence. At this point in the narrative, the sailors are ignorant of the House of Salomon and hence are ignorant of the possible Bensalemite control of wind and sea.⁴⁶ Bacon's change in the psalm, then, suggests the possibility that the providence displayed in the *New Atlantis* replaces the providence of an irresponsible and hostile creator. Thus in the beginning, the sailors' ignorance of Bensalemite science causes them to seek final refuge in the bonds of heavenly grace; this ignorance and their gradual enlightenment provide the background for their liberation.

In contrast to what has become of Plato's Atlantis,⁴⁷ Bensalem is an island naturally open to ships, although access to the port and city is strictly controlled by law. The Bensalemites are "humane" but prudent: the "man of place" or high rank claims to worry only about disease but stays "a flightshot" away. The accounts of the first encounters and of the sailors' going ashore are characterized by unusual procedures and events.⁴⁸ The sailors learn gradually that tips are scorned in Bensalem as double payment. The Bensalemites are very concerned with the precise limitation of rewards and with the prevention of "extras" or petty bribes. A second kind of tip, the sailors' promise of God's "reward" to the Bensalemite officer, while not scorned, is met with silence—a

⁴² The two sections of the first major theme are: *NA*, BW III, (1) 129–147, (2) 147–166.

⁴³ The four sections of the second major theme are: *Ibid.*, (1) pp. 129–136, (2) pp. 136–147, (3) pp. 147–154, (4) pp. 154–166.

⁴⁴ *NA*, BW III, 135, 136, 139–40, 144, 146; cf. 156.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 129.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 157.

⁴⁷ See *Critias* 113c.

strange reaction for a Christian man. The oath required of the sailors illuminates this strange reaction. Before the sailors are allowed to come ashore, they must swear "by the merits" of Jesus that they are not pirates and have not shed blood "lawfully or unlawfully" within forty days. The conditions of the oath refer merely to the tainting of recent bloodshed and make no distinction between lawful and unlawful killing. With respect to righteousness, this is a contradiction of the Old Law, which makes a distinction between lawful and unlawful killing.⁴⁹ Taken together, the oath and the "psalm" hint that Bensalemite law provides a grace superior to that of Christ, that Bensalemite law surpasses both the Old and New Laws, but in a way that would count recent killing worse than old murder. Bensalem acknowledges the human lust for blood, and its law permits an oath that obscures the difference between killing and murder.

The men go ashore and are confined for three days while their sick are cured by the marvelous medicine of Bensalem. During their confinement the narrator addresses the sailors, likening their situation to that of Jonah and suggesting that they behave with restraint because their hospitable confinement may be a pretext for careful scrutiny by the Bensalemites. The differences between the sailors' plight and that of Jonah are obvious. Jonah fled from divine command, while the sailors travel for exploration or money or both. God sent a tempest to buffet Jonah, while strong winds of suspicious origin firmly guide the sailors to their destiny. Jonah subjected himself to bodily harm, while the sailors appear solely concerned to avoid bodily harm. Jonah brought tidings of destruction and learned a lesson in pity, while the sailors bring no such tidings but do learn something of pity.⁵⁰ While Jonah obeys divine command, the sailors obey only Bensalemite command. It is in this context that the sailors first mention the well-being of the soul, although the reason for their concern is explicitly utilitarian, and weal of body is mentioned in the same breath with weal of the soul. Thus, comparison of Bacon's Jonah with the biblical Jonah again suggests that Bensalem offers a grace that surpasses the power of divine grace to save or preserve body and soul. Like Jonah, the sailors learn something about pity, but, since the grounds of that pity may be a new kind of grace, we must wonder whether in Bensalem a new kind of pity will replace divine pity.

The sequel to the narrator's speech illuminates the unseemliness that lies beneath the outward hospitality of Bensalemite ways. The narrator's suspicions are confirmed.⁵¹ With the next visit of a Bensalemite official we learn that the sailors still fear for their lives but that this fear is dampened by the speech and offer of the official. The sailors are informed that they may be told some things they will not be unwilling to hear. Providing they do not go beyond one "Karan" from the city walls without special leave, the state will allow them to stay for six weeks or more, and if they have any request, they must not fear to ask it of the Bensalemites because their countenances will not be "made to fall." All this is possible because the Strangers' House is rich; it has been thirty-seven years since any strangers have visited.

The official's remark that the sailors may be told some things that will be happily heard indicates other things that would be unhappily heard. This points to the possible grounds of Bensalemite inhospitality and the narrator's earlier concern. The offer to stay comes after the three days of confinement. Since the Bensalemites study ways to control wind and sea, there may be another reason for the wealthiness of the Strangers' House. The Strangers' House could be rich simply because the Bensalemites have chosen not to spend their wealth on men they have previously brought to the island. The governor of course speaks only of a lack of visitors, but the power of Bensalemite science to draw "visitors" to its shores and the necessary laws of secrecy illuminate the harsh reality feared by the narrator.⁵² For when the governor-priest later explicates King Solamona's laws of secrecy, he remarks that no strangers have been detained against their will and that the sailors must think that anything reported by returning strangers would be "taken where they came but for a dream."⁵³ In the sequel, however, it is said that the missions of the Fellows of Salomon's House (the scientific institution) are strictly governed by the laws of secrecy.⁵⁴ This of course reflects the reason for the laws of secrecy: protection from corruption or attack by foreigners who might change or despoil the island.⁵⁵ Surely, then, the laws of secrecy assume the credulousness of non-Bensalemite peoples. The final revelation of the House of Salomon, meant as it is "for the good of other nations," also presupposes such credulousness.⁵⁶ The conclusion that must be drawn is obvious. Until the visit of the sailors, no strangers left Bensalem, and those who were unwilling to stay must have been imprisoned or killed.

⁴⁹ Exodus 20:13; 21:12-14; Numbers 35:9-34; Deut. 5:17. The Bible requires the exile of the manslayer because of the avenger's desire for revenge. See Maimonides, *Guide of the Perplexed* III, 40, 41. With respect to the sailors, the oath must be necessary only because of the danger of the killer's bloodlust.

⁵⁰ *NA*, BW III, 154.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 135-36.

⁵² See below, n. 97.

⁵³ *NA*, BW III, 145.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 146.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 144.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 166.

The Bensalemites are outwardly moderate, humane, and Christian, but a close examination of their oath and their laws suggests the subversion of divine law and the extreme opposite of hospitality. In this light, the seemingly commonplace and polite offer that gilds the Bensalemites' ambiguous hospitality must be viewed with circumspection. The offer is an open offer; the official says that *any* request will be met. Bacon modestly fails to mention the most notorious need of disembarking sailors, but we may now wonder if the offer goes beyond the healthy lust of seamen. The offer can be fully understood only in the light of Joabin's later mention of "Lot's Offer,"⁵⁷ but at this point we know that although all things may not be told, all things may be requested. If the Bensalemites' policy toward unwanted visitors may require murder unrestrained by divine or civil law, we may wonder whether for some wanted visitors, no request by such visitors will be too base.

The first part of the *New Atlantis* shows that the Bensalemite hospitality offered to the unliberated sailors suggests a combination of restraint and excess. The sailors are capable of great restraint: for the sake of their bodies and souls they restrain their use of victuals, restrain their "vices and unworthiness," and accept the travel limitation in spite of the inflammation of their hearts. Yet even this restraint is not at first as extensive as Bensalemite restraint, for they only gradually conform to the Bensalemite scorn of tips. But Bensalemite restraint, like Bensalemite Christianity and humanity, is beclouded by the harshness and baseness suggested by ambiguous hospitality. This hospitality hints at the coherence of moral opposites but not in a formally open way, and the secrecy of the *New Atlantis* illuminates the obscure grounds of the explicit secrecy of Bensalem. Bacon directs our attention to the possibility that the imperatives governing the choice and reception of visitors as the announcers of science necessitate the opposites of Bensalem's outward hospitality and restraint. The propagation of Bensalemite perfection is not immune from the possible problem of immoral means for moral ends. The important question is whether this problem is the sole root of Bensalem's secrecy. If it is, the *New Atlantis* must appear to be incomplete because of a problem that is overcome with the perfection of science. If it is not, the *New Atlantis* must appear to be incomplete because of a problem at the heart of man's scientific fortune.

Bensalem's Past: The Histories

Since the sailors are ignorant of Bensalem while the Bensalemites know about the sailors, the sailors are permitted to ask questions about Bensalem and its people. The questions prompt

the governor-priest to relate the religious and institutional histories of Bensalem, which illuminate the nature of Bensalemite secrecy and the nature of the sailors' liberation.⁵⁸

The first question asks about the nature of Bensalem's conversion to Christianity. The answer relates an instance of the miracle of revelation but is actually a subversion of divine revelation. For the implication of the wise man's prayer is that scientific speech must be the vehicle for divine miracles. Miracles must be "acknowledged" and "testified" for people by a man with the requisite scientific knowledge. Without this acknowledgment it would be impossible to discern true miracles from art, natural phenomena, fraud, or illusion. In the Bible, however, discursive speech is distinguished from miracles or signs; the miracles of God are meant to circumvent the need for speech. There is, therefore, no biblical distinction between true and false miracles but only between true and false speech, between true and false prophecy. Bacon, however, assimilates the veracity of prophecy to the veracity of miracles, and the result of this assimilation is the debunking of both. In the *Advancement of Learning*, Bacon implies that there can be no standard for verifying miracles as distinct from natural oddities because both are by nature rare. Thus there can be no certain distinction between true miracles and tales or impostures.⁵⁹ Insofar as Bensalem holds the wise man of Salomon's House to be the necessary judge of miracles, it invokes a natural scientific standard that is necessary and yet inapplicable. The Bensalemite test for veracious miracles debunks the status of miracles altogether. Bacon includes in this debunking not just the miraculous transmission of previously revealed divine speech, but also an original miracle of divine revelation. Without trustworthy divine revelation, the shepherding of Christ or divine providence is impossible.⁶⁰ Bensalem's saving and liberation of the sailors has nothing to do with God's claim to save and to liberate.

It is in the context of the debunking history of revelation that the names of the *New Atlantis* are revealed. The island is called "Bensalem," and the city on the eastern coast is called "Renfusa." Bensalem is a word of obvious Hebrew origin and is fashioned from the words "ben" and "šalem." The compound would be rendered "son or offspring of completeness, safety and peace." Bensalem, then, is the offspring of completeness as the product of science and scientific rule; Bensalem is

⁵⁸ *NA*, BW III, 136–147.

⁵⁹ *Advancement*, BW III, 287–88. See below, nn. 65–67.

⁶⁰ Not only does the Bible fail to mention judges of miracles from Bensalem's House of Salomon, but the biblical King Solomon's natural history is lost and is not a part of the canon. *Advancement*, BW III, 298–99; 1 Kings 4:33.

⁵⁷ *NA*, BW III, 153. See below, p. 881, n. 89.

the product of the completion or perfection of human knowledge and so represents the harmony of the possible intellectual and terrestrial globes. In spite of the formal incompleteness of the story, the name of the island explicitly suggests completeness and perfection. Bensalem is a complete and perfected model of the end of Bacon's great instauration. The island's name is revealed just before the veracity and hence the worth of divine revelation is debunked. Bensalem's perfection is independent of divine shepherding or providence.⁶¹ All the more important, then, is the name of the city, which is probably the port visited by the sailors.⁶² "Renfusa" is a combination of the Greek words *ρήν* and *φύσις*, which would be rendered "sheeplike" or "sheep-natured." Since sheep are in need of a shepherd, it is clear that the shepherd of the Bensalemites is not the debunked shepherd of divine revelation, but, rather, the independent perfection of science and scientific rule. The ambiguous relation of the shepherd to his flock is, therefore, not to be overlooked. If the history of Bensalem replaces the history of providence, it must be asked how and to what degree the Bensalemites are, in fact, sheep. The answer to this query more fully illuminates the saving and liberation of the sailors.

The speech about Bensalem's history repeats the replacement of divine providence by Bensalemitic rule and reveals a problem inherent in that rule; it illuminates the relation between sheep and shepherd. The history follows the account of Bensalem's Christianization and provides a partial answer to the sailors' query about Bensalem's secrecy. The first part explains why the rest of the world has no intercourse with Bensalem, and the second part explains why the Bensalemites remain hidden from the world in spite of Bensalem's intercourse with the rest of the world.⁶³ The civil history of Bensalem is the history of the coming of scientific rule. It must be noted at the outset that a history of Bensalem is a history of the perfection of science and as such is the perfection of human history. Thus Bacon's remarks about civil history in the division of the sciences are of great importance for understanding the civil history of Bensalem.⁶⁴

In the *Advancement of Learning*, Bacon likens the three kinds of civil history to three kinds of pictures or images: unfinished, perfect, and de-

faced.⁶⁵ Thus there are three kinds of civil history: memorials, perfect histories, and antiquities. Perfect histories are either of times, lives, or actions. The history of times, which is the most complete kind of civil history, is distributed by God's providence and is divided into the antiquities of the world, the history of Greece and Rome, and modern history. Although the history of times and divine providence are linked, Bacon makes no mention of the history of God's works—the Bible—in his discussion of the history of times. Rather, he treats the two parts of the Bible, the history of prophecy and the history of providence, as parts of a separate discussion of ecclesiastical history.⁶⁶ But in the first part of the *Advancement of Learning*, Bacon argues that ecclesiastical history often errs because miracles are too often given easy credit by "the people" only later to be esteemed old wives' tales or impostures. But at this crucial point in the *Advancement of Learning*, Bacon gives no hint as to what the criteria for judging the veracity of miracles may be. Rather, he contrasts his silence on this point to the mention of the standard of veracity in natural history: rareness and seeming incredibility. The standard of natural history only emphasizes his silence, for this standard cannot be used to discriminate between miracles because miracles are by definition rare and seemingly incredible.⁶⁷ The unstated implication must be that there are no criteria for judging the veracity of miracles and that proper acceptance of miracles is simply indistinguishable from ignorance, superstitious simplicity, and politic toleration. In this respect, the *New Atlantis* is in perfect accord with the teaching of the division of the sciences.

Since the veracity of the Bible depends on the miracle of revelation, and since the demonstrable veracity of miracles is debunked, the Bible can prudently be taken only as a human document with human limitations. Since it is neither the history of Greece and Rome nor modern history, and since it purports to divide times and declare the end of days, the Bible can at best be the remaining kind of the civil history of times: it can at best be the antiquity of God's providence. But since antiquities are "defaced" and "subject to the shipwrecks of time," the Scriptures must be defective history rather than perfect history. With circumspect prudence, Bacon argues that the history of God's providence is simply a defective and incomplete part of civil history. If there is an end of days, it can be declared only by a completed, per-

⁶¹ The vehicle of Bensalemitic perfection, the natural science of the House of Salomon, comes to Bensalem before the saving grace of Jesus. See below, p. 878.

⁶² The sailors are brought to Bensalem by a "wind from the south, with a point east." *NA*, BW III, 129. Thus the wind came from the south-east and would have caused them to land on the eastern shore of the island. Renfusa is a city on the eastern shore of the island.

⁶³ *NA*, BW III, 139–143, 143–47.

⁶⁴ *Advancement*, BW III, 333–37.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 340–42. In the *De Augmentis* Bacon treats ecclesiastical history as a part of civil history. *De Augmentis*, BW IV, 243–44. Again, this minor change strengthens the present argument.

⁶⁷ *Advancement*, BW III, 287–88. Of course, this is the standard used in Bensalem.

fect, universal history of times that is *not* the history of God's works.

Bacon argues that a perfected or completed history of times *is* possible in a proper history of Great Britain, which is "after the manner of the sacred history" because both relate the uniting of separated kingdoms.⁶⁸ Bacon implies that completed or perfected modern history will replace the sacred history in dividing times and declaring the end of days. Modern history in the form of a proper history of Great Britain will distribute the history of times and proclaim the end of days, which means that the proper history of Great Britain will declare completed or perfected human nature.

In his mention of the sacred history, Bacon refers only to the "story of the Ten Tribes and of the Two Tribes as twins together." In the context that points to the inherent limitation of sacred history, Bacon limits the sacred history to the period from the Exodus to the united Davidic monarchy. He makes no mention of the second empire or monarchy, the empire of Jesus Christ. It is, then, not immediately clear how perfectible modern history replaces the history of divine providence. While modern or perfected history replaces the claim of Christ to save, it is not clear whether the modern replacement of providence takes account of the difference between David and Jesus. From the standpoint of pious Christianity, which characterizes the outward appearance of Bensalemite society, this distinction is of paramount importance. The difference between the old and new covenants consists in the saving grace of Jesus whose divine and human perfection contrasts with the defects of the first of the House of David. Bacon's silence with respect to this crucial difference is striking. It suggests that the difference is of no importance and points to the possibility that perfected modern history, which proclaims perfected human nature, preserves the fundamental characteristic of Davidic-Solomonic hegemony. As any schoolboy knows, the rule of David and his successors was characterized by the sexual excesses and sins of David and the prophecy of Nathan. Thus if perfected modern history preserves the fundamental characteristic of Davidic hegemony, the human perfection it announces will be characterized by Davidic excess. Bacon's discussion of perfected civil history tells us what to note in his example of perfected civil history; if the example excludes the distinction between David and Jesus, we must wonder about the nature of scientific human perfection or completeness.

Bacon argues that the perfection of science will be coeval with the "circling of the earth, as the

heavenly bodies do."⁶⁹ That is, the perfection of science will be coeval with the circumnavigation of the terrestrial globe. Bensalem, of course, represents the possibility of such circumnavigation, and the sailors have been shown to represent the European masters of exploration, the Spanish and the English. The narrator writes in English, and we wonder if this does not reflect Spanish subservience to English exploration. Thus the sailing of the men to Bensalem represents the future way of Great Britain to the perfection of science and hence to the fulfillment and perfection of human destiny. The history of Britain's future is, therefore, the history of Bensalem, which ends in the true end of days. It declares the perfection of man, which, as perfect, distributes the history of times and ends the history of times. Thus the history of Bensalem and the history of England converge.⁷⁰ It is all the more important, therefore, to note whether the history of Bensalem as perfected history, or the culmination of man's scientific fortune, admits the crucial distinction between David and Jesus.

The history related by the governor-priest tells the stories of Altabin's triumph over the insolent Atlantians, the institution by king Solamona of Salomon's House, and the institution of the Bensalemite laws of secrecy. As we should expect, the civil history of Bensalem contains the history of the coming of science. From the clues provided by the governor-priest, the chronology of Bensalemite history can be reconstructed, as well as the date of the sailors' voyage.⁷¹ If the "six score years" since navigation has begun to increase be reckoned from the obvious beginning of European navigation, 1492, the sailor's voyage takes place in 1612.⁷² The time referred to as "three thousand years ago" would, then, be 1388 B.C., 458 years before the biblical Solomon completed the temple in 930 B.C., and the date of king Solamona's reign, which brought Salomon's House, would be 288 B.C. The first mention of Bensalem's past is before the acme of Davidic greatness, and the event

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 340.

⁷⁰ It is of course unimportant whether England or another country was to be the bearer of modern history. Bacon's choice is properly patriotic, but the important points are that only modern history is said to be perfectible, and that Bensalem is the model of life governed by modern science, which is the principle of human perfection.

⁷¹ See Howard B. White, *Peace Among the Willows: The Political Philosophy of Francis Bacon* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968), pp. 104 n. 30, 121–22.

⁷² This date puts the voyage after the publication of the *Advancement of Learning* and before the *Novum Organum* and *De Augmentis*, and it provides a clue to the primacy of the *Advancement of Learning* in the whole of Bacon's writings. The division of the sciences contained in the *Advancement of Learning* provides the description of the intellectual globe that will tame and conquer the terrestrial globe. Cf. White, pp. 104 n. 30, 121–22, 197–98.

⁶⁸ *Advancement*, BW III, 336.

heralding the completion of Bensalemite greatness—Solamona's institution of the scientific academy—is 642 years after the acme of Davidic greatness. Thus the history and perfection of Bensalem as the model for human perfection is chronologically within the era of David's sin and Nathan's prophecy. Bensalem's perfection predates the coming of Christ; in spite of the Bensalemite replacing of Christ's saving and Christ's kingdom, the replacement of Bensalemite (English) history for sacred history excludes the distinction between Jesus and David. Although we can identify pre-Davidic beginnings of Bensalem, we cannot find a post-Davidic past and so an event that would obviate the prophecy of Nathan. Thus Bacon's remarks about history and his example of perfected history come together; the distinction between Jesus and David is no part of the human perfection that replaces the promise of sacred history. Unless the advent of Solamona's reign explicitly obviates the prophecy of Nathan, we can expect the characteristics of Bensalem's Davidic past to be manifest in its post-Christian but "Davidic" present, which is England's and mankind's future. This important possibility can be finally accepted only after an examination of Bensalem's present and the speech of Joabin. It should be noted, however, in addition to the obvious implication of Joabin's name, that the unit of measure in Bensalem is the "Karan," a Hebrew word that can mean a ruler of the House of David and a horn.⁷³

Bacon's account of Bensalem's early encounter with the Atlantians (Coyans) makes explicit reference to Plato's account of Atlantis and Athens in the *Timaeus* and *Critias*. Important differences and distortions separate the two accounts, however, and suggest a Baconian revision of Plato's teaching about nature's necessity, and excess and moderation. Plato teaches that the Athenians defeated the technically advanced but insolent, prideful, and tyrannous Atlantians, and that they magnanimously freed those who dwelled within the bounds of Heracles despite their failure to aid in their own liberation.⁷⁴ Bacon hides the magnanimity of the Athenians by declaring his uncertainty about the identity of the Greeks who, along with the Bensalemites, defeated the invading Atlantians. Rather, he contrasts the ruthlessness of the Athenians (or whoever it was), who destroyed every ship and man of the invading Atlantians (Tyrambelians), with the extraordinary humanity and clemency of Altabin, the king of the Bensalemites at the time.

In Plato's account, at a later time from the conflict, earthquakes and floods destroyed the entire

body of Athenian warriors and caused the entire island of Atlantis to be swallowed by the sea. The deed no longer lives in Athenian memory because Athens, along with the rest of the world except for the Egyptians, was subject to "many and diverse destructions of mankind, of which the greatest are by fire and water, and lesser by countless other means."⁷⁵ In Plato's account, Egyptian antiquity depends upon the combination of memory and piety, for although they are immune from rain and fire because of the fortuitous presence of the Nile, they are not immune from earthquakes.⁷⁶ In Plato's account, then, both the moderate and the insolent were destroyed by nature's ravages; the distinction between them was preserved only in the mnemonic speech of the pious Egyptians. In Bacon's account, while Atlantis and the rest of the world are destroyed by "accidents of time," which consist of violent natural destruction or slow natural decay, the Bensalemites are saved from such destruction by the coming of science. Nature's power to destroy wholly is overcome; no one suffers the total annihilation of Plato's Atlantis. Thus, for Bacon, Bensalem combines the deeds of the Athenians (Greeks) and the surviving antiquity of Egypt. The difference between Egypt and Bensalem consists in the difference between piety and natural science. As might be guessed by now, this difference is, for Bacon, simply the difference between nature's chance and the scientific conquest of nature. He is careful to note that "that whole tract is little subject to earthquakes."⁷⁷

For Plato, the distinction between moderate and immoderate deeds can be permanent only in speech, for with respect to the rewards of deeds as such, the moderate and the immoderate are ultimately linked by the indiscriminate chastisement of natural catastrophe and decay. But since Plato teaches that it is not speeches that are permanent and enduring, but rather the intelligible things or *ideas* disclosed by speeches, the enduringly moderate or moderate in itself is in fact twice removed from particular moderate or immoderate deeds.⁷⁸ For Plato, the search for the eternal *ideas* of the human virtues discloses the distinction between theory and practice. The articulation of the eternal *ideas* of the virtues explains the intelligibility of

⁷³ *Timaeus* 21c1–23d1.

⁷⁴ Seth Benardete, "On Plato's *Timaeus* and *Timaeus* Science Fiction," *interpretation*, 2 (Summer, 1971), 30; *Timaeus* 22c1–23a1, 25e8–d7.

⁷⁵ *NA*, BW III, 142. Bacon refers to the natural disaster at once as "Divine Revenge" and as a "main accident of time." *NA*, BW III, 143. It is by no means clear that the destruction of Atlantis in Plato's account is due to divine revenge, for there is no thematic connection between the missing speech of Zeus and the destruction of Atlantis. See *Timaeus* 25c8–d7; *Critias* 121b7–c4; Benardete, p. 30; cf. *Timaeus* 21a7–e1; *Phaedrus* 272c7–278d2.

⁷⁸ *Republic* 474c–480a.

⁷³ Ezekiel 29:21; Psalms 132:17. The verb form means to send out rays or display horns.

⁷⁴ *Timaeus* 24e–25d7; *Critias* 120d6–121c4.

particular deeds as moderate or immoderate, but discloses the indeterminateness of particular deeds as singularly moderate or immoderate. For Bacon, the scientific overcoming of the distinction between speeches and deeds, between theory and practice, consists in the overcoming or conquest of natural catastrophe and decay and results in the permanence of speeches and deeds. As shown by the contrast of Plato's Athens and Atlantis to Bacon's Atlantis and Bensalem, the scientific conquest of natural catastrophe and decay facilitates the permanent and certain distinction between moderate and immoderate deeds. But Bacon has distorted the Platonic account of Atlantis, and our first comparison of the two accounts must be revised. The revision discloses astonishing results.

According to Bacon's distortion, the Athenians were no less ruthless than the Atlantians; the barbarism of the Athenians is contrasted with the extraordinary humanity of Altabin. Yet the Bensalemite overcoming of natural catastrophe and decay as well as necessity and chance, the creation of the perfected combination of Athens and Egypt, is the work of Solamona rather than Altabin.⁷⁹ It is Solamona who brought science to Bensalem and is said to be its lawgiver; it was his intention to perfect the prescientific humanity of Altabin that was subject to natural decay. Yet Solamona's laws are laws of secrecy that contain the harsh reality of the most extreme inhospitality and inhumanity.⁸⁰ Thus the humanity and hospitality of Altabin contrast with the potential inhumanity and inhospitality of Solamona's reign and laws that complete the humanity of Altabin. The humanity perfected by scientific conquest is a problematic humanity. It is in this light that Bacon's distortion of Plato is intelligible. If the deeds preserved by the memory of Egypt reveal no distinction between the moderate and the immoderate, the replacement of Egypt by Bensalem makes eternal the link between the moderate and the immoderate.

But we must not contrast Bacon's version of Plato's Athens with his description of Altabin's

Bensalem. In terms of moral virtue, Plato's Athens and Altabin's Bensalem considered together contrast with Bacon's distorted Athens and Solamona's Bensalem considered together. The proper comparison is between Plato's moderate Athens and the humane Altabin, on the one hand, and Bacon's immoderate Athens and Solamona's Bensalem, on the other hand. Bensalem is a new Atlantis; Bacon's distorted Athens and Bensalem are alike in their immoderation and different only in their different susceptibility to natural catastrophe and decay. Bacon's Bensalem perfects and immortalizes the immoderation of Bacon's distorted Athens, but this means that Bensalem immortalizes the insolent pride of the old Atlantis.

For Plato, the distinction between the moderate and the immoderate is indeterminate with respect to particular human deeds. But while the distinction between the moderate and the immoderate is problematic in deed, the distinction as such is intelligible and is disclosed by the link between ephemeral speeches and the eternal things. Thus while there is no divine speech about justice or moderation, there is human speech that pursues the divine and illuminates the eternal grounds of justice and moderation.⁸¹ Although there can be no certain, demonstrable determination of particular moderate deeds, the theoretical pursuit of the moderate as such moderates the lure of those practical goods for the sake of which men commonly behave in moderate or immoderate ways. The common fate of Athens and Atlantis is not disheartening because human virtue is not determined by the strict superiority of one particular deed over another. Rather, the rough, indeterminate practical distinction between moderate and immoderate deeds, expressed by right opinion, is grounded on the distinction between theory and practice and the consequent superiority of the theoretical to the practical life.⁸²

For Bacon, the scientific conquest of natural catastrophe and decay permits practical life to endure. But the subtle contrast Bacon presents between the old and the new Atlantis suggests that the immortalization of practical life makes eternal the link between moderate and immoderate deeds, and we must wonder if this does not subvert the ground of any possible moderation. For Bacon, like Plato, there is no divine speech about justice and moderation. But unlike Plato, Bacon gives an account of the new Atlantis that is incomplete because of the dangerous, unmentionable product of the new science that will perfect human practice by facilitating the preservation and restoration of the corruptible things. While these suppositions spring from an interpretation of

⁷⁹ The war and natural decay that afflicted the "rest of the world," as distinct from the "main accident of time," took place *after* the beginning of Solamona's rule and the institution of science. We know this because Solamona found an island where the entrance of strangers was frequent and for that reason ordained the prohibitions that "touch the entrance of strangers." *NA*, BW III, 144. Solamona came upon an island that was both "happy and flourishing," and his intention was "to give perpetuity to that which was in his time so happily established." Altabin's name means "twice lofty," and his double loftiness or perfection of humanity and war was incomplete without the third perfection, the perfection of science. Altabin's perfection was defective because of its susceptibility to natural decay and chance.

⁸⁰ See above, p. 874. Solamona's founding laws hide Bensalem's origins by indirectly dictating that recent killing be considered worse than old murder.

⁸¹ *Republic* 377b-383a, 474c-480a, 505a-511e.

⁸² Cf., for instance, *Republic* 611b9-621d3; *Meno* 96d5-100b12.

Bensalem's past, they are confirmed by the revelation of Bensalem's present, upon which the meaning of Bensalem's history and the whole of the *New Atlantis* depend.

Bensalem's Present: The Feast and Joabin's Speech

The cut between Bensalem's past and present corresponds to the cut between the two sections that illustrate the sailors' changes of heart and mind. It is at the juncture between Bensalem's past and present that the sailors exhibit restraint that springs from desire rather than fear and declare their liberation. The historical speeches that proclaim the replacement of divine providence by Bensalem's promise and the laws of secrecy provide the background for the sailors' new-found freedom. Their freedom consists, therefore, in freedom from the limitations on bodily weal that they have known, and in corresponding freedom from the bonds of divine grace or providence.⁸³ The speeches about Bensalem's present illuminate the relation between Bensalem's past and present, which in turn reveals the true nature of the sailors' new restraint and freedom.

The revelation of Bensalem's present consists of two parts: the first is a description of the sum of Bensalem's promise, and the second describes the regulation of that promise. The feast of the Tirsan⁸⁴ (any father of thirty living descendants) is sponsored by the Bensalemite regime and honors the promise of the regime, the preservation and generation of the human body, which shows Bensalem to be "compounded of all goodness." Because of the Bensalemite priority of body over soul, the state of the soul is not the primary consideration in the feast of the Tirsan. Rather, it is "granted to any man that shall live to see thirty persons descended of his body alive together, and all above three years old." At the same time that the festival honors the ultimate priority of body over soul, it reveals the stringent moral restraints imposed by the Bensalemite regime. The regime guarantees, with the power of law, the orders of the Tirsan, on the moral seemliness of his favored family. As we learn from Joabin, Bensalem is the

"virgin of the world"⁸⁵ who sees as the sum of all goodness the preservation and generation of the human body. The feast honors the end of Bensalemite restraint and humanity: the preservation of the human body and the most intense pleasure that accompanies the procreation of human bodies. In the action of the story, the sailors, who restrain body and soul for the sake of the weal of their bodies, show themselves to be open to the promise of Bensalem. While the humane restraint of the Bensalemites appears to reflect the humanity and restraint of Altabin and Solamona, the sequel to the description of the feast reveals the restraint and humanity of Bensalem to be problematic. This problematic restraint and humanity is confirmed by reflection on the relation of the Bensalemite past to the Bensalemite present.

The speech of Joabin explicates the full meaning of the feast.⁸⁶ He is asked about marriage laws and customs because the relation of the feast to the narrator makes him wonder about "nuptial copulation" from which proceeds the "propagation of families." Joabin's remarks consist of a long speech about European and Bensalemite marriage and a short mention of the "Adam and Eve's pools."

Joabin first characterizes European and Bensalemite marriage practices. Whereas Bensalem is the most chaste of nations, "free from all pollution and foulness," and the "virgin of the world," European marriage practices are foul and debauched. In Europe, marriage is "ordained a remedy for unlawful concupiscence," but since Europeans have at hand "a remedy more agreeable to their corrupt will, marriage is almost expelled." For "the depraved custom of change, and the delight in meretricious embracements (where sin is turned into an art) maketh marriage a dull thing and a kind of imposition or tax." The Europeans liken marriage to prostitution when they argue that prostitution, like marriage, should be tolerated because it prevents "greater evils: as advoutries, deflowering of virgins, unnatural lust, and the like." But Joabin says that the Bensalemites hold this argument to be a preposterous wisdom, and they call it "Lot's Offer; who to save his guests from abusing, offered his daughters. . . ."

After a brief interruption by the narrator, Joabin describes the laws that regulate Bensalemite nuptial copulation. There is no polygamy; there is a month wait between first interview and marriage or contract for marriage; marriage without parental consent is "mulcted in the inheritors," (i.e., the children are penalized); and finally, "because of the many hidden defects in men and women's bodies," before a contract is made, one friend of

⁸³ *NA*, BW III, 147. The sailors declare their liberation in the sixteenth paragraph of the story. The sixteenth Essay in the *Essays* treats atheism and is followed by the seventeenth Essay on superstition. The principle of the sixteenth Essay is that any belief about God is better than unbelief. The principle of the seventeenth Essay is that unbelief is better than wrong or heretical belief. Given that such a contradiction must always redound to the benefit of unbelief or atheism, Bacon here makes an argument for atheism. In the seventeenth paragraph the narrator forgets a difference between six and seven days. If Essays sixteen and seventeen come together as a true essay on atheism, the number of Essays is equal to the number of paragraphs in the *New Atlantis*.

⁸⁴ *NA*, BW III, 147–151.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 152.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 151–54.

the potential bride and one friend of the potential groom are permitted to see the bride and groom "severally bathe naked" in the Adam and Eve's pools that are situated near every town.

Joabin's speech is the most important in the *New Atlantis*. Joabin as speaker is of crucial importance: except for the wise man who judged the miracle, Joabin is the only post-Solomonic character described as wise. The Father of Salomon's House, who makes the final speech revealing the "true state" of Salomon's House is *not* described as wise. Not only is Joabin said to be wise, but he is also said to be "learned, . . . of great policy, and excellently seen in the laws and customs of Bensalem." Joabin is, therefore, wise in the study of government or rule, and as such he speaks of the Jewish dreams "from tradition" rather than from conviction of truth.⁸⁷ Joabin knows the Jewish dreams as dreams; as a man wise in general and wise in policy, he transcends the myths of Bensalem. It is as a man wise in general and wise in policy that Joabin exhibits the only comprehensive wisdom in the *New Atlantis*. In terms of explicit description, Joabin's wisdom surpasses even that of the large-hearted founder and lawgiver Solomona. It is all the more important, then, that Joabin's speech illuminates the fundamental problem of Bensalem's promise.

As Bacon has Joabin present it, the Bensalemite characterization of European marriage and prostitution as "Lot's Offer" is subtly inappropriate. Joabin argues that the European practice is to offer daughters (prostitutes or wives) to save other daughters, the potential victims of unnatural lust and rape. But Lot offered his virgin daughters to save male strangers, an act of extraordinary hospitality.⁸⁸ If Joabin's characterization is meant to contrast European and Bensalemite practices—and this is Bacon's intention since the context is an explicit contrast of Bensalem to Europe—Bacon has Joabin express Bensalemite abhorrence of the offering of daughters to save daughters, but has him indirectly approve the offering of daughters for the sake of visiting strangers. The example of "Lot's Offer" points to the Bensalemite offer to the sailors and to Bacon's modest but conspicuous silence regarding the sailors' sexual desires.⁸⁹ By means of subtle allusion and conspicuous silence, Bacon causes Joabin's speech to suggest the Bensalemite

secrecy that hides the immoral means necessary for the propagation and rule of science. Just as restraint is necessary for the propagation and rule of science, so too are laws of secrecy that mask the unrestraint of "unlawful lust" necessary for the proper treatment of necessary strangers.

We are reminded of the harsh alternative to Bensalemite hospitality when the narrator says that Joabin's speech reminds him of his sin as Elias reminded the widow of Sarepta. Bacon causes the narrator to ignore the widow's fear that Elias had come to kill her son.⁹⁰ The laws of secrecy hide Bensalem from the world in more than the obvious way; they mask Bensalem's hospitality and humanity, which can include basely open offers and the inhumane opposite of hospitality. Joabin's speech, which reflects the present practice of the "son of completeness" or perfection, illuminates the immoral means that are necessary for the promise of Bensalem's perfection. The speech reveals the secrecy necessary to overcome the temporal gap between Bensalem as a completed model and the task illuminated by the sailors' odyssey, the way of science to the actual lived reality of the image or model of scientific perfection.

The institution of the Adam and Eve's pools⁹¹ is an important part of Bensalem, which, as the offspring of completeness, is the model of scientific perfection. The institution of the Adam and Eve's pools regulates nuptial copulation by preventing the dissatisfaction with one's own partner made possible by the discovery of the "many hidden defects in men and women's bodies." The noblest end of science is the preservation of the human body. The pools regulate the act of generation and the most intense pleasure preserved by the conquest of bodily decay, they regulate the pleasure that informs the very end of science itself. Joabin's speech also exhibits a second crucial silence or secrecy; his remarks are interrupted at the point where obvious queries about this astonishing institution would naturally arise. Although we know that desire for bodies other than one's own mate's is a potential problem in Bensalem—this is the very reason for the institution of the pools—Bacon causes Joabin to make no mention of possible licentious desire provoked by that which is most conducive to the breakdown of restraint. Thus Bacon ignores the obvious possibility that a friend of a suitor might make a false report of bodily defect because he desired the intended partner for himself, for Bacon is silent about the sex and marital status of the friends. Thus, although Bacon acknowledges the desire for a more perfect or beautiful body and informs us that this

⁸⁷ *NA*, BW III, 151. The narrator does not simply ascribe the Jewish dreams to Joabin but, rather, says that "surely this man . . . would ever acknowledge" them. He is careful to point out that Joabin espouses Bensalemite Jewish belief by tradition; to recognize tradition is not necessarily to acknowledge truth.

⁸⁸ Genesis 19:1–11.

⁸⁹ See above, p. 875. One modest editor saw fit to omit the discussion of marriage and eros for the sake of "modern taste." *New Atlantis*, ed. Gough, p. vi.

⁹⁰ I Kings 17:18.

⁹¹ *NA*, BW III, 154.

desire must be regulated, he describes Bensalem as having an institution that ignores the very erotic desire it is designed to regulate. By causing Joabin to be silent because of a crucial interruption, Bacon describes an institution designed to control Bensalem's erotic behavior that in fact reinforces the licentious possibilities of choosiness, the love of one's own, and the desire for more. Although the institution is meant to keep the rooster in the coop, it exacerbates the possibilities of adultery and cuckoldry.

Bacon's indirect description of Bensalem's erotic practice is important in the light of what must by now be obvious. The only man said to be wise in general and wise in policy, who articulates the astonishing Bensalemite erotic practice, is named *Joabin*. Not only was Joab David's strong lieutenant in his rise to power, but he is known as one of the most ruthless men in the Old Testament. It was Joab who committed murder, who slew David's son, and who carried out the treachery against Uriah the Hittite. It was Joab, then, who assisted in adultery and cuckoldry; he was David's horns in matters that deal with horns.⁹² In the light of Bacon's indirect description it is again obvious that the institution and practice of the Adam and Eve's pools, revealed to us by Joabin, are imitations of the sin of David, which arose from the viewing of a friend's wife bathing.⁹³ In the speech of Joabin, Bacon teaches by means of a subtle structure of allusion and conspicuous silence. With Joabin's speech, Bacon confirms the web of indirect suggestions of a problematic Bensalemite humanity and perfection that leads up to the speech. The speech of Joabin links Bensalem's past and present so as to disclose the dangerous truth about the perfection of science and man's scientific fortune. We noted earlier that unless the coming of Solamona obviated the prophecy of Nathan, unless it eliminated the defect of excessive desire, the defective characteristics of Bensalem's Davidic past would be present in its Davidic present and, hence, in England's and mankind's scientific future. Both the speech and name of Joabin, far from signaling the obviation of Nathan's prophecy, point to the repetition of Davidic excess. Bacon identifies Joabin with Joab and so identifies the ruthless Joab and the problem of excessive desire with the man of comprehensive wisdom. But "Joabin" is simply the plural form of "Joab"; Joabin's name and speech are not only of Joabin, not only of a wise man, but of all other and future men of comprehensive wisdom.

If the Davidic characteristics of Bensalem's past are inherent in Bensalem's present and future, the

possibility of insolent excess is inherent in the promise of science. The grounds of that excess, which knows only the limits of barbarism,⁹⁴ are the desires of one human body for another. One justly wonders, then, about the final disposition of unnecessary and undesired strangers. The contrast wrought by the institution of science in the history of Bensalem is, then, between the simple magnanimity and humanity of Athens and Altabin on the one hand, and the problematic magnanimity and humanity of the distorted Athens and Bensalem, or the new Atlantis, on the other hand. The speech of Joabin completes a picture that shows the true depth of Bensalem's problematic humanity to consist in the grotesque possibilities of excessive desire. Bacon's point is that since science requires restraint for most men, the full range of possibilities promised by science cannot be revealed in its entirety. Bensalem is not on the surface a nation of barbarous cannibals; on the contrary, the Bensalemites are sheep—"Tirsan" is a Persian word (*tarsān*) meaning timid or fearful—and they are shepherded by the rule of science. It is all the more important, therefore, to wonder in what or in whom the ultimate *rule* of science consists.

Joabin's speech explicates the secrecy which is a means of science to its end and which is abolished by the central deed of the story, the revelation of Bensalemite science to the world. But Joabin's speech also explicates the more profound secrecy which is inherent in the end and perfection of science and which is not abolished by the universal revelation of science. This latter secrecy necessitates Bacon's prudent, circumspect, and indirect way of teaching. It is only by following Bacon's way that we can see how the *New Atlantis* contains a teaching about political science, and so that we can see how the *New Atlantis* and the whole of Bacon's teaching are complete.

Conclusion

The last section of the story presents the magnificent return of a Father of Salomon's House, his revelation to the narrator of the "true state of Salomon's House," and the final deed of the story, the Father's giving of a "great largess" or tip to the narrator and his fellows.⁹⁵ The Father's speech about the "true state" of Salomon's House reveals that it is dedicated to the study of the things above, the things below, and the things in between, which constitute the visible whole.⁹⁶ The study of the things above, however, does not include the

⁹² See n. 73 above.

⁹³ II Samuel 11:2-5.

⁹⁴ See *Advancement*, BW III, 290-95, 420-26; *De Sapientia Veterum*, XII, XIII, XVI, BW VI, 649-652, 654, 723-26, 728.

⁹⁵ *NA*, BW III, 154-166.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 157.

study of the celestial heaven.⁹⁷ The visible whole, the conquest of which is the "enlarging of the bounds of Human Empire," is limited to the realm inhabitable by the human body. The celestial heaven is excluded from the visible whole studied by the new science because of man's limited ability to fly. In the light of the eternal promise of science, the celestial heaven can be no image of the delimitation of human nature; the celestial heaven is ignored because it contributes in no way to the eternal, intelligible whole that is illuminated and constituted by science and human power.

Perhaps a more important study omitted from the House of Salomon is the study of policy or government. The House of Salomon studies natural philosophy and logic, it studies all varieties of bodies that are useful for the preservation and perfection of human bodies, but it does not study the relations between human (ensouled) bodies. In accordance with the secret and retired nature of government, the regime of Bensalem is hidden from view. It is not completely hidden, however. We learn that Bensalem is a monarchy, and we see its laws and deeds that regulate secrecy and erotic affairs. While the men of Salomon's House decide matters of secrecy, they do so without the science that governs the practice of secrecy.⁹⁸ Their practice of secrecy points to someone learned in political science who would adjudicate their decisions. Thus, wherever the Bensalemite regime is located, it is clear that the wisdom that guides its rule does not spring from the House of Salomon. The Bensalemite regime must perpetuate secrecy, even toward the fellows and Fathers of Salomon's House, because of the problem of human eros. It must be wondered whether the Father himself is not a servant of the one who truly rules because the true ruler alone understands the full range of human possibilities illuminated by the new science. Bacon's mention of the Father's pity⁹⁹ would, then, be doubly ironic. At the same time that its ambiguity reflects the scorn and compassion the Father feels for his sheep, it reflects the sheepishness of the Father himself.

Consideration of the possible source of wise

Bensalemite rule obviously leads to a consideration of Joabin's comprehensive wisdom. If the true rule of science springs from a comprehensive understanding of science and man, then Joabin's comprehensive wisdom must be the source of the true rule of science. But Joabin's comprehensive wisdom also illuminates the fundamental and enduring problems of scientific rule. Joabin's wisdom, which reflects the harmony of speech and deed and the full range of human possibilities engendered by that harmony, illustrates the problem inherent in the very end or perfection of science itself.

The teaching about scientific rule is located in Joabin's wisdom, but that very teaching necessitates the outward incompleteness of the story. The completeness of the *New Atlantis* consists in a teaching about scientific rule that must appear to be missing. Bacon argues that the conquests of science will facilitate the subduing and overcoming "to some degree" of the "necessities and miseries" of humanity, and it is only in Joabin's political wisdom that the limit of this overcoming is to be found. The limit of the overcoming of necessity and misery does not consist in the delimitation of the human body as such; for the new science, the corruptibility of man's body is simply the jealous act of a conquerable God. Rather, the limits of the overcoming of human necessity and misery, as disclosed by Joabin's wisdom and Bensalemite rule, consist in the problematic relationships between human bodies whose desires are not limited merely to self-preservation.

The new Atlantis promises to preserve and restore the most important of the corruptible things, the human body, and so promises to preserve and restore the desires and pleasures of the human body. But as Bacon teaches in the *New Atlantis*, the preservation and restoration of desire must include the desire for more. The new science promises that human desire will be freed from the limits of the corruptible body and so from the disproportion between body and soul. The new science suggests the possibility in lived reality of what would, before the new science, be possible only in speech or imagination. The new Atlantis promises to all men what most men desire, but the teaching of the *New Atlantis* shows that the perfection of science contains possible grotesque extremes that may threaten the felicity of some or even most men. The extraordinary restraint of the sheeplike Bensalemites is necessary for the conquests of science. But if the promise of science encourages and opens the way for human conquest, it does nothing to restrain the horizons of those men who are by nature conquerors.

The combination of Bacon's open recommendation of scientific conquest with his knowledge of the fundamental moral problem of this conquest

⁹⁷ The House of Salomon contains instruments of astronomy that are kept in a "mathematical house." *Ibid.*, p. 164. The mathematical house is not a part of the "upper region" that is dedicated to the study of weather phenomena. Rather, astronomy is located in the middle region, which is the region inhabited by men, and is not accorded a highest position. Astronomy studies the heaven, then, as it affects men, but it does not study the celestial heaven, which constitutes the whole that envelops the high, the low, and the in-between. The difference between high, middle, and low is dictated simply by the location of the phenomena affecting man; in the House of Salomon, it is not a cosmic distinction. Cf. Plato, *Apology* 18b7-10, *Republic* 527d-529c3.

⁹⁸ *NA*, BW III, 165.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 154.

was sufficient to require his prudent, circumspect, and indirect way of teaching. But the most profound and perhaps shocking reason for the apparent incompleteness or secrecy of the *New Atlantis* is its indirect teaching about those who contemplate the virtues of the new conquest and conquerors. For the wise speech that illuminates the possibilities and limits of human virtue comes from a source that represents the transgressing of those limits. The new science perfects practical life in a way that is problematic with respect to excess and moderation, but for Bacon, the nature of the theoretical life can be no basis for a defense of moderation. The very superiority of the new science consists in overcoming the distinction between theory and practice, and the *New Atlantis* teaches us that comprehensive wisdom is itself problematic precisely with respect to the possibilities of excess and moderation. The *New Atlantis* discloses that the perfection of human speech and deed, which depends on restraint and perfects humanity, points directly to human speech and deed that know no restraint and no humanity.¹⁰⁰ The full meaning of the promise of science is disclosed by the man who is wise in general and wise in policy: comprehensive wisdom about the meaning of science and human ends is coextensive with comprehensive political wisdom. The deepest problem of Bensalemite (scientific) rule springs from its connection to the morally unstable knowledge about conquest and moderation that illuminates the whole of which man is the constitutive part.

The comprehensively wise Joabin encompasses, in speech and potential deed, the moderation and immoderation inherent in the end of science. The speech and deed of the Baconian wise man or self-knower reveal the necessary coexistence of the moderate and the immoderate within the comprehensive good articulated by science. The speech and deed of the wise man point at one and the same time to the unified grounds of restraint and excess, moderation and immoderation. The political rule that springs from the wisest human speech and deed is necessary because of the restraint necessary for science and the regulation of human eros, and yet that speech and deed together articulate and manifest the most extreme human possibilities. The rule of science must always be unstable with respect to restraint and excess; the ironic final deed of the story is an act of double payment, an admitted excess in Bensalem.¹⁰¹

Joabin reminds us not of Socrates, but rather of Timaeus as described by Socrates. Timaeus pro-

vided the cosmogony and cosmology that preceded the account of the best city in motion,¹⁰² the story of Athens and Atlantis. Like Timaeus, Joabin combines the excellence of policy and philosophy.¹⁰³ Like Timaeus' speech, Joabin's wise speech, which must be the final product of Bacon's great instauration, takes its bearings from the somatic and visible since, for Bacon, the only difference between image and lived reality is a temporal difference.¹⁰⁴ Thus Bacon, like Timaeus, views man and the cosmic whole from the standpoint of the somatic and the visible. Also like Timaeus this standpoint entails the problem of the inability of the ensouled human body to be or to imitate the body of the visible whole.¹⁰⁵ However, unlike Timaeus' speech, which is admittedly mythic and less than true, Bacon's speech is meant truly to illuminate lived reality. The question that arises, then, is how, for Bacon, the combination of the scientific measures of body and soul coupled with the new unconcern for astronomy and the celestial heaven produces a true science of bodies in motion.¹⁰⁶

Whereas for Plato, who is Bacon's target in the *New Atlantis*, the distinction between moderate and immoderate deeds cannot be strictly demonstrated, and so is rough or indeterminate in practical life, the contemplation of the distinction between theory and practice—the contemplation of a theoretical problem—provides the sole stable ground for moderation. Thus it is the speech of the man who pursues wisdom that illuminates and buttresses the meaning of moderation. For Bacon, the speech of the man whose wisdom pursues the conquest of nature discloses the link between moderation and immoderation and subverts the stable ground of any possible moderation. Bacon teaches that comprehensive wisdom is located in political science and that political science discloses the immoderation of any moderate speech to be linked to the immoderation of any moderate deed. His teaching is breath-taking because of its audacious resoluteness. Bacon recommends that men embrace the scientific conquest of natural necessity and chance, and so urges them to embrace the necessary possibility of the most extreme moral chance. The prudent dress of Bacon's utopia is necessitated by the restraint required by science and its open promise to the many. To

¹⁰² *Timaeus* 19b3–c9.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, 20a2–7.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 19b3–20c3, 28b2–29d3; Benardete, pp. 26–29, 32–37.

¹⁰⁵ Benardete, p. 63; *Timaeus* 86b1–92C3.

¹⁰⁶ *Timaeus* 29b–d3; *Republic* 528a9–530d2; Benardete, pp. 22, 25. The complex symbolism of the feast of the Tirsan, which extols the noblest end of science and thus the human conquest and constitution of the natural whole, can be understood only in the light of the full explication of these measures.

¹⁰⁰ White misses the crucial importance of Joabin because he does not consider Joabin in the context of the literary whole of the *New Atlantis*. See above, n. 72, and White, pp. 245–46.

¹⁰¹ *NA*, BW 111, 165.

know and embrace the full range of scientific possibilities requires a stouter and more resolute soul. Nietzsche declared of Bacon that

the strength required for the vision of the most powerful reality is not only compatible with the most powerful strength for action, for monstrous action, for crime—it even presupposes it. We are very far from knowing enough about Lord Bacon, the first realist in every great sense of that word, to know everything he did, wanted, and experienced in himself.

It would be a slight to both Nietzsche and Bacon to think that this remark refers to the petty transgression of bribery.¹⁰⁷

The *New Atlantis* is at once the core and the prolegomenon to the whole of Bacon's teaching. Bacon's prudent way requires that once the reader

discovers the completeness of the *New Atlantis*, he must turn to the whole of Bacon's teaching in the light of the *New Atlantis*. For the completeness of the *New Atlantis* is the key to the unity of Bacon's teaching about science and man. The fundamental Baconian theme is the virtue of science as the highest human activity, and this theme consists in a teaching about the nature and virtue of the conquests facilitated by science. Bacon's fundamental teaching raises the questions related to the question of conquest: the questions of self-knowledge, the relationship of the active to the contemplative life, and, ultimately, the nature of and relations between the virtues of wisdom, courage, justice, and moderation. But these questions are encompassed by the question of the best regime and the ends of political life. The *New Atlantis* and Bacon's teaching as a whole are complete because they present a new, audacious, and morally problematic stance toward the traditional questions of political philosophy.

¹⁰⁷ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, II, 4. Hobbesian political science, which forged the link between modern science and a certain, demonstrable doctrine of political rule, was directed at the Baconian problem of moderation and was based on the pretense of just such a slight.

"Virtue, Obligation and Politics," Revisited*

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Much contemporary literature in moral philosophy discusses how concepts condition understanding, especially because they sensitize us to certain questions and exclude others. Stephen Salkever in this *Review*¹ applied this line of reasoning to political philosophy and discovered two paradigms of politics: one based on the concept of virtue (ancient political philosophy), the other resting on obligation (modern political thought). The virtue paradigm understands politics as "a relationship among individual human beings in which some public value or law takes the place of private desire as the most authoritative guide to action." The political community, then, "is that structure (or pattern of relationships) which has as its aim the development of moral virtue among its citizens."² This public good, moral virtue, which leads to happiness, is intelligible only if man can possess it. Good, in other words, is grounded in human nature; one cannot do ethics without doing moral psychology.³ Furthermore, one cannot do ethics without doing politics, because whether or not the good character potential in man is developed depends upon the kind of relationships men have, which is largely determined by politics.

The politics of obligation, on the other hand, does not assume that virtue is intelligible, or needs to be intelligible, except insofar as a belief in the value of freedom (or community) might imply some kind of limited good or virtue. It is more accurate, however, to say that the value of freedom reflects a rejection of virtue as meaningful: since characterizing the good life is impossible, the value of the ends that individuals pursue cannot be assessed except insofar as they may frustrate the purposes of others. Therefore the ideal of politics is freedom—a situation in which as many individuals as possible can realize as many of their ends

as possible. The uses of liberty, or the purposes for the sake of which communities may be organized are of no consequence, because those uses or purposes cannot be evaluated. The only thing humans have in common is the common pursuit of individually determined goals (or communally determined goals): politics is only of importance as a means to liberty or community, which is established by contract.⁴ Thus, the only meaningful questions are "Why should I obey the state?" and "Who is to rule?," but certainly not "What is justice, or the good life?" The paradigm of obligation focuses on "the reconciliation of the requirements (needs and desires) of the individual and the requirements of society as a whole."⁵ The concern about obligation reveals the view that there cannot be a political (or any sort of public) solution to the question of the best human life, and there can hardly be anything but a prudential, as opposed to a moral, obligation to the political community.⁶

Within the virtue paradigm Salkever distinguishes three qualitatively distinct life-styles—the economic, the political, and the philosophical—which also represent three potentially dominant principles of human nature. They form a hierarchy such that the political is superior to the economic, and the philosophical is superior to the political.⁷ Our position is based generally on a theory of cognitive development common to John Dewey, Jean Piaget, and Lawrence Kohlberg.⁸ Specif-

⁴ Salkever, "Virtue," p. 80.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 79.

⁶ According to the obligation paradigm, the needs and desires of the individual are either not known, or not knowable, and even if to some extent they are known, they do not lead to moral virtue. Moral virtue is here understood as "the quality on account of whose presence we praise actions and characters as being good." Salkever, p. 85.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 82.

⁸ See, e.g., John Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct* (New York: Random House, 1930); Jean Piaget, *The Psychology of Intelligence* (Totowa, New Jersey: Littlefield, Adams & Co., 1966), and, with Barbel Inhelder, *The Psychology of the Child* (New York: Basic Books, 1969); Kurt W. Fischer, *Piaget, Learning, and Cognitive Development* (W. H. Freeman & Co., 1976); Lawrence Kohlberg, "Stage and Sequence: The Cognitive Developmental Approach to Socialization" in *Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research*, ed. David Goslin (New York: Rand McNally, 1969) and "From Is to Ought: How to Commit

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¹ Stephen G. Salkever, "Virtue, Obligation and Politics," *American Political Science Review*, 68 (March, 1974), 78-92.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 81 and 84.

³ See A. C. MacIntyre, "Hume on 'Is and Ought'," reprinted in *The Is/Ought Question*, ed. William D. Hudson (London: Macmillan, 1969), p. 49.

Table 1. Salkever's Virtue Paradigm and Kohlberg's Cognitive-Moral Levels

The Virtue Paradigm*	Cognitive-Moral Levels**
I. <i>The Economic Level</i> Economic man is primarily concerned with the satisfaction of his selfish needs and wants. There are of course the needs common to other animals (food, self-preservation, shelter, sex, etc.), together with the range of desires unique to man, e.g., the desire to acquire material wealth. Economic man's needs are practically limitless: he is Hobbes's natural man, committed to a perpetual search for security and well-being. Accordingly, he enters into relationships only if he expects to obtain something he desires. II. <i>The Political Level or Level of Moral Virtue</i> Political man subordinates his selfish desires to the aims of the polis or political community. The public good replaces the private as the primary guide to action. Moral virtues such as self-control, generosity, courage and justice become important inasmuch as the possession of such virtues gives one "standing" in the community. Man enters into a political relationship because all good (moral virtue) depends on the community, and he reciprocates by serving and defending the community, its institutions and values. III. <i>The Philosophical Level or Level of Intellectual Virtue</i> Philosophical man seeks intellectual virtue, i.e., the fullest possible extent of the human capacity for understanding. "He has a voracious appetite for learning. His curiosity is not like that of a craftsman who learns only what is useful in the narrow sense and whose interest is limited by his craft. The philosopher learns simply because it seems good and an end in itself." He enters into a community to learn, and because moral virtue is necessary to intellectual virtue.	I. <i>Preconventional Level</i> The individual is responsive to cultural labels of good and bad, right or wrong, but he interprets these labels in terms of either the physical or hedonistic consequences of action (punishment, reward, exchange of favors), or in terms of the physical power of those who enunciate the rules and labels. Stage 1: The punishment obedience orientation. Stage 2: The instrumental relativist orientation. II. <i>The Conventional Level</i> Maintaining the expectations of the individual's family, group or nation is perceived as valuable in its own right, regardless of the immediate and obvious consequences. The attitude is not only one of conformity to the social order, but of loyalty to it, of actively maintaining, supporting, and justifying the order, and of identifying with the persons or groups in it. Stage 3: The interpersonal concordance or "good boy-nice girl" orientation. Stage 4A: The "law and order" orientation. 4B: The societal value orientation. III. <i>The Principled, Autonomous, or Postconventional Level</i> There is a clear effort to define moral values and principles which have validity and application apart from the authority of the groups or persons holding these principles, and apart from the individual's own identification with these groups. Stage 5A: The social-utility legalistic orientation. 5B: The higher law and conscience orientation. Stage 6: The universal ethical-principle orientation.

* Sources: Salkever, "Virtue": the quotation describing philosophical man is from Allan Bloom, *The Republic of Plato* (New York: Basic Books, 1968), p. 392.

** Kohlberg, "From Is to Ought," pp. 164-165, 196-213; "Continuities in Childhood and Adult Moral Development," chapter 45 (manuscript) in *Moralization, The Cognitive Developmental Approach*, ed. Kohlberg and Turiel, pp. 20-41.

ically, we rely on the three levels⁹ of cognitive-moral development identified by Kohlberg which parallel the three life-styles Salkever extracts from the works of Plato and Aristotle (see Table 1).¹⁰

There are two major differences, however, between our developmental perspective and Salkever's construction and comparison of the virtue and obligation paradigms. First, for us normative

the Naturalistic Fallacy and Get Away with It in the Study of Moral Development," in *Cognitive Development and Epistemology*, ed. Theodore Mischel (New York: Academic Press, 1971).

⁹ Fischer, Piaget.

¹⁰ Kohlberg's own research includes a 12-year study of the same 75 boys from adolescence (ages 10-16) through young manhood (ages 22-28) at three-year intervals, plus cross-cultural studies of middle-class boys in Taiwan, Mexico, and Great Britain, together with studies of villagers in Taiwan, Malaysia, Turkey, and Yucatan. A discussion of this research can be found in "From Is to Ought," pp. 163-183. More recent studies by Kohlberg and others can be found in *Moralization, the Cognitive Developmental Approach*, ed. Kohlberg and Elliot Turiel (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973). For a

critique of Kohlberg's methodology, see William Kurtines and Esther Blank Grief, "The Development of Moral Thought: Review and Evaluation of Kohlberg's Approach," *Psychological Bulletin*, 81 (August, 1974), 453-470. Kurtines and Grief argue that "the empirical utility of [Kohlberg's] model has yet to be demonstrated." While their argument deserves attention, it does not compromise the theoretical foundations upon which this article is based. For example, the same three levels of cognitive-moral development that Kohlberg identifies can be found in Dewey, "Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics," in *The Early Works*, vol. 3: 1882-1898 (Carbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1969), especially, pp. 355-357. See also, Piaget, *The Moral Judgment of the Child* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1948).

Table 2. Definition of Kohlberg's Stages*

I. Preconventional Level

Stage 1: The punishment and obedience orientation. The physical consequences of an action determine its goodness or badness regardless of the human meaning or values of these consequences. Avoidance of punishment and unquestioning deference to power are values in their own right, not in terms of respect for an underlying moral order supported by punishment and authority (the latter being Stage 4). Stage 1 thus defines the "socio-moral" order in terms of differentials of power, status, and possessions rather than in terms of equality or reciprocity.

Stage 2: The instrumental relativist orientation. Right action consists of what instrumentally satisfies one's own needs and occasionally the needs of others. Human relations are viewed in terms such as those in the marketplace. Elements of fairness, reciprocity, and equal sharing are present, but they are always interpreted in a physical, pragmatic way. The Stage 2 sense of fairness as quantitative equality in exchange and distribution between individuals prescribes positively acts of reciprocity conceived as the equal exchange of favors or blows, or as acts of cooperation in terms of a goal of which each person gets an equal share; negatively, noninterference in the sphere of another is deemed right.

II. Conventional Level

Stage 3: The interpersonal concordance or "good boy-nice girl" orientation. Good behavior is what pleases or helps others and is approved by them. There is much conformity to stereotypical images of what is majority or "natural" behavior. The sense of justice centers on the Golden Rule ideal of imaginative reciprocity rather than exchange. Related to this is a conception of equity. Since the Stage 3 individual can take the role of others in other than concrete terms, since he can consider what he would wish in the other's place, equity implies that it is fair to give more to a helpless person to make up for his helplessness. Behavior is frequently judged by intention—"he means well" becomes important for the first time. The socio-moral order is conceived as primarily dyadic relations of mutual role-taking, mutual affection, gratitude, and concern for one another's approval. One earns approval by being "nice."

Stage 4A: The "law and order" orientation. The individual is oriented toward authority, fixed rules, and the maintaining the given social order for its own sake. Justice is defined in terms of a social order of rules and roles which are shared and accepted by the entire community, and which constitute the community. In terms of role-taking, this means that each actor must orient to the other's orientation as a part of a larger shared system to which they both belong, and to which all are oriented. Justice is no longer a matter of real or ideal reciprocity or equality between individuals as dyads, but a matter of relations between each individual and the system. Questions of positive reciprocity are questions of the relation of individual work and merit to the rewards of the system: merit should be rewarded by the system and every individual must contribute to society. Conversely, "vengeance" is the right of society and is conceived not as vengeance but as "paying one's debt to society." The equality element of justice appears primarily in terms of the uniform and regular administration of the law, and as equity in an order of merit.

Stage 4B: The societal value orientation. The individual is oriented to what is behind the rules of a given social order, e.g., to the purpose of the law and rules in terms of utility or the welfare of the majority of others, the wishes, agreement and viewpoint of the majority which lie behind the rules, and the "moral law" as the consensus of society's norms and beliefs, which may still conflict with the legal law at particular points. Still, the basic orientation is "conventional." While society's specific rules are interpreted in terms of their underlying shared values and purposes, they are reflected on from society's point of view. Society's point of view is still, itself, unquestioned, and is not, itself, reflected on from some "outside-of-society" perspective.

III. Principled Level

Stage 5A: The social-contract legalistic orientation (generally with utilitarian overtones). Right action tends to be defined in terms of general individual rights and of standards that have been critically examined and agreed upon by the whole of society. There is clear awareness of the relativism of personal values and opinions and a corresponding emphasis upon procedural rules for reaching consensus. Aside from what is constitutionally and democratically agreed upon, right action is a matter of personal values and opinions. The result is an emphasis upon the "legal point of view," but with an additional emphasis upon the possibility of changing the law in terms of rational considerations of social utility (rather than "freezing" it in terms of Stage 4). The law's function is seen as adjudicating between the rights and interests of one group of individuals as opposed to another, rather than as protecting the rights of all "decent" citizens. Outside the legal realm, free agreement and contract is the binding element of obligation. The social contract, which is the basis of the socio-moral order, is a justice conception which presupposes reciprocity of the partners to the agreement and equality between them prior to the agreement, and the form of this agreement takes priority over substantive justice, once agreement has been reached.

Stage 5B: Higher law and conscience orientation. The individual identifies morality with a conception of natural rights, i.e., rights which are naturally or intrinsically defined, such as rights of life and freedom. Society's demands

* Kohlberg, "From Is to Ought," pp. 164-165, 196-213; "Continuities," pp. 20-41.

Table 2. Continued

upon the individual are valid only to the extent that they are based on a recognition of these rights which, in effect, provide the criteria for a blueprint of society, criteria by which one law or society may be said to be better than another. Accordingly, the individual defines the socio-moral order in terms of justification. With respect to limitations of freedom, for instance, reasons must be given for constraining people in the pursuit of what they take as good.

Stage 6: The universal ethical-principle orientation. Right is defined by the decision of conscience in accord with self-chosen ethical principles that appeal to logical comprehensiveness, universality, and consistency. These principles are abstract and ethical (the Golden Rule, the categorical imperative); they are not concrete moral rules like the Ten Commandments. At heart these are universal principles of justice, of the reciprocity and equality of human rights, and of respect for the dignity of human beings as individual persons. Obligation is defined in terms of "a rational being acting as a moral agent," deciding from "a disinterested point of view that allows one to make decisions consistent with the decisions of any rational agent in a similar situation." The considerations determining one's choice are those which "any rational agent" in a similar situation should consider.

development follows a cognitive-developmental sequence, making Salkever's three life-styles not only hierarchical, but empirically sequential (in time). Secondly, Salkever juxtaposes the two paradigms, claiming that they are not mutually exclusive, they are just different perspectives from within either of which the distinctions of the other are insignificant. Our analysis of the obligation paradigm leads us to conclude that it is comparable to Salkever's political man and to Kohlberg's conventional level. Thus the obligation paradigm is better understood as a stage in a developmental theory, rather than as juxtaposed to the virtue paradigm. (Similarly, the highest activity within the virtue paradigm—philosophic man—is better understood as a higher and later stage than obligation.)

As a result of employing a cognitive-developmental framework we are able to (1) clarify the relationship between intellectual virtue (philosophic man) and moral virtue (political man)—a relationship that is obscured by Salkever's approach; (2) add a provocative dimension to the literature of political theory by considering the theories of Machiavelli, Hobbes and Locke to be expressions of the conventional level of cognitive-moral development, and by briefly considering the theories of Rawls and Rousseau as expressions of the principled level of cognitive-moral development; (3) support Salkever's case for the virtue paradigm by relating the findings of contemporary moral psychologists to the history of political thought; (4) contribute to the theoretical and empirical understanding of the nature of morals; and (5) provide theoretically promising possibilities for empirical research in the field of political philosophy.

The Developmental Approach

The label "cognitive-developmental" can be applied to a variety of specific theories of social and cognitive development, but we are most concerned with Kohlberg's theory of moral development and those theories upon which his work is largely

based, viz., the theories of Dewey and Piaget. At the very least these theories share three basic assumptions: (1) development involves qualitative changes in cognitive structures, i.e., changes in the organization or pattern of thought; (2) cognitive structures result from the active interaction of the organism and the environment rather than representing different levels of maturation or learning (in the sense of a direct shaping of the organism's responses to accord with environmental structures); and (3) the direction of development of cognitive structures is toward greater equilibrium or balance between the action of the organism upon the environment and of the environment upon the organism.¹¹

The notion of qualitative change presupposes a distinction between mental structure and learning in general. Structure refers to the organization, mode, or pattern of response and not to specific responses determined by familiarity.¹² Suppose, for example, two children are confronted with the task of arranging a number of sticks by length.¹³ If both children *organize* the problem in the same manner, e.g., by systematically comparing one

¹¹ Kohlberg, "Stage and Sequence," p. 348.

¹² Dewey refers to such structures as habits: "The essence of habit is an acquired predisposition to ways or modes of response . . . rather than bare recurrence of specific acts." *Human Nature*, pp. 40–41. Piaget and Kohlberg categorize such structures in terms of cognitive stages which form an invariant and hierarchical sequence. These stages form an order of increasingly differentiated and integrated structures to solve the same problems at different levels of complexity and abstraction. Higher stages displace (or rather reintegrate) the structures found at lower stages, and the structures of lower stages are therefore both necessary for and available at higher stages. Analogously, calculus is built upon the arithmetic skills of addition and multiplication and cannot precede them; still, the mathematician who uses calculus can also add and multiply. See Kohlberg, "Stage and Sequence," p. 351.

¹³ Seriation of sticks is a standard Piagetian test. It is not an easy perceptual task as the sticks are generally between $\frac{1}{4}$ and $\frac{1}{2}$ inch different in length. A discussion of procedure and the interpretation of various responses can be found in Piaget, *Genetic Epistemology* (New York: Norton, 1971), pp. 28–29.

stick to the next, there is no difference in their structural competence. If one child arranges the sticks faster than the other (but using the same procedure), we could speak of a quantitative (as opposed to qualitative) difference in their behavior, i.e., a difference in *performance*.¹⁴ On the other hand, if one constructs his series by systematically comparing one stick to the next while the other randomly arranges the sticks and serializes them only after a number of attempts using trial and error, we could speak of a qualitative difference in mental structure.

With respect to moral judgments, qualitative novelty involves the distinction between form and content.¹⁵ Consider the following moral dilemma:

In Europe, a woman was near death from a very bad disease, a special kind of cancer. There was one drug that the doctors thought might save her. It was a form of radium for which a druggist was charging ten times what the drug cost him to make. The sick woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money, but he could only get together about half of what it cost. He told the druggist that his wife was dying, and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist said, "No, I discovered the drug and I'm going to make money from it." So Heinz got desperate and broke into the man's store to steal the drug for his wife.¹⁶

If, for example, two persons answer affirmatively to the question "Should Heinz have stolen the drug?" the *content* of their responses would be the same. But the underlying thought organization, the *form*, the reasons behind their respective responses may be quite different: e.g., one might respond that Heinz should steal the drug because if his wife died, he would have no one to cook and clean for him (Stage 2), while in contrast, the other might argue that a person's right to live takes precedence over the right to make a profit (Stage 5). In short, the same affirmative response

may nevertheless reflect qualitative differences in moral reasoning.

On the other hand, qualitatively similar reasoning can be used to justify both stealing and not stealing the drug. An individual at Stage 4, for example, could argue that Heinz, as a husband, has a duty to steal the drug, while Heinz, as a citizen, has a duty to obey and respect the law. The form or structure of reasoning is the same in this instance while the content is different.

The development of moral reasoning, then, refers not to an increased internalization of cultural rules any more than the development of logic is an internalization of the linguistic forms of the culture.¹⁷ Stages of moral and logical reasoning do not refer to cultural contents but rather to organizational structures which emerge from an interaction between an individual and his environment.¹⁸ According to Piaget, in every relation between a living being and its environment, the former modifies the latter by imposing its own structure. In this way, physiologically, the organism absorbs substances and changes them into something compatible with its own substance (assimilation). An act of assimilation, however, requires that the organism adapt the structure it imposes to the substance to be absorbed and modified (accommodation). Psychologically the process is the same except the interaction is entirely functional: assimilation no longer alters assimilated objects in a physicochemical manner, but simply incorporates them into its own form of activity, and accommodation only modifies this activity.¹⁹ In short, assimilation refers to an organism's active attempts to apply *schemes* to objects and

¹⁷ Kohlberg, "From Is to Ought," p. 194.

¹⁸ These structures are the most basic modes of connecting experienced events—e.g., the relations of causality, substantiality, space, time, quantity, logic (referring to relations of inclusion or implication between classes or propositions), and justice (the mode of organizing role-taking experiences). See Kohlberg, "Stage and Sequence," p. 350; see also Isaiah Berlin's rich essay, "Does Political Theory Still Exist," reprinted in *Contemporary Political Thought: Issues in Scope, Value, and Direction*, ed. J. A. Gould and V. V. Thursby (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969), pp. 328–357, especially pp. 350–351. If stages depended upon acquired associations, reasoning would vary by culture since different cultures teach different associations. While cultural factors cannot alter the form or sequence of development, they may speed up, slow down, or stop development, depending on the variety of experiences they generate. We discuss the types of experiences conducive to development below.

¹⁹ Piaget, *Psychology of Intelligence*, pp. 7–8. Dewey draws the same parallel: "[H]abits are like [physiological] functions in many respects, and especially in requiring the cooperation of organism and environment. . . . [N]atural operations like breathing and digesting, acquired ones like speech and honesty, are functions of the surroundings as truly as of a person. They are things done *by* the environment by means of organic structures or acquired dispositions." *Human Nature*, p. 17.

¹⁴ Most social learning theories do not make distinctions between quantitative and qualitative changes in behavior because both specific acts and general cognitive categories (space, time, causality, etc.) are considered to be reflections of structures that exist outside the individual. Kohlberg writes: "[Stimulus-response theory] explains the learning of logical operations or 'truths' in terms of the same processes as those involved in learning a social dance step (which is cognitively neutral), or those involved in 'learning' a psychosis or a pattern of maze errors (which are cognitively erroneous)." "From Is to Ought," p. 152.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 230.

¹⁶ This story is based on one of the nine dilemmas which make up the Kohlberg questionnaire most often used to assess levels of moral reasoning. Each story confronts the subject with a moral dilemma, and following each story, an interviewer asks a series of questions designed to bring out the reasoning a person uses in dealing with the dilemma. A brief account of how to use and score the Kohlberg questionnaire can be found in N. Porter and N. Taylor, "A Handbook for Assessing Moral Reasoning" (mimeograph, available from the Moral Education and Research Foundation, Harvard University).

events in the world, and accommodation refers to the adjustment of those schemes to the characteristics of the things to be known.²⁰

For example, when an infant tries to pick up his rattle, he attempts to apply a particular scheme for grasping the rattle, choosing the scheme and adjusting it accordingly to the shape of the rattle. A "scheme" in this sense is an organized action or form of activity applied by an organism to its environment.²¹ For Piaget, knowledge of objects and events in the world results from the equilibration of assimilation and accommodation precipitated by the organism's attempts to apply its schemes. Fischer describes this process:

An infant comes to know objects by grasping them in his hand, and must often change the way he is holding his hand in order to grasp an unfamiliar object. He finds that different objects must be grasped in different ways, and that some (such as walls) cannot be grasped at all. In the same way that the child adjusts his hand to fit different objects, he adjusts his schemes to fit different objects and events. This modification of schemes is what produces intellectual growth.²²

In this manner the very young infant *differentiates* his grasping scheme with respect to a variety of objects. At the same time he is differentiating a number of other schemes including his looking, hearing, and sucking schemes. Such schemes, built upon the reflexes of the newborn infant, are called primary schemes since the infant cannot yet intercoordinate or integrate these schemes with each other.²³ The infant at the level of primary schemes, for instance, can only grasp objects which his hand encounters, independent of what he sees. But as his grasping and looking schemes become more and more differentiated (as he gets better at looking and grasping), the infant begins to explore the connections between these schemes. The child may grasp his rattle out of his field of vision and, by accident at first, bring the rattle into view and look at it, or his hand may at random bump into an object at which he is already looking. In short, the environment presents the chance juxtaposition of schemes which the child then explores. Such behavior characterizes the beginning of the intercoordination of primary schemes. When the infant completes this

intercoordination, we can speak of the secondary schemes grasping-in-order-to-look and looking-in-order-to-grasp.

Piaget describes this process of intercoordination or integration of schemes as reciprocal or mutual assimilation. In other words, component schemes incorporate (assimilate) and modify (accommodate) each other in order to form a higher-order consolidated scheme. The integrated or consolidated scheme represents a qualitative advance over its component schemes (secondary schemes are qualitatively different from and functionally superior to primary schemes). A consolidated scheme in turn is differentiated and becomes a component for higher-order integrations (secondary schemes are components of tertiary schemes, and so on). In this manner, differentiation and integration of cognitive structures imply an invariant and hierarchical sequence of cognitive stages.

The process is much the same with respect to the development of moral judgment, but the environment, instead of presenting the chance juxtaposition of grasping and looking schemes, etc., presents the juxtaposition of conflicting points of view or role expectations. For instance, in the story of the dying woman and the druggist, suppose Heinz has a Stage 4 orientation. Since his moral reasoning is conventional, he is primarily concerned with maintaining the social order and its institutions. If he takes the role of a husband, which implies the duty to "honor, cherish, and protect," he must steal the drug. On the other hand, if he takes the role of a citizen, he must consider the implications of stealing the drug as a generalized member of society: "If one person breaks the law for a good reason, then everyone will find good reasons, and everyone will break the law."²⁴ If he recognizes the juxtaposition of these role claims as a situation of competing institutional claims—to maintain the institution of marriage, he must steal the drug; to maintain society and its laws in general, he must not steal the drug—he will be unable to resolve such a conflict with Stage 4 reasoning. In other words, if he *differentiates* the claims of marriage as a social institution from the claims of society in more general terms, he must reintegrate or reconcile the competing claims from a broader, more universal perspective, viz., a perspective outside that of any constituted society.²⁵

²⁰ Fischer, *Piaget*, chapter 2, p. 15 (manuscript).

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

²² *Ibid.*, pp. 12–13. For a more general account of the process of equilibration, see Dewey, *Human Nature*, pp. 81, 169–170.

²³ Piaget, *The Origins of Intelligence in Children* (New York: Norton, 1963). This means that an infant at the level of primary schemes does not associate his various sensory-motor understandings of objects and events. For example, his rattle is not a "rattle" as we understand it, but a series of unrelated *tableaux*: a sound *tableau*, a visual *tableau*, a tactile *tableau*, etc.

²⁴ Heinz could also take the role of his wife or the role of the druggist, but to do so at the conventional level would only define his duties as a husband and as a generalized member of society respectively.

²⁵ The process of reconciling competing claims, or the process of equilibration generally, can be characterized as a process of controlling anxiety at successive levels of abstraction. For a statement of this view in a number of related contexts, see Abraham H. Maslow, *Motivation*

The recognition of moral conflicts in terms of irreconcilable institutional claims characterizes the beginning of a movement from Stage 4 to Stage 5 or, more generally, a movement from conventional to principled reasoning. As this movement continues, the differentiation of distinct and contradictory institutional claims from the claims of society in general often generalizes so that competing claims between classes, sexes, generations, nations, etc., become relative to one's point of view. For instance, "from the Nazi point of view, it was justifiable to kill six million Jews." Since values become relative to one's perspective, the values of one society are considered just as arbitrary as the values of another. This relativistic tendency can become so generalized that morality becomes a question of personal preference—"it's moral for me."

An individual in transition from the conventional to the principled level, therefore, often appears to be at Stage 2, the stage of instrumental relativism. But there is a fundamental difference between Stage 2 and Stage "4½" relativists. An individual at Stage 2 makes judgments on the basis of selfish needs and wants, i.e., judgments instrumental to his wish. He is not aware of any other point of view and does not, therefore, question the validity of moral terms: good is what's good for him. On the other hand, a Stage 4½ relativist is aware of the social point of view (Stage 4) but denies its final validity in defining what the individual should do. There is an equally valid individual point of view with equally valid definitions of "good" and "right," this viewpoint not being necessarily selfish, but self-realizing, one of ethical egoism.²⁶

A position of ethical egoism provides the foundation for the differentiation of individuals as human beings from their socially prescribed roles as spouses, citizens, etc. In other words, each individual comes to represent a source of equally valid definitions of what is good and right. The individual's self-centered view is thus generalized and integrated into a conception of individual rights: an individual can pursue what he believes to be good only to the extent that others respect his right to do so; he must therefore reciprocally respect the right of others to do the same. As we might suspect, Stage 5 retains a clear awareness of the relativism of personal values and opinions, but right action tends to be defined in terms of general individual rights, and society's demands are recognized as legitimate to the extent that they

are based on a recognition of these rights. This recognition is ideally embodied in a social contract which presupposes reciprocity of the partners to the agreement and equality between them prior to the agreement.²⁷

The movement from stage to stage is best characterized as a process of differentiation and integration. In parallel fashion it is a movement toward increased *prescriptivity* and *universality*.²⁸ A prescriptive moral structure is, at bottom, a principle, the validity of which does not depend on external events or conditions.²⁹ A universal moral structure is one which can be applied with consistency to any person, independent of his status. With respect to the moral value of human life, for example, the sequence of stages herein discussed represents a sequence of increasing prescriptivity inasmuch as the moral imperative to value life becomes increasingly independent of the factual properties of the life in question,³⁰ and it also defines a sequence of increasing universality inasmuch as successive stages define a wider circle of others subject to moral consideration and respect, from persons with physical and social status at Stage 1 to all of mankind at Stage 6. Because conventional morality is not fully prescriptive, it leads to internal contradictions manifest in conflicting and apparently irreconcilable institutional claims, and because it is not fully universal, it defines rights which are different for different social units: classes, races, generations, nations, etc. In contrast, principled morality resolves such conflicts in a stable, self-consistent manner.³¹ According to Kohlberg, the general rule at the principled level is that, in situations of conflicting claims, the only valid claims are those consistent with the recognition of the related claims of others, and a claim is only final if one would uphold it as final no matter which role in the situation he were to play. This formula is a statement of reversible or equilibrated role-taking,³² i.e., it provides a

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ Kohlberg, "From Is to Ought," p. 185.

²⁹ For Kohlberg, "the increasingly prescriptive nature of more mature moral judgments is reflected in the series of differentiations . . . of 'is' and 'ought' (or of morality as internal principles from external events and expectations)." *Ibid.*, p. 184.

³⁰ The value of a person's life is successively differentiated from the value of his property possessions, his "usefulness," his family, his nation, and his individual rights, so that at Stage 6 his life is valued in-and-of-itself, independent of any other considerations. *Ibid.*, pp. 168-169.

³¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 185, 213. With respect to the "Heinz example," the druggist's claim to withhold property at the expense of a life is not reversible, i.e., he could not have recognized this claim as valid in the wife's role; on the other hand, the wife's claim to life at the expense of property rights is a valid claim which she could recognize if she were to switch roles with the druggist. *Ibid.*, p. 213.

³² Piaget writes: " . . . development (must be) regarded as an evolution governed by an inherent need for equi-

and Personality (New York: Harper & Row, 1954), Ernest Becker, *The Birth and Death of Meaning*, 2nd ed. (New York: Free Press, 1971), and Erik H. Erikson, *Identity: Youth and Crisis* (New York: Norton, 1968), pp. 15-44, 91-141.

²⁶ Kohlberg, "Continuities," p. 25.

mechanism which insures that, in situations of conflicting claims, the solution can be shared by all the actors, assuming none of them know which role in the situation they occupy. The structure of this mechanism is the structure of the principle of justice as fairness, elaborated by John Rawls among others.³³

Of course, Salkever includes Rawls among the modern political theorists in the obligation paradigm.³⁴ He questions the applicability of Rawls's theory of justice to the virtue paradigm primarily because of Rawls's claim that the question of the best life for man cannot be rationally or objectively answered.³⁵ Rawls's position with respect to the best life for man, however, presents no problems from our developmental perspective. In the first place, we use Rawls's statement of justice as fairness to define the structure, not the specific content, of principled thought (our term) or intellectual virtue (Salkever's term). The essential function of structure is organizational. Richard Peters writes: "Fundamental principles of morality such as fairness and the consideration of interests only give us general criteria of relevance for determining moral issues. They prescribe what sorts of considerations are to count as reasons."³⁶

librium." *Psychology of Intelligence*, p. 49. The same concept can be found in Dewey, *Human Nature*, especially pp. 169–170.

³³ John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971).

³⁴ As he does with Rawls, Salkever tends to place Rousseau in the obligation paradigm, although he admits the latter sometimes employs the language of virtue. Salkever, "Virtue," pp. 85, 92 (footnote 60). We understand both Rawls and Rousseau in terms of the virtue paradigm. Rousseau's theory of the general will is in fact fundamentally equivalent to Rawls's theory of justice as fairness. Rousseau writes: "The undertakings which bind us to the social body are obligatory only because they are mutual; and their nature is such that in fulfilling them we cannot work for others without working for ourselves. Why is it that the general will is always in the right, and that all continually will the happiness of each one, unless it is because there is not a man who does not think of 'each' as meaning him, and considers himself in voting for all?" *Social Contract*, trans. G. D. H. Cole (New York: Dutton, 1950). II, iv., p. 29. For a discussion of the structural nature of the general will, see, e.g., I, vii., p. 17; II, iv., p. 29; II, vi., pp. 35, 37; also, Allan Bloom, "Jean-Jacques Rousseau," in *History of Political Philosophy*, ed. Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963), p. 524. Salkever's paradigmatic scheme cannot account for Rousseau's use of the language of legitimacy and his ambiguity about the best life for man without placing him in the obligation paradigm. We understand Rousseau's concepts of legitimacy and the good life in connection with the general will, and thus within the virtue paradigm. Authority is legitimate for Rousseau only to the extent that it expresses the general will, and the life of virtue must certainly include as a minimum obedience to the general will (or legitimate authority).

³⁵ See Salkever, "Virtue," pp. 78 (footnote 4), 80 (footnote 13), 82 (footnote 20).

³⁶ Richard S. Peters, "Concrete Principles and the

Justice as fairness, or structure or reason (rationality) in general, then, while not *sufficient* to answer the question of the best life for man, is clearly *necessary*.

Second, the principle of justice as fairness is not a simple extension of economic or rational choice—and thus irrelevant to questions of good or virtue—as Salkever suggests.³⁷ The principle of justice as fairness in fact presupposes the virtue paradigm to the extent that it depends on at least a minimal definition of good, a point of which Rawls himself is quite aware.³⁸ While justice cannot prescribe precisely what we ought to do, still it rules out certain courses of action and sensitizes us to the features of a situation which are morally relevant.³⁹ In this regard Dorothy Emmet argues against the claim advanced by Professor Hare and others that "universalizability,"—the rule "treat relevantly like cases alike and relevantly different cases differently"—as a strictly formal criterion, is constitutive of moral judgment. She maintains that an appeal to relevance amounts to adopting the substantive notion of fairness. Moreover, understood as impartiality in applying moral principles, universalizability takes on the substantive moral character of fairness. In other words, there is no reason to treat relevantly like cases alike, other than consistency, which is no reason at all, unless we first postulate fairness as good or right in-and-of-itself.⁴⁰

Finally, Salkever's claim that Rawls's theory of justice cannot objectively answer the question of the best life for man is at best irrelevant to his claim that justice as fairness is inapplicable to the virtue paradigm, for the question of the best life cannot, even from within the virtue paradigm, be answered objectively. Indeed, the Greek notion of a life of intellectual virtue depends on the subjective experience of good for its content. Such experience, however, presupposes the structure of principled thought, so that from the Greek view, to achieve intellectual virtue is *at least* to achieve Stage 6 autonomy.⁴¹

Rational Passions," in *Moral Education*, ed. Nancy F. and T. R. Sizer (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 33.

³⁷ Salkever, "Virtue," p. 81 (footnote 19).

³⁸ See Rawls, *Justice*, sec. 60.

³⁹ Peters, "Concrete Principles," p. 34.

⁴⁰ Dorothy Emmet, *Rules, Roles, and Relations* (London: Macmillan, 1966), chap. 4. For Hare's argument, see R. M. Hare, *Freedom and Reason* (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), and "Universalizability," in *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 1954–55.

⁴¹ This is not to suggest that in the Greek view there is no objective good unique to man's nature, only that to understand that good requires its subjective experience. See our discussion of moral understanding, below. More generally, any ethic at the principled level will have some content built into it—this is Emmet's point. We claim only that the Greek concept of intellectual virtue, Kohl-

The fact that justice as fairness emerges as the most basic principle of organizing role-taking experiences at Stage 6 provides concrete meaning to the developmental assumption that the principles of moral reasoning emerge from an interaction between the self and the social environment. It is clear that a sense of justice would not develop without the experience of social interaction, i.e., without opportunities to take the role of others. Justice, then, does not reflect the preprogrammed tendencies of a biological organism. But neither is it a direct expression of the structure of the environment, a rule imposed from the outside. It is rather the expression of an ideal equilibrium between the actions of the self toward others and the actions of others toward the self. According to Piaget, "the rule of justice is a sort of imminent condition of social relationships or a law governing their equilibrium."⁴² If we then accept the developmental assumption that moral principles emerge from an interaction between the self and the social environment, it follows that there should be elements of justice present from the beginnings of moral behavior, and this is in fact the case.

The concept of justice at the preconventional level is a functional extension of the private aims of economic man. Since his is primarily a selfish motivation, economic man enters into social relationships only if such relationships promote the satisfaction of his personal needs and wants.⁴³ He makes a charitable contribution, for example, not for the benefit of the underprivileged, but as a tax write-off, and he attributes such motivation to others as well. Accordingly, justice at this level operates in a concrete fashion, as the quantitative equality of exchange, and as reciprocal relationships implied by the expression "you scratch my back, I'll scratch yours."⁴⁴ While reciprocal relationships continue only so long as they remain useful, within such relationships there is a sense of obligation to fulfill one's end of the bargain, a duty which defines the corresponding right of "eye-for-an-eye" retribution. Justice at this level is the justice of the marketplace and the justice of thieves.⁴⁵

Eventually economic man comes at least to the practical recognition that society and its institutions, formal and informal, are instrumental to the satisfaction of his private needs and wants. So, without forming any critical theory of institutions,

without considering whether they are what they should be, he identifies himself, his own life, with the social forms and ideals in which he lives, and repels any attack upon them as he would an attack upon himself.⁴⁶ "The demands which the existing institutions make upon him," writes Dewey, "are not felt as the coercions of a despot, but as expressions of his own will, and requiring loyalty as such."⁴⁷ Economic man thus becomes political man and, accordingly, justice no longer operates as a matter of concrete reciprocity or equality between individuals, but in terms of the relations between each individual and the system.⁴⁸ Kohlberg provides the following description of the Stage 4 concepts of justice:

Questions of positive reciprocity are questions of the relations of individual work and merit to rewards of the system. "a good day's work for a good day's pay"; merit should be rewarded by the system and every individual must contribute to society. Accordingly, Stage 4 positive reciprocity is exchange of reward for effort or merit, not interpersonal exchange of goods or services. Negative reciprocity is even more clearly centered on the social system: vengeance is the right of society and is conceived not as vengeance but as "paying your debt to society." The equality element of justice appears primarily in terms of the uniform and regular administration of the law, and as equity in an order of merit. Social inequality is allowed where it is reciprocal to effort, moral conformity, and talent, but unequal favoring of the "idle" and "immoral," poor, students, etc., is strongly rejected.⁴⁹

The most basic principle of justice at the principled level is equality or distributive justice, the principle that "none should be held to have a claim to better treatment than another, in advance of good grounds being produced."⁵⁰ Questions of reciprocity at this level are nothing more than questions of mutual respect. Equality and reciprocity at this level are the substantive essence of justice as fairness and, taken together, imply the imperative to treat each individual as an end in himself.⁵¹

ventional justice since they imply reciprocal relationships governed by preconventional concepts of obligation and retribution. Also relevant here are the descriptions of "traditional" societies found in Jean Duvignaud, *Change at Shebika: Report from a North African Village* (New York: Vintage Books, 1970); Clifford Geertz, *Peddlers and Princes: Social Development and Economic Change in Two Indonesian Towns* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1963); and Edward C. Banfield, *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society* (New York: Free Press, 1958).

⁴⁶ Dewey, "Critical Theory of Ethics," p. 356.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ Kohlberg, "From Is to Ought," p. 199.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰ This particular statement of the equality principle is taken from S. I. Benn and R. S. Peter, "Justice and Equality," in *The Concept of Equality*, ed. William T. Blackstone (Minneapolis, Minn.: Burgess, 1969), p. 57.

⁵¹ According to Andrew Reck, the concept of equality

berg's Stage 6, Rawls's justice as fairness, and Rousseau's general will are structurally compatible, despite any differences in content. See footnote 62, below.

⁴² Piaget, *Moral Judgment*, p. 196, Kohlberg, "From Is to Ought," p. 194.

⁴³ See Salkever's account of economic man, "Virtue," pp. 80-81.

⁴⁴ Kohlberg, "From Is to Ought," p. 164.

⁴⁵ The expressions "let the buyer beware" and "honor among thieves" might be said to be statements of precon-

Movement from level to level (or stage to stage) depends on the opportunities for role-taking afforded by the social environment. Role-taking most generally refers to two interrelated processes: the reaction to others as like the self, and the reaction to the self's behavior from the others' point of view.⁵² An individual in short must be able to think of himself in the shoes of another. Now it is very difficult for a master to think of himself in the role of his slave, less difficult for an officer to imagine himself as a private, and still less difficult for two players on opposing baseball teams to reverse their roles. This might suggest that baseball players can imaginatively switch roles only because they themselves are familiar with the role of the other. But more basically it suggests that role-taking depends on the *shareability* of roles. The master will never be the slave, nor will the slave be the master. Accordingly, master-slave relationships offer few opportunities for role-taking since neither party can easily imagine himself in the role of the other. More generally, "the *shareability* of rules and role expectations in an institution or social unit," writes Kohlberg, "rests centrally upon a justice structure underlying specific rule and role definitions."⁵³ In a negative sense, rules

and roles which are *not* grounded in justice do not have the quality of shareability since their very nature is arbitrary: they do not exist apart from those who enunciate the rules and fill the roles. It follows that institutions better organized in terms of justice provide greater opportunities for role-taking and, consequently, for development as well.⁵⁴ From a developmental point of view, then, the political problem is one of providing just institutions, a view shared by the ancient Greeks.⁵⁵ In fact, the Greeks may have been the first cognitive-developmental psychologists.

At any rate it is clear that the notion of development had a pervasive influence on the whole of Greek philosophy and psychology. Indeed, Robert Nisbet argues that the metaphor of growth became the basis of the entire Greek world view. In this regard he quotes Professor Sambursky:

The Greek remained closely attached to the cosmos as the result of his viewing the cosmos as a living organism, a body that can be understood and comprehended in its entirety. The Greek had a profound awareness which was characterized by his biological approach to the world of matter. The teleological principle is essentially biological and anthropomorphic, so that the first basis for the conception of order in the universe was found in the system of the world of living things.⁵⁶

For Nisbet, the concept of *physis* best summarizes the Greek preoccupation with growth and development. He writes: "If the nature of a thing is how it

"presupposes metaphysically: 1) that each man is an independent, continuant, individual entity or substance, and 2) that each man partakes of the same essential humanity with other men." Reck, "Metaphysics of Equality," in *The Concept of Equality*, ed. Blackstone, p. 139. If we consider these propositions as worthy of respect, thus combining the principle of equality and reciprocity as mutual respect, it follows that we ought to treat individuals as ends. Along these same lines, Paul Tillich writes: "The relation of equality and justice depends on the power of being in a man and his corresponding claim for justice. . . . What is decisive is only that man is considered as a deliberating, deciding, responsible person. Therefore one had better speak of the principle of personality as a principle of justice. The content of this principle is the demand to treat every person as a person." *Love, Power, and Justice: Ontological Analyses and Ethical Applications* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), pp. 59–60.

⁵² George H. Mead, *Mind, Self, and Society* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934) and James Mark Baldwin, *Thoughts and Things* (New York: MacMillan, 1906), 3 vols. Corresponding to the two processes of role-taking are the notions that moral judgments are based on sympathy for others and that the moral judge must adopt the perspective of an "impartial spectator" or a "generalized other." Kohlberg, "From Is to Ought," p. 190. It is an easy step from here to the claim that justice represents an ideal equilibrium of social interaction if one avoids the pitfalls of the utilitarian maximization principle. According to Rawls, decisions by the "impartial spectator" for utilitarians in general are those which maximize the total sum of happiness. Such decisions almost by definition "short-change" some individuals and are not, therefore, consistent with the process of reacting to others like the self. Rawls, *Justice*, sec. 5.

⁵³ "From Is to Ought," p. 193. This idea is also central to Hart's justification of the equality principle. Hart argues that any system of morality which incorporates a notion of "rights" presupposes the equality principle. H. L. A. Hart, "Are There Any Natural Rights?" in

Society, Law, and Morality, ed. Frederick A. Olafson (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1961). For a discussion of Hart's argument, see William T. Blackstone, "On the Meaning and Justification of the Equality Principle" in *The Concept of Equality*, p. 129. In this same regard, Rawls writes: "The primary subject of justice is the basic structure of society, or more exactly, the way in which social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages from social cooperation." *Justice*, p. 7.

⁵⁴ Just institutions *per se* may not be enough to generate the opportunities for role-taking necessary for development to the principled or even conventional levels. The institutions of a given social environment must be varied so as to provide, not just opportunities for interpersonal relationships, but a matrix of complex interactions. The fact that the populations of many "traditional" societies remain for the most part at the preconventional level can thus in part be explained. Kohlberg's own research in two isolated villages supports this view. Kohlberg, "From Is to Ought," p. 173. Other examples can be found in Duvignaud, *Change at Shebika*, Geertz, *Peddlers and Princes*, and Banfield, *Moral Basis of a Backward Society*. In one setting—Shebika—the case can be made that the role-taking opportunities generated by the presence of Duvignaud's research team precipitated a general movement from preconventional to conventional thought. See Duvignaud, *Shebika*, especially pp. 297–298.

⁵⁵ See especially Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics* Book 10. ⁵⁶ S. Sambursky, *Physical World of the Greeks*, tr. Merton Dagut (New York: MacMillan, 1956), pp. 241–242, cited in Robert A. Nisbet, *Social Change and History: Aspects of the Western Theory of Development* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 21.

grows, and if everything in the universe, physical and social alike, has a *physis* of its own, a distinctive way of growing, a life-cycle, then the task of the philosopher or scientist is clear. It is to find out what the *physis* is of each thing: to learn its original condition, its successive stages of development, the external factors such as water, light, and heat, that affect it, and, finally, what its 'end' is; that is, its final form, the form which may be said to be the ultimate 'cause' of it all."⁵⁷ The cognitive-developmental account of moral development, we might suggest, presupposes the notion of *physis*: given the biological organism we call *homo sapiens*, the development of intelligence in general and moral reasoning in particular follows a formal pattern of differentiation and integration, defining successive and qualitatively distinct stages of development; it depends on opportunities for role-taking afforded by the external environment; and it tends toward an ideal equilibrium or final form of justice.⁵⁸ But not only is developmental theory compatible with the concept of *physis* or an expression of it, a cognitive-developmental approach is at least useful if not necessary to an explication of the Greek notion of social reform.

Any psychological theory of development must account for the roles of both the organism and the environment. There are essentially three possibilities: either development proceeds primarily from the organism (nativistic, innate, maturational theories), from the environment (stimulus-response, social learning, associationistic theories), or from an interaction of the two (cognitive-developmental theories).⁵⁹ The theoretical differences between these three broad streams of thought are often subtle, matters of emphasis and interpretation. But a practical analysis of each approach, a study of their social and political implications, reveals that the differences are quite real.

If we assume that social and political institutions differ in their capacity to fulfill the "public good," i.e., that from a moral perspective some are more desirable than others (an assumption the

Greeks clearly make), it follows that social reform is a moral matter and, in turn, that the determinants of moral conduct also determine the direction and degree of social change. Accordingly, if the moral is a product of human nature, if it flows from that which is native or innate, then social change must follow changes in human nature: good men *make* good institutions. If, on the other hand, the moral is an expression of the effects of social institutions upon men (the environmental position) social change must precede changes in human nature: good men *presupposes* good institutions. In contrast, if moral conduct is not an expression entirely of human nature or environmental influence, but the product of the interaction of the two, then social progress can originate from two sources: from within man and from without.

It is just such an argument which John Dewey employs to justify an interactional theory of development. For Dewey, neither the innate nor the environmental position offers a practical solution to social ills: the former relies on "an appeal to inner rectitude and benevolence" to elicit change, while the latter "throws us back upon accident, usually disguised as a necessary law of history or evolution, and trusts to some violent change, symbolized by civil war, to usher in an abrupt millennium."⁶⁰ But this argument is not Dewey's alone. We can, for example, find the same case in Aristotle's *Ethics*.⁶¹ In his discussion of ethics and politics, Aristotle outlines a theory of social reform which appears to be based on an argument with no end, a vicious circle. A good polis, he writes, depends on good legislation which in turn depends on wise legislators. A wise legislator is one who knows the good, but he only comes to know the good if he is properly brought up and educated in good habits. To be properly brought up, however, requires participation in good institutions; in other words, a proper education depends on a good polis, which in turn depends on good legislation, and so on, *ad infinitum*. The only way to make sense of this argument is to assume that the good is a product of the interaction between man and his environment, for then change can originate both from within man and from within his social environment.

In brief, the Greek view of human nature and development is more than compatible with our

⁵⁷ Nisbet, *Social Change*, p. 22. For a standard interpretation of *physis*, see Strauss and Cropsey, *History of Political Philosophy*, 2nd. ed., p. 3.

⁵⁸ See Dewey, *Human Nature*, pp. 258-259.

⁵⁹ Maturational and environmental theories can be respectively described as involving primarily *assimilation* or *accommodation*. See Kohlberg, "The Concepts of Developmental Psychology as the Central Guide to Education," a paper presented at the Conference on Psychology and the Process of Schooling in the Next Decade: Alternative Conceptions, Minneapolis, Minn., pp. 2-3. According to the cognitive-developmental view, maturation serves to open up new possibilities, thus it constitutes a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the appearance of certain cognitive structures. The possibilities thus opened up need to be fulfilled, and for this to occur, the maturation must be reinforced by functional exercise and a minimum of experience. Piaget and Inhelder, *The Psychology of the Child*, p. 154.

⁶⁰ Dewey, *Human Nature*, pp. 10-11.

⁶¹ Aristotle *Ethics* Book 10. With respect to Plato's conception of social reform, it can be argued that an interactional account represents an underlying premise of the *Republic*. The philosopher-kings who are to construct the "ideal" state must develop their knowledge of good without the benefit of the good institutions of such a state. But on the other hand, Socrates and Glaucon hope to derive the meaning of justice from the institutions of the Republic.

cognitive-developmental account: it is equivalent to an early expression of this theory.⁶² Accordingly, the virtue paradigm described by Salkever fits neatly into our developmental scheme. For Salkever there are three potentially dominant principles of human nature, each corresponding to a way of life: "If the economic life is dominated by the love of self (or of life), and the political life by love of city (and of having a 'good name' in the city), the philosophic life is controlled by the love of truth or being."⁶³ These three ways of life correspond respectively to the three levels of development—preconventional, conventional and principled (Table 1)—and they form not only a hierarchy but an invariant ontogenetic sequence of development as well. In the following section we demonstrate that the obligation theory of politics is an expression of conventional thought, i.e., that the virtue paradigm includes within it the obligation paradigm. In this regard we show that Machiavelli, Hobbes and Locke—all obligation theorists—base their political aims on a vision of man at the conventional level or below.⁶⁴

The Politics of Obligation as Conventional Thought

Machiavelli has the classical view of the relationship between politics and ethics. This position is concisely described by Isaiah Berlin: "Since men are beings made by nature to live in communities, their communal purposes are the ultimate values from which the rest are derived, or with which their ends as individuals are identified. . . . Ethics . . . cannot be known save by understanding the purpose and character of the polis. . . ."⁶⁵ The point is that without a political community men are nothing, for only within a political community will common public notions of excellence arise, thereby making it possible for men to excel—to attain virtue. Virtuosity in politics is the virtuosity of the performing artist rather than the creative artist; it is action in the presence of an audience: the performance itself. The political community is the stage, the audience and the per-

formers, in a manner of speaking. Virtuosity is the expression of politics.⁶⁶

Machiavelli is concerned about what is good for man, but he is not willing to go beyond saying that a political community is good. The political community is good because without it no good of any kind is possible. There is also the thesis that the presence of a political community must entail some degree of such universal values as safety of life, individual freedom, and protection from deliberately inflicted harm, and that it is such values that make a political community worthwhile to human beings. It is even arguable, as H. L. A. Hart puts it, "that a human society in which these values are not recognized at all in its morality is neither an empirical nor a logical possibility, and that even if it were, such a society could be of no practical value for human beings."⁶⁷ Machiavelli comes very close to this position when, in discussing whether or not cruelty is conducive to political stability, he says:

I believe that this depends on whether cruelty is used well or ill. It may be said to be used well (if we may speak of using well a thing in itself bad) when all cruel deeds are committed at once in order to make sure of the state and thereafter discontinued to make way for the consideration of the welfare of the subjects. Bad use of cruelty we find in most cases where the cruel acts, though few to begin with, become more numerous with time. Those who practice the first kind may find some defense for their state in the eyes of God and man, but as far as the second class, it is impossible for them to stay in power.⁶⁸

Nevertheless Machiavelli does not look upon politics as an educational process leading to moral virtue, where moral virtue entails a perspective by which to evaluate virtuosity—a perspective beyond the community (or conventional level). Machiavelli's consuming interest is the creation and maintenance of political structure.⁶⁹ By default good becomes either having a "good name" in the city (which signifies the support of the politi-

⁶² The major difference between the Greek view, i.e., the virtue paradigm, and the cognitive-developmental perspective is that, from the latter point of view, the Greeks confuse form and content. For example, "intellectual virtue" has content built into it, while Stage 6 is primarily structural or organizational in character. Still, the structural component of intellectual virtue is the structure of Stage 6.

⁶³ Salkever, "Virtue," p. 82.

⁶⁴ Since later stages of development are reintegrations of earlier stages, the latter are both necessary for and available to the former. See footnote 12, above. Thus, while the politics of obligation is justified primarily at the conventional level, it is possible to appeal for support to the preconventional level, as Hobbes and Locke do (see Table 3).

⁶⁵ Isaiah Berlin, "The Question of Machiavelli," in *New York Review of Books*, 17 (November 4, 1971), p. 23.


⁶⁶ Hannah Arendt, "What is Freedom?" in *Between Past and Future* (Cleveland, Ohio: World Publishing Company, 1963), p. 153. Arendt also makes the interesting point that Christianity understood goodness to consist of acts unrecognized by secular man as good: only in the eyes of God, so to speak, were they recognized. Goodness then was unvirtuous, which helps explain Machiavelli's animosity to the church. Arendt summarizes: "... the problem of religious rule over the secular realm was inescapably this: either the public realm corrupted the religious body and thereby became itself corrupt, or the religious body remained uncorrupt and destroyed the public realm (virtuosity) altogether." Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 77.

⁶⁷ H. L. A. Hart, *Law, Liberty, and Morality* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1963), p. 70.

⁶⁸ Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Prince*, ed. Thomas G. Bergin (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1947), pp. 25–26.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 52.

Table 3. The Politics of Obligation in Perspective: The Developmental View



cal community) or being a virtuoso (which signifies a thriving political community).

On the other hand Machiavelli argues neither that might makes right nor that politics should serve private interests. So while he is not at the principled level, he is also not at the preconventional level. Might is not justifiable as a goal; it is justifiable only in connection with the creation and maintenance of political community. Virtuosity is justifiable as an end, but it is not possible without politics. The same can be said of might, understood as virtuosity, keeping in mind the kind of limitations mentioned in connection with cruelty. Neither optimistic, nor nihilistic, Machiavelli is a modified obligation theorist who fits into the virtue-developmental paradigm at the conventional level (see Table 3).⁷⁰

Hobbes, too, is preoccupied with the political order, but his analysis of the sources of disorder and his prescriptions for dealing with disorder distinguish him from Machiavelli. First, like Machiavelli, Hobbes does not make might equivalent to right. He maintains validity of moral judgment: power does in fact determine what happens, but power does not make it right. Leo Strauss points this out by noting that Hobbes

distinguishes between unjust vanity and just fear of violent death. Had he not done so he would be in the naturalist camp where man's natural appetites—all his passions, especially vanity—are as justified by nature as is reason.⁷¹ For Hobbes, power based on appetite cannot make itself right. Yet power as "common power"—political structure—is the source of all right, because only it can ultimately check private individual desires; practically and theoretically speaking, without it appetite and reason become equally valid.

To this warre of every man against every man, this also is consequent: that nothing can be unjust. The notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice have there no place. Where there is no common power, there is no law: where no law, no injustice. Force, and fraud, are in warre the two cardinall vertues. Justice and injustice are none of the faculties neither of the body, nor mind. If they were, they might be in a man that were alone in the world, as well as his senses, and passions. They are qualities, that relate to men in society, not in solitude.⁷²

In one respect Hobbes seems to assume a preconventional level: fear is the motive behind the reason upon which the political structure exists. On the other hand, reason is more justifiable than vanity according to nature, which does not indicate

⁷⁰ Machiavelli's views of human nature also put him in the middle, at the conventional level. His analysis of power shows that political structure is realistic, but human beings are too wicked to make the principled level realistic. For the former, see *The Prince*, pp. 24–26, 34, 52; for the latter, *ibid.*, pp. 44–45, 48, 51.

⁷¹ Leo Strauss, *The Political Philosophy of Hobbes* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), p. viii.

⁷² Hobbes, *Leviathan* (New York: Dutton, Everyman's Library, 1914), p. 66. For similar passages in *Leviathan* supporting and enlarging this theme, see pp. 70, 74, 88–89, 116.

an "ethics" based on power (see Table 1). Hobbes seems to be both within and above the preconventional level.

Seen from the postconventional level, in terms of the relationship of the principled or autonomous level to the "common power" (the political order), Hobbes's statements on human nature do not warrant concluding that the cultivation of reason and truth through mutual respect, openness, and reciprocity will lead to justice.⁷³ On the contrary, we think Irene Coltman's statement accurately reveals Hobbes's rejection of the principled level:

Their [referring to such moderate advisors to the King as Falkland and Clarendon] devotion to good causes was to Hobbes a method of rebellion. Their search for truth was a way of being disobedient just as the desire to know good and evil was the primal act of disobedience. They said that ideals transcended patriotism, in order to justify their treachery and they made themselves the sole judge of what ideals they would follow: ideals that emanated from themselves and sanctified their impulses. The good king, to them, was one who had surrendered his kingship by giving up his absolute authority. The good man was the bad citizen who followed his private truth and went his own way. Insanely complacent about letting the social order fall apart, intellectuals and all private men who claimed this sort of freedom were, Hobbes thought, the enemies of society and of civilization.⁷⁴

The distance between Hobbes and the principled level of the virtue paradigm is evident in other interpretations of Hobbes as well. Norman Jacobson, for example, finds in the *Leviathan* not the virtue paradigm's position that there is a good for man suitable to his nature, but the notion that man can master his nature. Man accomplishes this by the power of language—man's creation, not God's or nature's. Through the creation of a scientific language the problem of order is solved. Henceforth to discuss politics is to discuss geometry; there is no time for the passions that give rise to conflicts and disorder. Objective, precise, neutralizing science becomes *Leviathan*. The principled or autonomous level is nowhere to be found.⁷⁵

⁷³ See especially *Leviathan*, pp. 51–54, 64, 88.

⁷⁴ Irene Coltman, *Private Men & Public Causes: Philosophy & Politics in the English Civil War* (London: Faber & Faber Limited, 1962), pp. 22–23. See also pp. 140, 161, 189–191. From within the developmental paradigm Hobbes's reaction to people like Falkland and Clarendon is justified; they do not represent an authentic Stage 6. Martin Luther King and Socrates would be authentic examples, because principled thought must include as well as surpass previous stages—loyalty to the political order (conventional level) must be maintained at the same time that principles are. Morality does not transcend the political realm; the political realm is the schoolhouse of morality.

⁷⁵ Norman Jacobson, *Thomas Hobbes as Creator* (New York: General Learning Press, 1971).

Hobbes occupies a middle ground between the preconventional and the principled levels.⁷⁶ No better statement to this effect exists than Strauss's:

For, by starting from "right" and thus denying the primacy of "law" (or, what amounts fundamentally to the same, of "virtue"). Hobbes makes a stand against the idealistic tradition. On the other hand, by basing morals and politics on "right," and not on purely natural inclinations or appetites. Hobbes makes a stand against the naturalistic tradition. That is to say, the principle of "right" stands midway between strictly moral principles (such as those of the traditional natural law, on the one hand, and purely natural principles (such as pleasure, appetite, or even utility) on the other.⁷⁷

The function of politics for Locke, as Salkever points out, is the protection of privately determined enterprises:

The commonwealth seems to me to be a society of men constituted only for the procuring, preserving and advancing their own civil interests. Civil interests I call life, liberty, health and indolency of body; and the possession of outward things, such as money, lands, houses, furniture and the like.⁷⁸

This position is largely a result of Locke's views of man and philosophy.⁷⁹ "What is good for man?" is not only a question beyond man's capacity to answer, it is politically irrelevant, as the practical solution is public policy that conforms to community standards. Two comments by Locke help to show this:

We are not born in heaven but in this world, where our being is to be preserved with meat, drink, and clothing, and other necessities that are not born with us, but must be got and kept with forecast, care and labour, and therefore we cannot be all devotion, all praises and hallelujahs, and perpetually in the vision of things above . . .⁸⁰

⁷⁶ The function of politics for Hobbes, according to Table 3, is "order for the sake of civil society." It is true that civil society is worthwhile because of the values it promotes—industry, culture, navigation, knowledge, arts and letters, freedom, etc. Hobbes's concern seems to be that when those values become uppermost in men's minds, then the pursuit of them may undermine civil society. It is for this reason we describe Hobbes's position as order for the sake of civil society.

⁷⁷ Leo Strauss, *Hobbes*, p. viii.

⁷⁸ Locke, *A Letter Concerning Toleration*, citation in Salkever, "Virtue," p. 87. Sheldon Wolin makes the interesting point that liberal man is not so much acquisitive as he is ultra-sensitive to his social position, which is dependent upon property. Acquisitiveness results from the fear of losing status in the eyes of the community—a Stage 4 position. Wolin, *Politics & Vision* (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown, & Co., 1960), p. 328. On the political significance of property as economic growth, see Robert Goldwin, "John Locke," in *History of Political Philosophy*, 2nd ed., ed. Strauss and Cropsey, pp. 469–470.

⁷⁹ John Locke, *Two Treatises of Government*, ed. Peter Laslett (New York and Toronto: The New American Library, Inc., 1965), p. 396. In these passages Locke describes man as too biased to receive the plain and intelligible standards of right and wrong in the law of nature.

⁸⁰ Wolin, *Politics*, p. 298, citing H. R. Fox-Bourne, *The*

And thus all private judgment of every particular member being excluded, the community comes to be umpire, by settled standing rules, indifferent, and the same to all parties.⁸¹

These views culminate in the liberal position (see Adam Smith and Spencer, for example) of distributing goods by the impersonal judgment of the market mechanism, rather than by a standard of justice. This position emphasizes freedom, but without concern for evaluating what courses of action result from freedom; it is the obligation paradigm par excellence. It also describes the conventional level, because it does not offer standards or methods to define moral values and principles which have validity and application apart from the authority of the groups or persons holding these principles, and apart from the individual's own identification with these groups. This is readily apparent in the emphasis Locke places on society:

The first and fundamental natural law . . . is the preservation of society. . . .⁸² [But the preservation of society is motivated by the desire for self-preservation:] The first and strongest desire God planted in man, and wrought into the very principle of their nature, being that of self-preservation. . . .⁸³

Self-preservation as the means to peace and preservation is not a theory of good or obligation that goes very far. Where the preservation of the society is at odds with the preservation of the individual, society must be obeyed because without society, i.e., without a set of mutual expectations based on trust, without order, freedom would not exist.⁸⁴ But where the individual's life, and his freedom, therefore, is at stake this argument breaks down. Every theory exclusively committed to freedom encounters a dead end, because it does not offer a means of choosing between conflicting purposes (the presence of conflicting purposes is evidence of the existence of freedom).

Where the virtue paradigm sees reason and justice as man's ends (to be served by the passions) Locke sees the passion of self-preservation. From self-preservation he arrives at freedom, but he can go no further. There is no doubt that he is not at the principled level: even the questions which lead to autonomy (Stage 6) are superfluous for Locke.

Life of John Locke, 2 vols. (New York: King, 1876), vol. 1, p. 396.

⁸¹ Locke, *Second Treatise*, p. 367.

⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 401. Also see pp. 393–394, 412–413.

⁸³ Locke, *First Treatise*, p. 244.

⁸⁴ On the nature and significance of trust in Locke, see Peter Laslett, "Introduction," in *Two Treatises*, pp. 126–135. Also see Goldwin, "Locke," p. 483: "Locke is profound and comprehensive on the reasons for founding political society, but those reasons turn out to be such that he is prevented by their very character from considering in what direction society should develop after the founding is secure."

Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Locke stop short of virtue; they do not see politics as education for justice. Given our interactional theory—moral conduct is an expression of the interaction of human nature and environment—then their historical circumstances help to explain why they set their sights no higher. But in more fortunate times, as in the case of classical Greece and perhaps, we venture to say, of contemporary western civilization,⁸⁵ politics can be looked upon as a process for moral development, no better expression of which can be found than that by John Dewey:

When we observe that morals is at home wherever considerations of the worse or better are involved, we are committed to noting that morality is a continuing process not a fixed achievement. Morals means growth of conduct in meaning; at least it means that kind of expansion in meaning which is consequent upon observations of the conditions and outcome of conduct. It is all one with growing. Growing and growth are the same fact expanded in actuality or telescoped in thought. In the largest sense of the word, morals is education. It is learning the meaning of what we are about and employing that meaning in action. The good, satisfaction, "end," of growth of present action in shades and scope of meaning is the only good within our control, and the only one, accordingly, for which responsibility exists. The rest is luck, fortune.⁸⁶

From our developmental perspective, Dewey's "meaning," Salkever's "truth and being," as well as our "principles and autonomy" must be understood as the highest stage of politics. As such they come first in importance—ultimately they justify politics, yet they do not come first in time. First, politics must guarantee a minimum of security—the preoccupation of Hobbes; afford man an opportunity to display virtuosity in the sense of performing exceptionally well in terms of the political community's values—the preoccupation of Machiavelli; and guarantee man freedom in return for giving up unbridled lust—Locke's concern. The conventional and pre-conventional levels that these views exemplify do not ever simply go away, and neither do the functions of politics at the conventional and pre-conventional levels. Plato goes to great lengths to point this out; a political community always exists simultaneously at various levels:

⁸⁵ James S. Coleman argues, however, that the rise of "corporate actors" restricts role-taking opportunities: "... when [an individual] carries out an action toward a corporate actor, he cannot see himself ever in the corporate actor's place. He will never become a corporate actor. For that reason, he will feel fewer pangs of guilt when he rips out a public telephone or steals paper from the office than he would if he had committed similar acts against a person." Coleman, *Power and the Structure of Society* (New York: Norton, 1974), p. 97. We should also state explicitly that, even in the best of environments, few persons will reach the highest levels of cognitive-moral development. See, for example, footnote 88 below.

⁸⁶ Dewey, *Human Nature*, p. 259.

this is one message of the *Republic*.⁸⁷ Justice as education for virtue is the end of politics, yes, but its realization (in degrees—never fully) is dependent upon the acknowledged importance of such functions of politics as Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Locke had in mind. Thus politics as virtue, where education for justice is the function of politics, incorporates as well as exceeds politics as obligation.

While our developmental view incorporates politics as obligation (obligation fits in at the conventional level) there is a tension between higher and lower stages within the paradigm. In the first place, the conventional level can be understood from the principled level, but the principled level cannot be understood from the conventional level.⁸⁸ Politics at the preconventional and conventional levels, and politics at the postconventional level also highlight different facets of human behavior. The politics of the preconventional and conventional levels focus on civilized man as a creature of emulation; in his effort to make something of himself, i.e., to prove himself superior to others, he creates largely arbitrary, socially recognized values upon which social stratification and inequality rest. Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Locke seem preoccupied with man in this dress. The postconventional view of politics focuses on man as he promotes equality and justice through growth and sharing, as he increasingly considers others independently of goods, status, and prestige, and as he enlarges the circle of others subject to his moral consideration and respect. Tension between these two views of politics exists, but reality consists of both.

Moral Understanding

The understanding of virtue—ethics, values, morality, or whatever term chosen—is comparable to the understanding of such phenomena as marriage in at least two respects. First, an understanding of virtue or marriage presupposes its ex-

perience, and second, a condition for the experience of either virtue or marriage is the prior acceptance of its validity. There is a difference, for example, between the experience of marriage and the experience of a trial marriage, where the relationship from the outset is understood to be provisional. The acceptance of the validity of a lasting commitment is essential to the experience of marriage (not trial marriage); an understanding of marriage is only possible, therefore, when the validity of a lasting commitment is accepted beforehand. Otherwise the experience of marriage and consequently, the understanding) does not occur. Similarly, an acceptance of the validity of virtue makes possible a participatory (as opposed to, say, an analytic) understanding of virtue.⁸⁹

Aristotle makes two comments in the *Ethics* which support and clarify these views. He says first, "A young man is not a proper hearer of lectures on political science; for he is inexperienced in the actions that occur in life, but its discussions start from these and are about these."⁹⁰ Aristotle means inexperienced in a subjective sense. He does not mean, for example, someone who does not know what the word marriage means, but someone whose social experience has been so limited that he cannot, even imaginatively, come close to understanding marriage from the inside. Aristotle is also indicating that political science involves ethics, the understanding of which depends upon participatory experience. In this regard he says, "Anyone who is to listen intelligently to lectures about what is good and noble must have been brought up in good habits."⁹¹ Aristotle makes this statement while trying to determine the nature of "good"; consequently, he seems to beg the question by referring to "good" habits. There is a reason for this, as Joseph Schwab points out so well: "If an argument is to appeal to experience of the inward effects and satisfactions of certain kinds of actions and undergoings, those inward effects and satisfactions must have been experienced by those the argument addresses."⁹² Good habits will provide experiences of the inward effects and satisfactions to which moral arguments appeal.

Piaget carries this line of reasoning further:

In the same way that a kind of contradiction exists in adhering to an intellectual truth from the outside (without having rediscovered and reverified it), so it can be asked whether there does not exist some moral inconsistency in recognizing a duty without having come to it by an independent method. . . . In other words, just as a pupil can recite his lessons without understanding them

⁸⁷ In this respect see Bloom, *Republic*, pp. 307–436. For example, Bloom writes (p. 410): "He shows what a regime would have to be in order to be just and why such a regime is impossible. Regimes can be improved but never perfected; injustice will always remain. The proper spirit of reform, then, is moderation. Socrates constructs his utopia to point up the dangers of what we would call utopianism; as such it is the greatest critique of political idealism ever written. The *Republic* serves to moderate the extreme passion for political justice by showing the limits of what can be demanded and expected of the city; and, at the same time, it shows the direction in which the immoderate desires can be meaningfully channeled."

⁸⁸ In the "Apology" and "Crito" Socrates understands the conventional level; he is even an expression of it: his loyalty to the polis leads to his death (although his love of philosophy was a factor as well). The jury, however, is not at Socrates's principled level, and cannot appreciate his philosophic activities. What is entailed in understanding a stage is discussed below (901–903).

⁸⁹ Fred M. Frohock, *Normative Political Theory* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1974), pp. 14–15.

⁹⁰ Aristotle *Ethics* 1095a.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 1095b.

⁹² Joseph Schwab, *College Curriculum & Student Protest* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1969), p. 127.

and can substitute verbalism for rational activity, so a child obeying is sometimes a spirit subjugated to an external conformism, but does not understand the real meaning or facts surrounding the rules he obeys, or the possibility of adapting them or making new ones in different circumstances.⁹³

Understanding develops in two steps: first the acceptance of validity—by faith or trust—then a testing by recreating. The commitment involved in the first step is facilitated by justice, understood as the shareability of rules, roles, and relations, or rather by the mutual respect and reciprocity involved therein. In short, justice promotes communication—the experiencing of others—without which development of higher stages is impossible. Piaget calls the process “decentering”:

We have stated that the two correlative aspects of the personality are independence and reciprocity. In contrast to the individual who has not yet reached the stage of “personality,” and whose characteristics are to be oblivious of all rules and to center on himself whatever interrelations he has with his physical and social environments, the person is an individual who situates his ego in its true perspective in relation to the ego of others. He inserts it into a system of reciprocity which implies simultaneously an independent discipline, and a basic de-centering of his own activity. The two basic problems of ethical education are, therefore, to assure this de-centering and to build this discipline.⁹⁴

The processes of de-centering, communication, justice and learning merge into a complex activity, with each process contributing to the others. Justice can therefore be considered as a means to understanding and communication, as well as the result of understanding and communication.⁹⁵

Development to the principled or autonomous level is the aim of justice as a process. Arrival at the principled level is indicated by autonomy; the appeal of such moral sensitivities as, for example, respect for persons is internal rather than external. An understanding of Stage 6 (the autonomous or principled level) is thus available only to persons at Stage 6, for if the internal appeal is not present, then the principles of the stage will neither be attractive nor meaningful from the inside, and if they are not appealing and meaningful from the inside, they do not constitute Stage 6. Consequently, the virtue paradigm (Stage 6) is not meaningful from the obligation perspective (Stage 4), but the obligation paradigm is understandable from the virtue perspective. Salkever, on the other hand, is neutral concerning the justifiability of the two paradigms: “I have in no way ‘refuted’ the legitimacy (or obligation) paradigm. . . .”⁹⁶ Our

position is that understanding the virtue paradigm at Stage 6 leads to accepting the obligation paradigm as a means but not an end. The obligation paradigm is an incomplete view of human nature and development; it does not go as far as the virtue paradigm does toward justice (keeping in mind that justice is open-ended, attainable only to a degree, and is not always a feasible pursuit).

If virtue did not have to be understood from the inside, then justice in practice would not be necessary: politics would not have to provide the means, justice—the reciprocity and the trust necessary to participatory understanding—to the end, justice—the shareability of rules, roles, and relations. Justice as a means to justice must be qualified, however, by taking into account the fact that people are at various stages of moral development. Policies that would lead to moral development in some cases would not in others. (It is necessary to deal with persons at their cognitive level.) This reaffirms the importance of the communicative and imaginative faculties in achieving the realistic appraisal of character and consequences so necessary for wise moral choices.⁹⁷

The virtue paradigm’s answer to “What is the best life?” is described by Salkever as rational and nonidiosyncratic, implying an objective answer that arrives at standards which hold good for all. Beyond this Salkever does not go, his purpose not requiring such a venture. To elucidate the cognitive-developmental perspective does require going further. The principles that emerge at Stage 6 do not say specifically what good is, but rather indicate considerations to which one must be sensitive.⁹⁸ These considerations turn out to be those conducive to moral and cognitive development, keeping in mind the interdependence of moral and cognitive aspects of development. For example, sharing in social roles, the product of a certain quality of moral relationships, is vital to cognitive development, and certain cognitive skills—reversibility, for example—are necessary for such moral relationships as reciprocity. We have noted the importance of trust and commitment in this process, and it is important to recall the movement

⁹⁷ Depth of moral understanding has more to do with giving moral principles content than with grasping more and more abstract theories. Giving content to such principles as impartiality, freedom, respect for persons, and consideration of interests requires an understanding of persons which is best arrived at by sharing a common life with them. Breadth of understanding is of equal importance. Awareness of complexity of roles, activities, motives, and rules is important, and knowledge of historical, political, economic, and social facts is indispensable to the process of giving principles realistic content. See Peters, “Concrete Principles,” pp. 53–54.

⁹⁸ For an account of such principles, see Kohlberg, Table 2; Peters, “Concrete Principles,” pp. 29–55, especially pp. 35–44; Hart, *Law, Liberty, and Morality*, pp. 70–71.

⁹³ Piaget, *To Understand Is To Invent* (New York: Grossman Publishers, 1973), pp. 118–119.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 111–112.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 117.

⁹⁶ Salkever, “Virtue,” p. 92.

toward greater equilibrium. The goal of the developmental perspective ("good") is that kind of learning or understanding that leads to further learning and understanding. Given the fact of change in both the organism and the environment, and given the interaction theory, equilibrium must be considered a continuing process dependent upon continuing understanding. In this sense the developmental perspective is rational, nonidiosyncratic, and open-ended.⁹⁹

Yet understanding through justice, and justice through understanding, are not always viable pursuits. There are times when the obligation paradigm is necessary (so thought Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Locke of their situations), and occasions when preconventional sensitivities are dominant (Hobbes's condition of war). But even then the future can be promising; the possibilities of man and his activities in common through politics raise ever anew the possibility of justice. The superiority of the principled level of development over the conventional (obligation paradigm) is that, having experienced the conventional stage, it can employ conventional morality when necessary, whereas the obligation paradigm is powerless to promote principled moral and political development when opportunities to do so exist.

Conclusion

At the heart of Salkever's case for the virtue paradigm is the idea that "... there is a direct path from the political question to the human question, since we can fully answer the question of whether or how political life is choice-worthy only on the basis of an understanding of what human beings are—an understanding, that is to say, of human nature."¹⁰⁰ Our position is also based on an understanding of human nature. We have argued that the nature of a thing is how it grows, that man grows (develops cognitively and morally) in the presence of justice, so human nature is to be understood in connection with justice. But the "end" of human development according to our thinking is open-ended understanding—Dewey's concept of meaning, the kind

of understanding that must lead to more understanding. Justice is sensitivity to the moral principles (see Peter's four principles, or Hart's formal values) that both produce understanding (development) and yet result from understanding. Thus human nature is human development—a process of justice and understanding.

Salkever's virtue paradigm centers on the question "What is good for man?" Does such an inquiry flow from man's nature? Our argument would be yes: it is man's nature to develop, and dealing with this question is a form and a reflection of that development. Yet there seems to be a self-fulfilling hypothesis here. Once the question "What is good for man?" is entertained, the process of understanding (keeping in mind the relationship between understanding and justice) has begun, and understanding becomes the answer to the question as well as the means to answering it.

Thus the significance of the question "What is good for man?" is that it reveals man's distinctive powers of understanding and justice:¹⁰¹ its presence indicates that the processes of understanding and justice are occurring, and it makes man aware of his capacity for development through these processes, thereby encouraging their continuation. This does not mean moral sensitivity cannot develop without an awareness of the developmental process itself. Rather it suggests that the moral sensibilities (and understanding, of course, since they go together) are more likely to develop and thrive where (through literature, drama, history, philosophy, religion, etc.) man's reflections of his morality are present as a continuing contribution to the development of understanding and morality. In this service Salkever's virtue paradigm performs well, especially when augmented by cognitive-developmental moral psychology.

To grasp the nature of man's distinctive powers requires the use of those powers. This observation is similar to a point made earlier in reference to the principled or autonomous level of development: that the appeal of moral principles at this level rests upon their inward effects and satisfactions (thus "autonomous"), such that persons without the experience of those inward effects and satisfactions cannot understand the moral quality of those at the autonomous level. Inside understanding is necessary to grasp the inside understanding of others. Even at the conventional level of morality a person not tuned into the group will not grasp the morality of those who are. This line of reasoning can be expanded to the generalization that it

¹⁰¹ Salkever notes that "Stuart Hampshire argues that any idea of human goodness depends on some idea of the 'distinctive powers of humanity.'" We are also arguing that any idea of the distinctive powers of humanity depends on some idea of human goodness. Salkever, "Virtue," p. 80.

⁹⁹ In addition to being open-ended, the developmental perspective is pluralistic: the principles of Stage 6 are not necessarily mutually compatible. The following statement by Berlin can be reconciled with a Stage 6 orientation: "The world that we encounter in ordinary experience is one in which we are faced with choices between ends equally ultimate, the realization of some of which must inevitably involve the sacrifice of others. Indeed, it is because this is their situation that men place such immense value upon the freedom to choose; for if they had the assurance that in some perfect state, realizable by men on earth, no ends pursued by them would ever be in conflict, the necessity and agony of choice would disappear, and with it the central importance of the freedom to choose." Isaiah Berlin, *Two Concepts of Liberty* (London: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 54.

¹⁰⁰ Salkever, "Virtue," p. 80.

takes a moral agent (man) to know one (man); we cannot abstract our moral sensitivities if we are to understand moral characteristics of man—the moral dimension of man being the phenomenon that separates him from other animals. To grasp the nature of man's distinctive powers requires the use of those powers.¹⁰²

On the basis of a cognitive-developmental approach to moral psychology we have analyzed the meaning and significance of Salkever's two paradigms of political thought. Our first step was to

¹⁰² Compare to Strauss: "Hobbes's political philosophy is really, as its originator claims, based on a knowledge of men which is deepened and corroborated by the self-knowledge and self-examination of the individual, and not on a general scientific or metaphysical theory. And because it is based on experience of human life, it can never, in spite of all the temptations of natural science, fall completely into the danger of abstraction from moral life and neglect of moral difference. Hobbes's political philosophy has thus for that very reason a moral basis, because it is not derived from natural science but is founded on first-hand experience of human life." Strauss, *Hobbes*, p. 29.

present the cognitive-developmental theory and its findings. We then analyzed the two paradigms in terms of this theory, which required placing Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and Rawls within our developmental scheme. And finally, the nature of understanding moral principles was developed from the cognitive-developmental perspective. We assume, as does Salkever, that any account of political good (public good as opposed to private) must be based on moral psychology, that it must deal with the question "What is good for the most inclusive of all publics, the human species?"¹⁰³ We, however, go two steps beyond Salkever by showing the significance of the question, and by providing an answer to it (both of which bear upon the understanding of morality). An underlying purpose of our research is to reveal and to promote the political relevance and significance of moral psychology in general, and cognitive-developmental psychology in particular.

¹⁰³ Salkever, "Virtue," p. 80.

The Future of Community Control*

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It is now more than a decade since the slogan black power symbolized a radical reorientation in the movement to improve the condition of American minority groups. It is eight years since the clash between black activists in New York City and the United Federation of Teachers (UFT) linked the issue of municipal decentralization with black power under the rubric of community control. The early 'seventies have been a period of reduced militancy, but legacies of the 1960s persist. We now expect that black groups will participate in the pluralist bargaining structure (black power devoid of radical potential), and we continue to experiment with the structure of municipal government in order to make it more responsive to neighborhood-based demands. While race remains a crucial determinant of attitude in the debate over municipal reform, changes in historical circumstances have influenced the ideologies of blacks and whites so that the term community control has taken on more complex meanings and its identification with specifically racial demands has diminished. It is our purpose here to explore the meaning of community control for black and white community leaders in New York City; to investigate the importance of racial background, perceptions of city services, and neighborhood contexts in determining that meaning; and to relate our findings to the political future of urban minorities.

Two Types of Community Control Ideology

The argument in favor of community control has been made within two related, but distinguishable, ideological frameworks. The first, which we shall refer to as the *democratic model*, presents the demand for vesting governmental authority at the neighborhood level in terms of the liberal democratic tradition. According to this model indi-

viduals become alienated from government and society unless they can effectively participate in the determination of public policy as it affects them most directly:

It is primarily at the neighborhood level that meaningful (i.e., potentially rewarding) opportunities for the exercise of urban citizenship exist. And it is the breakdown of neighborhood controls (neighborhood self-government, if you will) that accounts for the principal concerns of urban citizens. When they can neither take for granted nor influence by their actions and those of their neighbors the standards of conduct within their own neighborhood community, they experience what to them are "urban problems"—problems that arise directly out of the unmanageable consequences of living in close proximity.¹

Size of the governmental unit is a significant limiting condition on the capacity of citizens for self-government. Large-scale units, although capable of commanding more resources and controlling a broader range of policy than small ones, permit only a minuscule proportion of the population to participate actively in decisionmaking. They submerge even fairly large minorities within a mass of competing interests and produce a majority based on the lowest common denominator. Even if his or her goal is far short of direct democracy, the reformer still must seek to break up vast governing structures if he or she is to realize any degree of citizen participation and responsive administration:

It must be pretty clear by now that if we want to reduce time's implacable constraints in order to increase opportunities for participation, we shall have to find ways by which citizens can participate more fully in smaller units, units smaller than nation-state or megalopolis. These smaller units must be, I think, neighborhoods and cities of human proportions. This means both preserving and creating. To move in this direction is to transform into terms appropriate to modern life a much older perspective on the human dimensions of an urban polity, a perspective that the explosive and fascinating eruption of megalopolis during the past century has all but buried from view.²

The argument for decentralization based on democratic principles has no necessary implica-

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¹ James Q. Wilson, "The Urban Unseal," *The Public Interest*, No. 12 (Summer, 1968), p. 28.

² Robert Dahl, *After the Revolution?* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), p. 153.

tions for racial separatism. Kotler, who is perhaps the strongest and most romantic recent proponent of the democratic community, goes so far as to maintain that community control is a universalistic principle which, by protecting the rights of minorities, inhibits separatist drives:

By gaining legal authority, the neighborhood government participates in the constituted power of the state. This has no value for purposes of separatism. It is not only endangered by such a policy; it is also the best protection against it.³

The second paradigm of community control, which we call the *race-conflict model*, stresses the utilization of the homogeneous black neighborhood as a vehicle for the mobilization of political power. As Carmichael and Hamilton wrote, "We must begin to think of the black community as a base of organization to control institutions in the community."⁴ While the race-conflict model also emphasizes the importance of citizen participation for both the political education of individuals and the assurance of just outcomes, its principal thrust is the identification of geographic community with racial group. Community control thus becomes the *black* demand for participation in large cities.⁵ In general the two models differ according to their preoccupation with different actors in the political system—the democratic construct is concerned with governmental processes as they involve individuals and territorially defined groups; the race-conflict model is oriented towards outcomes for groups defined by their social status.

Both models have a common root in reaction to the urban dialectic of machine and reform.⁶ These two structural forms have shaped the ideology and institutions of American cities since the last century, and their clash has provided much of the drama of local politics. Although antagonistic to each other, neither machine nor reform provides a means of representation of locally based policy interests. Despite its ward organization, the machine excluded neighborhood groups interested in public goods; reform, in its achievement of

centralized, professionalized city government, virtually eliminated the representational function or urban public institutions altogether. The triumph of reform has meant that in most cities policy is made by functionally organized central bureaucracies, governed by universal norms and insulated from grass-roots pressure.⁷

The democratic and race-conflict models of community control converge in their concern over the powerlessness of bureaucratic clients. They can be distinguished, however, according to the grounds on which they counter the reform values of professionalism, centralization, and universalism. The democratic model attacks the legitimacy of contemporary governmental institutions because they deprive individuals of their right to affect the formulation and implementation of governmental policy. According to the democratic argument, professionalism and centralization prevent responsiveness by public officials to the needs of constituents.

The race-conflict model contends that the reliance on universalism as a legitimating value results in discrimination against the interests of relatively deprived groups.⁸ Only the winning of power by groups which have been treated discriminatorily can result in a redress of their grievances. This view is based on an evaluation of government as a zero-sum game and assumes that a redistribution of jobs, contracts, and services in favor of blacks will occur at the expense of previously favored groups. The redistributive argument is, of course, threatening to those who receive income and status from the present system; and it precipitated the acute reaction to community control which created the New York school confrontation. Holders of the race conflict ideology thus do not expect that power will be ceded to them gracefully, but rather that it must be seized through militant, although not necessarily violent, tactics. Built on a colonial analogy,⁹ the race conflict model considers the situation of blacks as resulting from exploitation that can be eliminated only through radical changes in the socioeconomic structure.

The empirical dominance of one or the other

³ Milton Kotler, *Neighborhood Government* (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969), p. 93. Kotler, in this work, presents the argument in favor of neighborhood democracy in its most extreme form, and traces its roots to the origins of the American republic. Yates, however, asserts that while local democracy is often considered characteristic of the American political tradition, it was in fact more myth than history. Douglas Yates, *Neighborhood Democracy* (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1973), p. 12.

⁴ Stokely Carmichael and Charles V. Hamilton, *Black Power* (New York: Vintage, 1967), p. 166.

⁵ See Alan Altshuler, *Community Control* (New York: Pegasus, 1970).

⁶ See Norman I. Fainstein and Susan S. Fainstein, *Urban Political Movements* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1974), chap. 1; J. David Greenstone and Paul E. Peterson, *Race and Authority in Urban Politics* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1973), chap. 4.

⁷ While proponents of community control promote values of lay participation, decentralization, and group particularism, they do not see these as requiring the jettisoning of technical expertise and fair treatment of individuals. Rather, they claim that reform principles have been carried out to an extreme where they produce results contrary to their original intentions.

⁸ See Leonard J. Fein, "Community Schools and Social Theory: The Limits of Universalism," in *Community Control of Schools*, ed. Henry M. Levin (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1970), pp. 76–99.

⁹ Carmichael and Hamilton, *op cit.*; Robert Blauner, *Racial Oppression in America* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), chap. 3; Ira Katznelson, *Black Men, White Cities* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), chap. 3.

model of community control has important theoretical and practical consequences. The theoretical question is whether the position of minority groups in America is sufficiently unique to cause them to adopt a radical ideology, or whether, despite their situation as a victimized and isolated stratum, they nonetheless remain adherents of the liberal democratic political formula. If the latter is true, then cultural values could be so strong as to outweigh marked structural differences in shaping group ideologies. While even the more moderate, democratic type of community control ideology is opposed to the status quo, it does not repudiate the concepts of individualism and majority rule that underlie American liberalism. Rather it presses for institutional forms under which those values can be better realized. Adherence to this model by blacks and Latins would signify that even the least assimilable groups in American society continue to view the world through the framework of an ideology which values individual freedom and mobility above all, and promises participation in a pluralistic society.

In practice, widespread belief in the democratic model would mean that urban political institutions could be made more flexible and responsive without necessarily precipitating hostile outbreaks and increased polarization. Such an outcome may be viewed as either a palliative, representing minor accommodation and coöptation of dissidents, or as evidence of reformism and adaptability. The calm acceptance of Boston's little city halls¹⁰ and New York's Office of Neighborhood Government,¹¹ the assimilation of many of the poverty and Model Cities programs into the regular political structure, and the willingness of big city mayors to lobby for their continuance—all these seem to point to the prevalence of the reformist rather than the radical ideology. Within that ideological framework, these developments provide evidence of minority group successes and confirm a pluralistic world view. Outside of that framework, they are evidence of coöptation which points to the truth of demystifying, group-conflict ideologies.¹²

Our hypotheses, which we test by examining the

orientations toward community control of white and minority community leaders within New York City, are that (1) among both groups the holders of the democratic model of community control far exceed adherents to the race conflict model, but that, (2) because they view their group interests differently, minority leaders are willing to carry the implementation of this democratic model much farther than are most whites. This difference means that the strong racial component which persists in attitudes toward community control is expressed largely through institutional preferences rather than ideological rationales. We further expect to discover that among both white and minority leaders evaluation of the functioning of city services powerfully determines attitudes toward decentralization of authority. Finally, we predict that the institutional preferences of leaders will vary according to the particular situation in which they find themselves, and thus will differ according to the homogeneity and balance of power in any specific community.

Attitudes Toward Community Control of Community Leaders in New York City

New York City presents an especially interesting locale in which to examine attitudes toward decentralization and community control. Politics in the city is characterized by a high level of ethnic and racial consciousness. Here, more than in most other American cities, black (and to some extent Hispanic) leaders make explicit ideological appeals to racial solidarity and participate in a politics of group conflict which further heightens minority-white ideological differences.¹³ In contrast to a city like Chicago, where intergroup exchanges have been made primarily within the organizational confines of the political machine, New York's weak party structures have long encouraged the public mobilization of ethnic and racial sentiment as a vehicle for enhancing the power of local leaders. As far back as the 'thirties, the efforts of blacks to enter the political process took the form of establishing citywide interest groups which articulated "racial" programs, rather than working strictly within the established structure of the declining Tammany organization.¹⁴ When agitation on behalf of poor black and Hispanic communities surfaced in northern cities during the 'sixties, New York became a major center of racial conflict and developed ideological demands. In fact, many of the programmatic elements which would later be termed "black power" and "community control" appeared in the city during the early 'sixties in the activities of Mobilization for Youth, an agency sponsored by

¹⁰ See Eric A. Nordlinger, *Decentralizing the City: A Study of Boston's Little City Halls* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1972).

¹¹ See Susan S. Fainstein *et al.*, "Community Leadership and the Office of Neighborhood Government in Bushwick, Crown Heights and Wakefield-Edenwald" (New York: Bureau of Applied Social Research, Columbia University, November, 1973), interim report; Susan S. Fainstein and Fran LaSpina, "District Service Cabinets and the Office of Neighborhood Government" (New York: Bureau of Applied Social Research, Columbia University, November, 1973), interim report.

¹² See Frances Fox Piven, "The Great Society as Political Strategy," in Richard A. Cloward and Frances Fox Piven, *The Politics of Turmoil* (New York: Pantheon, 1974), pp. 271-83.

¹³ Greenstone and Peterson, *Race and Authority in Urban Politics*, pp. 39-43.

¹⁴ Katznelson, *Black Men, White Cities*, chap. 5.

the Ford Foundation's Gray Areas Program which quickly took a stance of racial militance.¹⁵ Thus, well-developed ideological thinking should be found among New York City leaders, if it is to be found anywhere; and so should positions of racial militance.

For structural reasons, too, New York should be the place where community control ideology and opposition to it, would be most highly developed. In no other American city is the central government so highly bureaucratized and so distant—both politically and geographically—from local communities. The scale of the city means that areas designated "local" or "communities" would constitute sizable cities elsewhere in America. Thus, the official "communities" in New York which have received some increased power over government agencies in the early seventies are the Community Planning Districts (CPDs). The CPDs average 125,000 in population, and some have more than 200,000. Analysts of city affairs, as well as most politicians and civic leaders, have recognized for some years the problems of acute bureaucratic insulation, goal displacement, rigidity and lack of responsiveness to the environment which constitute the "bureaucratic phenomenon."¹⁶

During the late 'sixties, New York was rocked by severe racial conflict resulting from the efforts of some minority group leaders to effect community control over the city's largest bureaucracy, the school system. The association of community control with racial militancy (especially with "black power") was one of the factors which helped to defeat the movement, at least in its more radical form. The open warfare between minority communities and city bureaucracies on the one hand reflected the city's politics of group mobilization and the objective conditions stemming from the bureaucratic phenomenon, but on the other, contributed greatly to minority-white conflict and to the symbolic association of community control with minority solidarity and power. The very term "community control" became a condensation symbol which evoked strong hostility from many whites.

The community control controversies emphasized the need to deal with the problem of the large bureaucracies, and the inadequacy of linkage structures connecting the administrative centers of government with ordinary citizens in their neighborhoods, particularly with minority neighborhoods where citizens were both most dependent upon public services and most dissatisfied with

their quality. The low legitimacy of some bureaucratic structures meant that they became centers of popular mobilization, instead of stabilizing instruments of social control.

The end of the decade could, then, be categorized by two ideological currents, an inter-racial split over community control, as well as a collective recognition that some structural changes could benefit all New York communities. The future of community control and decentralization will hinge largely on which tendency becomes dominant. Thus, New York City is a research site where the problems which have produced demands for governmental reform in many large cities are most acute, and where the relatively high degree of ideological concern about community control issues should make analysis of leadership attitudes particularly interesting in pointing to the political solutions which are likely to be adopted.

The Office of Neighborhood Government

The waning of the movement for community control was associated with continued efforts by the administration of Mayor Lindsay to deal with the bureaucratic phenomenon and the attenuation of mechanisms linking city and public. Some of the city officials who had helped to precipitate the battle for community control of education tried again to reform governmental structures, but this time with much greater caution, and in an historical context less racially charged. After two abortive attempts at establishing new community institutions, the city began an experimental program in the winter of 1971-72 called the Office of Neighborhood Government (ONG).

The Office of Neighborhood Government was aimed at establishing some degree of administrative decentralization and area-based coordination among the dozen or more agencies servicing a community planning district. A district cabinet of agency representatives was chaired by a professional district manager who, with a small staff, attempted to monitor agency performance, determine community (i.e., CPD) priorities, suggest new programs, and link the city bureaucracies with local organizations and civic leaders. In some places, the district managers created neighborhood councils, a step in the direction of community control.

ONGs were initially established in five CPDs.¹⁷ These five experimental districts, and three additional CPDs which were chosen for comparative purposes,¹⁸ constitute the areas from which our

¹⁵ Joseph Helfgot, "Professional Reform Organizations and the Symbolic Representation of the Poor," *American Sociological Review*, 39 (August, 1974), 475-91.

¹⁶ Michel Crozier defines the term in *The Bureaucratic Phenomenon* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967).

¹⁷ Brooklyn No. 4 (Bushwick), Brooklyn No. 8 (Crown Heights), Manhattan No. 12 (Washington Heights), Bronx No. 13 (Wakefield-Edenwald), and Queens No. 14 (Rockaways).

¹⁸ Brooklyn No. 5 (East New York), Bronx No. 5 (Grand Concourse), and Queens No. 3 (Jackson Heights).

data are drawn. On the whole they fall into the second and third quartiles of CPDs in terms of socioeconomic status, social problems, and racial segregation. They range from being about 20 per cent white to 80 per cent white, and are broadly representative of many areas of New York and other large American cities.¹⁹ Information about politics in such typical yet anonymous places, and about the attitudes of their leadership structure, is therefore of interest to the urban political sociologist, particularly given the relative paucity of such data in the literature.

This paper is based upon four primary sources of empirical evidence. First, a closed-ended field survey of a total sample of 368 community leaders chosen through a reputational methodology was carried out during 1972 in four of the five experimental CPDs and in the three control districts. (The survey was pretested in the other ONG district, the Rockaways.) Second, intensive, semi-structured interviews were conducted during 1973 with a sample of 114 community leaders active in three CPDs: Bushwick, Crown Heights, and Wakefield-Edenwald. Both leadership samples included members of community planning boards, police precinct councils, community (anti-poverty) corporation boards, clergymen, officers of a wide range of voluntary organizations (such as PTA's, taxpayers and block or neighborhood improvement groups, tenants councils and race or ethnic organizations), city councilmen, state legislators, and party leaders. Third, voluntary organizations, protest groups, quasi-government agencies, and the political clubs and parties were observed directly during 1973 and 1974 in Bushwick, Crown Heights, and Wakefield-Edenwald. Fourth, all city bureaucrats (e.g., police precinct captains, district sanitation supervisors) who sat on the five ONG cabinets were interviewed in 1973. This population consisted of 78 individuals.

The next section of the paper will depend mainly on the first two sources of data, which we will designate, respectively, the *survey* of community leaders and the *interviews* with community leaders. Field observation data are used to illustrate the impact of community types on operational orientations toward community control. Finally, the cabinet interviews are examined in the last section, when we discuss the attitudes of minority-group cadres within city bureaucracies.

(An extensive discussion of sample characteristics and of methodological issues is contained in

an appendix to this article which, for reasons of space, could not be printed here. Interested readers may request copies from the authors.)

Racial Differences in Ideological and Operational Orientations Toward Community Control

An ideology is a differentiated and logically organized set of beliefs which identifies relevant social and political actors, diagnoses the forces which constrain them, and proposes courses of action which are ethically justifiable and can lead to valued ends. The race-conflict and democratic systems of beliefs are alternative ideologies by this definition, even though they are not complete in the sense that they focus only on particular political questions and problems, and could be fitted into more general typologies of political thought.

Individuals employing the same ideological framework may have different *operational beliefs* about group interests, probable outcomes, and appropriate actions in concrete situations. For example, there is much greater consensus among Americans about the liberal ideological belief in freedom of speech than in the operational belief that communists should be allowed to speak in their communities.²⁰ Operational beliefs are easier to specify than are the patterns we call ideologies. And because they are more closely tied to immediate situations, they are more readily utilized predictors of behavior than are ideologies.

The survey and interviews provide evidence about both the community control ideologies and the operational beliefs of community leaders. After describing both levels of thought and analyzing some of the factors which explain differences among leaders, we will consider the implications of these findings for the possible future of community control.

Ideologies of community control. The overwhelming majority of community leaders favors some form of community control and shares one of the two ideological frameworks supportive of it. When leaders are presented with a list of city services in their CPDs, only 18 per cent of those surveyed oppose any degree of local control over the agency they *least* wish to control, the fire department (Table 1). Opposition to community control averages less than 10 per cent for the entire array of thirteen services. Of the 97 leaders whose beliefs about community control are codable into ideological types, 92 (95 per cent) advance either the race conflict or the democratic supporting ideologies (Table 2). *The evidence is unambiguous in pointing to a positive orientation toward local*

¹⁹ More detailed information is provided in Norman Fainstein and Susan Fainstein, "Political Representation and the Urban District," paper presented at the 1975 meeting of the American Sociological Association, and in Nathalie Friedman and Naomi Golding, "Urban Residents and Neighborhood Government: Profile of the Public in Seven Urban Neighborhoods of New York City" (New York: Bureau of Applied Social Research, Columbia University, June 1973).

²⁰ Empirical evidence and a theoretical discussion of the concept of ideology versus operational or procedural beliefs is provided by Herbert McClosky, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," *American Political Science Review*, 58 (1964), 361-82.

Table 1. Orientation of Community Leaders Toward Operationalization of Community Control for Each of Thirteen City Services^a

Service	Percentage Favoring Decision-Making Powers	Percentage Favoring Advisory Powers	Percentage Opposing Community Control	Percentage Don't Know/Doesn't Matter
Recreation	61 ^b	35	3	1
Drug Addict Treatment Programs	52	40	7	1
Housing Maintenance & Code Enforcement	52	38	9	1
Public Schools	52	39	8	1
Parks	50	42	6	2
Street Repairs	44	46	8	2
Health Services	44	48	8	0
Sanitation	40	52	6	2
Traffic	32	58	8	2
Police Protection	30	56	12	2
Welfare	29	52	16	3
Subway & Bus Lines	27	58	11	4
Fire Protection	20	58	18	4

^a Services are ranked in decreasing order of percentage favoring decision-making power.

^b Percentages sum to 100 horizontally. *N*'s vary slightly, but are approximately 350 for each row.

control over government agencies by the entire community leadership stratum.

When leaders explain what they mean by community control most invoke a democratic type of ideology. About 14 per cent (see Table 2) employ an ideological framework which can be interpreted as reflecting the race-conflict type. In coding for this type of ideology we accepted rather subtle indicators of racial orientation, because the overt support for black power or racial militancy which was current six or seven years ago is almost completely absent from the interview responses. Here is a typical expression of race-conflict ideology:

People must be made aware of their potential to influence government policy and education processes. People have to learn how to protect themselves. The crisis is immense, staggering. The biggest problem is to get the poor to participate in government. . . . We have to learn to share [power]. Black politicians should make it clear that they represent the black community. . . .

We must train our people to do research and gain evidence in their favor. We're going to win. . . .

Missing from this and other race-conflict arguments are explicit statements concerning racism, the colonial status of minority groups, or the zero-sum nature of politics. Rather, the emphasis is on development of minority communities so that they can act effectively within (rather than against)

governmental institutions. Outcomes and institutional processes are linked. Accountability to the community will both help facilitate community development and guarantee an adequate share of services. Nevertheless, adherents to race-conflict ideas do clearly equate "community" with minority-group collectivities, rather than with a geographical area, and their major concern is in improving the situation of racial minorities.

There are several possible explanations for the moderation shown by supporters of the race-conflict position. Minority group respondents may have chosen their words carefully in talking with our white interviewers. This stratum of leaders, however, produced the activists who participated in the urban political movements of the 'sixties, when many of them were willing to get involved in public confrontations with city officials and frequently with the police as well. Methodological factors seem to us of less importance in accounting for the lack of militant rhetoric than do changes which have taken place in the situation of minority groups. First, at the time of the interviews, the political climate nationwide was one of conservatism, declining expectations, and political "realism," all of which discouraged racial militancy. Second, minority-group community leaders had better access to governmental institutions and the political process than they did in the mid-

Table 2. Types of Ideology Used by Community Leaders Interviewed in Bushwick, Crown Heights, and Wakefield-Edenwald as Rationales for Community Control^a

	Support Some Form of Community Control		Oppose All Forms of Community Control
	Ideology used to Rationalize Support is:		
	<i>Race-Conflict Type</i>	<i>Democratic Type</i>	
<i>Minority Leaders</i>	20% ^b (11)	80% (45)	0%
<i>White Leaders</i>	7% (3)	81% (33)	12% (5)

^a Tabulation based on analysis of 97 interviews with community leaders who provided codable responses to the following question: "The Charter Commission is particularly concerned with devising ways of making city institutions more responsive to citizens. What suggestions do you have?" Interviewers probed for attitudes about decentralization, citizen participation, decision-making or advisory power for community boards, elective versus appointed boards.

^b Percentages sum to 100 per cent horizontally. Of the 45 minority leaders, 10 are Hispanic. Three of the Hispanic leaders support Hispanic group power, and 8 of the 48 black leaders support black power. These are roughly comparable percentages. Since minority leaders tend not to focus on black-Hispanic conflict, the aggregation of black and Hispanic leaders into a single minority-group designation seems justifiable for the purposes of this analysis.

'sixties. Whether this was viewed as progress or co-optation, it seemed to have dampened rhetoric considerably, and to have led to efforts to use the system, to work through newly developed channels of communication. Finally, the need for some kind of bureaucratic decentralization and local political input had been recognized as a general problem in New York City, no longer as primarily a racial demand. Minority leaders, while having a greater stake in community control than whites, could frame their demands in terms which did not undermine the possibility of interracial coalition. Approximately four-fifths of community leaders rationalize support for community control through a democratic-type ideology (Table 2). As the following examples (from five respondents) indicate, however, within a common ideological framework beliefs vary considerably concerning the manner in which local control should be effected and the degree of power local majorities should have over city agencies:

There's a need for real change, change that would provide a greater voice with power to speak for those who

live in the city and are victims of the existing situation. What is needed is an organization to speak for the community.

* * *

We need simultaneously to have community development and administrative decentralization. We need the orderly interpretation of the feelings of the community . . . so the community can have input into city offices. We need to get away from street rhetoric and to have a formal mechanism for input.

* * *

City agencies have become too large. I feel decentralization at this point would help; the community would set the priorities for the agencies. . . .

I go for decentralization and, of course, citizen participation. I favor neighborhood boards with real power. Advisory power is just the status quo. They should have power over personnel, the budget—so as to give a chance for the community people to participate in city government and to keep city government money here. Part of the problem is that people setting policy don't live in the area they are setting the policy for. It is only a job for them.

* * *

To restructure the agencies you should put a member of every board or organization or of the Community Corporation [community action agency] Board into an affiliation with a service agency at a decisional level. . . . That community person should be consulted on services and priorities. If the agency doesn't perform, this liaison should finger the person responsible and report him to higher political officials. These liaisons should report monthly to the local community organization office.

* * *

Elected officials should give more attention to the needs of their constituency. The Borough President should have more power. The City must eliminate the superagencies and give the Borough President the authority.

This range of responses suggests that the dominance of democratic ideology among community leaders, whatever their racial background, may mask large differences in operational beliefs about community control. Qualitative examination of the interviews confirms two generalizations about these differences: first, that individuals who utilize a race-conflict ideology are certain to want to operationalize community control by giving relatively great power to local communities; but, sec-

community control (a large plurality of both minority and white leaders) encompass a great range of possible degrees and modes of operationalization. And, as we will show, although racial differences in ideological rationales for community control are fairly small, racial differences in operational beliefs are quite large.

Operational support for community control. The survey provides considerable evidence about the predictors of operational support for community

control. The main indicators of operational support derive from the item presented in Table 1. Respondents were asked whether they favored (1) local decision making or (2) local advisory powers over thirteen separate city services, or (3) whether they opposed community control altogether. Since so few people oppose community control, the practical distinction is between those who favor decision-making powers versus all others, and an aggregate indicator of their general support can be provided by the total number of agencies over which they wish to extend local decision-making powers. Using these indicators of operational support for community control, we find that the racial background of community leaders is a significant predictor of degree of operational support, but that income, education, religion, partisan affiliation and extent of organizational activity are not correlated with such support.

If we examine the first column in Table 1, we see considerable range in the percentage of respondents favoring decision-making powers over the various services. The services are ranked according to this percentage, which is greatest for recreation (61 per cent) and least for fire protection (20 per cent). This large range suggests that community leaders judge the particulars of each service separately, rather than having an undifferentiated

response set toward community control. Table 3 shows that willingness to operationalize community control seems to depend upon a complex assessment of the conditions affecting a given city service.

With one exception rank order is similar regardless of race, even though a greater percentage of minority than white leaders operationally support community control over every single service.²¹ The percentage of minority leaders showing high support is, in general, between 15 and 20 per cent greater than the white percentage. The largest interracial differences are in support for community control of drug addiction programs, housing maintenance, schools, health services, sanitation, and police protection (20 per cent or more in each case; Table 3). For each service, the race of a leader is a statistically significant predictor of the leader's degree of support for community control (i.e. for local *decision-making* power). Gamma correlation coefficients range between .29 and .53, with all significant at better than the .05 level.

²¹ The only service with a ranking that differs significantly depending on the race of leaders is police protection. Presumably this may be explained by minority leaders assigning a much higher priority to controlling the police because of their greater interest in changing current police practices.

Table 3. Orientation Toward Community Control of Minority and White Leaders for Each of Thirteen City Services^a

Service	Percentage of Each Racial Group Favoring Decision-making Powers ^b		Gamma Correlation between Race and Decision-making Powers	Significance of Chi-square with 1 df; P Less Than:
	Minority	White		
Recreation.....	71	56	.37	.01
Drug Addict Treatment Programs..	69	43	.48	.001
Housing Maintenance and Code Enf.	66	45	.44	.001
Public Schools.....	65	43	.41	.001
Parks.....	59	46	.28	.05
Street Repairs.....	57	37	.38	.01
Health Services.....	58	36	.41	.001
Sanitation.....	53	33	.39	.01
Traffic.....	40	28	.29	.05
Police Protection.....	46	21	.53	.001
Welfare.....	41	23	.42	.001
Subway & Bus Lines.....	37	21	.36	.01
Fire Protection.....	33	14	.51	.001

^a Services are ranked in decreasing order of percentage of *all* leaders favoring decision-making powers (as in Table 1).

^b Based on *N* favoring decision-making powers, advisory powers, or opposing community control for each racial group. *N*'s vary slightly, but are approximately 350 for each row.

Table 4. Index of Minority and White Operational Support for Local Decision-making Power over City Services

Rank		(Range of Scores ^a Included in Rank)	Minority	White	All
Least					
Support	0	(.00-.08)	17% (21)	31% (74)	26% (95)
	1	(.09-.25)	10% (12)	16% (39)	14% (51)
	2	(.26-.50)	18% (22)	19% (46)	19% (68)
Most	3	(.51-.69)	16% (20)	17% (40)	17% (60)
Support	4	(.70-1.000)	39% (47)	17% (41)	24% (88)
			100% (122)	100% (240)	100% (362)

Gamma = .41

Chi-square = 23.44 with 4 df:

P less than .0001

^a Index score = number of services over which respondent favored *decision-making* power divided by number of services rated in terms of "decision-making," "advisory," or "opposed to community control." Services for which response was DK or "Doesn't Matter" are excluded from the computation, and respondents with 4 or more such exclusions are eliminated from the tabulation. The resulting scores are essentially the percentage of the thirteen city services over which respondent favored decision-making powers. Almost all respondents in the lowest rank "0" did not favor decision-making powers over any services; while those in the highest rank "4" favored such powers over 10 or more of the thirteen services.

Racial differences in support for community control are presented in a more simplified form by the index described in Table 4. As would be expected from the previous findings, minority leaders score considerably higher on the index than do whites. Only 17 per cent of minority leaders, but 31 per cent of white leaders, fall into the lowest index rank; while 39 per cent of minority leaders and 17 per cent of whites show the highest level of support for community control. The Gamma correlation between race and the five-rank index is .41. *Thus, there are consistently large interracial differences with regard to degree of operational support for community control despite similar ideological rationales and similar overall support for some kind of local citizen participation.*

This apparent anomaly is, in part, explained by the existence of other political beliefs according to which blacks and whites differ. Our data, in fact, point to such an attitudinal correlate of operational support. Using a two-item index of support for citizen militancy, we find considerably greater support for militancy among minority leaders than among whites (Gamma = .62; Table 5). Furthermore, there is a strong correlation between support for militancy and for community control (Gamma = .42; Table 9). A factor, therefore, which accounts for greater minority support for community control is the predisposition of minority leaders toward citizen militancy. Intraracial variation in orientation toward community control can likewise be partially explained by this attitudinal correlate (see Table 9, columns 2 and 3).

General political beliefs offer one explanation for varying attitudes toward operationalizing com-

munity control. Another explanation relies on analysis of the overall structural position of minority groups in American cities. Eisinger argues that the social position of individual respondents is less important in accounting for racial differences in support for protest activities than is the structural position of the group with which individuals identify.²² By this logic minority leaders would support community control more than whites if the interests of minority groups are advanced by community control to a greater extent than those of whites. The process by which community leaders come collectively to represent their racial groups need not be conscious and is, in any event, not accessible to us without additional data.

Race constitutes a dominant and continuously functioning structural force shaping the interests and beliefs of community leaders. Further factors, arising out of the specific political situations in which individuals find themselves, assist in explaining the variations within racial groups. These situationally specific factors include perception of the quality of city agencies, experience with actual instances of decentralization and community input, and the relations among social groups in the community. Stress upon the importance of situationally specific beliefs about the costs and benefits of operationalizing community control should not obscure the importance of race as a discriminating variable. It does, however, point to the complex set of cross-cutting cleavages and interests to which community leaders are sensitive.

²² Peter K. Eisinger, "Racial Differences in Protest Participation," *American Political Science Review*, 68 (June 1974), 592-606.

Table 5. Support for Citizen Militancy by Minority and White Community Leaders

Rank on Index of Support for Citizen Militancy ^a	Minority	White	All
Lowest	6% (7)	20% (44)	15% (51)
Intermediate	74% (85)	76% (169)	75% (254)
Highest	20% (23)	4% (9)	10% (32)
Gamma = .62	100% (115)	100% (222)	100% (337)
Chi-square = 29.78 with 2 df; <i>P</i> less than .0001			

^a The index is based on two questions from the survey with which the respondent could strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree:

- (1) Tenants are justified in organizing a rent strike if the landlord fails to make needed repairs in a building.
- (2) Sometimes violence is necessary to bring about important changes in society.

Forty-four per cent strongly agreed with the rent strike item, and 39% agreed; 9% strongly agreed with the violence item, and 27% agreed.

The index was constructed so as to clearly identify individuals at the two extremes of support for militancy. Only respondents who *strongly* agreed with the violence item were labeled "highest supporters." Those who disagreed or strongly disagreed with *both* items were placed in the "lowest support" category. Those who agreed with the violence item and agreed or strongly agreed with the rent strike item were designated as "moderate supporters" of militancy. There were six cases where an individual agreed or strongly agreed with the violence question but disagreed or strongly disagreed with the rent strike question. These cases were designated as "logical errors" and not included in the index.

Situational Factors Affecting Operational Support for Community Control

Our evidence suggests three situational factors which influence attitudes toward community control. First, the more dissatisfied leaders are with governmental performance, the more likely they are to favor community control. Second, like the doctors who support Medicaid when they find it in fact raises rather than lowers their incomes, leaders who have had favorable experience of actual programs of decentralization and community control indicate higher levels of operational support for community control. Third, the operational model of community control which leaders desire to see implemented is strongly influenced by the racial composition and political organization of their local districts. These propositions reflect situa-

tionally specific interest cleavages which cross-cut the basic interracial divisions among community leaders.

Quality of agency performance. Leaders show considerable variation in their evaluations of the performance of different city agencies in their districts. The average evaluation of city services also varies among the districts, and does so in a manner which probably reflects objective reality (see Table 7). While there is an overall correlation between race and rank on an index of service evaluation (Table 6), closer analysis shows that this association is minimal or even reversed in three of the seven CPDs. These data suggest that leaders' perception of the quality of services is tied to factors situationally specific to each agency and to each CPD.

Table 6. Racial Differences in the Evaluation of the Quality of Local City Services

Rank on Index ^a	Minority Leaders	White Leaders	All Leaders
1. Most Positive Evaluation	26%	38%	34%
2. Intermediate	29	35	33
3. Most Negative Evaluation	46	27	33
Gamma = .29	101%	100%	100%
	<i>N</i> = 122	<i>N</i> = 240	<i>N</i> = 362

Chi-square = 13.02 with 2 df; *P* less than .002

^a Respondents were asked to rate the quality of each of thirteen city services in their own Community Planning District on a five point scale from excellent to very bad. The services were the same as those in the community control item.

The index is based on a summation (weighted by score) of the number of services each respondent rated "very bad" or "bad" divided by the number of services rated "excellent," "good," "fair," "bad," or "very bad." This index was divided into ranks at the 34th and 67th percentile.

Table 7. Racial Differences in the Evaluation of the Quality of Local City Services for Leaders from the Same Community Planning Districts

Community Planning District	Percentage of Each Group of Leaders Falling into the Lowest Rank (Most Negative Evaluation) on the Service Index ^a			Racial Differences Within Districts
	All Leaders from District	Minority (a)	White (b)	
East N.Y. (Brooklyn)	46% (N = 50)	63%	38%	25%
Bushwick (Brooklyn)	43 (N = 49)	59	23	36
Jackson Heights (Queens)	33 (N = 55)	47	25	22
Grand Concourse (Bronx)	32 (N = 56)	70	24	46
Crown Heights (Brooklyn)	32 (N = 50)	27	36	-9
Wakefield-Edenwald (Bronx)	26 (N = 51)	32	22	10
Washington Heights (Manhattan)	24 (N = 51)	22	24	-2

^a This index is defined in Table 6. Note that respondents are ranking the services in *their own* Community Planning Districts.

The evaluation of city services is negatively correlated with operational support for community control, and this correlation remains unchanged when minority and white leaders are examined separately. Table 8 shows these relationships most simply by cross-tabulating the variables in dichotomized form. (Table 9 shows similar Gamma correlations for the full indexes.) Within the minority group, there is a 17 percentage point difference in positive support for community control between

those with lower and higher rankings on the service index (Gamma = .34); within the white group, the difference is 19 per cent (Gamma = .39). Thus, the overall perception by leaders of the quality of city services apparently influences their willingness to operationalize community control over those services. We have also examined these relationships for individual services, and our findings are identical. The correlation within each social group between an index of service evaluation and com-

Table 8. Racial Differences in the Relation between Support for Community Control and Evaluation of the Quality of Local Services

	Minority		White	
	Lower Service Evaluation ^a	Higher Service Evaluation ^b	Lower Service Evaluation	Higher Service Evaluation
Lower Support for Community Control ^c	36% (20)	53% (35)	52% (34)	71% (125)
Higher Support for Community Control ^d	64% (36)	47% (31)	48% (31)	29% (50)
	100% (56)	100% (66)	100% (65)	100% (175)
Gamma = -.34			Gamma = -.39	
Chi-square = 3.94 with 1 df; P less than .05			Chi-square = 7.93 with 1 df; P less than .01	

^a Rank 3 on service evaluation index defined in Table 6.
^b Rank 1 and 2 on service evaluation index.
^c Ranks 0, 1, and 2 on index of support for community control defined in Table 4.
^d Ranks 3 and 4 on index of support for community control.

Table 9. Summary of Predictors of Operational Support for Community Control for All Leaders, and for Minority and White Leaders Examined Separately

Predictor	Gamma Correlations between Rank on Index of Support for Community Control and Specified Variables for:		
	All Leaders	Minority Leaders	White Leaders
Race (Minority Status)	.35 ^{a*}	—	—
Education ^a	-.05	.09	-.02
Income ^b	-.04	-.03	-.03
Index of Support for Militancy ^c	.42*	.31*	.38*
Index of Evaluation of Quality of City Services ^d	-.28*	-.28 ^f	-.26*

^a Four rank index.

^b Five rank index.

^c Three rank index using categories specified in Table 5.

^d Three rank index using categories as specified in Table 6.

^e All coefficients marked with an asterisk are significant using a Chi-square statistic at .05 level or beyond.

^f This cross-tabulation has 15 cells (since the community control index has five ranks), and 8 df. Collapsing either or both of the indexes produces a Chi-square significant at better than .05 and a Gamma higher than .28. (See Table 8.)

munity control attitudes is replicated service by service. The more negatively a leader rates a particular service (say, police protection in his CPD), the more likely the leader is to favor local decision-making powers over that service.

Nevertheless, analysis of Table 8 (and examination of service-by-service relationships) also shows that the basic disparity in support for community control *between* racial groups is not eliminated when service evaluation is partialled out. Among the leaders with lower service evaluations, 64 per cent of minority leaders, but only 48 per cent of whites, indicate higher support for community control. This 16 percentage point difference within service-evaluation groupings is comparable to the differences within each racial group when service evaluation is a variable. Computation of correlation coefficients between race and community control for the higher and lower service-evaluation groupings produces Gammas, respectively, of .38 and .33, which are almost identical to those between community control and service evaluation within each racial group. (Table 9 shows similar results using the full indexes for the two variables.) We conclude, therefore, that the structurally rooted factor of race and the situa-

tionally specific factor of service evaluation are equally important as predictors of the dependent variable. Jointly, they explain a good deal of the variance in levels of operational support for community control.

Experience with programs of decentralization and community control. Since 1969 New York City has established a number of programs intended to produce administrative decentralization and mechanisms for local input or community control. The most significant programs involving to some degree both elements of institutional change are the Community School Boards and the Office of Neighborhood Government (ONG). The response of community leaders to each of these programs provides additional evidence about the way situational factors affect the basic racial cleavages in operational support for community control. Each presents leaders with a concrete institutional form and actual experience. In these instances, the operational orientation of leaders need not depend entirely on deductions from general propositions.

In actual practice, community control of schools in New York took a much less radical form than white critics had feared or than minority advocates had desired during the period of major interracial hostility in the 'sixties. The thirty-odd community school boards have been, in general, dominated by groups supportive of educational professionalism. This leads us to expect that, at the least, white opposition to community control of education would be lessened by contact with the new institutional arrangements, although it is not clear what effect these arrangements might have for minority leaders.

Table 10 presents data on support for community control of schools among self-identified specialists in educational problems. White educational specialists indicate much higher approval of community control of education than white non-specialists. Sixty-six per cent of the white specialists, as opposed to 37 per cent of other white leaders, endorse local decision-making powers over schools.²³ This suggests that familiarity with the actual operation of school decentralization has created support for its continuation.²⁴

²³ The percentage of white specialists most supportive of community control of schools is identical to the percentage of all minority leaders in this category. There is no difference between minority specialists and other minority leaders, however. From additional analyses, we also know that white specialists and nonspecialists do not differ from each other in their support for community control over other city services. Moreover, the relationship between specialization and support for community control over the institution with which leaders are most familiar does not hold for other city services.

²⁴ It does not tell us whether our sample of white specialists has increased its level of support from what it was prior

Table 10. Orientation toward Community Control of Schools of White and Minority Leaders by Problem Specialization^a

	Minority		White	
	Educational Specialists	Nonspecialists	Educational Specialists	Nonspecialists
Oppose Community Control of Schools or Favor Only Advisory Powers	33% (8)	35% (34)	34% (13)	63% (126)
Favor Decision-making Powers Over Schools	67% (16)	65% (63)	66% (25)	37% (75)
	100%(24)	100% (97)	100% (38)	100%(201)
Gamma = - .04 Chi-square = .03 with 1 df; P less than .80			Gamma = - .53 Chi-square = 10.65 with 1 df; P less than .01	

^a Leaders were asked which one of a list of "problems" they had "the most experience dealing with" in their community planning district. Those who identified schools are designated educational specialists.

ONG presents a second example of a governmental program which provided a concrete stimulus for leadership attitudes. As we will discuss shortly, ONG constituted only a step toward community control, and the program was introduced in a way least likely to exacerbate latent racial cleavages. Probably as a result of these specific aspects of the ONG innovation, the response of community leaders in Bushwick, Crown Heights and Wakefield-Edenwald to ONG reflected no racial division.²⁵ Fifty-eight per cent of minority leaders interviewed expressed positive evaluations of ONG; 18 per cent gave mixed evaluations; and 18 per cent were negative (3 of the 60 minority leaders had uncertain opinions). The white breakdown was virtually identical, with 58 per cent positive, 16 per cent mixed, and 13 per cent negative (4 of 31 white leaders were uncertain). These findings underline once more the complexity of forecasting leadership responses to actual programs. The politics of implementation of community control does not depend on leadership ideologies and general attitudes alone. Predicting the impact of specific programs requires taking into account situational factors, such as the process by which institutional innovation is effected and the particular interests which leaders think are being served in the actual instance.

Types of communities. Several dimensions are to 1969, or whether there has been selective recruitment into the educational arena of whites who favor community control of schools. If viewed with caution, however, the data do seem to describe a cleavage which results from situational experience with, or vested interests in, actual programs.

²⁵ The following data are drawn from Fainstein *et al.*, "Community Leadership and the Office of Neighborhood Government. . . ."

involved in a typology of neighborhoods which would explain variation in the politics of community control. First, the social class of residents should indicate their level of dependence on governmental services and bureaucracies. Second, racial composition is obviously important given what we know about the general correlation between race and operational support for community control. Third, social divisions within a single neighborhood and the relative power of the various groups within the community affect their interests in institutional change. Such dimensions help identify how leaders measure the effects on their constituencies of alternative programs of administrative decentralization and community control.

Brief examinations of the Bushwick, Crown Heights, and Wakefield-Edenwald districts illustrate how community type affects orientations toward local control. Bushwick is the most ethnically pluralistic yet homogeneously poor of the three CPDs. It is divided among a shrinking white population of Italian and German ethnicity (25 per cent of the total), blacks (30 per cent) and Hispanics (45 per cent). Most people in Bushwick are working or lower class. The district had a median income in 1969 of about \$6500, or \$400 less than the New York City norm. In Bushwick, the primary concern of all groups of leaders seems to be community development, both in an economic and social sense. The relative lack of civic leadership is seriously compounded by the virtual desertion of the district by partisan political organizations. The main centers of community activity and of linkage with city government are the community corporation (originally a community action agency under the federal poverty program) and ONG.

Bushwick leaders emphasize the need to increase public services in the district and see community control as a means for doing this. But control in Bushwick must be advanced in spite of the inactivity of the population. Thus, leaders believe that new institutional structures should not be premised on widespread community participation. Rather, Bushwick needs more professionals who would act as its advocates within the city bureaucratic arena. According to this conception, community control in Bushwick might take a technocratic form, with ONG and community corporation professionals advancing the interests of the Bushwick community through virtual rather than mandated representation of the larger population.

Crown Heights falls between Bushwick and Wakefield-Edenwald in terms of both racial and economic composition. Blacks are in a numerical majority, comprising 75 per cent of the population, with the remainder divided between a small Hispanic group (5 per cent) and whites (20 per cent), most of whom are Jews. The Jewish population is dominated by a tightly knit sectarian community of Hasidim. The 1969 median income was \$7,500. Both blacks and whites are divided along economic lines. Many blacks (approximately 50 per cent) are homeowners and thereby rooted in the district, while the Hasidim are also rooted, but for religious and cultural reasons. The politics of Crown Heights is defined by a sharp cleavage between homeowners and renters, which is reflected in splits within the Democratic party leadership. Crown Heights has a high level of civic activity among all social groups. The Hasidim, however, have political power far beyond their numbers in the district, both because they have religious ties with bureaucrats in the central city government, and because they have been able to vote as a disciplined bloc in local elections (something the blacks have not accomplished). As a result of their voting power, the Hasidim have considerable influence in one of the Democratic party clubs and dominate the board of the community corporation. The major vehicle linking the black majority with government agencies is a community board created by ONG. The board represents local civic organizations and is controlled by black groups.

Black leaders in Crown Heights strongly favor community control through the ONG community board. They feel they need a vehicle for resolving conflicts among civic and partisan organizations, so that the "community" can focus its attentions on collective development. They want representation on any local board, however, to reflect the interests of communal groups in proportion to their share of the population. Because the Hasidim dominate popular elections, black leaders prefer to have an appointed board. The Hasidim, for their part, would like to maintain the status quo.

They are probably correct in seeing any form of community control as likely to be disadvantageous for themselves since they are a numerical minority in the CPD. In the context of Crown Heights, the politics of community control centers about maintaining unity within a popular majority beset by cleavages, and balancing democratic norms against the power of a unified minority fearful of being overwhelmed at the local level.

Wakefield-Edenwald is a relatively well-off district almost three-quarters white (primarily Italian). Most whites are homeowners as are almost half of the black residents. The district is politically conservative. Homeowners are concerned with maintaining property values and a high level of "hard" services (e.g., sanitation, fire). There are many organizations in the district, with a cohesive structure of civic leaders who tend to be alienated from the relatively active Democratic and Republican clubs. The black lower class (perhaps 10 per cent of the entire population) is segregated into a remote corner of the CPD where a public housing project is located. This part of the black community is politically disorganized. Black homeowners participate in civic organizations, but not in partisan ones; their interests differ little from those of the white majority, and racial agitation is rarely evident.

In Wakefield, community control is seen as a vehicle for giving this geographically remote CPD a greater share of city resources and a local say over how these will be distributed. The emphasis is on decentralization rather than community power. Few leaders desire the establishment of a local board with decision-making powers, though most would like to see the community consulted by city bureaucrats. The minority of leaders who are active in the political clubs want elected officials to have more power, while the civic leaders are suspicious of politicians and want any structures of local input to be nonpartisan. Wakefield does not suffer from the problems of Bushwick or Crown Heights, and neither does it present much of an indigenous force for community control.

These sketches of three very different types of communities suggest the ways in which local situational factors influence the politics of community control. The descriptions of the three CPDs also call attention to the dynamic elements which must be considered in making any predictions about community control. In the next section we further examine these dynamic forces, but this time at a citywide and national level.

Community Control: A Prognosis

The future of community control, as an issue and an ideology, will be determined by a combination of factors deriving from broad ideological currents, national and citywide policies, and specific

local situations. The continued dominance of the democratic model, and in fact the continuation of community control as a meaningful organizing concept around which to center discussions of local politics, depends on a variety of different inputs, some of them unpredictable. The phrase community control had no particular significance when Banfield and Wilson published their path-breaking text on urban politics in 1963;²⁶ its disappearance from the urban scene might be just as sudden. In this section we examine the variables at the citywide and national level which affect the debate over community participation in policy making and implementation, and which will determine its longevity as an issue.

Citywide Factors. New York City presents two contrasting cases of the implementation of experiments in community participation and administrative decentralization—one in school decentralization that culminated in a crisis, and the second, the Office of Neighborhood Government (ONG), which was accepted calmly. While a significant factor in differentiating the reactions to the two experiments was the difference in militancy of the times in which they occurred, an important contributing cause also was the strategy pursued by governmental policy-makers. Comparison of the city government's role in these two experiments should help to isolate some of the variables which can make community control into a more or less controversial issue.²⁷

In 1967 the New York City Board of Education, in response to great dissatisfaction with the school system expressed by vocal black parents, and at the prompting of the Ford Foundation, set up three demonstration school districts (IS 201, Two Bridges, and Ocean Hill-Brownsville). Their declared purpose was to show the effects of placing limited control over school policy at the community level. The three demonstration districts quickly elected governing boards which interpreted their mandate as going well beyond the planning function visualized by the Board of Education. There was also hostility between the governing boards and professional school employees, eventually resulting in the transfer by the Ocean Hill board of a group of teachers out of the district and the lengthy teachers' strike of 1968. Intense emotion surrounded the conflict, and it came to symbolize a whole range of issues concerning the relationships between clients and public

bureaucracies and between the races.

Throughout the school decentralization controversy the city administration played an indecisive role. No central office, either under the Board of Education or the Mayor, coordinated the decentralization effort. A research institute at Queens College provided the fledgling districts with what technical assistance they received. The Board of Education, although the nominal sponsor of the program, quickly lost control of it. The Mayor, while acting as an advocate of the program until the political consequences of doing so became too heavy, had no statutory power over an educational program. Many of the individuals associated with the experiment, including governing board members and some school personnel, believed that the programs could be meaningful only if their supporters were willing to confront the school bureaucracy directly.

In contrast, the ONG experiment was mounted with great caution. Its promoters, some of whom had been involved in the school dispute, devoted much attention to developing a program that would be politically viable. Thus, while many of them hoped to see considerable power transferred to community boards, their rhetoric concentrated primarily on administrative decentralization rather than community participation, and when they referred to participation it was in terms of democratic rather than race-conflict ideology. The program was set up so that the five experimental districts reported to a central Office of Neighborhood Government, which itself was directly under the Mayor. The Mayor issued a directive to the agencies under his control that ONG was vested with his authority. The director of the central office was diligent in keeping track of the activities of the neighborhood offices and selling the program to the various city bureaucracies. A key role was played by the local district managers who acted as intermediaries between neighborhood groups and the city service agencies. Some of the districts had community boards and others did not; in all cases the district manager worked actively to insure cooperation between community groups and the district service cabinet. He also worked especially hard to see that local elected officials did not regard ONG as usurping their role, and sought to provide staff services to these officials and give them credit for ONG activities.

A second important factor contributing to the nonthreatening nature of the ONG experiment was the composition of the district service cabinets. The establishment of cabinet structures enhanced the authority of district service chiefs, who while only occupying middling positions within their agencies, were at the top from the district perspective. Besides giving their egos a boost, the new structure permitted cabinet members to consult

²⁶ Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, *City Politics* (Cambridge: Harvard University and M.I.T. Press, 1963).

²⁷ A more extended analysis is provided in Susan S. Fainstein and Norman I. Fainstein, "From the Folks Who Brought You Ocean Hill-Brownsville," *New York Affairs* 2, No. 2 (1974), 104-115.

with their counterparts about district matters without going all the way up the agency hierarchy and back down again. As long as forces in the community were not viewed as hostile by the cabinet members, there was little reason for them not to welcome the new structure, and, in fact, of 82 cabinet members interviewed, 68 (83 percent) regarded the district cabinet as useful or very useful and only 4 members (5 per cent) evaluated it negatively.²⁸

The fact that the cabinet bureaucrats were not seen as enemies by community leaders in the experimental districts results in part from the cautiousness of the ONG program in comparison with the far more ambitious school decentralization experiment. The rhetoric of some of the school decentralizers, including that of the Bundy Commission,²⁹ proclaimed that the educational system needed a thorough overhaul and that the experiments in community participation were a step in that direction. This overhaul was taken to mean major changes in the civil service rules which had long kept the administrative cadres of the system white and insulated from parental pressures. The goals of the school experiments thus were perceived as a direct threat by the administrative hierarchy and the teachers' and supervisors' unions, while the limited scope of the ONG experiment meant that it provided little threat to established interests.

Another important reason for the serenity surrounding ONG, however, was itself a product of the programs and activism of the 'sixties. One effect of strong pressures for bureaucratic change was minority-group recruitment to agency positions. Thus, 19 of the 82 district service cabinet members, or nearly a quarter, were nonwhite (only one was Puerto Rican). As a result, the client-bureaucratic cleavage was no longer so clearly reinforced by a minority-white division. Moreover, the presence of blacks on the cabinets created an ideological force within the bureaucracy supporting community control. This finding is particularly noteworthy since it indicates that blacks who "make it" maintain an ideological commitment different from their white peers (Table 11). The very high relationship between race and attitude toward community control among cabinet members ($\text{Gamma} = .80$) revealed in Table 11 is striking when compared with the relationship shown in Table 3 for community leaders, where Gamma ranges between .28 and .51.

Despite the presence of blacks on the service cabinets, and the preponderance of cabinet mem-

Table 11. Relationship between Race and Support for Advisory versus Decision-making Power for Community Boards among Bureaucrats on District Service Cabinets

	Minority ^a	White
Favor Advisory Powers for Community Boards	33% (5)	82% (32)
Favor Decision-making Powers for Community Boards	67% (10)	18% (7)
	100% (15) ^b	100% (39) ^c

$\text{Gamma} = .80$

Chi-square = 11.92 with 1 df;

P less than .001

^a One Puerto Rican was included in this group.

^b Fifteen of the 19 minority members interviewed responded to the probe concerning community boards.

^c An additional 19 white members did not respond to the probe concerning community boards, and one white member opposed any form of community participation. While it is possible that the exclusion of 19 respondents may bias the results presented here, it is most likely that failure to answer points to a negative attitude toward community participation. In that case the table would understate the correlation between race and attitude.

bers of both races who support at least advisory powers for neighborhood groups, analysis of the cabinet interviews shows that the potential for racially polarized conflict between community activists and bureaucracies over local control has not disappeared. Further inspection of Table 11 indicates that the higher correlation between race and operational support for community control by cabinet members than by community leaders results almost entirely from the more negative attitudes toward community decision-making powers held by white cabinet members as compared with white community leaders. Only 18 per cent of white cabinet members favor decision-making powers for local boards, while above 40 per cent of white leaders favor local decision-making powers over at least some city services. Moreover, as Table 12 indicates, when the white group of cabinet members is examined by type of bureaucratic status, only 5 per cent of the 21 whites in the "hard services" support decision-making powers (just one black cabinet member held a position in the hard services). The implication of this finding is that intrusion by community groups into these service areas could well precipitate hostile reactions.

On the whole, the ONG experience suggests that the two citywide factors which most influence

²⁸ Fainstein and LaSpina, "District Service Cabinets and the Office of Neighborhood Government," part II.

²⁹ Mayor's Advisory Panel on Decentralization of the New York City Schools (Bundy Commission), *Reconnection for Learning* (New York: Praeger, 1967).

Table 12. Relationship between Service Area and Support for Advisory versus Decision-making Power for Community Boards among White^a Bureaucrats on District Service Cabinets^b

	Hard Services ^c	Soft Services ^d
Support Advisory Powers for Community Boards	95% (20)	66% (12)
Support Decision-making Powers for Community Boards	5% (1)	34% (6)
	100% (21)	100% (18)

P (Fisher's Exact) = .03

^a There was only one black cabinet member in a hard service area.

^b Nineteen white members did not respond to the probe concerning community boards, and one white member opposed any form of community participation.

^c Hard services are sanitation, police, sewer, fire, water resources, traffic control, highway maintenance, and parks.

^d Soft services are health, education, planning, human resources, aging, housing, youth, social services, welfare, drug addiction.

reactions to the introduction of decentralized governmental programs are the strategies followed by the program's sponsors and the responses of the affected bureaucrats. Community control could become an extremely divisive issue once again in New York if it is pressed as a redistributive program, particularly if it is interpreted as an attack on the still white-controlled hard service bureaucracies. In cities where racial integration of the service bureaucracies has proceeded less far than in New York, we would expect that programs for neighborhood participation, when neighborhoods are black and bureaucrats are white, would continue to produce interracial conflict.

National Factors. The policies of city governments will produce wide variations from place to place in the introduction of decentralized programs and the intensity of conflict surrounding them. The parameters, however, will be set by the national situation; urban conflict will be as much affected by federal programs and national currents concerning relations between the races as by particular events in any one city. Whether the federal government chooses revenue-sharing as its method of "returning government to the people" or reverts to the Johnson administration programs of maximum feasible participation will significantly influence not just the kinds of programs offered to city dwellers but also the extent of minority activism and white reaction.

The dismantling of the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO), the demise of Model Cities, and the insistence that funding of organizations to benefit the poor must be channeled through regular governmental bodies have meant a decline in the resources available to ghetto residents in their battle against the status quo. Although few of these programs directly sponsored militant action,³⁰ they spawned militant leaders and raised the expectations of large numbers of people, thereby creating highly volatile situations. Reduced prospects of funding, a change in the national mood, and the routinization of organizations serving poor people have all served to reduce volatility. The strength of the counterattack following the urban disorders of the last decade made many black leaders wary of radical strategies. As a result, we have seen a nationwide decline in conflict organizations and militant rhetoric.

This decline, however, has not meant a return to the 1950s. There are a number of legacies of the previous era. Most important are the intermediate structures such as community planning boards, health boards, housing councils, block associations, and community corporations which arose in response to the urban programs of the 'sixties. These provided an arena for the development of a new cadre of civic leaders in areas of the city where, since the decline of the political machine, there had been almost a total absence of representative institutions. While the absolute number of participants in these structures is small and they lack authoritative power, such participants nonetheless act as attentive publics. The existence of a layer of even weak intermediate structures means some access, some patronage, and a reservoir of experienced individuals used to dealing with bureaucratic agencies.

A national Democratic administration would undoubtedly redirect attention toward the cities once again. Whether it would also foment the level of political activism which characterized the last period of Democratic ascendancy is an open question.³¹ Fear of intense reaction by whites,

³⁰ See Fainstein and Fainstein, *Urban Political Movements*, pp. 31-36; Kenneth Clark and Jeanette Hopkins, *A Relevant War Against Poverty* (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), p. 65; James J. Vanecko, "Community Mobilization and Institutional Change: The Influence of the Community Action Program in Large Cities," in *Planned Social Intervention*, ed. Louis A. Zurcher (New York: Chandler, 1970), p. 270.

³¹ Piven argues that cooptation of dissidents, increases in welfare spending, and the lessened political power of the cities vis-à-vis the suburbs all mean that the Democratic party in the future will not feel compelled to pay attention to the black urban masses. Frances Fox Piven, "The Urban Crisis: Who Got What, and Why?" in Cloward and Piven, *The Politics of Turmoil*, pp. 338-9. Her premise is that ghetto activism forced responses, rather than govern-

and realization that much of the earlier conflict was between deprived groups fighting with each other over limited resources, may make it less likely that minority leaders will again regard widespread mobilization as a useful strategy. J. Q. Wilson's prediction in *Negro Politics*³² that black leadership would be primarily specialized and bureaucratically oriented is sustained, even though in 1968 it appeared outdated. Although the current dominance of the democratic type of community control ideology over the race-conflict type may diminish, the basis for a rapid shift is not at the moment obvious. Which of the two ideologies is more valid or would produce better tactics from the minority-group point of view is a different question.

As we have seen, within the broad type of the democratic model there is a split, correlated with race, over operational beliefs in community control. Blacks and Hispanics are continuing to push for community decision-making powers based on their position not so much as racial minorities but as a bureaucratic clientele. This pressure, combined with a recognition on the part of even conservative policy makers that too much centralization leads to rigidity and poor areal coordination, means that we will continue to see programs aimed at devolving authority to lower administrative levels and providing channels for citizen input into bureaucracies. These programs, however, have for the last six years been implemented without any large infusion of new resources. While they have created more flexibility and more responsiveness, as well as new neighborhood leaders and new bureaucrats whose social backgrounds more closely resemble those of their clients, they have not produced basic changes in the distribution of social benefits. Nor have they really had much effect on the dominant position of central bureaucratic authorities and unions of service providers.³³

The various movements for community control and programs for decentralizing urban bureaucracies, then, have provided some new chips for the previously most disadvantaged players in the

urban ecology of games.³⁴ Robert Dahl has commented that

a central guiding thread of American constitutional development has been the evolution of a political system in which all the active and legitimate groups in the population can make themselves heard at some crucial stage in the process of decision.³⁵

Decentralization and the creation of new linkage structures enlarge the number of groups participating in the policy-making process and increase the legitimacy and bargaining power of the relatively deprived. In other words, deprived minorities in many urban areas have now been absorbed into the pluralist bargaining system. Where once their impact on the political marketplace was no more substantial than that of the impoverished consumer on the economic one, they may now participate on a level analogous to the individual with some money to spend but little to invest. The predictable result is compromise, an occasional gain, but no major redistribution across social classes.³⁶

The game, moreover, is limited to the municipal level. The greater power of racial minorities to control garbage collections or allocations in the city budget is not reflected in a commensurate ability to influence national priorities. In an era of rapid inflation and high unemployment, achievements at the local level often seem insignificant and diversionary, although there is no compelling logic to show that the energy spent on local causes could be easily redirected to more general issues.

The question of whether community control is a useful strategy for minority groups has been much debated.³⁷ Its general endorsement by whites as well as blacks, the lessening of its identification as a specifically black cause, despite the willingness of minorities to carry its implementation farther than most whites would, and its framing in democratic rather than group conflict terms, tend to validate the criticism by radicals that it is a moderate and coöptative strategy. Whether to sacrifice the limited but tangible gains that it

ment programs creating activism, as Moynihan has argued. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, *Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding* (New York: Free Press, 1969), pp. 134-5. An alternative view is that the two factors, programs for the poor and activism by the poor, are interactive and intensely each other, even while coöptative tendencies are also at work. Fainstein and Fainstein, pp. 231-3.

³² James Q. Wilson, *Negro Politics* (New York: Free Press, 1960), chap. 8.

³³ See Sterling D. Spero and John M. Capozzola, *The Urban Community and its Unionized Bureaucracies* (New York: Dunellen, 1973); The American Assembly, *Public Workers and Public Unions*, ed. Sam Zagoria (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972).

³⁴ Norton E. Long, "The Local Community as an Ecology of Games," *American Journal of Sociology*, 64 (November 1958), 251-61.

³⁵ Robert A. Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 137.

³⁶ See Robert Paul Wolff, *The Poverty of Liberalism* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968).

³⁷ See Dorothy Buckton James, "The Limits of Liberal Reform"; Ira Katznelson, "Antagonistic Ambiguity: Notes of Reformism and Decentralization"; and Dorothy Buckton James, "Response," *Politics and Society*, 2 (Spring 1972), 309-36. We provide a policy-oriented analysis in Susan S. Fainstein and Norman I. Fainstein, "Local Control as Social Reform: Planning for Big Cities in the Seventies," *Journal of the American Institute of Planners* (July 1976), 275-285.

brings in the hopes of larger redistributive goals is tied up with a number of political and normative judgments. These concern the possibility of radical black-white coalition, the virulence of majority reaction to militant strategies, the capacity of minority groups to constitute a revolutionary class, and the superiority of a direct system of in-

come redistribution to one of service provision. The continued predominance among minority and white urban leaders of an ideology of community control based on the democratic model indicates a general acceptance on their part of the inevitability, although not necessarily the desirability, of the pluralist model of urban politics.

COMMUNICATIONS

What Gordon Tullock Really Said

TO THE EDITOR:

Now that there is a citation index for the social sciences, every footnote citation can be depended upon to increase the real wealth of a scholar. Under the circumstances, I am happy to be cited in the Arcelus and Meltzer article.¹ Unfortunately, what Arcelus and Meltzer say I said is almost the exact opposite of what I really did say.²

I suspect that Arcelus and Meltzer in fact depended on Riker and Ordeshook.³ Riker and Ordeshook were working not from the final text of my book, but from a very early draft. Further, so far as I can see, they had somewhat imperfect memories of what was in even this early draft. However, because of the wide circulation their joint textbook has achieved, this particular misinterpretation of my views is becoming a widely cited part of my "works."

I should not like to close this comment without saying that this particular slip on the part of Arcelus, Meltzer, Riker, and Ordeshook does not, in my view, detract from the general excellence of their work. Indeed, I have used *An Introduction to Positive Political Theory* in teaching and intend to continue using it. But even Homer nods.

GORDON TULLOCK

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¹ "Tullock, p. 110-114, argues that in a typical election, there are many voters so P is small and R is negative. He concludes that voting is irrational. Riker and Ordeshook, p. 28-34 respond that P depends on the closeness of the election, not just the number of voters and also add D to the equation." Francisco Arcelus and Allan H. Meltzer, "The Effect of Aggregate Economic Variables on Congressional Elections," *APSR*, 69 (December, 1975), fn. 11, p. 1233.

² "The equation, if it is thought to be in any way descriptive of the real world, would imply that people would be more likely to vote in close elections, . . . since D would be larger The . . . hypothesis was tested by Riker and Ordeshook and found to be correct." Gordon Tullock, *Toward a Mathematics of Politics* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1967), pp. 110-11.

³ William H. Riker and Peter C. Ordeshook, "A Theory of the Calculus of Voting," *APSR*, 62 (March, 1968), 25-42; also, *An Introduction to Positive Political Theory* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1973).

Whom Did Wallace Hurt in 1968?

TO THE EDITOR:

The possibility of a Wallace-As-Independent candidacy in 1976 raises anew the question of the effect of his candidacy on the 1968 election.

A great deal has been written about the roots of the Wallace vote and about the Wallace sym-

pathizers who nevertheless voted for a major party candidate (see: Lipset and Raab, *The Politics of Unreason* [New York: Harper and Row, 1970], 338-427). But Wallaceites who remained hidden cannot have figured in Wallace's effect on the outcome in 1968. Wallace's impact must be measured by discussing actual Wallace voters and by figuring out how much the outcome would have differed if he had not run against Humphrey and Nixon.

If Wallace voters had strictly followed their ordinary party preferences, it would have been unambiguous that Humphrey paid the heavier price for the Wallace candidacy. Consider the data in Table 1.

But of course voters do not strictly follow partisanship, and knowledge of party identification will not help us predict the votes of "independents." According to Brody and Page ("Indifference, Alienation and Rational Decision," *Public Choice*, 15 [1973], 1-17) and Kelley and Mirer ("The Simple Act of Voting," *American Political Science Review*, 68 [June 1974], 572-591), voters appear to follow relatively simple decision rules. By using these rules we can examine the distribution of expected votes of those who voted for Wallace in 1968 under the counterfactual condition of no Wallace candidacy.

These decision rules are: (1)—Voters who say they favor¹ one candidate more than another are very likely—on the order of 95 per cent—to vote for their favored candidate. This rule holds regardless of how much they favor their favorite or even whether their most favored candidate is rated unfavorably. Americans appear to distinguish the lesser of two evils or the greater of two goods and vote accordingly. (2) Voters who are neutral or indifferent toward the candidates, i.e., those voters who give the candidates the same favorability rating, tend to vote for the candidate of their party.

Applying these rules to Wallace voters in 1968 we find that Humphrey was hurt more by Wallace's candidacy than Nixon was. But the disadvantage is not nearly as marked as the distribution of Wallace voters' partisanship would lead us to expect. Combining the two samples, the joint distribution on the two decision rules is shown in Table 2.

These data lead us to conclude that absent the Wallace candidacy, 55 per cent of the Wallace voters would have voted for Humphrey, 42 per

¹ Favorability is measured here by candidate "thermometer" ratings in the SRC sample and by a Likert scale in the ORC sample. Previous studies have shown that the two formats yield identical results as far as the decision rules are concerned.

Table 1

	Party Identification ^a			N ^b
	Democrat	Independent	Republican	
Wallace Voters	58.5%	17.4%	24.1%	195
Rest of Sample	56.6	9.2	34.1	2211

^a "Leaners" are grouped with their fellow partisans.
^b Data are combined from the SRC/CPS, 1968 postelection survey (N= 1384) and a postelection survey carried out by Opinion Research Corporation for the Stanford based Issues in an Election Project (N=1153).

Table 2

Balance of Favorability Judgment	Party Identification			N	Column %
	Democrat	Independent	Republican		
Pro-Humphrey	30 ^a	19	24	73	37.4
Neutral	34	6	2	42	21.5
Pro-Nixon	50	9	21	80	41.0
Row N	114	34	47	195	
%	58.5	17.4	24.1		

^a Entries are the number of Wallace voters satisfying the combination of conditions under the decision rules.

Table 3

Southern Region Balance of Favorability Judgment	Party Identification			N	Column %
	Democrat	Independent	Republican		
Pro-Humphrey	24	12	15	51	43.2
Neutral	19	1	1	21	17.8
Pro-Nixon	33	5	8	46	39.0
Row N	76	18	24	118	
%	64.4	15.3	20.3		

Non-Southern Region Balance of Favorability Judgment	Party Identification			N	Column %
	Democrat	Independent	Republican		
Pro-Humphrey	6	7	9	22	28.6
Neutral	15	5	1	21	27.3
Pro-Nixon	17	4	13	34	44.2
Row N	38	16	23	77	
%	49.3	20.8	29.9		

cent would have supported Nixon, and the remaining three per cent (the six "Neutral-Independents") would probably have abstained.

A coarse regional breakdown indicates that Humphrey was seriously affected by the Wallace candidacy only in the South. See Table 3.

These data yield the following distribution of expected votes:

Expected Vote	South	Non-South
Humphrey	59.3%	48.1%
Nixon	39.8	45.5
Non-Vote	0.8	6.5

These survey data will not permit us to examine the effect that Wallace's absence from the ballot would have had on the electoral vote.² But nationwide, the distribution of Wallace voters in accord with the decision rules would have affected the balance of the two-party popular vote very little. Instead of Humphrey's receiving 49% of the two-party vote in these combined samples, if the Wallace vote divided as expected, Humphrey would have received 49.85% of the two-party vote. Perhaps this change would have increased the suspense of an already tense election eve, but surely little else would have followed from the one and one-half per cent shift in the popular vote that is our best estimate of the effect of "No Wallace" in 1968.

RICHARD A. BRODY

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² If we were willing to assume that the observed distribution of "second preferences" held throughout the region, in the South, Humphrey would have had popular majorities in all five of the states that Wallace carried in 1968 (including Georgia and Arkansas where Humphrey ran third). In the six southern states that Nixon carried, however, a combination of Wallace weakness and Nixon strength means that Humphrey would not have gained a majority of the popular vote in any of these six states. In the 26 states outside of the South that Nixon carried, Humphrey's slight lead as "second preference" to Wallace, would not have helped him at all. Even in Ohio, Missouri and New Jersey, (where distribution of the Wallace vote in accord with the division for the entire non-southern region gives Humphrey his greatest boost, he falls short of the requisite majority. Thus under the assumption of uniform distribution, Humphrey gains all of Wallace's 45 electoral votes but still comes up short in the final tally.

The States' Role in Public Policy: A Clarification

TO THE EDITOR:

In December, 1973, I presented three tables measuring the state share of the national variance in a *Review* article.¹ Since these tables have been a

¹ Douglas D. Rose, "National and Local Forces in State Politics: The Implications of Multi-Level Policy Analysis," *American Political Science Review*, 67 (December, 1973), Tables 1, 2 and 3.

source of repeated misinterpretation and misuse, I would like to clarify their purpose with an example and to summarize why they cannot be used to evaluate the states' role in public policy.

At the time I wrote the article, researchers in state politics characteristically were basing their conclusions on methods which could not distinguish among three crucially different situations. In the first situation, which researchers usually assumed to be the actual state of affairs, state governments each made and implemented policy on the basis of what was possible and desirable for their state. Though states operated completely independently, they happened to follow a common pattern in their policy decision making, so we could discover the empirical laws describing state policy making by comparing states on their "inputs" and "outputs." The empirical law would be the rule linking resources and policy.

In the second situation, some national policy maker such as the federal government made policies, after considering what was possible and desirable, and applied them to individuals everywhere in the country; the policy resulted from a rule which linked an individual's resources to his policy benefits, so that we could discover the rule by comparing individuals on their resources and policy benefits. In the third situation, several levels of government made rules which all affected the policy; by examining the relationship of resources to policy benefits for states, we could only discover the net rule, not the separate rules at each level.

Researchers have three ways of knowing which of these situations is occurring: we can know who actually makes policy decisions, we can know what the different decisions would be if different actors made the decisions, and we can know the different patterns of variance at the individual level which would result from the different situations. Using any of these requires attention to more than one level of analysis; when researchers confined their data to the state level, they could not know which situation existed.

A Simplified Illustration. The Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program illustrates the problem. Consider for illustrative purposes that the program rules describe a broad-gauge welfare program not limited to families with dependent children. It is a federal program: the federal government sets up the program, provides the basic money, and sets the basic rule, the famous "thirty and one-third" rule. Again, let us simplify the rule to the following:

- (1) no welfare is received by an individual unless his income (I) falls below some standard (A);

- (2) the amount of welfare received (W) is proportional (.67) to the difference between income and the standard.

In addition to being a federal program, AFDC is a state program; states implement the program with some discretion and can modify the basic rule somewhat (in the guarantee level, setting a maximum payment, treatment of child care, etc.). Thus we have two levels, federal and state, operating with different rules.

Let us ignore the impact of the program (redistribution of income toward equality) and just concentrate on describing the policy. The federal input into policy follows the rule and the distribution of income in the population. Measure the income distribution with two variables, a dummy variable R , designating whether a case is rich or poor by whether the case is above or below the standard income, and a graduated variable I , applicable only to the poor, describing income in dollars. The federal variance in welfare payments (W) is a function of the rule and the variance of these two income distribution measures. Statistically, the federal variance is

$$(.67)^2(A - \bar{I})^2\bar{R}(1 - \bar{R}) + \bar{R} \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{N_r} .67^2(I_i - \bar{I})^2}{N_r}$$

In words, the federal input in welfare variance is (1) the mean payment squared times the variance in poverty (recipients), plus (2) the mean poverty (recipients) times the variance of payments among the poor (recipients). If these welfare payments were regressed against the income distribution measures, we would conclude that the rule (regression coefficients) was: rich people get no welfare, poor people get two-thirds the difference between their income and some constant (standard) A . We would be correct.

Though, as described so far, the policy decisions have nothing to do with the states in actuality, the federal input into welfare will result in state differences in welfare payments if the states differ on income. The federal rule will translate income differences among individuals into welfare differences among individuals; if poor individuals tend to cluster in some states, then those states will get more welfare payments. Specifically, the between state income variances will translate into between state welfare variances by exactly the same formula (reflecting exactly the same federal rule) as do individual level variances. While the relationship at the state level is spurious, it will show a perfect correlation between income and welfare. If we looked at only the between state variances, we could deduce the payment rule from a regression

analysis, but we could not know that it was a federal rule. Instead, we would be likely to conclude that states decided welfare payments, that the states' decisions were determined solely by economic considerations, and that poor states were making a greater "welfare effort" than were rich states. All these conclusions would be false.

Now consider an actual state input into welfare policy. Suppose states have to come up with some matching funds. States with many poor people will not have much of a tax base from which to collect the funds; so, let us assume, they come up short on matching funds, so people in their state will receive fewer federal funds than they otherwise would. For simplicity's sake, assume that the adjustment takes the form of reducing the payments; rich states do the opposite. State input into welfare policy thus adjusts the federal "two-thirds" rule by the proportion of a state's citizens who are poor ($\bar{R} - \bar{R}_s$). The net effect of these state adjustments is to decrease the between-state share of the welfare variance, as states are moving toward a common welfare payment per capita score despite the differences in poverty between their citizens. Suppose we now regressed between-state welfare variance on between-state income distribution variance; we would not come up with the federal and state rules separately but in confusing combinations. The deduced rule would be: (1) rich people get nothing, (2) poor people get $(.67 - \bar{R})$ times the difference between the standard and their income. Since in any particular analysis, $\bar{R}$ is a constant (.11 for instance), the only difference in results between the federal and federal-plus-state situations would be in the size of the coefficient, so the analyst would need to know the federal rule in order to understand that his results reflected the operation of two levels. As long as the analysis is confined to state level data and knowledge, the results do not give any clues to who is making what decisions.

If we look at both state- and individual-level data, we can deduce a great deal about the levels operating. The fact that the between state share of the variance on both input and output variances is more than zero and less than one indicates that two levels might be operating. The main clue lies not in examining income and welfare separately, however, but in comparing them. As the example has been given, if *only* the federal level is operating, the state share of the variance on income and welfare payments would be the same; with two levels operating, the state share of the variance on welfare will be much lower than the state share of the variance on income. It would be immediately obvious that two levels operate with two different rules. State characteristics on the aggregate would obviously be affecting policy at the individual level. Also, it would be obvious that while the

national rule was to translate income differences into welfare differences, the state input was, to the contrary, to negate these economic considerations and move all states toward a similar welfare payment per capita. In the original article, the illustrative results here were the characteristic results found empirically. The problem was real. States were only one of several levels making policy, and the state input into policy reduced the role of socioeconomic considerations, thereby producing highly similar policies in the states.

Legitimate and Illegitimate Uses of the State Share of the Variance. The comparison of shares of the variance on social and on policy variables indicated that state policies were in fact often the reverse of what we had thought and that we could not even measure state policies unless we considered the context within which they occurred. The intended effect was to encourage the study of states within a national and federal governmental context. To some degree this has been happening.

Just as frequently, the tables have been misused by being interpreted as summary measures of the importance of states in American politics. This misinterpretation ignores three aspects of the tables: (1) no reasonable standard of importance exists for the measure; (2) impacts which are common across states are not measured; and (3) policies which are redistributive within states are not measured. The problem of a standard of importance is normative and causal as well as statistical. On social variables such as sex, we do not expect governments to account for all the variance in the population; it is not clear that it is even possible for half the states to be all male and half all female as a permanent arrangement; I doubt that many would consider this a desirable distribution, and even fewer of us would consider it desirable for governments to mandate the arrangement. While the 100 per cent of the variance standard is important statistically in understanding what governments do, it is not a reasonable standard of the importance of governments. Standards of lesser magnitude, e.g., 50 per cent of the variance, appear to be equally unjustified without specific elaboration.

Similar problems obtain for politics and policy: Is it really possible or desirable to have all voters or all Democrats in a few states? Are states unimportant for policies when they lack a monopoly or, as in the electoral college, does their importance increase with internal diversity? If divorces only occur in Nevada, only Colorado allows abortion, or only New York regulates water use in summertime, does the variance accounted for make states more or less important than if policies and policy impacts are spread more widely within and among

states? The lack of a reasonable standard is tied to the second problem: when states have similar policies, societies and impacts, the states do not account for much variance, yet the consequences within any state are not diminished merely because other states display similar characteristics. As many authors—Walker, Munger, Gray, Menzel, Eyestone, etc.—have indicated, similar policies often exist in the states. Yet both the causes and the consequences of the policies are important; as I have demonstrated, the similarity in policy often masks independent processes occurring within each state. Variance, by definition, deals only with what varies; when the important state policies are similar across states, variance does not measure the important policies. Finally, some of the most important policies of governments are not public goods shared by all citizens (and thus reflected in averages across individuals) but instead are redistributions among citizens, which may be zero-sum (and thus not all are reflected in averages across individuals) and are reflected directly only by measuring variance within a state. Prior to the 1965 Voting Rights Act, many Southern states redistributed voting power away from blacks and toward whites; surely this policy was not important merely to the degree that it lowered the overall turnout rate—yet that is the only aspect of the policy which shows up in between-state variance. While states do not at present appear to engage in redistributions of equivalent magnitude,² the problem cannot even be examined by relying on between state variance (without special transformations, a la Fry and Winters). The state share of the national variance thus simply does not measure potentially important state impacts which are redistributive or common across states, and of the impacts measured there is no standard of importance which is reasonable in normative or causal terms which could be used to evaluate states.

One of the main purposes of the tables was to indicate the inadequacy of treating variance of single variables as an adequate basis for studying states. It is therefore somewhat ironic that I now have to argue that the same variance figure on the same single variables (this time divided by the national variance) is neither an adequate basis for refusing to study states nor an adequate justification for restricting the study of states to case studies and global variables “unaffected” by the national society or individual level behavior. As students of American national government occasionally discover, states cannot simply be ignored;

² For an examination of state redistributive effects, see my “Comment: The American States’ Impact on Voter Turnout,” *American Political Science Review*, 69 (March, 1975), 124–131.

the complexities involved in studying them cannot be vanquished by letters to the editor.

DOUGLAS D. ROSE

Tulane University

Issue Areas and Differentials in Bureaucratic Power

TO THE EDITOR

As a student of state politics and bureaucratic policy making, and further, as one who learned that sometimes esoteric trade working with and for Professor Jack L. Walker, I read "Variations in Elite Perceptions of American States as Referents for Public Policy Making" (Fred Grupp and Alan Richards, Sept. 1975, pp. 850-858) with the keenest of interest. To anyone who regularly reads the section of the *Review* titled Communications this will sound as hollow as it does obligatory, but I found the article to be stimulating, informative, and quite well done. I have already made classroom use of its Table 1, and I must confess that much of the *Review* does not find its way into my daily teaching performance. Still, I do have a complaint to register.

Grupp and Richards offer, and substantiate, the hypothesis that "the greater the inequality of esteem in a policy area, the greater the influence of administrators in that policy area" (p. 856). I have no quarrel with the hypothesis itself; indeed I am quite convinced they are right. My problem arises when they begin to tell us *why* they are right. In their conclusion they offer the following explanation for the observed relationship between consensus on quality state programs and administrative influence. In their own words, "... executives in those policy areas characterized by high levels of consensus about the better state programs have their influence increased because they are able to approach legislators or the governor's staff with specific policy proposals which are known to be working well in those highly esteemed states. This advantage does not accrue to executives in policy areas where there are no acknowledged leaders" (p. 858).

I find several objections to this path of explanation. First, does it not assume that the administrators are aware of whether or not consensus exists within their own field about who is "the best"? If knowledge of that consensus were not assumed, then why would the bureaucrat who saw in Maine the country's best welfare program feel he or she has "less to offer the other policy makers" (p. 856) than any of the 30 public works officials who felt California was the nation's leader in that area? Yet so far as I can tell from their article, Grupp and Richards asked each administrator to name the state he or she felt had the best program.

They did not ask whether this was a view these administrators felt was shared by similar professionals in other states. I am not convinced that we can infer from Grupp and Richards's work, or even from Walker's earlier efforts, that these officials are really aware of the level of consensus on program quality that exists in their area of specialization. Until we can be sure of their awareness of that consensus (or its lack) I do not see how we can conclude that such an awareness influences the perceptions of program administrators of their influence in the policy process.

Perhaps even more important, the Grupp and Richards explanation assumes that politicians (governors, their staffs, and members of the legislature) are also aware of the extent of program quality consensus within the various policy areas and that politicians and bureaucrats tend to agree on who runs the "best show in town." If such an assumption is not being made, then what makes the public works official's argument that it works in California more persuasive than the welfare officer's statement that it was successful in Nevada or Vermont? Until we actually ask them, can we assume that governors and legislators are aware of bureaucratic perceptions of program quality, or that the assessments made by these political officials as to who runs the best program in a particular policy area will parallel the judgments made by administrators in that same area?

Finally, even if administrators are aware of "inequality of esteem" within their own policy areas, on what grounds do we assume that the administrator who perceived West Virginia as the nation's welfare leader would feel he or she "has less to offer" than one of the "gang" who saw California as "top dog" in public works? As one who has been close to the training of welfare professionals I can imagine no group more likely to believe in the validity of its proposed solutions. It seems to me that West Virginia's secret admirer, like Maine's, Vermont's, or Oklahoma's may well feel that he or she can "provide a proven solution to the problem"; the question is whether or not that solution will be accepted, and that is a question that goes far beyond the administrator's conviction that the solution proposed is workable.

Still, as I said at the beginning, I cheerfully accept the hypothesis that administrators will feel more influential (and probably be more influential) in policy areas characterized by considerable agreement on program quality. The reason I can accept it is simple: both program quality consensus and administrators' perceptions of their influence are reflections of a third variable, the nature of the policy area in question. If it is an area like welfare or business regulation that has long been a political battleground and affects deeply felt American values there is likely to be

little consensus, even among program administrators, on the "right" course to follow. Similarly, since these issues have intruded themselves into past races for the governorship and the state legislature, and may be expected to do so again in the future, politicians are going to be reluctant to delegate their resolution to a set of officials who will not have to face the voters come November. Presumably, experienced bureaucrats will sense this attitude and adjust their perceptions of their own influence accordingly. On the other hand, executives in far less controversial areas like public works or public health administration (excluding the potentially explosive Medicaid program) would seem in a better position to arrive at some internal professional agreement on program quality and would face politicians far less concerned about exercising control over the final shape of policy outcomes. Once again, the bureaucratic executive will perceive this lessened concern and adjust his or her perceptions of agency influence on these policy decisions.

In addition to the differences in the level of political conflict surrounding various policy areas, some policy questions, on their surface, appear to require more expert knowledge for their solution than do others. In other words, some things just look more complicated than others. The governor and his or her staff almost certainly view the expertise of a public health epidemiologist talking about immunization programs in a very different light than they would view the expertise of a welfare administrator discussing eligibility requirements for AFDC. Though not unrelated to differences in the level of political conflict, this probably reflects an even deeper cultural perception about the nature of expert knowledge, as well as the need to use it. I can only speculate about why, but there are some areas of public policy in which the value placed on specialized knowledge is high and other areas in which it is low, and I suspect that bureaucrats soon become aware of which kind of area they are operating in and adjust their perceptions of their own influence on policy decisions accordingly. Our welfare bureaucrat enamored of Maine's excellence probably feels he or she can "provide a proven solution" but knows from years of trying that the political controversy surrounding welfare, as well as the politician's habit of downplaying the potential contribution of a welfare executive's expertise, will affect that politician's response to that "proven solution." It seems safe to conclude that administrators would take that realization into account when assessing their agencies' political influence. A public health administrator who knows that he or she works in a less controversial area and that specialized knowledge is seen as essential in that field will have far greater confidence about the

agency's ability to influence policy choices.

If others agree with this objection to Grupp and Richards, as well as with my conviction that they have produced a truly important article, perhaps we will have a real world example of that always hoped for but ever elusive "building on one another's work" that is supposed to be the essence of a scholarly community.

DENNIS D. RILEY

University of Minnesota, Duluth

TO THE EDITOR:

We find Professor Riley's comments reasonable, even plausible. Our discussion (p. 855) of differences in policy areas is similar to the points he raises—i.e., we are aware that some policy areas, such as welfare, are controversial and that the expertise employed in some areas, such as public health, is apt to be accorded great respect by political leaders. We chose not to highlight these assertions in our concluding remarks because they remain suppositions; our findings were made within Walker's theoretical context.

Further, we are more impressed than Professor Riley with the capacity of the national, professional associations of state officials (p. 851) to inform the executive and legislative branches of state government of programs and policies which are working well in other states. It would be revealing to see how many persons serving on the staff of the governor, in the Legislative Reference Service, or in the state legislature regularly attend the meetings of these professional organizations and receive their newsletters or other publications. Should there be considerable interaction between the professional associations and these policy makers, our explanation of our findings would receive additional support.

We believe the issue is still open. Professor Riley's stimulating comments are, in our view, not an example of "building on another's work," but rather a call to further research. We did write that the state executives' "ability to influence policy outcomes varies by policy area, within as yet uncharted limits" (p. 858).

Finally, we are very pleased that he found our article useful in the classroom.

FRED W. GRUPP, JR.

University of Connecticut

ALAN R. RICHARDS

Louisiana State University

Critical Elections and the Supreme Court: Putting the Cart after the Horse

TO THE EDITOR:

In recent years, political scientists have increasingly come to appreciate the impact of realign-

ments of the American electorate on the making of public policy. A recent article by Richard Funston, "The Supreme Court and Critical Elections," *APSR*, 69 (September, 1975), 793-811, extends consideration of this mass-elite linkage to the actions of the Court in declaring national legislation unconstitutional. Funston is to be commended for attempting to explain Supreme Court behavior in terms of factors external to the Court itself, for the clarity of his exposition, and for his compelling assessment of the role of the Supreme Court in American politics. Yet, the principal theory which he advances remains untested. We cannot determine from his study what impact electoral realignments (in producing new legislative majorities) have had on the activities of the Supreme Court.

Funston has theorized that the Supreme Court is significantly more likely to declare laws unconstitutional when it remains the last bastion for the (old) national majority recently vanquished in realignment. This theory seems quite straightforward: During a period of realignment, one legislative majority is replaced by another. Later, after presidential appointments have changed the composition of the Court, the Court comes to reflect that same national majority. In the interim, when the Court reflects the vanquished majority, it confronts the new majority directly by declaring acts of that majority unconstitutional.

In his empirical analysis, Funston provides us with three different tests of his theory—concluding that each provides strong support for it. (1) He compares Court actions (i.e., striking down national legislation as unconstitutional) during the periods in which realignments took place with Court actions during the remaining non-realignment years. (2) He compares Court actions during "the total years of partisan realignment phases plus the total number of years necessary for a fifth or majority appointment to be made to the Court *after the beginning* of each of the realignment phases" with those in the remaining years. (3) He compares Court actions during "the total years of partisan realignment phases plus the total number of years necessary for a fifth or majority appointment to be made to the Court *after the end* of each of the realignment phases" with those in the remaining years. In each of these tests, the years in which he expects the Supreme Court to oppose the new majority include the eight-year period during which Funston contends that the realignment itself was taking place: 1820-1828, 1852-1860, 1888-1896, and 1928-1936.

None of these comparisons provides an adequate test for the theory Funston has advanced. The problem is that, by using the years in which the realignment is taking place, Funston has included many years in which the "emerging majority" had

not yet become a legislative majority. The Jacksonian Democrats did not take power fully until 1829, Republican control began in 1861 and was later reasserted in 1897, and the Democrats did not become a legislative majority (i.e., control both Congress and the President) until 1933. In fact, of the 36 years in Funston's realignment phases, the Supreme Court "confronted" the old majority in exactly half and the new majority in only six (four during the New Deal period)! When we include laws declared unconstitutional which are at most four years old, the number of cases in which "old majorities" on the Court have overturned "old majorities" elsewhere may well increase.

No test of the Funston theory is adequate which includes these "realigning phase" years. Instead, attention should be focused on the first years after the realignment has been consummated by the installation of a new legislative majority—but before that "new majority" has been able to alter the basic composition of the Supreme Court. Thus, Funston at least should have studied the behavior of the Court from 1829 to 1836, 1861 to 1864, 1897 to 1909, and 1933 to 1940—in each case, the period from the new majority's seizure of control of both Congress and the Presidency to the appointment of a Court majority by "new majority" Presidents. To be even more precise, Funston should have taken into account the possibility that the "new majority" already had allies on the Court—i.e., McKinley "inherited" a Court in 1897 in which only three justices had been appointed by Democratic presidents. Finally, in order to be certain that old and new majorities are confronting one another, Funston should also examine the background of each case individually (there are not so many that the task is oppressive) instead of including all those in which the Court has negated laws four years old or less.

That Funston's theory has been supported with inadequate tests is not as puzzling as it may seem at first glance. A majority of the decisions to declare national legislation unconstitutional were rendered during the New Deal realignment phase. During the last four years of this period, a new majority was ensconced in Congress and the White House and faced a hostile Supreme Court. The confrontations between the Court and the more popular branches of government during this period alone may have produced the overall relationship. Thus, in order to demonstrate that a more enduring pattern of institutional conflict has been identified, a separate table for the non-New Deal periods should be provided.

The fact of the matter is that the observation made in the previous paragraph and Funston's are little more than speculation without the proper empirical tests. Funston should make these tests and report his results to the profession. His theory

is too interesting and too important for our understanding of policy consequences from realignments to leave the matter unresolved.

PAUL ALLEN BECK

University of Pittsburgh

TO THE EDITOR:

I think Professor Beck's criticisms very well taken. Indeed, they reflect certain caveats which I myself noted in my article. While his reservations about the analysis are appropriate, however, the vigor with which he presses them suggests that he has, in part, missed the point of the essay.

After three paragraphs which reasonably accurately summarize "The Supreme Court and Critical Elections," Professor Beck's central point (italicized, lest the unwary reader miss it) is made at the beginning of his fourth paragraph. I agree with that point. But I fail to see how it materially adds anything to what I wrote (p. 807):

... The use here of some years before the elections which brought new coalitions to power as part of the realignment phases may very probably have artificially deflated the indexes for the critical periods. ... Perhaps future research might attempt to determine the year of the ascendancy of the new coalition. ... Such attempts to determine precise years of ascendancy, however, not only must contend with the scholarly contentiousness about which elections actually involved realignments but also will be liable to the charge that they have defined the critical periods so as to inflate the statistical results. ... If the results reported here can be achieved by using realignment phases not inherently favorable to the thesis, they may perhaps be considered to be even more persuasive.

As for Beck's remarks concerning the New Deal period, I would simply refer him to my footnote 67.

"The Supreme Court and Critical Elections" was intended—and, I think, can and should so be read—as a synthetic rather than an original analytic effort. It was an attempt, as I stated in several places, to both integrate and test the assertions of certain leaders in our profession—most notably Dahl, but also Burnham—on their own terms. This effort at replication was dictated by my belief that we social scientists too little attempt to build upon one another's work as do our brethren in the natural sciences.

I could not more agree with Professor Beck that such an integrative statement as is represented by my article is but the beginning not the end of analysis, and I very much concur in his judgment that such an analysis must "examine the background of each case individually." I said as much in the article (p. 808):

Ultimately, the subject calls for an extended, systematic, historical examination of the Court's decision making explicitly based upon the electoral classification

scheme devised by the S.R.C. and elaborated by others, a treatment of the Court similar to that which Chambers and Burnham have done for the parties. ... Any study such as this, based upon aggregate data, necessarily sacrifices situational focus for numerological standardization, but Supreme Court decisions are not fungible goods.

Indeed, my conception of what is required is apparently much more ambitious than Beck's; I think we need nothing less than a definitive intellectual history of the Court; something we do not now have. (See also my note 84.) I am encouraged that someone with Professor Beck's analytic skills also thinks the pursuit important.

RICHARD FUNSTON

San Diego State University

Alliance Behavior in Nineteenth-Century Europe

TO THE EDITOR:

In their recent analysis of nineteenth-century European alliance activity, McGowan and Rood allude to two separate dimensions of alliance aggregation—spatial and temporal. "If these [Kaplan's] rules are violated, either by a rigid enmity, such as existed between France and Germany after the annexation of Alsace Lorraine [spatial], or by a decline in the system alliance formation rate [temporal], then a loss of system flexibility will result and system-changing events are likely."¹

Despite their repeated assertions that independence and flexibility in the matter of "whom the alliance partners are"² are vital to the maintenance of a balance of power system and their quoting Kaplan in the same vein ("the 'balance of power' system postulates that any alignment is as probable as any other alignment prior to a consideration of the specific interests which divide nations. Moreover, any particular alignment should not predispose the same nations to align themselves with each other at the next opportunity"),³ the authors go on to ignore the spatial dimension of alliance aggregation in their data analysis. They test, instead, three hypotheses which concern the times at which alliances in nineteenth-century Europe were formed. These are

H1: in a balance of power international system, the occurrence of alliances will be stochastically distributed (the number of alliances formed per unit of time is a Poisson random variable), and

H2: in a balance of power international system, the time intervals between alliances are randomly distributed (the distribution of interalliance intervals is a negative exponential random variable).⁴

¹ Patrick J. McGowan and Robert M. Rood, "Alliance Behavior in Balance of Power Systems: Applying a Poisson Model to Nineteenth-Century Europe," *American Political Science Review*, 69 (September 1975), 862.

² *Ibid.*, p. 861.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*

and

H3: in a balance of power international system, a decline in the systemic rate of alliance formation precedes system changing events, such as general war.⁵

Past scholarship, however, hardly agrees with McGowan and Rood that the time at which alliances are formed is the most important aspect of their relation to the operation of balance of power systems. Edward Gulick's account of European alliances is generally accepted as a classic account of the operation of a balance of power system (Robert Jervis's observation that Gulick's subject matter is more properly to be considered a "concert system" notwithstanding). In citing an example of the requisite (especially for the "holder of the balance") "mobility of action" for the maintenance of a balance of power system,⁶ he emphasizes the identities of allies and opponents at least as much as, if not indeed more than, the times at which the alliances were concluded. Richard Rosecrance argues that

the balancing system of Europe required states to ally or oppose each other according to the presumed distribution of power: if ideological bonds or animosities had arisen, states could no longer have charted their courses on power considerations alone; states would have refused to balance against their ideological *confreres* or to align themselves with ideological opponents, regardless of the configuration of power.⁷

Dina Zinnes assumes the importance of spatial flexibility when she constructs her analytic model of a "hypothetical world" of possible alliance combinations in such a way that "the labels of the nations are unimportant. The relevant factors are the number of alliances of various sizes and the placing and number of power equalities and inequalities."⁸ Nicholas Spykman offers simply that "he who plays the balance of power can have no permanent friends. His devotion can be to no specific state but only to balanced power. The ally of today is the enemy of tomorrow. One of the charms of power politics is that it offers no op-

portunity to grow weary of one's friends."⁹

It seems likely, then, that if threats to a very polarized (spatially nonrandom) system occur randomly (or according to a Poisson distribution), causing alliance formation within the system, most students of the balance of power "theory" would say that the system itself is neither fluid nor flexible (i.e., it would be a rigid system responding to random stimuli). On the other hand, a system of spatially random alliances would usually be considered fluid and flexible whether it was responding to random or nonrandom (temporally) stimuli. Therefore, the more important of the two dimensions of alliance aggregation would seem to be the spatial one.

Although McGowan and Rood have given us an excellent analysis of the temporal randomness of nineteenth-century alliances in Europe, it would be far more interesting and important to know whether these same temporally Poisson-distributed alliances exhibit spatial randomness as well. If they do, then McGowan and Rood's analysis (not to mention balance of power "theory" itself) would gain much more credibility. If, however, spatial alignment during the period is shown to be nonrandom—and more especially if the resulting pattern of alliance partners is indistinguishable from that of the 1910–1914 period's rigidity (which has been said to have been the cause of the disintegration of the European balance of power system and its transformation to a more-or-less bipolar one), then not only might McGowan and Rood's analysis lose much of its credibility and theoretical usefulness but also the usefulness of structural theories for the study of international politics in general might be brought into question.¹⁰

McGowan and Rood's data consist of 54 alliances among European states during the period 1814–1909. Although other states occasionally are included in these alliances, most of the activity concerns only five states—Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia. Their alignments during the period can be summarized according to partners as follows:

State	Prussia	Russia	Aligned with France	Great Britain	other
Austria	20	12	3	13	12
Prussia		11	1	6	9
Russia			7	9	3
France				9	6
Great Britain					10

⁵ McGowan and Rood, p. 862.

⁶ Edward Vose Gulick, *Europe's Classical Balance of Power* (New York: Norton, 1967), p. 68.

⁷ Richard N. Rosecrance, *Action and Reaction in World Politics* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1963), p. 28.

⁸ Dina A. Zinnes, "An Analytical Study of the Balance of Power Theories," *Journal of Peace Research* 4 (1967), 273.

⁹ Nicholas Spykman, *America's Strategy in World Politics* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1942), p. 103.

¹⁰ Arthur L. Stinchcombe's ideas concerning theory testing should be apparent here, if only in some twisted form. See especially his *Constructing Social Theories* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1968).

From this table, the frequencies of bilateral relations within the system can be seen. These can then be listed according to frequency (starting with the most frequently-found partnership):

Austria-Prussia	20
Austria-Great Britain	13
Austria-Russia	12
Prussia-Russia	11
Russia-Great Britain	9
France-Great Britain	9
Russia-France	7
Prussia-Great Britain	6
Austria-France	3
Prussia-France	1

Since there are ten possible pairs of states in the data set, the probability that any one pair will occur, given that any one pair is just as likely as any other, is 1/10. Ninety-one bilateral ties occur in the matrix above. Therefore, an hypothesis of spatial randomness among the states under consideration would predict that each cell frequency would be 9.1. It is immediately apparent from both the matrix and the list presented above that this is not the case. The alliances which formed the McGowan-Rood data set are not spatially random.

One finds instead that Austria is allied with Prussia more than twice as often as random distribution would predict. On the other hand, a Prussia-France alliance almost never occurs at all and an Austria-France one is very little more frequent. Only the Great Britain-Russia and France-Great Britain ties occur as frequently as balance of power "theory" would expect.

If Austria-Prussia alliances predominated during the 1814-1909 period in Europe while Great Britain-Russia and France-Great Britain alliances occurred at least no less frequently than they would by chance, the modal alliance pattern for the system as a whole would seem very little different from the pattern which obtained in 1914.¹¹ Balance of power "theory" (and all structural theories of international politics) then faces the

¹¹ If the grand coalitions which were formed just after the Congress of Vienna are dropped from the McGowan and Rood data set, then the general bipolarity of the European state system during the remainder of the nineteenth century becomes considerably more evident. With an hypothesis of randomness expecting identical frequencies of 5.3 for each bilateral combination, the following frequencies are actually observed:

Austria-Prussia	14
France-Great Britain	7
Austria-Russia	7
Austria-Great Britain	7
Russia-France	6
Prussia-Russia	6
Russia-Great Britain	4
Prussia-Great Britain	1
Austria-France	1
Prussia-France	0

question of why pre-1910 European alliance rigidity did not cause international system transformation whereas post-1910 rigidity did. The only satisfactory answer to this question may have to be found at the individual-nation-as-actor level of analysis.¹² Although this is another matter deserving further empirical research, it should be noted that Kaplan himself considered balance of power systems to be "subsystem dominant,"¹³ in other words, not amenable to systems (structural) theories and explanations at all: but rather dependent upon the actions and orientations of individual states.

Finally, an even more fundamental criticism can be made of both the McGowan and Rood analysis and this very brief one. Both analyses are in some fundamental sense after the fact of alliance, concerning themselves only with the point at which the "specific interests" of states have already shown themselves and the states in the system have taken up sides according to those interests. Kaplan's classic statement bears repeating: "the 'balance of power' system postulates that any alignment is as probable as any other alignment prior to a consideration of the specific interests which divide nations (emphasis added)." By the time alliances form, it is too late to determine this probability. Any study which concerns itself solely with alliances which have already come into being cannot adequately address itself to the task of testing balance of power "theory."

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¹² For a very precise delimitation of the two levels of international political analysis, see William B. Moul, "The Level of Analysis Problem Revisited," *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 6 (September 1973), 494-513.

¹³ Morton A. Kaplan, *System and Process in International Politics* (New York: Wiley, 1957), pp. 27, 125.

TO THE EDITOR:

As we understand Mr. Lawson, he makes six points in his criticism of our recent study of balance of power alliance behavior in nineteenth-century Europe:

(1) the choice of alliance partner (and, by implication, opponent) is an important aspect of balance of power theory;

(2) we ignored this "spatial" dimension of alliance aggregation in our exclusively "temporal" study;

(3) if alliance pairings among the five great European powers in the nineteenth century are approximately random, then our analysis and balance of power theory "would gain much more credibility," but if "spatial alignment . . . is . . . nonrandom," then our study and other "structural theories" of international politics "might be brought into question";

(4) according to his presentation of our data,¹ alliances "are not spatially random";

(5) moreover, *ex post facto* research, such as our original study and his comment, cannot "test" balance of power theory;

(6) therefore, our study and balance of power theories are of dubious value.

We appreciate Mr. Lawson's interest in our paper and we welcome this opportunity to respond to his interpretation of our work and thereby to extend research in this important area of international relations theory.

Before we discuss each issue Mr. Lawson has raised, two general comments are in order. First, although he cites Moul's fine paper,² we do not think he has fully understood its relevance to his critique. The units of analysis and the treatment of time are completely different in our article and in his comment. We presented a longitudinal study of one international system, whereas Lawson works with a single aggregated cross-section of time (96 years!) and ten pairs of states. In Moul's language, for Lawson to claim that his critique says *anything* about the findings of our article is a clear instance of "confounding the ecological fallacy with a cross-sectional—longitudinal fallacy."³ However, Lawson's presentation of our data is of interest in its own right, a point we shall consider. Second, Lawson has not reanalyzed our data, he has simply presented *without citation* and with several counting errors⁴ information reported four years ago in Table 7 and Appendix A of Rood's dissertation.⁵

(1) Without question, *at the levels of states and pairs of states*, patterns of choice of alliance partner are a fundamental aspect of balance of power theory. However, to examine this issue in an entirely static, cross-sectional fashion as Lawson does obscures the dynamic, sequential nature of alignments, making it difficult to discuss in an intelligent manner alliance flexibility and also making more probable a spatially skewed distribution of the behavior between pairs of states, or any other interacting units for that matter.⁶

¹ We made these data available to Mr. Lawson at his request, a fact he fails to acknowledge.

² William B. Moul, "The Level of Analysis Problem Revisited," *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 6 (September, 1973), 494–513.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 501–502.

⁴ The errors are: (1) our alliances number 55, not 54; (2) the Austria-Prussia pair has 21, not 20 alliances, and (3) the Austria-Great Britain pair has 12, not 13. These correct figures are used in the new analysis we report in this communication.

⁵ Robert M. Rood, "Agreement in the International System" (Ph.D. dissertation in Political Science, Syracuse University, 1973), 88, 183–201.

⁶ Edwin Kuh, "The Validity of Cross-Sectionally Estimated Behavior Equations in Time Series Applications," *Econometrica* 27 (1959), 197–214.

(2) It is obvious that we did not examine the *dyadic level* problem of alliance choice in our exclusively *system level* paper. It is also obvious that Mr. Lawson has not read carefully or has not understood fully our article and Rood's dissertation from which he obtained our data. To repeat what we said in our article,⁷ Rood's study was an explicit test of the *dyadic level* proposition that "any alignment is as probable as any other alignment prior to a consideration of the specific interests which divide nations."⁸ Rood was unable to falsify this proposition when a probabilistic model of agreement among pairs of actors developed by Brams and O'Leary was applied to the data.⁹ Moreover, subsequent research has shown that deviations from this model may be explained statistically by the magnitude of war within each pair of states,¹⁰ a violation of its assumptions that balance-of-power theory predictions should affect choice of alliance partners and opponents.¹¹

(3) We strongly agree that if it can be demonstrated that alliances occur on both a spatially and temporarily random basis, then our study and balance-of-power theory will have their credibility enhanced. The problem with Lawson's critique is that skewed cross-sectional data are *not necessarily evidence of nonrandomness in statistical models*, particularly (a) when one works with a simplistic probability model, equal probability, (b) when the *N* is small, only ten dyads, and (c) when the author merely "eyeballs" the data rather than applying the appropriate statistical goodness of fit test. Lawson, in his "analysis" of our data, makes the same mistake Londoners did during World War II when they were sure that German rocket bombs fell in clusters in certain neighborhoods. A Poisson-based analysis of the spatial distribution of south London bomb hits indicated perfect randomness.¹² We would advise Mr. Lawson to heed Feller's conclusion regarding "the established fact that to the untrained eye randomness appears as

⁷ Patrick J. McGowan and Robert M. Rood, "Alliance Behavior in Balance of Power Systems: Applying a Poisson Model to Nineteenth-Century Europe," *American Political Science Review* 69 (September, 1975), 863.

⁸ Morton A. Kaplan, *System and Process in International Politics* (New York: Wiley Science Editions, 1964), Preface.

⁹ Rood, "Agreement in the International System," pp. 159–163; Steven J. Brams and Michael K. O'Leary, "An Axiomatic Model of Voting Bodies," *American Political Science Review* 64 (June, 1970), 449–470.

¹⁰ Robert M. Rood, "The Dyadic Distribution of Alliance Commitments," Columbia: Department of Government and International Studies, University of South Carolina, mimeo, 1975.

¹¹ That is, the patterned relationships of international conflict (magnitude of war within dyads) certainly are "specific interests which divide nations."

¹² William Feller, *An Introduction to Probability Theory and Its Applications*, 3rd ed. (New York: Wiley, 1968), 160–161.

regularity or tendency to cluster.”¹³

(4) In point of fact, alliance choice *is* randomly distributed in the five power nineteenth-century European balance of power system. Table 1 shows this when the spatial *t*-axis is defined in terms of pairs of states and grouped in units of four alliances. We have also calculated goodness-of-fit tests for cutting points of two and three alliance units with similar results. Substantively, contrary to Lawson’s reading of our data, we can report that the hypothesis, *in a balance-of-power system, pair-wise choice of alliance partner will be stochastically distributed* (the number of alliances formed per dyad is a Poisson random variable), cannot be rejected and is independent of how the number of alliances is categorized. Methodologically, Table 1 is cross-sectional (spatial) with all the attendant

Table 1. The Pair-wise Choice of Alliance Partners in Europe, 1814–1914, as a Poisson Distribution

Number of alliances per dyad	<i>p</i> ^a	Number Observed	Number Expected
0–3	.0198	2	.2
4–7	.2924	2	2.9
8–11	.4709	3	4.7
≥ 12	.2068	3	2.1
		10	9.9

$\chi^2 = 4.48$, d.f. = 3, $p = .21$
Kolmogorov–Smirnov test^b, $p > .20$

^a Calculated from T. Kitagawa, *Tables of the Poisson Distribution* (Tokyo: Baifukan, 1952).
^b Calculated from Sidney Siegel, *Nonparametric Statistics for the Behavioral Sciences* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1956), pp. 47–51.

¹³ Feller, *Probability Theory*, p. 161.

problems we have discussed regarding such analyses, and the *N* is very small. Nevertheless, we appreciate Mr. Lawson’s stimulus and we hope that this original demonstration of the spatial randomness of alliances leads him to find more credible our original study as well as balance of power theory and structural theories of international politics in general.

(5) It is difficult to determine what Mr. Lawson means by his concluding criticism that balance of power theory cannot be “tested” by nonexperimental methods including historical research and quantitative international political analysis. If he is correct, then the “theory” is no more empirical than the statement “everything which happens is God’s will.” We think Professor Kaplan intends to say more than such truisms and that in making statements about possible alliance partners and opponents, one must include the specific interests which divide nations as part of the statement of initial conditions from which the explanation (postdiction) or prediction is deduced. Could Kaplan mean anything else by his “classic statement” and still claim to advocate a “scientific” approach to the study of international relations as he so often does?¹⁴

(6) For all of these reasons, including his changes in the level of analysis and temporal organization, we cannot accept Mr. Lawson’s criticisms. We do, however, thank him for his interest in our work.

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¹⁴ Morton A. Kaplan, “The New Great Debate: Traditionalism vs. Science in International Relations,” in K. Knorr and J. N. Rosenau, eds., *Contending Approaches to International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), pp. 38–61.

EDITORIAL COMMENT

The Election of 1972: You Read it Here Last. With each passing presidential election, larger and larger bodies of public opinion data are collected—and by more and different sorts of people. The *Review* has frequently published the results of election studies done by our colleagues at the University of Michigan which through the years has focused the efforts of academics from many institutions. David Broder of the *Washington Post* suggested to us that when we presented the Michigan Center for Political Studies 1972 findings, we might also gather up comments and analyses from students having access to public opinion data originally generated in behalf of the McGovern and Nixon candidacies. The result of our followup has borne the fruit visible in the current issue, a symposium unusually complex and difficult to put together analyzing the 1972 presidential election just in time for the 1976 election. Art may or may not imitate life; we couldn't say. We do note, however, that social science tags along after real life at a respectful distance—in this case, four years.

Good Advice Needed. Now is a good time to remind readers that if they have suggestions or ideas to improve the *Review*, the transition period between managing editors is a strategic moment to let fly. Our successors in Pittsburgh are far more receptive and open minded than the barnacle-encrusted current management is likely to be. If you write, please do not omit a word of good cheer and commiseration, since a good part of the energies of any new administration must go into cleaning out the cobwebs neglected by the old.

Already improvements have been made in the processing of manuscripts. Prospective contributors should attend to the new instructions, printed in each issue, which, if followed, will cut costs without attenuating service to authors or readers. Good ideas like that are what we are after.

Articles Accepted for Future Publication

- Joel D. Aberbach, University of Michigan, "Power Consciousness: A Comparative Analysis"
- C. Arnold Anderson, University of Chicago, "Conceptual Framework for Political Socialization in Developing Societies"
- John M. Bacheller, Kirkland College, "Lobbyists and the Legislative Process: The Impact of Environmental Constraints"
- Paul Allen Beck, University of Pittsburgh, "Partisan Dealignment in the Postwar South"
- Robert A. Bernstein, Texas A&M University, "Divisive Primaries Do Hurt: U.S. Senate Races, 1956-1972"
- Paul R. Brass, University of Washington, "Party Systems and Government Stability in the Indian States"

- Steven R. Brown, Kent State University, "Toward An Experimental Analysis of Political Literature"
- Charles D. Cary, University of Iowa, "A Technique of Computer Content Analysis of Transliterated Russian Language Textual Materials: A Research Note"
- Clarke E. Cochran, Texas Tech University, "Authority and Community: The Contributions of Carl Friedrich, Yves Simon, and Michael Polanyi"
- Neal E. Cutler, University of Southern California, "Demographic, Social Psychological, and Political Factors in the Politics of Age: A Call for Research in Political Gerontology"
- Barbara Deckard, University of California, Riverside, "Party Realignment and the Transformation of the Political Agenda—The House of Representatives, 1925-1938"
- Shaheen F. Dil, Princeton University, "The Cabal in Kabul: Great Power Interaction in Afghanistan"
- Lowell Dittmer, State University of New York, Buffalo, "Thought Reform and the Cultural Revolution: An Analysis of the Symbolism of Chinese Polemics"
- Robert Eyestone, University of Minnesota, "Confusion, Diffusion and Innovation"
- Richard F. Fenno, Jr., University of Rochester, "Congressmen in Their Constituencies: An Exploration"
- Norman Frohlich, Joe A. Oppenheimer, Jeffrey Smith and Oran R. Young, University of Texas at Austin, "A Test of Downsian Voter Rationality: 1964 Presidential Voting"
- Dante Germino, University of Virginia, "Eric Voegelin's Framework for Political Evaluation in His Recently Published Work"
- John A. Ferejohn, California Institute of Technology, "On the Decline of Competition in Congressional Elections"
- John V. Gillespie, Dina A. Zinnes, Philip A. Schrodt, G. S. Tahim and Richard Rubinson, Indiana University, "An Optimal Control Model of Arms Races"
- R. Kenneth Godwin and W. Bruce Shepard, Oregon State University, "Political Processes and Public Expenditures: A Re-examination Based on Theories of Representative Government"
- Robert T. Golembiewski, University of Georgia, "A Critique of 'Democratic Administration' and Its Supporting Ideation"
- George D. Greenberg, Jeffrey A. Miller, Lawrence B. Mohr and Bruce C. Vladeck, University of Michigan, "Developing Public Policy Theory: Perspectives from Empirical Research"
- Russell Hardin, University of Pennsylvania, "Hol-

- low Victory: The Minimum Winning Coalition"
- Douglas A. Hibbs, Jr., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, "Industrial Conflict in Advanced Industrial Societies"
- Douglas A. Hibbs, Jr., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, "Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy"
- Robert W. Jackman, Michigan State University, "Politicians in Uniform: Military Governments and Social Change in the Third World"
- M. Kent Jennings and Gregory B. Markus, University of Michigan, "The Effect of Military Service on Political Attitudes: A Panel Study"
- Bryan D. Jones, Saadia Greenberg, Joseph Drew, and Clifford Kaufman, Wayne State University, "Bureaucratic Response to Citizen-Initiated Contacts: Environmental Enforcement in Detroit"
- Sam Kernell, University of Minnesota, "Presidential Popularity and Negative Voting: An Alternative Explanation of the Mid-Term Congressional Decline of the President's Party"
- Arthur J. Lerman, St. John's University, "National Elite and Local Politician in Taiwan"
- Michael S. Lewis-Beck, University of Iowa, "The Relative Importance of Socioeconomic and Political Variables for Public Policy"
- Michael Margolis, University of Pittsburgh, "From Confusion to Confusion—Issues and the American Voter (1956–1972)"
- Richard D. McKelvey, Carnegie-Mellon University and John H. Aldrich, Michigan State University, "A Method of Scaling, with Applications to the 1968 and 1972 Presidential Elections"
- Richard D. McKelvey and Peter C. Ordeshook, Carnegie-Mellon University, "Symmetric Spatial Games Without Majority Rule Equilibria"
- J. Miller McPherson, Susan Welch, University of Nebraska, and Cal Clark, New Mexico State University, "The Stability and Reliability of Political Efficacy: Using Path Analysis to Test Alternative Models"
- Paul E. Meehl, University of Minnesota, "The Selfish Voter Paradox and the Thrown-Away Vote Argument"
- Abraham H. Miller, Louis H. Bolce and Mark Halligan, University of Cincinnati, "The J-Curve Theory and the Black Urban Riots: An Empirical Test of Progressive Relative Deprivation Theory Using Both Objective and Perceptual Indicators"
- Edward N. Muller, State University of New York at Stony Brook, "Behavioral Correlates of Political Support"
- Edward N. Muller and Thomas O. Jukam, State University of New York at Stony Brook, "On the Meaning of Political Support"
- Garrison Nelson, University of Vermont, "Partisan Patterns of House Leadership Change, 1789–1976"
- Helmut Norpoth, University of Cologne, "Explaining Party Cohesion in Congress: The Case of Shared Policy Attitudes"
- Thomas C. Nowak, Waynesburg College and Kay A. Snyder, Michigan State University, "Politics and Administration: The Philippines Before Martial Law"
- Thomas L. Pangle, Yale University, "The Political Psychology of Religion in Plato's *Laws*"
- James L. Perry, University of California, Irvine and Charles H. Levine, Syracuse University, "An Interorganizational Analysis of Power, Conflict, and Settlements in Public Sector Collective Bargaining"
- James H. Qualls, The Johns Hopkins University, "Barber's Typological Analysis of Political Leaders"
- David Resnick, Cornell University, "Crude Communism and Revolution"
- Neil R. Richardson, University of Texas at Austin, "Political Compliance and U. S. Trade Dominance"
- Howard Rosenthal, Carnegie-Mellon University, and Subatra K. Sen, University of Rochester, "Spatial Voting Models for the French Fifth Republic"
- Barry S. Rundquist, University of Illinois, Urbana, Gerald S. Strom, University of Illinois at Chicago Circle, and John G. Peters, University of Nebraska, "Corrupt Politicians and Their Electoral Support: Some Theoretical and Experimental Observations"
- Lester M. Salamon, Duke University, and John J. Siegfried, Vanderbilt University, "Economic Power and Political Influence: The Impact of Industry Structure on Public Policy"
- Lars Schoultz, Miami University, "The Socioeconomic Determinants of Popular-Authoritarian Electoral Behavior: The Case of Peronism"
- Thomas Schwartz, Carnegie-Mellon University, "Collective Choice, Separation of Issues and Vote Trading"
- Donald D. Searing, University of North Carolina, "Measuring Politicians' Values: Administration and Assessment of a Ranking Technique in the British House of Commons"
- Gerald S. Strom, University of Illinois at Chicago Circle, and Barry S. Rundquist, University of Illinois, Urbana, "A Revised Theory of Winning in House-Senate Conferences"
- Peter J. Steinberger, University of California, Riverside, "Hegel as a Social Scientist"
- Fred H. Willhoite, Jr., Coe College, "Primates and Political Authority: A Biobehavioral Perspective"
- Gerald C. Wright, Jr., Florida Atlantic University, "Contextual Models of Electoral Behavior: The Southern Wallace Vote"
- Marvin Zetterbaum, University of California, Davis, "Equality and Human Need"

On the *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences**

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The *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* had its origin in a series of discussions about how to revise the earlier *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (New York: Macmillan, 1930). It was decided not to revise it, but to create a new encyclopedia, because social science seemed to be growing and changing so rapidly that our generation, and perhaps each succeeding one, needed its own statement. There are so many new ideas about what social science is and ought to be in the *International Encyclopedia*, that revision of the older *Encyclopedia* would not have been able to incorporate them in its structure. Continuity between the two is not only evident in many articles but also in the overlap of some sixty contributors.

The *International Encyclopedia* is both narrower and broader than the *Encyclopedia*. It does not compete with general encyclopedias on topics they do well. It has less purely descriptive matter and sheer information than the *Encyclopedia*, but more on methods and ideas. Indeed, its emphasis is on analytic and comparative study (the *Encyclopedia* did not, for example, have an article on comparative politics), and its editors believe that historical and descriptive materials in the articles should be illustrative of concepts and theories; people wanting the materials themselves in greater detail can find them elsewhere. New scientific interests are revealed by more studies and more pages on such subjects as human biology and linguistics, and on the relationships between social sciences and other studies, including literature and the arts.

We may be misled by the title, *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, for it gives the impression that the work it presumably supersedes, the *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, was only American, or at least not intentionally international in scope, and that is not true. American contributors to it were chosen, sheerly for the sake of convenience, if they were thought to be as able as their foreign counterparts; otherwise they were not chosen. Foreign contributors were asked to write in their own languages, which were translated. And all contributors were expected to be concerned with social science everywhere. Part Two of the Introduction (which alone covered about 118 very large double-column pages) was devoted almost entirely to the place of social science in Great Britain, the countries of Europe,

Latin America, and Japan. The *International Encyclopedia*, despite its name, is chiefly American and English in its contributors.

The history of social science was more concentrated and had far more range in the older encyclopedia. Part One of the Introduction, which would make a stout volume in itself, dealt with the growth of social science from ancient Greece to its own time. The individual periods were discussed by such scholars as E. R. A. Seligman, W. L. Westermann, Tenney Frank, Harold Laski, Charles Beard, and Robert MacIver.

There was also a self-conscious attempt at unity which is lacking in the *International Encyclopedia*. There one must read widely to discover assumptions unstated by the editors. The *Encyclopedia's* editors were explicit; they found the social sciences justifying themselves as separate disciplines and continuing to exist in "water-tight compartments" (Vol. I, p. xvii, 1937 edition). Whatever virtue this had in the development of science the compartments should not be permanent, and the editors wanted to break them down. "The conclusions reached by the separate sciences were gradually recognized, therefore, as incomplete and provisional, and the demand went forth to attempt a better analysis through a more comprehensive synthesis" (Vol. I, p. xvii). The movement toward a science of society thus received an official cachet. The *International Encyclopedia* is quite unclear on the subject and, although some studies, like political sociology, combine elements that were once separate, water-tight compartments are found everywhere.

The *Encyclopedia* was less restrictive, more catholic, in what it surveyed. It designated ethics, education, philosophy, and psychology as semi-social sciences, and included articles under those headings with a view, perhaps, to completing that comprehensive science of society which shows the influences of common activities within the group on each of its members. Seligman, the editor-in-chief, even recognized "the sciences with social implications" (Vol. I, p. 3) as a class of social science. The *International Encyclopedia* treats psychology at length, including physiological psychology, as a part of social science, and contains articles on ethics and education, but it has no article on philosophy at all, in contrast to the *Encyclopedia*, which had a long, excellent article on the subject by John Dewey. Altogether, I must express a preference for the *Encyclopedia* as a

* *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*. Edited by David L. Sills. (New York: The Macmillan Company & The Free Press, 17 volumes. 1968. \$495.)

more coherent, more intellectual, better edited work.

Biographies of living persons were excluded from the *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*. Thus, for all the attention he attracted at the time, and although his work was completed, there was no biography of Gaetano Mosca. The *International Encyclopedia*, however, includes biographies of living persons assumed to have already completed most of their work, so their ideas and contributions can be judged; in practice, that amounts to including people thought to be important to social science who were born before 1891. It is a tribute to the choice of contributors to the *Encyclopedia* that more than one hundred of them were found worthy of being biographees in the *International Encyclopedia*.

In general, the articles in the *International Encyclopedia* are in alphabetical order, but where it seems reasonable they are placed under a more general subject. Thus the Rorschach Test comes under Projective Methods, and Balance of Payments under International Monetary Economics. The articles have useful selected bibliographies. The index lists, first, contributors, and then articles, in alphabetical order, and concludes with a classification of articles under appropriate rubrics.

Much of the academic community was involved in the preparation of the *International Encyclopedia*. David L. Sills was the editor; he was assisted by Associate Editors, Special Editors, and Editorial Staff. W. Allen Wallis was chairman of a distinguished Editorial Advisory Board and, a nostalgic note, Alvin Johnson, who was Associate Editor of the *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, was Honorary Editor of the *International Encyclopedia* and gave time and counsel to the editors, although he was over ninety years old.

Before dealing with specifics, I should like to try to capture the overall character of the *International Encyclopedia*, the quality that gives it whatever coherence it has. The publication date is 1968, just yesterday in the world of scholarship, but the articles must have been written a little earlier, and ours is a time of rapid change. What I am suggesting is that the editors and contributors, people of distinction in the academy, made up a kind of Establishment of the social sciences, which is already being criticized, sometimes quite feebly, sometimes trenchantly and in essentials. I am not concerned here with the criticism of those younger, and occasionally older, scholars who were radicalized by the political atmosphere of the late '60's and want to politicize social science and scientific associations; I am interested in the kind of criticism that reconsiders the assumptions and general direction of the social sciences, and that may affect their future. It may prove useful to

characterize the *International Encyclopedia* by comparison not just with its predecessor, but with a great encyclopedic landmark of an earlier age, and for that I have chosen the *Encyclopédie* of the eighteenth century. The *Encyclopédie* was not intended just as a vast compendium of human knowledge in the Age of Reason, but as a synthesis larger and more ambitious than that aimed at in the *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*. The dreams of science are fitful, but recurrent, and although one aspect of the vision of Diderot and D'Alembert is still repeated by some philosophers of science, the reality, at least of the social sciences, is farther from the dream than it was in 1930.

The View of Knowledge

Evaluation and criticism get better and worse with the passing of time. Because we are not men of the Enlightenment, we do not breathe their air of ideas and values; we must, intellectually, reconstruct the climate of the Enlightenment, and we are prone to error. But we have new perspectives, which let us see past time from a vantage point that makes relations and patterns clearer, and some of our information is new. Thus what the philosophes took to be simply knowledge, we see as part of their age. In that respect, if not in others, we can write of Diderot's *Encyclopedia* with a confidence unmatched by Diderot's contemporaries. So it will be in the future with the *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*. In the meantime, it is still rewarding to compare the *International Encyclopedia*, in its view of knowledge, with Diderot's *Encyclopedia*.

The French *Encyclopedia* embraced all knowledge, not just the social sciences, and classified knowledge under the general headings, Memory, Reason, and Imagination (see below). The *International Encyclopedia* less schematically classifies knowledge in the social sciences under the headings of subjects, or branches of study, like Demography, Econometrics, and Social Psychology (in the extremely useful Index, Vol. 17).

D'Alembert, in his *Preliminary Discourse to the Encyclopedia of Diderot*,¹ is concerned with the way knowledge arises, and holds much of Locke's (and Condillac's) epistemology. "We can divide all our knowledge," he says, "into direct and reflective knowledge" (p. 6). Direct knowledge comes from the senses; reflective knowledge is what we make of direct knowledge. The first thing we learn from our sensations is the fact of our existence. "From this it follows that our first reflective ideas must be concerned with ourselves, that is to say, must concern that thinking principle which constitutes our nature and which is in no

¹ Published in 1751. My references are to the Library of Liberal Arts edition, Indianapolis and New York, 1963.

way distinct from ourselves" (p. 8). Thus Descartes follows on Locke.

Unlike Diderot and his colleagues, the editors of the *International Encyclopedia* hold no philosophical theory of knowledge on which its contributors would agree, except for the scientific method of our day, whose victory over all rival methods is complete in these pages. Diderot's *Encyclopedia*, too, had a special concern with scientific method, but it was essentially the method of Newton and the Newtonians, with an assist from Locke (see D'Alembert, p. 16ff.). The *International Encyclopedia* attends to the history of ideas in each of its subjects, sometimes thoroughly, as in Dwight Waldo's "Public Administration," sometimes casually, as in "Taxation." The *Encyclopedia* of Diderot takes the position that history is the basic source of certain kinds of knowledge, especially of ethics, politics, and human nature. On human nature and ethics, D'Alembert is quite Hobbesian and makes much of self-preservation. Human nature, ethics, and politics are a kind of continuum, although D'Alembert offers a caution: he describes politics as "... a sort of ethics of a particular and serious kind, to which the principles of ordinary ethics can on occasion be accommodated only with much subtlety" (p. 36).

Although Memory, Reason, and Imagination are the general headings under which D'Alembert places all knowledge, they are not utterly distinct from each other. They are, indeed, all faculties of Understanding, and are closely related. History (in the large sense in which everything has a history) comes from memory, Philosophy (which includes natural philosophy, or science—even to veterinary medicine) from reason, and the Fine Arts (all capitals are D'Alembert's) from imagination. Yet "Imagination acts no less in a geometer [i.e., mathematician] who creates than in a poet who invents" (p. 51f.). And all the subjects D'Alembert names are branches of knowledge, including the Fine Arts, not so readily accepted in our day as yielding knowledge.

Underlying the whole enterprise of Diderot's *Encyclopedia* is a belief in the unity and ultimate simplicity of knowledge. It is a belief that sustained the fascinating diversity of work and interest so typical of the philosophes of the Enlightenment, a quality popularly associated only with Renaissance man. In studying and doing many different things, the men of the Enlightenment were still concerned with one thing, knowledge, as it was revealed in all the activities of mind. D'Alembert himself, whose talents were not perhaps so great and diverse as Voltaire's, or Rousseau's, or Hume's, was a distinguished mathematician and scientist, a student of philosophy and psychology, about which he wrote elegantly, and the author of a work on music (*Éléments de Musique*, 1792) that

was much acclaimed. He did not, like Rousseau, write operas, but he collaborated with him on articles about music in the *Encyclopedia*.

The great theme of the French *Encyclopedia* can be stated simply, as D'Alembert did. "The universe," he wrote, "if we may be permitted to say so, would only be one fact and one great truth for whoever knew how to embrace it from a single point of view" (p. 29). This faith is sometimes called the unity of science, but it is not that in our sense of "science"; it is the unity of "knowledge," which is all that "science" initially meant. Today we have distinguished science from other kinds of knowledge, like legal knowledge, and from activities like art, whether or not they yield knowledge. Science, to us, rests on observation and culminates in general laws, and that rules out many things from our own faith (which many share) in the unity of science. D'Alembert held a larger doctrine. Typically, he said: "... it is readily apparent that the sciences and the arts are mutually supporting, and that consequently there is a chain that binds them together" (p. 5).

Today's belief in the unity of science is like D'Alembert's in one respect: its idea that to unify science is to "reduce" it to its fundamentals. D'Alembert's version of reduction is implicit in this passage: "... if it is often difficult to reduce each particular science or art to a small number of rules or general notions, it is no less difficult to encompass the infinitely varied branches of human knowledge in a truly unified system" (p. 5). Perhaps each subject was ideally to be "reduced" to a few general laws, and then connected to other subjects by "a chain that binds them together," and the whole finally seen "from a single point of view" as "one great truth." Current ideas, less widely accepted at the moment than the unity of knowledge was by the philosophes, give the basic physical sciences a high priority, and present an ideal "reduction" of science as the statement of all scientific knowledge in physico-chemical terms.

This "reduction" includes human behavior, and so psychology as well as the other social sciences, but it excludes the arts. Properly so, too, when knowledge shrinks to science, for it is hard even to image "reducing" *Macbeth* or Michelangelo's *David* in any way, let alone stating them in physico-chemical terms. In their heyday, the logical positivists held the unity of science to be a cardinal principle of their philosophy, and sponsored the relatively small *International Encyclopedia of Unified Science*, which contains some splendid articles, but neither that doctrine nor the Enlightenment's unity of knowledge are the central themes in the *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*.

Let me try to state those themes, as I see them recur in many articles. Whatever the individual

contributors or editorial staff may have thought they were doing, the *International Encyclopedia* does not merely report the current state of each subject, but the current state of social science itself. With only minor disagreement among the contributors, social science is perceived as continuous in general method with physical science and, perhaps as a result of that, is understood by some contributors as value-free. The *International Encyclopedia* is the fullest statement of what a (perhaps value-free) social science, modeled on physical science, has accomplished in our time.

Some contributors, like Sheldon Wolin ("Political Theory: Trends and Goals"), think it naive to expect social science to be value-free, but many contributors simply take it for granted. The more theoretical among them are explicit, and distinguish fact from value in different degrees. The range starts with Arnold Brecht ("Political Theory: Approaches," Vol. 12), who wants to use the word "science" in such a way that "the validity of ultimate moral standards of valuation cannot be established through scientific means" (p. 308), but still permits "scientific political theory" to function "so as to make an informed choice [of goals and goal-values] possible" (p. 313). This may be a refusal to meet the issue squarely, because of the word "ultimate." An informed choice among values is a great deal; it goes a long way toward making facts relevant to values, and it may be *hubris* to expect more. Also, Brecht wants us to put the study of "goals and goal-values in the center of political theory, where it used to be" (p. 313), but on a strictly scientific base. Perhaps that, too, is *hubris*.

The range of opinion on fact and value continues throughout the *International Encyclopedia*, and one reads Felix E. Oppenheim saying bluntly "... normative principles cannot be derived from factual generalizations" ("Equality: The Concept of Equality," Vol. 5, p. 107), without Brecht's elaborate qualifications. This is an extension of the social-scientific claim to be value-free, as is the first statement I quoted from Brecht, going beyond description of science as containing facts which are value-free to a philosophical position in which values are fact-free. Perhaps normative principles cannot be derived (i.e., logically inferred) from factual generalizations *alone*, but Oppenheim's failure to qualify his principle in this way makes it seem that we cannot learn about our values from experience, that factual generalizations do not affect values. Experience leads us to facts and factual generalizations, and experience shows they do bring clarification and alteration of values; if they did not, we would all be doomed to dogmatism or caprice.

As for a value-free social science: what parts of it are value-free? There can be little dispute that

values enter science in the selection of problems and the application of conclusions. Beyond that, matters are less clear. Do values enter in the choice of methods, for example? They may. The area of value-free science, then, becomes, first, the ways in which methods, however selected, lead to conclusions and, second, the actual statements within the body of social science, including particular descriptions and generalizations. Here, however, the values of science play their part. Data are selected because of their relevance to hypotheses, those aspects of experience which are thus relevant are described, other aspects are ignored, and the described aspects of experience are called "data." If only the *shape* of a snowflake is relevant to a hypothesis, its color and temperature are ignored. Generalizations are formulated so they are testable and, perhaps, relate clearly to other generalizations. Experiments must be replicable, and evidence must be honest.

To rule the values of science out of the general realm of values, which is a possible defense against what I have said, one must either qualify the statement that science is value-free by asserting that it is free of nonscientific values, or one must classify scientific values as procedure or method, thus denying they are values at all. Perhaps in the second case one can accept truth as a value and relegate all other scientific values to the category of means. Then one can possibly assert that science *ought* to be value-free and ask whether in fact it is.

Another justification for value-free social science might come from the perspective of use and application. The truth such science discovers would work when used. For some, that is itself a definition of truth. Again, this argument is all right, too, so far as it goes, but it leads quickly to an ethical quagmire, because of the ambiguity of the word "work." Should all the conclusions of social and behavioral science be spoken freely, or is it better to repress some conclusions in the interest of a just society, *whatever we mean by that*? If, for instance, it should turn out, in repeated studies, that ethnic group A falls far short, on the average, of other ethnic groups in the amount and quality of education its members can absorb, might not one consequence of such knowledge be an imposed inequality of educational opportunity, and might not that inequality lead to more and worse consequences? Such truth would "work," in a sense, but not as many people would want it to. Shall we then repress the utterance of some conclusions? And can we? If the conclusions are known, will they not be said? It is only a little step from granting that we should, but cannot, repress dissemination of those conclusions, to advocating that we should repress the research that might breed them.

Perhaps the social scientist wants to be above the social battle and simply proclaim that science its uses then falls on others. At once we are back to the initial argument about the physical scientists who discovered nuclear fission. Is a human being entitled to compartmentalize his life so that, as scientist, he forbids himself to know how his conclusions will probably be applied, even when that is obvious? As a matter of fact, mustn't he lie to himself sometimes, pretending he does not know what he does know? An unhappy situation for any scientist, but especially for the social scientist, because the probable application of scientific knowledge is a legitimate question in social science.

Then, what of the sentences within social and behavioral sciences? Are they all free of implied value? Max Weber, who wanted a value-free social science, said the state has a monopoly of legitimate force. Is "legitimate" a value-free word? Doesn't "illegitimate force" sound morally bad? And how about the current description of politics as "the authoritative allocation of values"? Isn't authority legitimate and good, as opposed to illegitimate and bad? Further, when a "social item" is called functional for the maintenance of a system, only those who oppose the system itself are likely to think of that item as bad; for others it is probably felt to be good. If we agree that something is dysfunctional, don't we want to be rid of it if we can? Being rid of it, or substituting something functional for it, requires purposive action, and purposive action is hard to conceive without some value or values to guide it. Even if we do not intend to act, a need for action is implied.

When the economist says that particular legislation will increase inflation or unemployment or will bring depression, his statement is more than prediction; it is also a warning that our values will not be served. When the political scientist asserts that some governmental action may cause civil disorder, there is no value-neutrality in "civil disorder." We may not only conclude that some sentences in social science are not at the moment value-free, but we may question whether social science can at any time be entirely value-free. The thrust of that question comes not only from the subject matter of social science, which is human behavior, but from the nature of language as it is developed in human cultures.

Ordinary language is drenched in values. Most people have trouble articulating their own values explicitly, but those values fashion their conduct and their words. The language of imaginative literature is even richer in values than ordinary language, while the language of natural science eliminates values as much as possible. The poet is always concerned with valuing, and shapes his language to reveal his values. The physicist may

be obsessed with scientific values, but uses language in his scientific work so it results from, but does not reveal, those values. Yet even natural science, when it deals with matters that affect man, uses of necessity a less neutral vocabulary. Language about quasars can be quite neutral, but language about pollution cannot, at least in the same degree.

Social science may seek a technical language, but it can be utterly technical only here and there, usually in the use of mathematics. Otherwise social science is condemned to ordinary language and its heavy freight of value. It stands somewhere between common speech and the language of natural science; and however much it aspires to the latter, it is mired in the former.

There is still another point to be made about value-neutrality, apart from the individual sentences of social science. I have suggested considerable agreement about the importance of value in choosing a problem. As social science gains in prestige, one can anticipate mounting social pressure to work on problems that are not merely of scientific interest but bear on the problems society is facing. Successful work can then become a basis for public policy. Indeed, this is already the case. I cannot believe that a social scientist who knows that his work may influence public policy will regularly do that work with no hint of the policy he prefers, even when that preferred policy must be carefully based on the outcome of his research. And policy, of course, always involves value judgment. Even a study of the relationship between types of housing and the incidence of crime contains an implied preference for a type of housing that correlates with a low incidence of crime, unless other consequences of it are even more dreadful. Should such a study be undertaken when a public housing agency is interested in the question and clamors for more information, the policy implications of the study are likely to be overwhelming.

These considerations cast doubt on the possibility that a social science can be modeled on the physical sciences. And there is a reasonable chance that the idea of physical science in the minds of most social scientists is quite different from the idea of physical science in the minds of most physicists. I am thinking of the paradoxes of quantum mechanics, like those that come from holding both a wave and corpuscular theory of light, and of the primacy of the indeterminacy principle, at least in dealing with subatomic particles. If the ideas of physical science held by physicists and sociologists are indeed different, then many social scientists are imitating a model of their own construction, to which they ascribe the high prestige properly due to quite another model. But that is really of small consequence compared to the question whether the scientific model of social science, wherever it

comes from, is indeed appropriate to social science.

A completely obvious difficulty with the nomological pattern of physical science in its application to social science is consistently neglected: the creation of a great work of art. One can undoubtedly state general laws about painters and the conditions under which they paint. These laws might apply to Leonardo as plausibly as to any other painter, but how could they explain that, on one occasion, what he painted was *The Virgin and Child and St. Anne*. I don't mean the subject; I mean the picture itself which, whatever its relations to other pictures, is sufficiently different from them so that it is a *unique event* in the history of the world.

What happens when we constantly fit particular occurrences into the Procrustean bed of general law is that we eliminate individual differences and individual purpose. There is no great problem in treating atoms of the same kind in this way; they are not different from each other and they have no purposes. But dealing with people may very well be another matter. It seems entirely possible to explain some events individually and thus to include purpose, with all its value-components, in the explanation. Would such procedure destroy social science? I see no reason why it would. Its consequence, however, would be a new direction in social science, perhaps part of the social science of the future, and perhaps with a different name, in which exploration of purpose and value, with due regard to morals, held a central place.

Propositions about Administration

A large body of knowledge, well enough organized so that the information one wants is never beyond his finger tips, can be immensely useful. That is surely true of the *International Encyclopedia* although, as I shall try to show, there are problems of inconsistency throughout it. One use to which the *International Encyclopedia* lends itself is a summary of knowledge in a given area. Thus Howard R. Alker, Jr. and P. G. Bock published a piece called "Propositions About International Relations" in the *Political Science Annual of 1972*, basing their propositions on material in the *International Encyclopedia*. It is impressive work and, in an effort to see how readily it can be done, I tried my hand at the same sort of job for Administration and Public Administration.

My results were somewhat unsatisfactory, or I should record them here. In order to write such a set of propositions with any confidence that they represent the thought of the distinguished authors of articles on the subject, I would have to be sure they all agree, and that does not seem to be so, although here and there a subset of propositions is relatively clear. Herbert Simon, for example,

takes some conclusions of human relations research to be unexceptionable, especially as they apply to blue-collar workers and lower supervisory levels of organization (Vol. 1, "Administrative Behavior"). Three such propositions follow:

(1) Employees who feel more free to set their own work pace prove to be more productive than those who lack this sense of freedom.

(2) Noneconomic motivations, especially in primary work groups, are more important determinants of human behavior than economists of scientific management suppose.

(3) Under many circumstances, moves to more nonauthoritarian and egalitarian management styles increase productivity, acceptance of change, and worker satisfactions.

All this has little to do with the motivations of executives; it is rather motivation induced in others by executives. It is about executives and administrators of the higher echelons that we know least. Also, Simon's concern with business administration, whose emphasis is on productivity and profit, does not always appeal to those students of public administration whose interest in public policy is quite different in nature. Dwight Waldo expresses it this way: "Simply put, students in Public Administration were inclined to feel that Simon's work did not describe the world of public administration as they had experienced and observed it. To a generation emancipated from the politics-administration dichotomy, Simon's separation of fact and value seemed but another artificial division of the universe into two realms" (Vol. 13, p. 155).

Even within public administration itself, the disagreements are serious; they begin with a question of definition. There is substantial agreement that administrators affect policy. They don't simply carry out decisions made by politicians. But administrators who are not elected must be distinguished from politicians who are. Herbert Kaufman defines administrators as appointed officers in governmental service who supervise others, and he distinguishes administrators from formal rulers who are, one assumes, elected or hereditary (Vol. 1, "The Administrative Function"). Norton Long defines administrators as public officials other than judges or legislators (Vol. 1, "The Administrative Process") and so differs from Kaufman by including all those in the executive branch of government as administrators, thus meaning what journalists do, or for that matter the man in the street, when they speak of "the administration."

Waldo finds no moment in history when the study of public administration began, but comments that an essay by the young Woodrow Wilson is often taken as a symbolic beginning (Vol. 13, p. 146). Wilson wanted to use European ways of

training civil servants and studying administration, not, of course, for their monarchical or autocratic ends, but to perfect our "republican-democratic constitutional system." The more one reads about administration the more one wonders whether we are not perfecting the double-edged means and neglecting the ends. Indeed, Waldo argues that among the areas inadequately studied today is "the tremendous expansion of 'government by contract and grant,' which has blurred the lines between the public and private sectors and between the federal and state spheres" (Vol. 13, p. 153). Perhaps, if the study of public administration becomes increasingly value-free, we may totally neglect such matters.

I hope Alker and Bock's propositions were based on greater agreement than I could find in the writers on administration, although international relations strikes me as a subject at least as controversial as administration. Of course, one is on fairly safe ground in dealing with international treaties and agreements, although much is hidden from us, and on even safer ground in dealing with the structure of administrative agencies, at least as they are described in organization charts; but process, behavior, and function are another matter. Let me cite one conclusion about the study of public administration in Waldo's careful and thorough article on the subject:

That the political process reaches deeply into public administration and that the making of public policy is an important activity of public administration have . . . been all but universally recognized. But the response has been varied: there is still no general agreement on what conclusions follow, what the methodological implications are, what lines of inquiry are indicated as most appropriate and fruitful, what the implications are for programs of education and training. The discipline is presently trying to find its way through the tangle of issues. Many of the issues are posed in putative dichotomies and verbal antinomies: politics and administration, political science and Public Administration, science and art, pure science and practical science, fact and value, prescription and description, administrative science and administrative sciences, diversity and similarity, absolutism and relativism, universality and uniqueness, generality and concreteness. Whether in general or in any particular case the dichotomies are properly conceived, the antinomies properly opposed, is questionable, and they undoubtedly present a tangled skein to the student. In the last analysis, however, it must be universally conceded that important problems are involved (Vol. 13, p. 154).

Indeed, very important problems are involved, some of which, unlike most of Waldo's catalogue, are at the very heart of democratic government—problems like consent, representation, and responsibility. But these are problems that seem to

slip through the net of Public Administration or were never in it because they were placed in still other nets. The treatment of administration in these articles is therefore as interesting for what is unsaid as for what is said. As a single instance, let us consider the disparity I have mentioned in the definitions of administration.

What is left unsaid is the enormous difference in consequences that follows from this difference in definition. Neglecting that difference means little for the description of the administrative process or administrative behavior, even for Public Administration as a study, but it means much for the study of discontent, dissent, and revolution. When the people assume that the government or the state is separate from the administration (and the government, as I have said, is usually equated with the executive), then discontent may lead the people to appeal to the king or president to save them from his corrupt and wicked ministers. Russians used to appeal to the Czar to replace the ministers who were in fact carrying out his orders, and American colonials begged George III to protect them from his own policy, but as usual in such behavior, to get the beauty of it hot one must go to Machiavelli. In *The Prince* he tells us that Cesare Borgia "took the Romagna," which "had previously been governed by weak rulers, who had rather despoiled their subjects than governed them . . . so that the province was a prey to robbery, assaults, and every kind of disorder."

"He, therefore, judged it necessary to give them a good government in order to make them peaceful and obedient to his rule. For this purpose he appointed Messer Remirro de Orco, a cruel and able man, to whom he gave the fullest authority. This man, in a short time, was highly successful in rendering the country orderly and united, whereupon the duke, not deeming such excessive authority expedient, lest it should become hateful, appointed a civil court of justice in the center of the province under an excellent president, to which each city appointed its own advocate. And as he knew that the harshness of the past had engendered some amount of hatred, in order to purge the minds of the people and to win them over completely, he resolved to show that if any cruelty had taken place it was not by his orders, but through the harsh disposition of his minister. And having found the opportunity he had him cut in half and placed one morning in the public square at Cesena with a piece of wood and blood-stained knife at his side. The ferocity of this spectacle caused the people both satisfaction and amazement" (*The Prince and The Discourses*, Modern Library, p. 27).

When, however, the public makes no distinction between government and administration, it blames the government for what goes wrong. This may

happen regularly at times of great public outrage, but it is probably fed by the arrogance of less Machiavellian rulers than Cesare, who do not hesitate to support their ministers openly. Then King Charles's head rolls, the Czar is shot, or an American president resigns. The president, in any case, is not so remote from the public that his political positions are utterly unknown, so he may survive some scandals like the Tweed Ring or Teapot Dome, but his complicity in Vietnam bombings and Watergate can destroy him. Thus the practical consequences of abstract or technical distinctions as they trickle down to the media, public opinion, and political action are unintended because they were not considered.

Consistencies and Inconsistencies

In turning to the specifics of the *International Encyclopedia*, one notes instantly a high level of individual performance and an excellent use of human resources. There are too many good articles to single out the best, and many articles are written by just the person one wants to read on the subject (although one misses people one has expected, Robert Merton, Paul Samuelson, Ernest Nagel, and others): Talcott Parsons, for example, contributes eight magisterial pieces. Current interests are thoroughly pursued: Systems Analysis gets 5 articles and 43 double-column pages; Information Storage and Retrieval gets 5 articles and 29 pages. The prose is all readable and was, presumably, carefully edited.

The inclusion, already noted, of much history of each topic, puts subjects in perspective and indicates the difference between the ideas and methods guiding current work and the ideas and methods of the past, including the immediate past. This virtue is enhanced by a wealth of biographies which point out contributions to social thought in both the past and the present. There is even a re-emergence of neglected work; Arthur F. Bentley is a case in point: his quite original book *The Process of Government* was published in 1908 (again in 1935, but little noticed) and not republished with any acclaim until 41 years later. Instead of the silence about him, which lasted far too long, there are many references in the *International Encyclopedia*, and a biography.

The selection of people for biographical inclusion is judicious, on the whole. Although they are often neglected in contemporary discussion, T. H. Green and Bernard Bosanquet are given a rightful place here. All the major figures are in evidence, but the cutoff point, as one moves down the scale in importance, is not always clear. That, of course, is an obvious complaint that any reviewer would make of any work like this. It is perhaps sensible, granted a limitation of space, to have biographies of Bentham and J. S. Mill, but not of James Mill.

Is it equally sensible to include Grotius and Bodin, but not Pufendorf? And what was the cutoff point that excluded Plekhanov and Bukharin but included Harry Elmer Barnes and Samuel A. Stouffer?

The work of the editors is by no means on the high level of so many contributors, and where the contributors err, the editors are at fault, too, in not knowing it. Let us look first at some matters of organization. A question about the principle of selection, and that of classification, enters in the choice of topics, as well as in that of biographies. There are separate articles, for example, on alienation and integration, but none on anomie, which is treated under "Durkheim." A more serious question is whether there are genuine differences in the various disciplines that make up the social sciences, but that is not entirely a question of editorial decision; it is also a matter of nomenclature and work in the field. Thus there are separate articles on what may not be separate subjects, Political Behavior and Political Sociology, the former indexed under Political Science and the latter under Sociology, and separate articles on Cultural Anthropology and Social Anthropology. To mark a further difficulty, there is not only "Political Sociology," but also "Political Anthropology: The Field," and there is no "Political Organization" under "Political Science," but only under "Political Anthropology."

The distinction between culture and society, or between cultural systems and social systems, is sufficiently established that it may justify a distinction between anthropology and sociology or lead to a division of study in both anthropology and sociology. In fact, the articles, by their very names, intimate that such a division is made between cultural study and social study in anthropology, but not in sociology (whereas "culture" has seemed a key category of anthropology and "society" of sociology), although if the culture-society distinction yields two types of work in anthropology, it would seem reasonable that it do the same in sociology. Yet the names seem to mislead the reader into a distinction without much difference. Is it merely the case that when English anthropologists say "social," Americans say "cultural"? And must the *International Encyclopedia* duplicate articles because of such habits? It does so: when one examines the American David Mandelbaum's article, "Cultural Anthropology," and the Englishman Raymond Firth's "Social Anthropology," one is struck by a virtual identity of definition. Mandelbaum writes: "The central task of cultural anthropology . . . is to study the similarities and differences in behavior among human groups, to depict the character of the various cultures and the processes of stability, change, and development that are characteristic

to them" (Vol. 1, p. 313). Firth defines his subject thus: "Social anthropology aims at understanding and explaining the diversity of human behavior by a comparative study of social relationships and processes over as wide a range of societies as possible" (Vol. 1, p. 320).

Further similarities under different names are hidden in other ways. In her article, "Political Anthropology: The Field," Elizabeth Colson distinguishes her subject from Political Science by calling attention to the mechanisms of control "in the seemingly amorphous stateless societies" (Vol. 12, p. 191). Such societies are apparently the meat on which anthropology feeds, but alien to the political scientist's diet. Yet in M. G. Smith's article, "Political Anthropology: Political Organization," not only stateless societies are treated, but medieval China and Japan, ancient Athens and Rome, and feudal France and Britain. In the very concept of political organization from the standpoint of anthropology, Smith shares the same ground as political scientists. He says: "Political organization has been defined structurally by reference to institutions that regulate the use of force and functionally with reference to social cooperation and leadership. Political organization can be described in terms of the processes of decision making found in a given population" (Vol. 12, p. 193).

The overlap (or identity) between subjects seems, if possible, even greater as one reads what is said of behavioral study in political science and of political sociology. Some universities recognize the difficulty of distinguishing the two clearly, if at all, by offering joint appointments in Political Science and Sociology to students of political behavior. In "Political Behavior," Heinz Eulau says: "The analysis of political behavior proceeds from the assumption that politics as a special form of human activity is not, and cannot be, independent of what is known or knowable about social behavior generally. The primary objective of such analysis, therefore, is to link what is specifically political with other aspects of social relations" (Vol. 12, p. 203). And in "Political Sociology," Morris Janowitz says of his subject: "Broadly conceived, political sociology is concerned with the social basis of power in all institutional sectors of society . . . in narrower terms, political sociology focuses on the organizational analysis of political groups and political leadership" (Vol. 12, p. 298). Although their subjects are similar, to say the least, the political scientist emphasizes the social basis of his work, perhaps to separate his subject from the rest of political science, and the sociologist emphasizes the political character of his work, especially when he writes "in narrower terms," perhaps to separate his subject from the rest of sociology.

Then, when writing of particular areas within their subjects, Eulau and Janowitz come even closer, as their treatment of elites testifies. Thus Eulau writes: "The systematic study of elites, particularly in terms of their social backgrounds, has long been a concern of political science, but more recently research has been directed to recruitment and career patterns, much of it conducted in specific institutional settings" (Vol. 12, p. 205). Curiously, the same type of study of elites went on in political sociology, and an identical change in emphasis has come recently, for Janowitz tells us: "Elite analysis has shifted from an exclusive concern with social background as a determinant of elite behavior to a broader concern with the processes of recruitment, career development, and patterns of interactions" (Vol. 12, p. 303). One wonders whether separate treatment of two subjects, political behavior and political sociology, is based on another distinction without a difference, and whether a number of subjects listed separately in the *International Encyclopedia* are kept apart, not by the demands of knowledge, which would unite them, but by the academic autonomy of university departments. Nonetheless, the separation of subjects in these volumes was an editorial decision, possibly an implicit one, and the editors must be held responsible.

A minor aberration that occurs too often in the *International Encyclopedia* is the slip, when suddenly something silly is said, and the minor error, which may be where the contributor nods, and where an alert editor would have intervened. The tendency to document everything, whether it needs documentation or not, is sometimes responsible for these follies, which almost approach the level of saying, "It sometimes rains, as Professor Robinson so sagely observed." Worth noting, too, is that some scholars invent names for well-known phenomena and then, because they are given credit every time one of their names is used, there is finally an assumption that they discovered each phenomenon they named or renamed.

There are many examples. In an otherwise sophisticated article on political theory, Sheldon Wolin describes a current development: "The contemporary conventions reject so-called grand or comprehensive theories and prefer to pursue testable hypotheses. According to one representative viewpoint, 'Whether the proposition is true or false depends on the degree to which the proposition and the real world correspond' (Dahl 1963, p. 8)" (Vol. 12, p. 327). This sounds as though Robert Dahl, in his *A Preface to Democratic Theory*, disclosed, along with other representative theorists of our day, a new and rigorous demand of political study, which turns out to be only the hoary, bewhiskered correspondence theory of truth.

James C. Davies ("Literature: Political Fiction") writes about some political fiction with insight and admiration, and reveals very wide reading. Yet somehow he has characterized a great novel in an utterly unrecognizable way. "Franz Kafka in *The Castle*," he says, "has his protagonist, K., use sex to get ahead, to try to get the attention of the leader, the unseen chief in the castle. The wretch K fails because he is concentrated all in self and at last can only throw himself on the infinite mercy that accompanies infinite power" (Vol. 9, p. 438). Incidentally, "the wretched K." would be more accurate than "the wretch K."

One article that might be singled out as especially cogent, Seymour Martin Lipset's "Social Stratification: Social Class," contains a sentence that an editor should have deleted or altered radically. After suggesting that stratification ought to be studied internationally as well as nationally, and that vast differences in per capita income and national wealth affect class relationships between nations as well as within them, Lipset adds: "A Chinese communist has already advanced the thesis that the significant class struggle is between the predominantly rural nations, which are underdeveloped and very poor, and the urbanized, wealthy ones (Piao 1965)" (Vol. 15, p. 314). The reference to Piao is to an article by Lin Piao in the *Peking Review*. Lin Piao, now vanished, China's Defense Minister at the time Lipset wrote, and expected by many Sinologists to be Mao's successor, deserved more of a description than "a Chinese communist," and since Lin was his family name, the reference should have been to Lin, not Piao. More important is the error of crediting to Lin Piao an idea that comes directly out of Lenin's *Imperialism; the Highest Stage of Capitalism* (1917), a regular source of Chinese communist thought—an idea, further, that was not even original in its basic form to Lenin, but borrowed openly from J. A. Hobson, whose *Imperialism; A Study* was first published in 1902; so that what is stated as a new development in the study of social stratification is, in nearly its current form, almost as old as the twentieth century. Everyone who has written a book has made such errors, but editors usually keep them from the printed page.

Should these slips have been caught by the editors and removed with a blue pencil? That question raises the whole issue of the editing of the *International Encyclopedia*. The copy editing is superb (e.g., there are almost no typographical errors) but who did the actual editing, copy editors or the contributors' peers? It is important to ask that question, because the contributors sometimes contradict each other, define the same thing differently, or come to opposed "definitive conclusions" about the same matter (this is an encyclopedia, after all, and its contents are readily

taken as definitive). But, first, there are many small examples of what may be simple editorial carelessness. In his "Ideology: Concept and Function," Edward Shils writes about ideology for the most part as it functioned in Nazi Germany and still functions in the Soviet Union. He contends, for example, that no great ideology has ever been committed to the scientific pursuit of truth, and says further: "Ideologies which concentrate on politics do so because for them politics embraces everything else. . . . Thus, no sphere has any intrinsic value of its own. There is no privacy, no autonomous spheres of art, religion, economic activity, or science" (Vol. 7, p. 68). It must have been the editors, for it could not have been Shils, who wrote in brackets at the end of the article: "For specific examples of ideologies, see *Democracy*. . . ." Whoever wrote that either did not read the article or did not understand it at all.

Under the general heading "Interaction," Talcott Parsons has an article called "Social Interaction," which is immediately followed by Guy E. Swanson's "Symbolic Interaction." In his first paragraph, Swanson informs us: "Among sociologists it [symbolic interaction] is often called social interaction" (Vol. 7, p. 440). The articles are in fact not on the same subject, but the reader is easily misled into believing they are.

Should the editors have checked for diverse comments on the same matter? Should they have notified contributors who contradicted each other, and asked them to reach some agreement or at least make clear what their disagreement was, and with what other articles they were disagreeing? That would seem a simple assumption of responsibility, but it is not common here. The series of articles on evolution, for example, reveal a conflict about what has happened to human evolution as society and culture have developed, but the antagonists simply utter their own conclusions, with no indication that they are at all controversial or that other distinguished evolutionists disagree with them. S. L. Washburn and Jane Lancaster, in "Evolution: Human Evolution," state it as fact that man is not adapted biologically to the complex cultures he created. "Human biology evolved to be adaptive in a world of small society, great hazards, and personal skill. The human actor in modern society is too dominance seeking, too acquisitive" (Vol. 5, p. 221). Elman R. Service, in "Evolution: Cultural Evolution," views cultural evolution as transcending biological evolution, and gives the impression that we act in ways for which our biology is not adequate, though our culture is. He even finds contemporary cultural demands "contrabiological" in repressing sexual behavior and in requiring that we share food, not simply compete for it (Vol. 5, p. 222).

Theodosius Dobzhansky, however, makes a

case for man's biological adaptation to modern society in his "Evolution: Evolution and Behavior," where he says that the chief determining factor in human evolution is culture. Human traits are characterized by genetic fixity and specialization or by genetic plasticity. As examples of these, genetic fixity occurs when natural selection favors mutant genes which in some climates make the inhabitants darkly pigmented, and genetic plasticity makes the pigmentation of other populations depend on exposure to the sun. Natural selection has on the whole, Dobzhansky says, favored plasticity of behavior; "Man's cardinal adaptive trait is his educability" (Vol. 5, p. 236).

In the article "Race," which is not under the general heading "Evolution," Marvin Harris cites and agrees with Dobzhansky, and states the position in a more extreme form: "... selection for behavioral plasticity, for freedom from gene-specific behavior, for high-order generalized learning receptivity, has been the most important source of biological control over the direction of hominid evolution during the last million and a half years" (Vol. 13, p. 267).

A last example: Seymour Martin Lipset holds (in the article cited) that alienation in Marx is essentially man's loss of autonomy (his truly human condition) because he is told what work to do, and how to do it, instead of being allowed a free and autonomous choice (Vol. 15, p. 300). But in his article, "Alienation," George Lichtheim says Marx believed that man's truly human or essential being exists in his labor, and that alienation arises from depriving man of the product of that labor, which is his own labor objectified, thus estranging him from both nature and himself (Vol. 1, p. 265f.). These are two quite different accounts of what Marx wrote in a few pages of his *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, but they never mention each other.

Another matter that should be treated has nothing to do with editing or editorial policy, except indirectly, but with the degree of specialization of many contributors. That specialization is a hallmark of much contemporary scholarship, surely among Americans, and has brought a vast increase of knowledge, sometimes at the cost of breadth and an accurate perception of relationships between fields, a quality the editors particularly sought. The complaint itself is a commonplace which gains interest only through documentation, for there one can find the kinds of limits specialization imposes even on first-rate scholars.

In "Values: The Concept of Values," Robin M. Williams, Jr. deals of necessity with modern philosophers who write on the subject. The philosophers Williams discusses are Stephen C.

Pepper and Ralph Barton Perry. Perry, in particular, had a considerable influence at one time through his characterization of values as any object of any interest. But that is not what Williams is really concerned with. He makes a distinction between the desired and the desirable, emphasizing the idea of values as the desirable, rather than what is merely desired. This he calls "one of the more widely accepted definitions in the social science literature" (Vol. 16, p. 283). It is a sophisticated definition, not easily used with simple scientific techniques, because the desirable is what ought to be desired in a given situation, and that cannot be discovered by, say, questionnaires, which can only ascertain what people do desire. The distinction and the definition are John Dewey's, part of his often unacknowledged influence on social science, but Williams does not mention his name. The reader is thus deprived of the chance of pursuing the idea in its fullest and most original form.

Val R. Lorwin, in his article, "Syndicalism," traces the syndicalist movements in Europe and America but, in his section on Italian syndicalism, omits any reference to its early role in the movement that led to fascism, probably its most disastrous mistake. Is this because Lorwin worked on syndicalism, but not on fascism, which might, if one did not study its development, seem another subject, with no roots in syndicalism?

Sometimes a contributor puts in material with which he has only a nodding acquaintance and then, if it is far away and long ago, may be supercilious about it. As an example, Leonard Berkowitz, in "Aggression: Psychological Aspects," comments, "Since the time of Aristotle, social science folklore has contended that an individual can be 'purged' of his emotions by displaying his feelings" (Vol. 1, p. 172). I assume the reference to Aristotle is to his *Poetics*, where he deals with purgation of the emotions. But, first, Aristotle is not talking about the purgation of all the emotions, but only of pity and terror which, in the *Rhetoric*, he describes as morbid. Secondly, it is the audience who are purged and the actors who arouse pity and terror in them, and not just by a display of emotion, but by incident and verse. As for the reference to folklore, one may agree or disagree with the *Poetics*, but he is bound to take it seriously if he has ever read it. If the reader of Berkowitz's article is innocent of Aristotle, he may be confirmed in the belief that his innocence is like that of Adam, not to be given up on pain of (social scientific) banishment.

The lack of sophistication that specialization can breed not only keeps it narrow, but on occasion simplifies in a way that violates the facts. Lorwin misses the full range of syndicalist possibility; one could not guess from his article that

Georges Sorel praised Lenin in 1919 and the Italian fascists in 1921. Berkowitz is deprived of understanding the development through time of Aristotle's doctrine of purgation, especially as it profoundly influenced the thought of Sigmund Freud. And Milton Rokeach dams the rich complexity of human values so that they flow into the straitened channel of egoism. In "Attitudes: The Nature of Attitudes," he writes, "... The function that seems to be served by all the values in one's value system is the enhancement of what McDougall has aptly called the master of all sentiment, the sentiment of self-regard" (Vol. 1, p. 457). That is a statement that can be defended only by the kind of ingenuity expended so lavishly to prove that all human action is pleasure-seeking, and like those arguments, its persuasiveness depends on begging the question.

While the editors are to be commended for the space given to the arts (Aesthetics, Architecture, Crafts, Drama, Fine Arts, Literature, Music, Primitive Art are general headings), a specialized preoccupation is noticeable in the articles themselves. They are written from the standpoint of social science, which is only right and fair in this setting. But they usually give no indication that there is any other standpoint, that literature, music, art, and aesthetics have their own warrant; and when a concession to other possibilities is made, there is no mention of what they are. Thus Irvin L. Child says correctly: "Although the term *aesthetics* has other specialized meanings, it has come to refer, in the context of social science, to the whole body of generalized inquiry especially relevant to the arts." Then, without hint of what the "other special meanings" are, he continues: "Aesthetics is the study of man's behavior and experience in creating art, in perceiving and understanding art, and in being influenced by art" ("Aesthetics," Vol. 1, p. 116). Yet, basic to the study of aesthetics itself is exploration of the creative process, of the nature of art, and of criteria which can distinguish good art from bad art, and better art from worse art. Child's article otherwise is sophisticated, and his range of reference properly includes Rudolf Arnheim's *Art and Visual Perception* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1954), in which aesthetics penetrates the psychology of art, but the elimination of aesthetics from this article on aesthetics takes from Child and his readers any shred of personal judgment and evaluation and makes them dependent, as he puts it, on "the likes and dislikes of experts in an art, or their evaluative judgments" (*ibid.*, p. 120).

Harold G. McCurdy's "Literature: The Psychology of Literature" is, in general, most able and learned, yet it shares with Robert Escarpit's "Literature: The Sociology of Literature" an almost exclusive emphasis on literature as com-

munication. However adequate such an approach is to expository writing, it is quite inadequate to imaginative writing (i.e., verse, drama, and fiction), in which experience is probed, shattered, and shaped, and a new experience is created which is shared, rather than merely communicated. Communication, of course, is an important element in society, and there is every reason why a sociologist should be concerned with literature as communication. But he should not therefore *conceive* literature exclusively as a pattern of communication, nor should his interest in communication lead him to forget the social and psychological importance of shared experience, which is a vital element in community. Escarpit does forget it; writing of literature as a pattern of communication, he says: "But this pattern alone is sufficient for the needed sociological investigation" (Vol. 9, p. 419).

Escarpit finally defines literature in terms of this pattern, thus converting what is "sufficient for the needed sociological investigation" into the very meaning of literature. "We are thus led to conceive of literature as a two-way communication in which an original message is broadcast by the writer to a community of readers, whose response to him takes the shape of thoughts, words, acts, and other messages, which react on one another and on the writer himself" (*ibid.*). Imagine how a first-rate literary critic would respond.

Beyond this Escarpit does not go, theoretically. He writes at length and informatively on such things as the nations and languages in which most books are published and read, the percentage of books translated, book selling, and the book market. All this is very useful, but it seems peripheral to the sociology of literature. What I regard as central is neglected, perhaps because it requires an interest in history that some sociologists do not have. The great questions, I believe, include: Under what social conditions is a great literature produced (e.g., the literature of classical Athens, of Elizabethan England, of seventeenth-century France)? Under what conditions are different forms of literature produced (e.g., why drama in Elizabethan England, lyric verse in the English Age of Romanticism, and fiction everywhere with the growth and triumph of the middle class)? What are the social effects of literature of one kind and another?

These examples are sufficient, I hope, to illustrate the ways in which specialization, when not combined with other and related knowledge, narrows a focus and even misleads. There are many more instances of this narrowness in the *International Encyclopedia*, as there are many other instances of slips and of unmentioned disagreement and controversy. In the last case, I offered only a controversy about evolution as an example. Permit

me to add briefly, lest that seem isolated, two articles on prejudice.

For both Otto Klineberg ("Prejudice: The Concept") and J. Milton Yinger ("Prejudice: Social Discrimination"), prejudice is a prejudgment, existing before the relevant information has been examined. After that they disagree, without reference to each other. Klineberg thinks we can be prejudiced against either individuals or groups; Yinger that we are prejudiced against individuals *because* of their group affiliations. "Prejudice can be defined as an inner tendency to respond to persons on the basis of their group membership; it is a rigid, emotional prejudgment that gives an individual confidence that he knows all about a person when he knows his membership in a symbolically important group" (Vol. 12, p. 449). The issue is never joined. One assumes these contributors did not read each other's articles and no comment was made to them by the editors. Yet Klineberg allows what Yinger precludes, prejudice against a person, regardless of his group membership, because of his shifty eyes, clammy hands, or whatever, before there is any other knowledge of what sort of person he is. (Not that such knowledge always changes things; some prejudices are impervious to knowledge, despite Klineberg and Yinger.)

I should like to make two comments in concluding this review. For all the approval of the fact-value distinction among a group of contemporary social scientists, some topics trigger instant evaluations. Prejudice is, of course, one of these; social scientists are not likely to talk of healthy prejudices, especially as Klineberg and Yinger define prejudice. Edmund Burke had a different view of prejudice, but he also defined it differently. Nor are social scientists today likely to agree with Nietzsche that the weak and botched should perish. But perhaps nothing arouses so much open scientific commitment as democracy. Giovanni Sartori (Vol. 4, "Democracy") does much editorializing and utters many valuable value judgments. That might be expected, and the hardheaded may mutter something derogatory about political theorists. But value judgments about democracy also enter the very citadel of behavioral study.

In "Political Sociology," Morris Janowitz concludes his discussion with a straightforward avowal of the relation of his subject to values, and at the moment to democracy. "Political sociologists have been men of strong opinions, and they have been concerned with the value implications of their work. But it is only since the end of World War II, particularly under the influences of the newer types of economic analysis, that some political sociologists have become interested in theoretical formulations which explore explicitly the conditions under which political democracy would be maximized . . . political sociology has come to

be linked to the analysis of the economic, social, and psychological preconditions for political democracy" (Vol. 12, p. 306).

By and large, the contributors write about their topics calmly, neither starry-eyed about the future nor crying doom. But the *malaise* of our day can creep in, and then one hears a somber note, quickly muted, which may sound the end of an era. The late George Lichtheim was more explicit; he was not an academic social scientist and he operated with fewer restraints than they do. He argues that

positivist sociology in the late nineteenth century fell heir to the unsolved problems of traditional metaphysics. . . . What appears at one level as the disintegration of traditional ways of life is reflected at a different level in the dichotomy of "facts" and "values." Since the intellectuals as a group form a stratum of society in which material tension is immediately experienced in theoretical terms, their role in developing concepts which reflect their own peculiar situation is obviously crucial. Provisionally it may be suggested that the intelligentsia's rejection of the modern world is central to the contemporary situation in philosophy. Yet this world is itself the creation of a rational science in which intellectuals have traditionally placed their faith. The paradox suggests that we may have come to the end of an important chapter in modern cultural history ("Alienation," Vol. 1, p. 268).

Lichtheim's judgment of our time includes, however inadvertently, the *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* itself, but it derives, I am confident, from his knowledge of the literary and political intelligentsia and the journals where their work appears. Far fewer social scientists reject the modern world. Yet their work makes up a good part of the world that the intelligentsia reject and that is partly rejected, too, from within the ranks of social science.

An important conclusion about the *International Encyclopedia* is that it represents its time, and represents it very well, although in our day of increasingly rapid change, that time may already be the past. For this the editors and, especially, the contributors deserve enormous credit, although the editors did not do the coherent job they should have. Quarrels with articles in the *International Encyclopedia* (and my quarrels are evident enough) are quarrels with thought in our time, not just with social science, because much that can be said justly about social science can be said with equal justice about other branches of academic knowledge and about the nonacademic intelligentsia as well. Some criticisms apply especially to social science, though, and others to the rest of contemporary thought. Whatever new directions thought may take, social science as it appears in these pages will have made its mark and contribution.

Philosophy and International Violence*

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The study of international politics has no established place in philosophy as an academic discipline. Professional philosophers who discuss the subject at all typically do so under the stimulus of external events, rather than as an outgrowth of other philosophical inquiry, and are likely to conceive what they have to say primarily as a contribution to public affairs. The fact that most of the attention among philosophers to international politics in recent years has been concerned with warfare, war crimes, and related themes pertaining to what might be called "international violence" bears this out. Violence is (or was) an *issue* of current affairs. As such, it is marginal to the more enduring concerns of philosophy, and the interest of philosophers in it is understandably a transient one. This is not to say that the scholarship produced under these conditions is without value; on the contrary, it is just because it does constitute an unusual contribution to our understanding of international politics that this work should receive wide consideration. Yet because the main stimulus underlying the recent growth of philosophical interest in the subject is one that arises outside of philosophy itself, that interest is likely to dissipate once the external forces sustaining it have diminished. It would therefore be good if the results of this interest could be assimilated and developed within the framework of continuing scholarship by those engaged in political and international studies.

In order for this to happen both the nature and limitations of this latest contribution of philosophy to the study of international politics must be understood. If one of its features is a tendency to abandon the field for greener pastures, another is the thoroughness with which the grass is cropped by this particular species of ruminant. Instead of

the broad speculations about "the nature and causes of war" characteristic of so much of what passes for philosophy in the study of international affairs, the essays that constitute the books reviewed here contain knowledgeable and skillfully executed analyses of particular aspects of this highly organized form of human violence, such as strategic bombing,¹ genocide,² war crimes trials,³ and conscientious objection.⁴ Both the advantages and liabilities of the analytical style of philosophy pursued in these essays are related to this close attention to particular events, practices, and current controversies. The approach is one that *can* yield specific, fresh, and expert reconsiderations of fundamental problems. It can also go astray to become no more than a stale and inept rehashing of trivial problems. There is enough work of superior quality and interest, however, to reward time spent with these essays.

In a review of this kind it would be impossible to treat the results of each particular inquiry in detail, and in any case a broader assessment of the fundamental problems underlying the specific issues of contemporary debate might do more to advance the subject. I have therefore chosen to focus on four problems of general philosophical significance for the analysis of the various substantive topics currently receiving attention: (1) the nature and justification of the laws of war as an institution for the regulation of international violence, (2) the proper grounds for moral judgment of military conduct, (3) the dilemmas of attributing responsibility and blame for acts of military violence, and (4) the implications of alternative descriptions of such acts for both legal and moral judgment. These rubrics do not, however, exhaust the range of topics explored in these volumes.

* *Philosophy of War*, ed. Lewis White Beck (Special issue of *The Monist*, 57 [October, 1973]. Pp. 461-606. \$2.25).

War and Moral Responsibility, ed. Marshall Cohen, Thomas Nagel, and Thomas Scanlon (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974. Pp. 182. \$2.95).

Individual and Collective Responsibility: The Massacre at My Lai, ed. Peter A. French (Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman Pub. Co., 1972. Pp. 207. \$3.75).

Philosophy, Morality, and International Affairs, ed. Virginia Held, Sidney Morgenbesser, and Thomas Nagel (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974. Pp. 338. \$3.95).

War and Morality, ed. Richard A. Wasserstrom (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1970. Pp. 136. \$3.50).

¹ John C. Ford, S.J., "The Morality of Obliteration Bombing," in *War and Morality*, pp. 15-41, and Michael Walzer, "World War II: Why Was This War Different?," in *War and Moral Responsibility*, pp. 85-103.

² Hugo Adam Bedau, "Genocide in Vietnam?," in *Philosophy, Morality, and International Affairs*, pp. 5-46. Bedau's essay is an example of the helpful results that can be produced by the combination of analytical skill and substantive (in this case, legal) knowledge.

³ The implications of "Nuremberg" are explored in many of the essays in these volumes, while the Calley trial provides the point of departure for those assembled in *Individual and Collective Responsibility*.

⁴ Alan Gewirth, "Reasons and Conscience: The Claims of the Selective Conscientious Objector," *Philosophy, Morality, and International Affairs*, pp. 89-117.

Violence Under Law?

Because violence is often thought of as the antithesis of rule-governed human activity, the notion that its initiation and conduct might be made subject to legal regulation strikes many people as self-contradictory. But the air of paradox thus generated is partially dissipated as soon as particular military practices and the legal rules that help to define and order them are brought into focus. For then, although there may be little agreement concerning the applicability, validity, or efficacy of particular rules, there can be little doubt that there *are* rules whose applicability, validity, or efficacy is being debated. Traditionally these rules have been divided into distinct bodies of law according to whether they sought to regulate the initiation of violence by states (*jus ad bellum*) or the conduct of hostilities once begun (*jus in bello*). The first seeks to establish a regime of law according to which the resort to armed force can be judged lawful or unlawful. The second seeks to limit the harm that belligerents can do to one another's armed forces, prisoners of war, and civilian populations; to facilitate diplomatic, medical, and humanitarian relief activities during periods of hostilities; and to regulate in numerous other ways the practices and relationships that arise under the special conditions of organized armed conflict.

With one or two exceptions, questions about the initiation of armed force have not occasioned particular interest among the philosophers represented in these volumes, although it is the principal question at issue in traditional discussions of the just war, and has provided the source of endless debates in legal circles concerning such matters as the definition of aggression or the legality of particular acts such as American intervention in Indochina. Insofar as there is presently a general legal attitude on this question, it seeks to identify lawful resorts to force with those that are undertaken in self-defense, and to rule out as unlawful the "aggressive" resort to force, aggression being identified with armed attacks against other states. Although the legal issues are in fact much more complicated, this distinction between lawful and unlawful war reflects a basic principle embodied in the United Nations Charter. It is similar to that contained in the Charter and Judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal, with its category of "crimes against peace" according to which German leaders were prosecuted for waging aggressive war. Legally speaking, this conception of unlawful war replaced an earlier conception in which the resort to force was neither lawful nor unlawful, but rather (with certain qualifications and exceptions) a right whose exercise was left by international law to the discretion of individual states. As James Turner Johnson shows in his critique of it,⁵ the newer

conception of an unjust war as a war of aggression is one that has also infiltrated religious thinking on the just war; papal pronouncements, for example, have in recent years reinterpreted the traditional criteria for the just war (such as "just cause" and "right intention") so as to make them similar to those of the Nuremberg and United Nations Charters. The philosopher tends to regard this conception with much suspicion; as G. E. M. Anscombe puts it, "The present-day conception of 'aggression' . . . is a bad one. Why *must* it be wrong to strike the first blow in a struggle? The only question is, who is in the right?"⁶ Johnson, too, urges a reconstruction of the *jus ad bellum* along traditional lines, but neither critic is explicit in suggesting how the traditional criteria such as just cause and right intention are to be incorporated in an effective *legal* regime.

Indeed, the difficulties are obvious. For all its defects, the criterion of "armed attack" is at least *relatively* clear. Naturally, there are continual pressures for existing legal criteria to be extended so as to legitimize almost any uses of force that states and other potential belligerents might wish to undertake; but it is just this problem that the legal process, as it goes on in United Nations debates, diplomatic negotiations and correspondence, judicial proceedings, and legal scholarship is designed to overcome. Thus, the criterion of armed attack is itself an attempt to limit the freedom of states to interpret the meaning of "aggression," a much more flexible notion. Similarly, over the years a relatively narrow conception of self-defense has evolved to distinguish this plea from the far more comprehensive justifications implied by notions such as self-preservation, self-help, and necessity. In contrast to the traditional just war criteria, which require moral agreement and the identification of intentions, the initiation of armed attacks and acts of self-defense against them are easier to identify and to define in an agreed way. One must therefore go further than merely noticing the moral deficiencies of present-day conceptions of unlawful war, which are in any case well known to international lawyers who have been struggling with these criteria for many decades, and try to weigh the costs and benefits of alternative principles according to which judgments of particular acts of violence in international disputes might be made. In doing so, it will be necessary to take account of the extremely diverse forms that violence can take and the circumstances under which it might occur, including such forms of action as blockades and "quarantines," interventions of various kinds, reprisals, and terrorist acts. The law can no longer, if it ever could, limit itself to regulating the movement of uniformed troops across clearly demarcated national boundaries.

⁵ "Toward Reconstructing the *Jus Ad Bellum*," in *Philosophy of War*, pp. 461-488.

⁶ "War and Murder," in *War and Morality*, pp. 43-44.

Any such more refined and particular examination of the forms and occasions for initiating violence will also call into question the point of distinguishing between *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*—the laws of war—which presupposes a clear distinction between war and peace as legal states that has been all but abandoned in current thought and practice. Perhaps the recognition of this fact is partly responsible for the concentration of most of the philosophical interest in law and warfare on the *jus in bello*, broadly reinterpreted so as to include civil as well as international armed conflicts.

The diversity of existing opinion concerning the laws of war is illustrated, in microcosm, by the various attitudes expressed in these essays toward the Nuremberg trials. They are merely the most recent of a long line of commentaries on the trials, and in the broad range of attitudes toward them that they display do not differ notably from their forerunners. Philosophical interest in Nuremberg can perhaps without too much distortion be made to conform to three stages in the reinterpretation of the Nuremberg events in the context of the Indochina War. In the first stage the moral dismay occasioned by the war and by American practices in it was uppermost. The Nuremberg principles offered a set of standards that were not only readily at hand, but possessed the particular appropriateness of having been inspired and applied by Americans, so that to judge by the Nuremberg principles was to judge ourselves by our own standards. Conscientious objectors soon began to express their position in the form of what became known as the "Nuremberg defense," and others wondered if there were not grounds here for identifying American military commanders and political leaders as war criminals. In this first stage, the moral and legal aspects of the Nuremberg principles were not clearly distinguished; a "war crime" could mean either a legal or a moral wrong, or both; and prominent writers, such as Telford Taylor, wrote as if the laws of war constituted a system of moral principles for judging acts of war.

The second stage consisted of greater discrimination and some disenchantment in the application of the Nuremberg principles. It was discovered, for example, that the law applied at Nuremberg left much to be desired, morally speaking, and commentators began to warn of the dangers of placing too much weight on the Nuremberg background as a basis for criticizing American military practices in Indochina. Thus, a writer like Richard A. Wasserstrom worried about the implications of a body of rules that appeared to him to equate military necessity with mere utility or advantage, or that employed legally and morally dubious notions such as those of criminal

conspiracy and collective criminal liability.⁷ Earlier criticisms of the Nuremberg trials from the point of view of fairness were resurrected. The Nuremberg precedent began to appear painfully complex and increasingly inapplicable from the legal point of view, as well as quite below standard from the perspective of morality. And this disenchantment leads directly to the third stage, in which the attempt to assimilate the Nuremberg experience becomes most fully philosophical. This stage is characterized by two sorts of inquiry. One is the careful analysis and criticism of the concepts employed or presupposed by the Nuremberg principles—concepts such as responsibility and guilt, or those which, like superior orders, embody particular understandings of the scope and limits of legal defenses. The other comprises attempts to articulate rationally defensible principles in terms of which the legal principles applied at Nuremberg could be judged, and upon which reconstructions of them might be founded. A similar evolution of ideas can be traced in attitudes toward other aspects of the laws of war such as the Geneva Conventions and related legal norms such as those of the Genocide Convention.

Underlying these changes is a deep interest, amounting almost to preoccupation, with moral issues; and although this is perhaps more to be commended than criticized, it has led to hasty judgments on the difficult issues of the relationship between morality and the laws of war. For example, Wasserstrom, whose doubts about the Nuremberg precedent have already been mentioned, finds the laws of war to be so morally deficient that we must cease to take them seriously as standards to be used in making judgments concerning military conduct. Instead, we should seek to articulate morally defensible standards upon which we might rely in judging war: "A preoccupation . . . with our legal responsibilities can tend to deflect attention from what is surely the central concern: that individuals, especially in time of war, try to do the morally right and obligatory things."⁸ This rather blanket repudiation of a rich and well-established legal institution is surely an overreaction. As one of Wasserstrom's critics points out, to demolish existing institutions in order to clear the ground for the construction of new ones that

⁷ "The Relevance of Nuremberg," in *War and Moral Responsibility*, pp. 134–158.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 158. The point is developed by Wasserstrom in a second essay: "The Responsibility of the Individual for War Crimes," in *Philosophy, Morality, and International Affairs*, pp. 47–70. Cf. Sanford Levinson in "Responsibility for Crimes of War," in *War and Moral Responsibility*, p. 109; "It would be better to focus clearly on the morality of warfare and to speak unequivocally of moral condemnation than to pretend that the category of 'war crimes' or 'war criminals' is meaningful."

more closely approximate a moral ideal is a dangerous tactic of political change.⁹ Also implied in Wasserstrom's view is an argument for disobedience to the laws of war where they conflict with the requirements of morality; it is an argument of which we should be particularly wary. In this view the laws of war are seen as so bad, morally speaking, that the repudiation by governments and individuals of their obligations under them is scarcely thought to need justification. The anarchic implications of a principle according to which everyone—statesman or citizen, commander or corporal—takes "morality," not law, as the proper guide for both thought and action with respect to international violence are obvious.

Perhaps it is the uncertain content and legal status of the laws of war, together with widespread ignorance of how the system actually works, that explains why these issues have so far been debated with an imprecision that would be intolerable in discussions of political obligation and civil disobedience in the context of domestic law. It is, for example, important to discriminate among the various agents whose acts are affected by the laws of war, and to delineate the various ways in which they are affected. Its rules appear in a different guise to the young man facing induction and contemplating conscientious objection, the soldier in the field who is moved to reinterpret or disobey orders, or the policy maker choosing among alternative military strategies. Much more thought will also have to be given to the nature and purpose of the laws of war, which are variously presented in these essays as a coercive system of criminal law, as an impotent caricature of law properly so called, as a device for coordinating the pursuit of common interests among belligerents, and as a rallying point for principled opposition to morally atrocious policies and practices. The features of the laws of war as an institution and its place in the political order merit closer philosophical attention, not to mention the much more intensive empirical study from which philosophical criticism can be divorced only at the cost of impoverishing both.

Moral Puzzles

The unsatisfactory state of philosophical discussion of the legal dimensions of warfare reflects the fact that philosophers writing about it have been for the most part only peripherally concerned with the criticism and revision of law. The main task for philosophy, as they see it, has been to understand war as a subject for *moral* reflection and judgment. It is the attempt to solve the evident

moral dilemmas raised in so acute a form by warfare that constitutes the principal interest of analytical philosophy in this area. With few exceptions, other philosophical tasks have been made subordinate to the pursuit of this goal. Thus, the criticism of law is motivated largely by a wish to articulate standards more adequate from the moral point of view than those presently embedded in the legal institutions affecting international violence. Similarly, the conceptual inquiries so characteristic of analytical philosophy are scarcely motivated by the intrinsic philosophical interest of the concepts particular to discourse about war, which is minimal, but rather by the wish to solve moral problems. There are different reasons for this interest in moral questions. It may occur as the result of an attempt to solve a practical problem, such as how to justify selective conscientious objection. Or it may be undertaken in a spirit of moral outrage and of determination to advance in public debate the standards of sanity and virtue. Sometimes the subject seems to be taken up as little more than a field for the application of moral theory, as a setting for the conduct of moral or meta-ethical debates originating outside the realm of warfare itself: a new theatre opened up in the Hundred Years War between the forces of Utilitarianism and Deontology. Whatever its motives, a preoccupation with moral questions is the leading characteristic of contemporary philosophical interest in war.

The sense of paradox is scarcely less apparent in moral controversies concerning warfare than it is in those concerned with questions of law. Force is sometimes justified to defend the community against those who would destroy it, but its employment is seldom able to avoid the infliction of harm on those who have done nothing to deserve it. It is possible to distinguish two contrasting approaches to the resolution of moral dilemmas of this kind. One is to accept them as unresolvable, and to note that on certain questions at least no conclusive answer exists. The other is to insist that, properly qualified and interpreted, such dilemmas can always be resolved in terms of some higher principle; that morality is not a system of static ideals, but rather a way of resolving just such dilemmas of human action; and that while to apply moral principles in practice may involve making assumptions, these need not be arbitrary but, on the contrary, are required by morality to be rationally defensible. To those that are drawn to the first approach, the second will appear dogmatic; those drawn to the latter find the first nihilistic. Whereas the second approach must emphasize the capacity of reason to resolve moral dilemmas (as suggested by the very name "reason of state" for the principles according to which the

⁹ Marshall Cohen, "Morality and the Laws of War," in *Philosophy, Morality, and International Affairs*, p. 86.

apparent contradictions between Christian morality and the requirements of the common good as protected by the state were at one time thought to be resolvable) the first is apt to criticize this approach, not as wrong, but as impossible. It looks upon moral reasoning as something that can only be done *within* a given morality, that is, according to an ordered collection of principles. Within the system, it is thought, one can proceed deductively from premise to conclusion; and indeed rationality in moral judgment means, on this view, being consistent in the application of one's basic principles when making judgments about particular cases. It is the choice between apparently incompatible systems of principles that cannot be rationally defended. The impulse here is to say that each captures an aspect of the truth, and reflects a certain moral attitude. Such at least is Thomas Nagel's conclusion with respect to the systems he labels "utilitarianism" and "absolutism": "We must face the pessimistic alternative that these two forms of moral intuition are not capable of being brought together into a single, coherent moral system. . . ."¹⁰ The philosopher who has arrived at this conclusion is of little help in seeking to reconcile conflicting moral claims—although, if he is right, this is no defect of his position.

It is interesting that Nagel refers to a theory of moral obligation such as utilitarianism as a "form of moral intuition." Does he mean to suggest that although one can rationally apply utilitarian principles in making moral judgments there are no rational grounds for or against being a utilitarian? A number of other contributors to these volumes have evidently taken him as suggesting something of this kind, and have sought to defend their own conceptions of moral obligation as applied to war against the implied charge of dogmatism. I shall mention two such replies that reveal characteristic and important themes in contemporary analytical moral philosophy.

In defending a non-utilitarian approach to the morality of warfare, Jeffrie G. Murphy argues that certain kinds of judgments are constitutive of morality as such; they are what distinguish it from other systems of principles such as law or etiquette. They are not the sorts of judgments that admit of further justification: "No reasons can be given for why it is wrong to kill babies." And: "The person who cannot just *see* that there is something evil about killing babies could not, I suspect, be made to see anything else about morality."¹¹ Nagel's suggestion is pluralist in the sense that it simply points to the existence of distinct moral attitudes, identifies them as different

forms of moral intuition, and allows that with respect to certain questions at least the different conclusions to which they lead must be accepted as reflecting a state of affairs that moral theory is unable to rectify. Murphy's examples, however, would seem to require a single comprehensive moral system capable of accommodating apparent contradictions.

What distinguishes Murphy's view from dogmatism is a definitional move according to which a judgment such as that it is wrong to kill the innocent is presented not as a moral *conclusion*, but rather as one of the premises of any reasoning that could be called moral. Principles like this one help to define what is to count as a moral judgment at all; as Murphy puts it, they explicate what may be called the moral point of view. Therefore, to insist upon such principles as "absolute" is only to insist upon their relevance for moral judgment, and not to claim that they can never be overridden. If something is a morally relevant consideration, then of course it must be taken into account in reaching moral judgments in situations where it applies. The function of ultimate moral principles is not to distinguish the moral from the immoral—that would be dogmatic—but to distinguish the moral from the nonmoral. Once we have grasped what are to count as moral considerations, we can proceed to engage in discursive reasoning in which we assign different degrees of priority to various principles and arrive at particular judgments. This does away with the problem of irreconcilable moral absolutes. On the other hand, by itself it also fails to generate any determinate moral conclusions at all, for what are now required are additional principles according to which we can decide how much weight is to be given to the different and doubtless conflicting principles that will arise when a particular case is looked at from the moral point of view.

The second reply to the kind of view represented by Nagel tries not only to reconcile conflicting moral principles but to do so in a way that sidesteps an a priori definition of moral relevance. As developed by Richard Brandt, it amounts to a rather straightforward application of John Rawls's rational contract theory of justice.¹² According to this theory, the principles of justice are those that rational persons seeking only to maximize their own interests would choose in an imaginary "original position." These are the basic principles according to which the constitutional rules for a society in which they will all live are in turn to be decided. In order to guarantee impartiality, they are not to know their future positions in such a society, and must thus be imagined to be choosing

¹⁰ "War and Massacre," in *War and Moral Responsibility*, p. 23.

¹¹ "The Killing of the Innocent," in *Philosophy of War*, p. 536.

¹² "Utilitarianism and the Rules of War," in *War and Moral Responsibility*, pp. 46–61.

the basic principles from behind a "veil of ignorance." Applying this theory to the problem of identifying the principles of justice for war, Brandt has imaginary national representatives deciding, under similarly abstract conditions, upon rules for the future regulation of armed conflicts among states, should such conflicts occur. The point of this thought-experiment is to uncover a single coherent set of nonarbitrary moral principles of international violence—a set of principles, that is, which does not merely constitute one form of moral intuition among others, but the unique set that rational, impartial contractors would choose under the idealized conditions of the original position. As Brandt himself notes, this is roughly the question that national diplomatic representatives faced in negotiating the first codified laws of war at the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 (although the requirements of the original position, especially that of the veil of ignorance, are imperfectly realized). The principles that Brandt derives are in fact remarkably similar to those underlying the laws of war as they presently exist, and include not only humanitarian restrictions that do not impair military efficiency but also certain restrictions that would entail military losses. Assuming such losses were not decisive for the outcome of the war, and could be presumed to be evenly distributed among possible participants in a future war, the acceptance of such restrictions would correspond to the long-run advantage of each state. And in fact the least well-regulated practices of war are those, such as the use of nuclear weapons or the tactics of guerrilla terrorism, that appear to possess military utility for just a few members of international society. Virtually all states, on the other hand, have an identical interest in having their prisoners humanely treated by the enemy and in preserving the possibility of truces and reliable communications with one another.

Whereas Rawls presents his theory as an alternative to utilitarian conceptions of justice, Brandt suggests (without really arguing the point) that the rules of war generated by an application of the original position to the problem of regulating international violence are those that utilitarian considerations of a certain kind (namely those of the "rule-utilitarianism" defended by Brandt in other contexts as a general theory of moral obligation) would support. The merits of this proposal cannot be examined here, but it is worth pointing out that a number of other essays reflect the ecumenical tendency of Brandt's analysis.¹³ Several echo the conclusion urged by Kant in *Perpetual Peace* that a means cannot be evaluated only in

terms of its proximate end; its employment has other consequences in the short and long run, including the restriction of future choices. Although usually taken as an inspiration for attacks on utilitarian conceptions of justice (as in Rawls's theory), Kant's criticism of political expediency can also be seen as being based on a perception of its incompatibility with long-run utility: he reminds us that although present actions are limited by necessity, they also create the necessities of the future. We must act justly now in order to encourage the growth of conditions that will allow us to act justly in the future. If this Kantian perspective is correct, then the gaps between what is reasonable, what is just, and what is prudent are not as great as one might think when initially confronted with the paradoxes of morality in the midst of violence. On the other hand, the scope of this conclusion, even if it is warranted, must not be exaggerated, for the conduct that might be regulated by public rules of war is by no means coextensive with the diversity of ways that human beings can affect one another in situations of war, nor are judgments of what is right and wrong by any means the only judgments people make that might count as moral judgments.

Legal and Moral Blame

There is, for example, a distinction between doing something wrong and doing something that is morally blameworthy. Following Machiavelli, one might suggest that there are times when to do wrong should be praised: when, for example, the leader who breaks the laws to protect the public good should be regarded as a hero rather than a scoundrel. Against the impulse to say that in such a case the act was not really wrong, all things considered, it may be argued that the various forms of moral judgment involved in such a case cannot all be reduced to a common standard, and that the person who does evil that good may come of it is guilty of a moral crime even if his act is justified. Perhaps, as Michael Walzer suggests, as political actors we become legally or morally blameworthy whenever we break the rules of the communities of which we are members, whatever our motives, and remain—like the civil disobedient—under an obligation to pay the penalty even when violation of the rules is justified by other—for example, utilitarian—considerations.¹⁴ Whether or not one accepts this particular account of doing wrong and

¹³ Especially R. M. Hare's "Rules of War and Moral Reasoning," in *War and Moral Responsibility*, pp. 46–61.

¹⁴ "Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands," in *War and Moral Responsibility*, pp. 62–82. Walzer distinguishes this attitude toward the problem of doing evil that good may come of it from two others: the Machiavellian, which despite its rhetoric of paradox actually disposes of the problem by deciding that the end justifies the means, and the Weberian, according to which to act politically becomes the vocation of those who accept the necessity of doing evil and suffering guilt for the sake of others.

being blameworthy, to retain some such distinction is to permit inconsistencies between different forms of moral judgment that systematic theories in ethics have always sought to overcome. For to judge an act is not the same as to judge its agent, and in many situations of moral judgment—of which the incidents of war provide excellent, but by no means the only, examples—the various judgments that we make about act and agent do not necessarily reveal the application of a coherent set of basic principles.

What is involved here can be illustrated by considering the various responses one could make to a charge of wrongdoing—say of participating in the artillery bombardment of military targets which are located in built-up areas, and which cannot be destroyed without also causing substantial destruction of civilian lives and property. One might seek to defend such attacks on the grounds that they are not prohibited by the laws of war, or that it is not wrong to attempt to hinder the efforts of those who are engaged in the attempt to harm you or your community even if innocent people must thereby be made to suffer. By such arguments, the attempt is made to justify the act as right, or at least as “all right,” through the appeal to some legal or moral rule that requires or at least permits it to be done, or by invoking the good results that are supposed to result from its commission. But a moment’s reflection shows that even if such arguments are successful in justifying the attacks in question, they do not necessarily justify a particular individual’s participation in them: he may, for example, have been motivated solely by hatred or by a desire for personal advancement. On the other hand, although the attacks may turn out to be unjustified, it does not necessarily follow that his participation in them was wrong, for he may have been doing his duty as he saw it; that a military act is wrong should not preclude recognition of the courage, selflessness, and other morally praiseworthy traits of some of those who participated in it. In thus seeking to justify the individual’s participation in a wrongful act, we are likely to try to distinguish what *he* did from what was done, and to argue that the former at least was not wrong under the circumstances. He is not to be blamed, either because the attack in which he participated is not wrong or because his participation in it can be shown to be justified even if the attack itself is not.

Both of these responses to the charge of wrongdoing may be contrasted with a third form of defense, one that acknowledges the wrongfulness of the act, but argues that the agent is nevertheless not to be blamed. This is a defense that is often advanced on behalf of soldiers who have committed atrocities, and it naturally receives close attention in the books reviewed here. Instead of

justifying the act, this form of defense seeks to excuse the agent. One way of trying to do this is to show that he cannot really be held responsible for the act or its consequences. People are sometimes excused from responsibility for acts that are due to some accident, mistake, or incapacity; in our example, the accused may have participated under duress or been kept in ignorance of the fact that in bombarding the enemy he was also harming non-combatants. In such cases we may be unable to identify any defect in the agent for which he could be blamed. Indeed, the event may scarcely qualify as his act; under certain circumstances it may be more truly represented as something that has happened to him rather than something he has done. Alternatively, there are situations in which an agent may be excused even though there is some defect that renders him responsible, at least in part, for what has happened, because of some standard that applies to the judgment of action in situations such as that in which his act was done.¹⁵ The soldier is often unable to trust his own judgment against the consensus of his peers and superiors, or is so overcome with exhaustion, fear, or rage as to cause him to become momentarily indifferent or hostile to the welfare of innocent people he knows himself to be injuring. While independence of mind and rigid self-discipline are virtues, they are not ones an individual acting in such extreme and trying circumstances can reasonably be expected to display. It would be wrong, so the argument goes, to blame him for succumbing to pressures that only an exceptional individual could resist. In contrast to the first sort of excuse, which qualifies the extent to which a given act can properly be said to have been done by the agent, excuses of the second kind qualify the extent to which an agent is properly censurable. To excuse in this sense is to try to show that his act does not fall below the standards applicable to a particular situation because anyone, or almost anyone, would have acted as he did under the circumstances. We might praise the exceptions, but cannot regard such exceptional behavior as obligatory.

Such judgments are influenced by the fact that the acts of international violence we criticize, justify, or excuse are often collective acts and their agents often collective agents.¹⁶ It is not only that judgments of acts and agents must recognize that in war individual action occurs in a collective context that transforms the significance of elementary acts like killing, and places new and different constraints upon human behavior. Equally

¹⁵ Peter A. French, “Morally Blaming Whole Populations,” in *Philosophy, Morality, and International Affairs*, p. 273.

¹⁶ See the volume of essays on this topic edited by Peter A. French, *Individual and Collective Responsibility*, as well as his essay cited above.

important, and usually more puzzling, are the issues raised by the actions of collectives. Can "acts" be ascribed to collectives? Are there "collective agents" that can be held morally or legally responsible for wrongdoing? Both the traditional doctrine of the just war and the Nuremberg charge of "waging aggressive war" which we have seen contrasted in theories of moral obligation appear, in the context of discussions of blame, to share a common framework of assumptions about collective action: in both, war is an act which can be judged in terms of conceptions of responsibility, blame, excuse and other categories of individual action. As has often been observed (for example, by defenders of "methodological individualism") this way of conceptualizing collective action encounters difficulties insofar as it seeks to present a descriptive or causal account of complex human interactions. Even so, we might still wish to retain such conceptions for the purposes of moral and legal judgment. For example, we might—as is done in making the charge of criminal conspiracy—wish to blame particular individuals for the acts of other members of a common collective, or to distribute blame for a collective act over many individual participants in it, each of whom made only a partial contribution to its completion.

Despite the complexity of the issues involved, questions of responsibility and blame raised by acts that are the outcome of organized collective processes are in fact among the more easily defined and intelligibly discussed aspects of the subject of collective responsibility. It is in connection with such organized collective acts that relatively definite, if objectionable, legal principles such as superior orders, command responsibility, and criminal conspiracy have been articulated and applied; here, at least, is grist for the philosophical critic's mill. But situations of organized collective action do not exhaust the possibilities for ascriptions of collective responsibility for acts of international violence, as is suggested by the common opinion that Germans in general were responsible for the crimes of the Nazis, or that Americans in general should be blamed for the atrocious acts of members of the United States armed forces in Indochina. Here we enter an area of thought in which legal principles are virtually nonexistent and moral notions primitive, unarticulated, and confused. Yet even those who reject the notion that all members of large and loosely defined collectives can be held responsible for such acts might allow the need for a conception of moral responsibility applicable to a wider circle of persons than those involved in some immediate and recognized way. How should the boundaries of the *unorganized* collectives whose members are jointly responsible for a particular act or outcome be delimited?

According to one suggestion, collective moral responsibility is properly ascribed to all those who would be willing to participate in the act if they were placed in the same circumstances as those who did actually perform it.¹⁷ According to another, it is the members of the class of those who should have constituted themselves into an organized group and sought to prevent its occurrence that are morally responsible.¹⁸ What such suggestions have in common is the aim of identifying the elements that would justify blaming some and excusing other members of an unorganized collective linked with wrongful violence. There seems, however, to be a confusion in these accounts between whether people are to be blamed for the violence itself or for the fault of falling short of other standards, such as those requiring that they not be willing to participate in such acts or even that they actively oppose their commission. Further analysis of the related concepts of responsibility, blame, fault, liability, culpability, and guilt, together with explorations of the applicability of principles such as negligence or vicarious liability borrowed from civil and criminal law, might contribute to the clarification of the obscurities surrounding the notion of collective responsibility. Yet such an approach also has its limits. In particular it is no substitute for inquiry explicitly aimed at clarifying those moral obligations of citizens that are presupposed by various conceptions of responsibility. These are in part obligations derived from standards of citizenship, and therefore perhaps more progress would be made if collective responsibility were to be understood in this way, as a problem of political philosophy, and not approached through the back door as an appendage to the problem of allocating blame for past horrors. It is just because they are so closely connected that blame cannot be profitably studied apart from the study of those standards of law and public morality from which our obligations as members of collectives are derived.

The Interdependence of Descriptions and Judgments

Judgments of violence may be influenced by the terms in which the acts to be judged are described and interpreted. To call an act a "reprisal" or an "accident" is not only to identify but also to describe it in terms that imply some evaluation of it. The outcome of such evaluations will often depend upon which description of the act is accepted as the "correct" description. There is thus an interaction between descriptions of acts of violence and judgments of them. Certain excuses, for example,

¹⁷ Haskell Fain, "Some Moral Infirmities of Justice," in *Individual and Collective Responsibility*, p. 32.

¹⁸ Virginia Held, "Moral Responsibility and Collective Action," in *Individual and Collective Responsibility*, p. 115.

apply descriptions that in some way question the "actness" of the violence for which a defense is being offered. They describe the violence as something other than the agent's act, as something that happened to him rather than something he did, or as not exactly what he did because in fact he was really doing something else. Other descriptions dispute the wrongness of the act, emphasizing features of it that would tend to justify rather than accuse: he was simply "obeying orders" or "defending himself." In this way, disagreeable forms of violence are assimilated to more acceptable categories of action; conversely, if one's objective is to criticize, then acts favorably described may be redescribed in terms that suggest their unacceptability. Because one so often encounters alternative descriptions having different implications for legal and moral judgment, one must understand the various forms of act-description used in talking about international violence, as well as the criteria according to which the limits of permissible descriptions are drawn.¹⁹

Because the description we apply to an act can affect our judgment of it, there must be some way to winnow descriptions that are correct, relevant, or appropriate from those that are not. To vary a familiar sort of example: a man firing in combat may be said to be clearing a landing zone, obeying orders, wasting ammunition, defending his country, overtaxing his heart, and violating the laws of war—all at the same time. Depending upon the context, we may select out one or more such descriptions to characterize his act. Some acts have a significance according to a social rule that provides the criterion for their identification as an act of a certain kind, according to which—for example—moving two pieces of ivory in a certain way across a patterned board counts as "castling," or entering another's house at night with the intent to commit a felony constitutes "burglary." In other cases, an observer may provide the description appropriate to his particular interests or responsibilities: the field commander, quartermaster, medical specialist, and military lawyer each have a professional perspective on acts like firing in combat according to which different descriptions become relevant. The description may also involve the interests and intentions of the agent himself: we have not got it quite right when we describe a terrorist taking a letter-bomb to the post office as just "mailing a letter." These differences of interpretation arise in part because what

we call acts are constructed of other acts related to each other in various ways. One act may constitute a temporal phase of another, more extended, act (as running the first lap is one phase of running a race). Or the act may be a species of a more inclusive genus (reading Locke's *Second Treatise*, as opposed to just reading), or a means to an end (breaking eggs in making an omelet).

Of particular significance for judging acts of violence is the relation between an act and its consequences, for often instead of criticizing or defending an act by pointing to its consequences, we may judge the act indirectly by characterizing it in terms of those consequences. If I observe a person (A) firing a gun at another person (B), who is in turn about to kill a third (C), what I have observed is a chain of acts and consequences involving, among other things, the tensing of a finger on a trigger, the functioning of a trigger mechanism, the detonation of a gunpowder charge in a cartridge, the propulsion of a bullet out of the barrel of the gun, the impact of the bullet on its victim, his death, etc. One description of the act that might be made is to say that the person firing the gun killed another person (that is, that A killed B). Another, more favorable to the agent, is that he saved a third person's life (A saved C). If one feels inclined to protest that the latter description is not really a description of the act proper, but rather an attempt to justify it by appealing in a veiled way to its (putatively) good consequences, he should be prepared to answer the argument that the description "A killed B" is not really a description of the act proper, either, for what really happened was that A fired a gun, with the consequence that B was killed. Or that A tensed his finger, with the consequence that the gun went off—etc. And once one embarks on a train of reasoning of this kind, it becomes possible to discover many different act-descriptions, many different ways of dividing a series of events into "act" and "consequences." Hence the need for rules according to which some ways of making the division will override others that might in another context prove decisive. It is because we are applying such a rule that we judge, in the preceding example, that the formulation "A killed B" constitutes the appropriate description of what happened. Which rule is to be applied depends upon the context of judgment. Thus although the interests of various observers might result in divergent descriptions of an act for which someone is being tried in a court of law, it is the description arrived at by the court applying legal categories and principles that is "correct" in that context, and not those possibly favored by plaintiff, defendant, or spectators. Similarly, moral rules place limits on the freedom with which the acts judged according to them can be described.

The application of these distinctions to judg-

¹⁹ This problem is explicitly considered by two contributors to *Philosophy, Morality, and International Affairs*: Joseph Margolis, "War and Ideology," pp. 246–265, and Kai Nielsen, "Social Science and American Foreign Policy," pp. 286–319. It is, however, implicit in each of the controversies we have examined, as I hope will soon become apparent.

ments of international violence is well illustrated by the problem, raised in many of these essays, of distinguishing legitimate killing in war from murder.²⁰ War involves the killing of innocent people, but it would be mistaken to regard all innocent deaths as murder; the problem is to distinguish those that are appropriately described as murders or war crimes from those that are not. Clearly it is no solution to this problem to describe an act involving the deaths of innocent persons in terms of its other consequences, intended or actual, that are more defensible and according to which the deaths of innocents might be justified. The relevant distinction, it has been suggested, is between deliberately bringing about the deaths of innocent persons either as an end in itself or as a means to an end, and acting in such a way in the pursuit of a legitimate end that innocent people suffer injury and death as an incidental and undesired side effect. It is on the basis of this distinction that one can understand the moral difference between, let us say, participation in precision bombing attacks on German operated railways in northern France prior to the Normandy invasion, in which the deaths of French civilians occurred and could be foreseen, and participation in the obliteration bombing of German cities with the express purpose of demoralizing their civilian inhabitants. In the first case one could say that to participate is not to murder (that is, deliberately kill) civilians, for doing so constitutes neither the purpose of the attacks nor a means to the realization of their purpose. But the infliction of injury and death upon civilians is, in the second case, if not the main purpose of the attacks at least a necessary means to the end of undermining civilian morale. To describe both attacks as attempts to weaken German military resistance is not mistaken, but it is a description that hides a legally and morally relevant distinction between alternative means to this end. Causally speaking, the participant in one form of attack is in the same relationship to the deaths accompanying it as the participant in the other; if we excuse or justify the first and blame the second, it is on the basis of criteria that require the two acts to be described in such a way as to permit the relevant distinction between them to be made.

²⁰ See the essays by Ford, Anscombe, Nagel, and Murphy already cited.

The problem of act-descriptions also has implications for inquiry aimed at the explanation of international violence. Like legal and moral judgments, the explanatory accounts devised by historians and social scientists are influenced by the descriptions employed in the interpretation of the phenomena that they seek to explain. Here both doctrines of method and substantive theories provide the source of criteria for choosing among alternative descriptions, and those in turn often reflect the application of distinctions derived from legal and moral discourse. Often, of course, the observer is insufficiently aware of this fact, and in selecting or in simply using without question a particular set of descriptions he may be unwittingly engaged in the perpetuation of judgments embedded in them. The analysis and criticism of explanatory theories of international violence would therefore appear to constitute an interesting and fruitful field for philosophical inquiry, one as deserving of attention as the study of its legal and moral dimensions. Yet this aspect of the subject is almost entirely overlooked by the contributors to these volumes.²¹

A rich diversity of questions, both cultivated and neglected, thus awaits those who are drawn to explore the regions in which philosophy, war, and international politics are joined. The body of work we have considered here provides both a reconnaissance of these regions and some tools for further exploration. Yet we shouldn't forget that the subject has been investigated for centuries, and that new tools alone are unlikely to produce significant results. Like other ways of thought, those of the analytical philosopher are sometimes unimaginatively exercised upon ill-chosen problems, with negligible results. Discernment is necessary in the choice of lines of inquiry, and in the study of international politics this requires an appreciation of history, institutions, and the empirical substance of policy. The philosophy of war and international politics presented in these volumes is interesting precisely because it does combine analytical skill with substantive knowledge to a degree unusual in recent philosophical commentary on the subject.

²¹ An exception is Sidney Morgenbesser, "Imperialism: Some Preliminary Distinctions," in *Philosophy, Morality, and International Affairs*, pp. 201-245.

BOOK REVIEWS

Montesquieu's Philosophy of Liberalism: A Commentary on *The Spirit of the Laws*. By Thomas L. Pangle. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1973. Pp. 336. \$10.00.)

The Spirit of the Laws is a puzzle. Its organization and its purpose have been as great a mystery as some parts of it have been clear. Thomas Pangle proposes an answer: Montesquieu is a liberal who advocated the establishment of commercial republics, as far as circumstances permit. Montesquieu's book is a gradual unfolding of that teaching. In Part One, according to Professor Pangle, Montesquieu exposes the inadequacy of the traditional regimes, among which the small republic based on virtue and equality is the most attractive. In Part Two, Montesquieu proposes liberal republicanism, based on freedom as the guarantor of the security of the individual. This proposal, Pangle argues, is grounded in Montesquieu's view of the English regime. In Part Three, Montesquieu examines the natural difficulties and facilitating aspects of climate and terrain. Pangle says this argument moves Montesquieu perilously close to modern historicism and sociology. Part Four pursues a description of modern commerce and its advantages, and the possibilities it creates for the arts and for legislation, if not philosophy. Religion is argued to be essentially different from politics and Christian natural law is argued to be pernicious for politics. In his final chapter, Pangle considers Books 26 and 29 and the final books on France. These form the concluding discussion of natural law and legislation. The political purpose of freedom, expressed as the moderation of the legislator, must find its way between the low universals of the natural law and the peculiar circumstances of any particular polity. France is

This view of *The Spirit of the Laws* is persuasive because it takes into account the depth of because it takes into account the depth of Montesquieu's understanding of the political alternatives, particularly liberalism, exemplified by the English commercial republic. However, the political and intellectual climate in which Montesquieu lived and wrote was not one of unrelenting censorship of admiration for England, particularly its commerce, or of great distrust of modern philosophy. Rather, provided a formal respect was paid the king and the church, the situation was the opposite. French admiration for England was increasing, and, as Rousseau was soon to note, the intolerance of the Enlightenment for any but its own rivaled that of the Church. In view of this situation,

Montesquieu's reticence about England could easily have had as much to do with the enthusiasm of England's followers as his fear of having the authorities think he joined them.

One must, therefore, be careful about Montesquieu's treatment of the ancients. Pangle complains that Montesquieu treats Plato's *Republic* and *Laws* as "serious practical proposals" (p. 65), implying that such treatment could never have been that of the ancients. Montesquieu follows Aristotle's lead in Book II of the *Politics* in this. Similarly, Pangle complains that Montesquieu lowers music from the peak of the citizen's education (p. 65). The clearest teaching of the *Republic*, however, is that music and gymnastic together were to establish a balance within the souls of the guardians. Montesquieu says that music aroused something in the spirit of the citizens other than the political virtue of dedication to their common existence (Bk. 4, ch. 8) which did not lead to the savagery of the speculative sciences. That the place of music was intermediate between philosophy and political life understood as common existence, and even that philosophy is not easily domesticated to political life—these ideas are not clearly outside Plato's understanding. If Montesquieu needs to be as subtle about his view of the ancients as of the moderns, these passages, which lead Pangle to see a radical distinction between Montesquieu and the ancients, do not lead easily to that conclusion.

Pangle's treatment of monarchies is as questionable. Monarchy, as Montesquieu describes it, is a curious regime, characterized not by its ruler, the monarch, but by the honor of the nobility. This structural difference between regimes is pointed out again by Montesquieu's emphasis on the size of monarchies (Bk. 8, chs. 16-20). Montesquieu repeatedly refers his reader back to these chapters. Monarchies are essentially different from republics, democratic or aristocratic, and from despotisms. Montesquieu, then, has not set up the regimes of Part One as a simple alternative to the liberal republicanism of Part Two. Rather, he has proposed some different regimes which the reader must pursue through *The Spirit of the Laws* in order to grasp the spirit of those distinctions and of yet another regime.

Although I would neither begin as Pangle did, nor proceed in his manner in a consideration of the *Spirit of the Laws*, his book is fascinating to read. It is the sort of book one reads arguing every step of the way, but emerging with a much

clearer understanding of what the questions in Montesquieu are and how one ought to understand him. This is because he takes Montesquieu's interest in politics and its improvement seriously and follows Montesquieu's argument as he sees it through *The Spirit of the Laws*. I would advise anyone interested in our liberal republican regime or in Montesquieu to read this book and to pursue the argument grounded in the text and in serious political questions where Pangle put it and where it belongs.

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Bentham's Political Thought. Edited by Bhiku Parekh. (New York: Barnes & Noble division of Harper & Row, 1973. Pp. 340. \$15.00, cloth; \$4.95, paper.)

Bentham scholars will welcome this book because the 280 pages of extracts that it contains (arranged by the editor in twenty-two chapters and five appendices) make available some material that has not yet been printed in the volumes so far published of the definitive edition of Bentham's writings that is being prepared by the Bentham Project housed at University College, London. They will also welcome it because, in the previously published work that is included, not only are the tamperings of the earliest editors avoided, but in addition, some of the transcriptions of more recent editors are amended. They will be interested, too, in the rationale of the selection procedure adopted that is given by the editor in his short (37-page) preface and introduction. They may ask themselves, however, whether Dr. Parekh has not perhaps rather over-trimmed Bentham's thought in order to fit it into his own conception, stated in the preface, of "what is expected in a work on political philosophy" (p. 7). As applied to Bentham, this involves starting with an ontology, proceeding to a theory of man, and, in particular, the place in this theory of pleasure and pain, moving next to analysis of key political concepts, then to an account of ideal political society, and finally to a discussion of the nature of political argument. Bentham scholars are likely, too, to wish that Dr. Parekh had given fuller references in his introduction which would have guided them to all the parts of the extracts on which the main points in his exposition of Bentham's political thought are based.

A degree of unease may also occur when one notices that the editor gives few indications in the introduction or elsewhere of changes in Bentham's positions, apart from rather general allusions to his earlier nonradical and late radical standpoints. Since in most cases the dates of the

various extracts are to be found in footnotes, the unwary reader might be led to suppose that, except on radicalism, Bentham's positions remained unchanged from 1773 to 1829. The very unwary reader might be even more misled by an odd lapse on the part of the editor when he says in his preliminary note to the extracts presented in Chapter 2 (p. 51): "Having examined the nature of fictitious entities in the previous chapter he [Bentham] now goes on to develop a technique of analysing them by relating them to some real entities." The previous chapter (which, of course, is the editor's chapter, not Bentham's) consists of extracts, for which dates are not given, from mss. U.C.L. box 102, and Chapter 2 consists of extracts from mss. U.C.L. box 101, written in 1814, 1826 and 1813, (p. 330, chap. 1 note 1, chap. 2 note 1).

In his preface Dr. Parekh says, "If the book gives a reasonably coherent account of Bentham's political philosophy and inspires students of Bentham to go to the original works, the labour will not have been in vain" (p. 11). But it is clear that the book is not at all suitable for unaided beginners and that it will be useful for students only if they are given considerable guidance. The preface and introduction, indeed, assume previous knowledge of Bentham (including acquaintance with the significance of "Panopticon"), and little there or in the notes links Bentham with earlier and later thinkers. There are some passages in which Bentham's views are set out in relation to those of others, but they are unlikely to help the beginner very much. At least one passage will seem distinctly puzzling in its reference to "the classical liberalism of Hobbes and especially of Locke" (p. 42), unless the reader is already familiar with some other literature, such as Dr. Parekh's own contribution "Liberalism and Morality" in *The Morality of Politics* the collection that he edited with R. N. Berki. (London: Allen & Unwin, 1972).

Nonetheless, it is useful to have the various extracts together in one volume, and the introduction, short as it is, does draw attention to certain themes in Bentham that do not appear to have been emphasized by others, especially Bentham's elaboration of the rendering of services as a central feature of his theory of government, and his treatment of the power of the sovereign in terms of the sovereign's dependence upon the extent of a disposition to obedience on the part of subjects. The last point, however, might well have led to a consideration of yet another interesting theme, Bentham's discussion of indirect legislation; unfortunately that topic is not touched on.

It should be mentioned, however, that *Ben-*

tham's *Political Thought* is not to stand alone. The publishers announce on the jacket that Dr. Parekh "is currently working on a critical study of Bentham," and therefore some of the gaps I have mentioned may be filled by that work. If they are, then Bentham scholars will be better placed to assess the interpretation that is summarized in the present volume.

WILFRID HARRISON

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Dynamische Demokratie: Zur konkreten Utopie gesellschaftlicher Gleichheit. By Anton Pelinka. (Stuttgart/Berlin/Köln/Mainz: Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 1974. Pp. 148. DM 18.80.)

Anton Pelinka, professor of political science at the recently founded *Gesamthochschule* at Essen, says in his new book, *Dynamic Democracy*, that he is primarily concerned with the process of democratization, from the perspective of what he labels "dynamic democracy" (p. 7). From his discussion of the relation between societal and political practice, Pelinka also arrives at a model of democracy.

He curtly dismisses the political conceptions of democracy set forth by Locke, Montesquieu, the authors of the *Federalist Papers*, and Rousseau and the juristic conception set forth by Carl Schmitt because, he claims, they are based on abstract postulates. He finds himself in partial agreement with the thought of Robert Michels, Vilfredo Pareto, Gaetano Mosca, Joseph Schumpeter, Anthony Downs, Gabriel Almond, Sidney Verba, and Robert Dahl, among others. He compliments these writers for focusing on the actual practices of democracies, but is, nevertheless, ultimately disappointed with the writings of Michels, Pareto, Mosca, Schumpeter, and Downs because, he says, they see "democracy" only as a "method," a "procedure" devoid of specific content (p. 15). But Pelinka welcomes the dynamic element inherent in the notion of active "political participation" as developed by Almond, Verba, and Dahl, though here too he laments the absence of a definite content (p. 18).

One may thus understand why Pelinka thrusts to the forefront those who have ascribed to the concept of "democracy" a norm he considers to be positive (e.g., Peter Bachrach—no mention is made of John Rawls and Christopher Jencks). For Pelinka, a dynamic democracy is, first of all, an operational procedure. As such it is in a constant state of flux, and in a constant state of development perpetually attempting to draw ever more people into the democratic process (p. 116). Equality and freedom are the goals. In the words of the author:

Democracy is the realization of as equal a measure of freedom for all as possible. Freedom and equality are

not opposites. Equality is nevertheless the variable quantity, which in its entirety can be maximized and also minimized. Equality is the concrete, the real utopia of dynamic democracy. It is utopia because its complete realization cannot be anticipated in the foreseeable future. And it is concrete and real because a given society can be judged according to the extent to which it has achieved partial equality; and because this observable measure of equality can be intensified in the direction of utopia, of total equality of power (p. 74).

Pelinka's discussion of both the process of moving toward the goal and the end product itself reveals one of his fundamental assumptions, namely, that man is now more or less rational and that in the course of history he will develop into an almost or even fully rational being. In this context one may understand Pelinka's argument that in the developmental process toward the hoped-for goal, power has to be made ever more "visible," "measurable" (p. 40), and "controllable" (p. 42), until it need no longer be based on "coercion" (p. 43). To achieve this diffusion of power, the author hopes, at least implicitly, to help the course of history along by educating man politically (pp. 101-102).

Pelinka's discussion gives rise to many questions, including the injecting into politics of an ideology considered to be true and absolute. But his fundamental weakness is his failure to integrate his conception of a developing democracy into the actual world of political reality, i.e., into the framework of a politically pluralist world.

Pelinka is silent on how a dynamic democracy, in the process of developing, can and should cope with political emergencies, whether internal or external. He does not solve anything by merely stating that a dynamic democracy in the process of developing is not only cognizant of, but also encourages conflict, and then equating conflict with domestic unrest (p. 57). What if such unrest were to become so sharp that a distinction must instantly be drawn between friend and foe? In a society in which political power is constantly divided, subdivided, and torn asunder, who will decide that an emergency exists? Who decides how it is to be resolved? Does this sort of developing democracy make any provision for emergency situations, and hence for emergency legislation to which individuals can be forced to conform?

Had Pelinka not skirted fundamental questions, his otherwise interesting discussion would not have been left hanging in the air. In the construction of a political system whose starting point is the actual world, reality must not and can not simply be ignored and wished away.

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The Nature of Human Values. By Milton Rokeach. (New York: The Free Press, 1973. Pp. 438. \$13.95.)

It is the business of political (and other) philosophy to explicate the nature of values, to contrast them to each other, to argue the case for some preferred set, and to relate these to the practices of institutions and societies. Some portion of this work could be expanded and, I think, improved, if we had some way of finding out who has what values, what behaviors follow from holding some set of values as contrasted to another, how values change, and how societies and social groups differ in their value preferences. The study of ideology, of public opinion, of electoral behavior, of decision making would similarly gain. (Of course the question of which values *should* be preferred is properly a philosophical question, although the cost/benefit problem is also a social scientific one.) In *The Nature of Human Values*, Professor Rokeach has come forward with a measure of values and some interesting, provocative research.

The concept of value is elusive: should it be divided between concepts of the desired and of the desirable, as Clyde Kluckhohn has argued? Rokeach says "no" because the desirable is "nothing more than a special kind of preference" (p. 11). Is it another word for "need," or can needs be translated into values, as Robert White has argued? Rokeach says they are by no means the same, for if they were the same, rats would have values; rather values are cognitive representations of needs. A value is not an attitude, for attitudes require objects or situations, and values do not. Values are more flexible than traits; they subsume interests. Thus, "A value is an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-state existence is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end-state of existence" (p. 5). It is enduring (but Rokeach can manipulate them), it is a belief (true-false, good-bad, and also prescriptive), and is to be divided into "modes of conduct" (instrumental) and end-states of existence (terminal).

The measurement or identification of values has always run into the problem of method; basically there are two: (1) ask people directly, (2) infer from behavior or expression, oral or written, the underlying value informing these expressive acts. Rokeach adopts the first of these. After wide scanning of many lists (but not Lasswell's) Rokeach develops his own list of 18 terminal values (a comfortable life, a world at peace, equality, freedom, inner harmony, etc.) and 18 instrumental values (ambitious, clean, forgiving, polite, intellectual, self-controlled, etc.). He presents these lists to his respondents and asks them to rank them. Test-retest reli-

abilities on the final form among different samples are .74 on the terminal values, and between .65 and .70 for the instrumental values. The validity is a different matter; in general, Rokeach's measure predicts not only attitudes but also behavior, and the relevant values are modestly correlated (.25 to .35) to McClelland's measurements of need. After some initial skepticism, I am persuaded by the research findings of those who have used the instrument that it is sufficiently valid to become a useful tool in an area that desperately needs one.

What does Rokeach find out? In a national survey he discovers that Americans (in 1968) value most "a world at peace, family security, freedom" and value least "pleasure, social recognition (!), and a world of beauty." They want people to be honest, but are indifferent about their being intellectual or logical. Three years later (see *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Summer, 1974) the valuation of "a comfortable life" and of being "clean" had declined, while "equality" and "a world of beauty" had increased, but there had been a general stability over that short time period. Since values are both elements of personality and reflections of social norms, information on the sources and content of change—about which much vapid material is written—may be one useful advantage of Rokeach's measure.

By social class: in the working class, compared to the middle class, there is no evidence of a Banfield-type culture of poverty (hedonism or present-time orientation), but there is much more conformism and religiosity. With income controlled, blacks show generally the same pattern as whites, except for their higher valuation of equality. There is no special black culture—so far as Rokeach's values go. By age: as one matures, "loving," "a world of beauty" and hedonism decline; "self-realization" values are highest in the college years. By political party there is no difference, but by candidate preference the ranking of "equality," from low to high, is as follows: Republican candidate supporters generally, McGovern supporters, then Kennedy/Johnson supporters. (More trouble for the interpreters of McGovern support.)

But the excitement in this study lies elsewhere. Two chapters on ideology find first that a thematic content analysis focussing on the two values that Rokeach believes to be most relevant—freedom and equality—in the writings of Lenin, socialist humanists, Goldwater, and Hitler, reveals a neat pattern: Lenin is high on equality and low on freedom, Goldwater is high on freedom and low on equality, Hitler is low on both, the socialist humanists are high on both, and these differences are such that the evalua-

tions of these concepts are at the poles of their value scales. Students who themselves have these relative value patterns reveal, through a variety of questions to test their ideologies and identifications, that such value preferences predict (determine?) ideological preferences. The "socialist" value types (high on both freedom and equality) are most "accurate" in their perceptions of the ideological implications of these values. "Communist" value types (high on equality and low on freedom—a small group) do prefer Communist symbols, slogans, personalities more than others, but they prefer fascist symbols even more. This anomaly, if that is what it is, is interpreted by Rokeach as reflecting a common misperception of ideology which limits it to one dimension on which all four ideological types are ranked, rather than the two dimensions he finds actually describe them better. Further, he discovers a "law of activism": extreme (high or low) valuation of freedom or equality is a necessary condition for sustained political activism.

The values can be manipulated rather easily: a casual mention to those who ranked freedom high and equality low, to the effect that they might be interested in freedom only for themselves, induced changes in attitudes and such behaviors as joining new civil rights groups and changing careers. The finding disturbs Rokeach, as it does me.

In spite of some methodological imperialism, the book and method illuminate some dark corners of politics, even if they do not light up the sky. We will be hearing more about Rokeach's value measure.

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The Heirs of Stalin. Dissidence and The Soviet Regime, 1953-1970. Edited by Abraham Rothberg. (Ithaca and New York: Cornell University Press, 1972. Pp. 450. \$14.50.)

As the title indicates, the book deals with that phenomenon in Soviet society which is now commonly though inaccurately designated in the West as "dissidence," while the parallel term in the Soviet Union is *inakomyслиye* or "another way of thinking." One of the most prominent "dissidents" and a highly qualified scientist, Dr. Khodorovich, recently protested in one of her *samizdat* essays against the term as a politically loaded misnomer. The term, she wrote, presupposes those who think in one way and those who think otherwise. But in fact *samizdat* today is the only forum of thought in the USSR, for thought cannot develop when it is subordinate to dictates of an ideology which has lost all credence, dictates of a dead ideology. Two types of thought presuppose a real or implied dialogue

between them, but what dialogue can there be between two chess-players, continues Mrs. Khodorovich, when one chess-player, every time he loses a figure, mops all the adversary's figures physically off the board.

Although the above generalization can be somewhat questioned, for in the field of, say, mathematical and natural sciences, advances in thought can (after the fall of Lysenko) be expressed in the official press; some original writing can still be found in *Novy mir* and other literary publications, and historians can write quite truthfully about the less controversial and more distant topics of historiography and get their findings published. But on the whole, particularly in the spheres of *Weltanschauung*, philosophy, religion, social and political thinking, Dr. Khodorovich's statement is correct. Furthermore, when one speaks to the so-called "dissidents" recently arrived in the West, one discovers that most of the more original historians, scientists and literary figures who continue to have their works published in the official press are personal friends of many of the well-known "dissidents." In other words, they are the "silent majority" of the so-called "dissidence" and potential *samizdatchiks* themselves. In fact, despite the increased pressures and more severe punishments, with every departure to the West and with every new arrest there appear in the Soviet *samizdat* new names to replace those who left; e.g., the Moscow-based mathematician, member of the Armenian Academy of Sciences, Yuri Orlov, the writers V. Kornilov, Voinovich, etc.

Mr. Rothberg's book itself should convince the Western Sovietologist how far behind the times he is in his continued concentration on the official Soviet press and his almost total disregard for *samizdat*, hypnotized by the quantitative disproportions between the two and by the external weight of Soviet foreign policies. Western intellectuals seem to ignore their own intellectual cradle of individualism and minority opinion.

Unfortunately, *The Heirs of Stalin* is a predominantly descriptive work, and not an analytical one. His chapters are individual case descriptions, either of individual "dissident" personalities or of fates of individual "controversial" works of art. There are extensive quotations. Documents and relevant writings are cited, much conscientious footnoting is done. So, the book leaves no doubt as to its reliability and factual accuracy. But there are no serious attempts at conceptualization, at an analysis of the whole phenomenon of "dissent" and "samizdat," no real thread or connection between the individual chapters and cases individually cited, stated, and

even analyzed to some extent. Consequently, the reader is left with fragmentary impressions, with considerable information on individual cases, but no appreciation of the whole post-Stalin development of Soviet society. Even if Mr. Rothberg had only reproduced Siniavsky's "On Socialist Realism" and some parts of his *Trial Begins* he would have given the reader a much more synthesized and overall understanding of Soviet society since 1953, than by all his fragmented chapters, which on their own only serve as an excellent illustration. But of what? Of Siniavsky's thesis (written as early as 1956-57) that ever since the death of Stalin, "we have entered a cycle of destructions and reassessments" (*Fantasticheskii mir Abrama Tertza*, New York, 1966, p. 455).

One could question the author's method of subdividing the book into "professional" sections: "Artistic Dissidence," "Political Dissidence," "Scientific Dissidence." Much more representative subdivisions would be according to schools of thought; e.g., "Neo-Marxism," "Neo-Slavophilism," "Neo-Liberalism," "Christian-Socialism," "Democratic Socialism" "Neo-Fascism," etc.; for one finds scientists as well as artists among all these ideational groupings and trends, while divisions by professions are just as artificial as the Marxist attempts to squeeze schools and trends of thought into frames of class origins.

There are some minor errors and misspellings of names (such as on pp. 174, 177, 185, 190, 210, 214, and elsewhere), some repetitions, some misleading labels of "liberal," "dogmatist," "more liberal," slapped on individual Soviet literary *apparatchiks* and other "with-it" figures. Why, for instance, is the super-subservient literary *apparatchik* S. Mikhalkov claimed to be more liberal than a similar *apparatchik*, G. Markov (p. 141)? Both have become "famous" in their campaign against Solzhenitsyn in the period from 1969 to 1974, and both now occupy key positions in the Writers' Union.

Nevertheless, it should be repeated, the book is a very valuable "first" in the English language on the "unofficial" or "unapproved" part of the post-Stalin Soviet intelligentsia and society and should be widely read and popularized in the ranks of thoughtful Western readers.

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Science and Politics. By Jean-Jacques Salomon. (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1973. Pp. 277. \$15.00.)

At least until the Second World War, the history of the relations between science and politics was represented often as the story of the struggle between the forces of reason and un-

reason. The atomic blasts at the end of World War II blurred the distinction by making science appear as both a more credible instrument of public policy and a less credible contributor to the promotion of rationality in public affairs. During the 'fifties and 'sixties, as the growing role of science in public affairs was increasingly accepted as a fact, the questions which were raised centered less on whether science should enter the political domain than on how this process, which was regarded as inevitable, should be effected without the politicization of science or the delegitimation of politics.

As a question bearing not only on the mechanics of government but also on the nation's deepest values and commitments, the relations between truth and power have remained a favorite theme for the philosophers, moralists, ideologists, martyrs and seers of the age. Don K. Price, moving from government to academia, was perhaps the first to treat the question about the place of science in democratic politics systematically (in *Government and Science* [New York: New York University Press, 1954] and *The Scientific Estate* [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965]). Even though Price was concerned primarily with defining an American solution to this problem, his book raised some fundamental theoretical questions whose significance for understanding the relations of science and politics goes beyond the specific contingencies of the American system.

This promising beginning, however, remained without a follow-up. By and large the wealth of accumulating historical material in this field has not been subject to conceptual regimentation and has not been illuminated by ongoing theoretical discourse. Instead the preoccupation with the subject has given rise on the one hand to moral and ideological literature on the social responsibilities of scientists and the obligations of the state to science and, on the other hand, to pragmatic literature on questions of science policy.

Salomon's book has not altered this intellectual landscape. In combining a discussion of the practical problems of science policy with a discussion of the responsibility of scientists in politics, it is in fact fairly representative of much of the literature which has evolved around this subject since World War II. A long-time participant-observer from his strategic position as head of the Science Policy Division of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in Paris, Salomon tries to bring together what he calls "philosophical discourse" and "realism" in a study of "the irrationality of the institution which most strikingly embodies the rationality of the West" (p. xv).

His book consists of three parts: Part I, "The New World" (pp. 3-68), presents a brief and schematic history of the relations of science and politics from the seventeenth century to the present, emphasizing the growing interpenetration of scientific knowledge and political power in the modern state. Part II, "Politics in Science" (pp. 71-144), consists of discussions of problems of science policy, such as planning and forecasting the development of science and the allocation of resources among different parts of science. Part III, "Science in Politics" (pp. 147-253), raises questions about the moral and political implications of scientists' roles in public affairs.

The general result is disappointing. Even though Salomon is a sophisticated observer with wide experience as well as an admirable mastery of a vast literature, his book lacks both the kind of documented evidence that could make it significant for the historian of science and politics, and the analytical rigor and theoretical depth that would make it useful for the social scientist. Instead, this volume takes on the characteristics of that special genre which has produced the business executive's "philosophy of the economy" or the practicing diplomat's "theory of international relations"—a cluster of worldly common-sense observations made by thinking participants who bring from their eventful odyssey into the "real world" some precious insights, some moral teaching, and some visions or warnings of what is in store for us in the future.

This kind of literature, however, is not entirely without its own value insofar as it furnishes insights into the symbolic constructs with which participants organize and systematize their experience. Of particular interest in Salomon's book is the underlying tension between the commitment to the ethos of science and to the cultural diffusion of scientific knowledge on the one hand, and the disenchantment and skepticism generated by the encounter with the "logic" of politics on the other. This book can be read at least in part as a description of the political education of scientists, a process through which they discover the limits of the power of knowledge and rationality in public affairs.

Salomon's main argument seems to be that since World War II a process of convergence of science and politics, whose signs were already manifest after World War I, became widely recognized and progressively institutionalized. He suggests that the fusion of the scientific and the political activities has altered the role of the scientist in society, that it has turned him from a "savant"—a definer of truths enjoying the status of a "cultural figure"—into a lower-grade technician, a sort of "production agent" in

the service of political power (p. 251). In advancing this argument, Salomon adds to a discourse already overburdened by neologisms the term "techno-nature" (p. 174) to indicate this convergence between science and politics—where perhaps it may have been the better part of wisdom to heed Occam's great dictum that "entities ought not to be multiplied except out of necessity." Even though, as Salomon suggests, the interpenetration of science and politics is the dominant feature of the state of science in contemporary society since World War II, his discussion of this phenomenon is handicapped by a frame of reference within which it is defined as another phase in the Manichaean history of the struggle of science "against the spirit of authority" (p. 73). He views politics primarily as the cultural manifestation of the irrational and the growing centrality of scientists in public affairs as threatening the glory of science as the cultural expression and symbol of truth.

This perspective obviously is not congenial for a study of the interrelations of science and politics as distinctive cultural activities involving the interaction of different languages, modes of action and institutions.

An investigator uninhibited by a demonological "theory" of politics and unconfined by the narrow concerns of science policy could, perhaps, direct the inquiry on the interrelations of science and politics toward a host of strategic questions which remain largely untouched by Salomon and others in this field. It might be fruitful, for instance, to raise such questions as: what are the political significance and uses of the social authority of scientists in political contexts aside from their intellectual skills? How does their professional role as men of knowledge interact with their roles in the larger society as popularizers, advisers, critics or legitimators? How is the selective reception of scientific knowledge in the public domain affected by the prevailing ideologies, the distribution of political power, the nature of political authority, the procedures of public policy and other such characteristics of political systems? Does science influence public perceptions and evaluations of government performance? What are the differences in the ways the scientific enterprise is socially organized in relation to political authority among different political systems, and what is their significance for comparative studies in politics and culture?

From the perspective of political science, the interrelations between science and politics ultimately fall within the boundaries of such classical topics as "rationality and politics," "truth and justice," "knowledge and authority." The potential contribution of modern political

science to these traditional debates is not confined, however, to the novelties introduced by the historical specificity of modern forms of knowledge, politics or their interrelations. It may perhaps lie no less in the conceptual innovations which would open the way for studying knowledge and rationality in the dynamic context of political interaction and public policy and integrating the related scholarly tradition of political theory with modern theories of organizational and political behavior. Even though Salomon's book does not represent a significant step in this direction, it is a good representative of the present state of the art and may help clarify the limits which must be transcended if our understanding of relations of science and politics is to be enhanced.

YARON EZRAHI

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Psychoanalysis and the Law. By C. G. Schoenfeld. (Springfield, Ill.: Charles C Thomas, 1973. Pp. 285. \$13.75.)

After a brief flurry of interest sparked by Harold Lasswell, few political scientists made any effort during the 1930s and 1940s to apply psychodynamic categories to the study of political behavior. Psychoanalytic insights were used by sociologists and anthropologists during the 1940s and 1950s, primarily for "national character" studies, and Talcott Parsons attempted to incorporate psychodynamic categories into the theory of action. By the late 1950s, however, interest had dropped off. The one enduring monument of the whole period was *The Authoritarian Personality* which, despite its flaws, has continued to influence and serve as a research guide for social psychologists, sociologists, and political scientists.

During the late 1950s and early 1960s, a few political scientists such as Lucian Pye continued the effort to interweave dynamic concepts of personality with the study of politics, but the bulk of the work in the area was left to psychologists and psychoanalysts with social concerns such as Kenneth Keniston, Robert Lifton, and Erich Fromm.

More recently interest has gradually revived. Following the lead of Erik Erikson, increasing numbers of historians are turning to "psycho-biography," and a spate of books and articles indicates that political scientists dealing with problems of socialization are attempting, once again, to bring psychological (if not always psychoanalytic) insights to bear on their work. Thus far, however, the approach has barely gotten off the ground. There are many reasons for this, but at least two are immediately relevant with regard to psychoanalysis. First, psycho-

analytic theory remains highly reductionist. Quite naturally, political scientists are not attracted to a discipline which treats the political world as epiphenomenal, i.e., as consisting of acts which are merely a projection and rationalization of primitive urges. Second, psychoanalytic theory is still based largely on clinical insights. Thus little effort has been made to develop propositions which can be tested at least in part, and instruments which can test them in some way or another.

By and large, then, books and articles which attempt to develop psychoanalytic perspectives still tend to be highly speculative and fail to offer the kind of approach or evidence which might commend them to working political scientists. Too many are still of a type which (a) review basic psychoanalytic hypotheses for a lay audience, (b) speculate about the inter-relationships between unconscious motives and social processes without offering any evidence for these speculations. Often such volumes promise much, if the research could be done, but after reading four or five which traverse the same ground with the same promise, one begins to become impatient.

The above comments apply to classics like Lasswell's *Psychopathology and Politics*, Kardiner et al., *The Psychological Frontiers of Society*, and Fromm's *Escape from Freedom* as well as to such lesser known works as Money-Kyrle's, *Psychoanalysis and Politics* and Ranyard West's, *Conscience and Society*. They also apply to the many psychoanalytically oriented "national character" studies which were supposedly to open the way to understanding the politics of particular nations.

Unfortunately Schoenfeld's book is of this type. The author is a lawyer trained in psychoanalysis, and it is clear from his writing that he is a serious scholar. But his attempted marriage of psychoanalysis and law fails for the reasons noted.

Essentially the volume consists of a very elementary discussion of psychoanalytic hypotheses followed by (1) propositions which are so ambiguous that they add nothing to our knowledge; (2) propositions which are so outrageous on the face of it that one is tempted to dismiss them out of hand; (3) propositions which are interesting, and which might conceivably be of some value but for which little or no evidence is offered. Let me offer some examples chosen at random:

In discussing the role of the Supreme Court in American society, Schoenfeld asks why so many Americans were shocked and dismayed by Roosevelt's "Court packing" plan. The answer is obvious to the author. The Court was a parent

surrogate to Americans, and Roosevelt's plan was perceived as an attack upon this surrogate. The author never asks why Roosevelt was not also a parent surrogate, nor (although he is aware of the fact) does he ever ask why most other nations do not have supreme courts which are regarded as parent surrogates. The Court's role, he suggests, stemmed primarily from the trauma of the Civil War which led to its elevation to the position it came to occupy, and other traumas confirmed this position. Yet many nations have faced comparable traumas without creating a "parent surrogate" court of this type. There may be something to the author's contention, but *only* if placed in a social and cultural context which explains the relevant differences between the United States and other nations, and supplies some evidence for the propositions offered.

Elsewhere Schoenfeld suggests that police brutality may be the result of the police acting upon unconscious sadistic impulses, but that those who "overemphasize" police brutality may unconsciously be trying to undermine the ability of the society to control aggression. Either or both propositions may be true, and reminding academic intellectuals that police chiefs and "hard hats" are not necessarily the only people behaving irrationally may serve some purpose, but the mere statement of the issue in the form in which Schoenfeld puts it leads us nowhere. The volume, incidentally, offers a rather lengthy discussion of unconscious aggression and the law, but aside from some references to Lorenz, the general discussion of the issue consists primarily of quotations from Freud and other psychoanalysts stressing the importance of the problem.

Just one final example. Schoenfeld reviews at length the problem of judicial "activism" versus judicial "restraint." His conclusion is that the arguments in favor of both are partly valid from a psychoanalytic perspective and therefore he can really come to no conclusion, unless it be that individuals should recognize that both judicial activism and judicial restraint are legitimate and necessary. The discussion hardly helps us with the problems we face in this area, and even the sympathetic reader is likely to conclude that reading it was something of a waste of time.

We do not need books which tell us how important it is to investigate unconscious mental processes as they apply to law or politics. We *do* need studies which demonstrate that we can reasonably do so in ways which enable us to have some confidence in our results. *The Authoritarian Personality*, with all its weaknesses, pointed in the right direction. One article which throws some light on our actual political experience by making use of psychodynamic hypothe-

ses (and testing them) will convince more scholars to take such hypotheses into account than will dozens of volumes which, like this one, merely urge us to do so, and add little, if anything, to our understanding.

STANLEY ROTHMAN

Smith College

Voluntary Associations: Perspectives on the Literature. By Constance Smith and Ann Freedman. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972. Pp. 250. \$8.00, paper.)

The political scientist, having paid \$8.00 for this paperback, is likely to feel further annoyance at finding the familiar subjects of interest groups, pluralism, and elitism dealt with from the perspective of scholars interested in voluntarism. As such it has a superficial quality which borders on the misleading, through some may find the very distinctiveness of its viewpoint suggestive in its implications.

This volume is indirectly related to David Horton Smith's Center for a Voluntary Society. The annual collections issued by this society (*Voluntary Action Research*: 1972, etc.), however, reflect a tone which the organization theorist will probably regard as more sophisticated than the present volume. Even the bibliographic function of these collections is in some ways superior, though neither they nor the present volume can match in usefulness Ralph Stogdill's related survey of the literature *Handbook of Leadership* (New York: The Free Press, 1974).

Smith and Freedman (Constance Smith was Dean of Radcliffe Institute prior to her death in 1970; Ann Freedman is Associate Professor of Political Science at Roosevelt University) begin their volume with "A Theoretical Overview" focusing on organizational typologies. Here the typologies of Clark and Wilson, Blau and Scott, and others are very briefly outlined. Organization theorists will be dumbfounded by the omission of famous constructs which belong in such a review, such as the typologies of Talcott Parsons, Amitai Etzioni, or James Thompson. On the other hand, several lesser-known contributions are outlined. No attempt at critical evaluation or synthesis is made here or in the following section on "Small Group Theory," which surveys the reviews of the subject, again without critical comment.

Chapter Two presents "The Pluralist Thesis." First "The American Tradition" is outlined, treating Tocqueville, Bryce, the social historical work of the Handlins, and a few minor contributions, and omitting discussion of the Federalists,

Calhoun, and the conservative theorists of the post-bellum period. Classical pluralism receives somewhat better coverage, though the discussion is so superficial one gets no feeling for the issues involved or the differences with those in the pluralist tradition who preceded or followed. Contemporary American pluralism is treated in a conventional section outlining ideas of Rose, Kornhauser, McConnell, Truman, Latham, Bentley, Key, Banfield, Lindblom, and a few others.

Chapter Three on "Pluralism: Attack and Defense" briefly treats Schattschneider, Lowi, Mills, Hunter, Schumpeter, Lipset, Polsby, Dahl, and Walker. A few discussions, such as that on Kornhauser, are extended enough to be of substantive interest. Some, like that on community power structure research, are so superficial they could better have been left out entirely. The radical elitist position is portrayed in stereotyped and dated terms, ignoring authors who followed Mills (e.g., Domhoff).

Chapter Four outlines writings on "Voluntary Associations and the Political System: Data." Here we find a survey of Milbrath, Lane, Almond and Verba; Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee; Prewitt, Stouffer, Rossi, Rosenau, Cutright, and others. Chapter Five surveys literature on participation in politics. Chapter Six surveys sociological literature on the relation to voluntary association memberships of class, race, ethnicity, sex, age, and attitudes. After this a much better treatment of community studies ensues. Two final chapters discuss "how-to" literature, studies of particular voluntary associations, and studies of VISTA and other government-related voluntary programs.

All these chapters, like the ones earlier, serve the useful purpose of providing the interested scholar with a concise overview of selected literature in the various related fields of interest. Throughout the discussion is bibliographic rather than critical, and hence the level is necessarily elementary. The surveys are neither comprehensive nor up-to-date, even for 1971. Omissions are striking, to the point of misleading the uninformed user.

In sum, Smith and Freedman have cast a wide net and have pulled in much that is of interest—some conventional, some important, some trivial. Their material is presented under headings no more arbitrary than the next, and while the presentation seems rambling because no critical argument is being made, researchers may find useful the orderly listing of more than six hundred sources pertaining to voluntarism. If the net result is less than compelling, this is less attributable to the authors than to the intellectual confusion which seems to surround the formation

of new subdisciplines, whether urban studies or voluntary action.

G. DAVID GARSON

Tufts University

The Baku Commune, 1917–1918: Class and Nationality in the Russian Revolution. By Ronald Grigor Suny. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1972. Pp. xxviii, 412. \$15.00.)

This study, characterized by good scholarship, proceeds to set the record straight before an official interpretation of the history of the Baku Commune in Soviet historiography which was maintained for reasons of political necessity. Professor Ronald Grigor Suny's work has the additional merit of focusing on a period and a place that have received only limited attention in Western scholarship. This is all the more welcome as the case of the Baku Commune condenses in time and space the major questions and problems the Bolsheviks were eventually called to deal with throughout the tsarist empire. And if Baku had not been threatened by and eventually fallen to the Turks in mid-September 1918, Stepan Shaumian, Prokofii Dzhaparidze, and their Bolshevik colleagues might have given Lenin and the others in Petrograd an example of Bolshevik power based on worker class-consciousness and cohesion where terror was virtually nonexistent. Shaumian might have even shown how to avoid interethnic warfare in Transcaucasia. As Suny writes: "More moderate than their Petrograd comrades, they had deep roots in the city, long training in the economic struggle, and a sensitivity to the dangers of inter-ethnic warfare" (p. 344). External factors were however not the only ones to plague Baku, for the city was a microcosm of the nationality problems the Bolsheviks had to face in Russia. The author deals with these problems with great sensitivity and care.

Suny has left few stones unturned in his research, and his study is as thorough as it is fascinating. He has not only brought to light a literature on Baku written in the U.S.S.R. in the 1920s, which, even if it is pro-Bolshevik, had not yet suffered the later Stalinist deformations, but through his own research, he has given Western scholarship an analysis of the problems created in Baku by class and especially by nationality during the Russian Revolution. In fact, the two variables were inextricably connected: "Most of the skilled workers, office employees, and administrators were Armenians and Russians, while the Azerbaijanis and Daghestanis formed the bulk of the drillers and field workers. Nationality tended to accentuate differences of status

within the working class" (pp. 13-14). Its oil fields made Baku a vital city in the power struggle waged throughout Russia in 1917 and 1918. Shaumian and his comrades were able to rise to power despite the seemingly unsurmountable nationality problems partly because of the inability of other parties, especially the Mensheviks and the Right Social Revolutionaries who held power in the Soviet after the February Revolution, to respond to the anticapitalist mood of the workers which the Bolsheviks knew how to exploit. They successfully led the September strike, and throughout October it looked as if they might carry themselves to total power, given the cohesion the working class manifested around them. This was not to be, however, for Shaumian was no Lenin, as Suny writes: "There was no Lenin in Baku who combined a resolute will to power with the necessary influence within the party, no one to argue that 'to wait is a crime against the revolution'" (p. 349). This class cohesion was short-lived and under external pressures gave way to national warfare which proved the undoing of Bolshevik power and resulted in the loss of Baku to the Turks.

On the question of political power, the Baku Commune and especially its chairman, Shaumian, stand out as examples of tolerance and democracy. Political parties were allowed to function and publish their newspapers; all Shaumian required was that they recognize Soviet power. Their participation in the Sovnarkom depended on this recognition. The rules of democracy were observed and when the Bolsheviks lost the confidence of the Soviet, they withdrew. This was indeed rather un-Bolshevik and un-Leninist behavior and within the context of the Revolution in Russia, where tolerance was the exception rather than the rule, it led to the undoing of the Baku Bolshevik leadership. When Baku fell to the Turks, twenty-six of the leading members of the Soviet who had fled the city, including Shaumian and Dzhabaridze, were captured by the Ashkhabad Committee, then in the hands of the Social Revolutionaries, and executed. Bolshevik power in Azerbaijan returned only in April 1920.

Although there is no theoretical model or lesson to be drawn from the Baku Commune, its history as presented by Suny is a valuable addition to the history of the Russian Revolution.

STANISLAV KIRSCHBAUM

York University

Flucht in den Mythos: Die Deutschnationale Volkspartei und die Niederlage von 1918. By Annelise Thimme. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Rupprecht, 1969. Pp. 195. DM 7.80.)

In the complicated political spectrum of the

Weimar Republic, the principal conservative role was assumed within days of the November, 1918 revolution by the newly created German National People's Party (*Deutschnationale Volkspartei*—DNVP). Intended to group various right-wing elements that otherwise despaired of survival in a democratic republic, the Party from the beginning was troubled with organizational and leadership difficulties, seriously hampering its political effectiveness. Having to satisfy East Elbian Junkers of the old German Conservative Party on the one hand, Christian Socialist workers in Westphalian industry, white-collar workers in Hamburg (members of the active *Deutschnationaler Handlungsgehilfenverband*), and remnants of the superpatriotic wartime German Fatherland Party among others, a satisfactory Nationalist platform was never easy to put together even at the best of times. There need be little surprise, then, if the Party demonstrated striking inconsistencies in its day-to-day activities and, in its basic programme, tended to those vague generalities identified by historian Annelise Thimme as a flight to myth.

Professor Thimme of the University of Alberta attempts to explain the essential character and motivation of the Nationalist Right in a relatively short study covering the whole period of the Republic. Although not intended to be a party history, the work is useful to those who want quick access to information on the platform, basic ideas, leadership, and tactics of the DNVP. But it remains an exercise in interpretation rather than research.

Essentially hostile to the new regime, the DNVP was never able to make the transition of Gustav Stresemann's German People's Party to reasoned support of the system. At best the Nationalists were ambivalent, as Professor Thimme ably demonstrates. They cooperated positively on aspects of the constitution in various committees of the National Constituent Assembly, and later twice joined government coalitions. The latter experience proved unfortunate for the coalitions as well as the Party itself. Its essential nature was not only to be negative under existing circumstances, but also to serve as an opposition: the disloyal opposition, for the most part, of *enragés* whose ire could be expected to rise at the prospect of even momentary successes of the hard-pressed Weimar Republic. If the Party could not command the votes needed to give it power, still it helped shape a public opinion that did much to nullify the liberating effect of Stresemann's imaginative foreign policy. The Dawes and Young plans, the Locarno Treaty, even Germany's entry in the League of Nations were denounced with constant vitriol. Stresemann had sought refuge in Bis-

marck's dictum of the primacy of foreign affairs. It was countered, with no little success, by a Nationalist line of vilification that endured through the Republic's fourteen years, with no genuine truce. The irresponsible, obstructionist tactic was to be adopted and pushed even further by the National Socialists whom the Nationalists attempted to use. In the end the Nazis were able to use and discard the Nationalists with ease.

Thimme follows others in showing the Nationalist juxtaposition of myth against myth: that is, the stab-in-the-back legend versus the November revolution. Nor is there much new in her description of the discomforts of the authoritarian, Nationalist personality in the environment of a democratic society. More difficult, and less successful is the author's attempt to characterize the Nationalists psychologically. Where hate prevails, she notes quite late in the book and almost parenthetically, there are also feelings of guilt and *Angst*. These in turn create the characteristic elements of frustration and aggression in the Nationalist style. The subjective chaos among these conservatives then would appear to be much greater than the objective chaos caused in Germany by the revolt against the Empire. That may well be—but Thimme's writing abounds in too many such unproved or only half-demonstrated surmises from different strands of social science. And there the suggestions remain, thought-provoking sometimes or merely irritating and misleading, for the most part unintegrated with the historical phenomenon under consideration. The result, then, is to create mystification about a group perhaps not really all that difficult to comprehend.

The Right has been amply studied in other countries, but overshadowed in Germany by the Fascist experience. Certainly the German version of the Right after 1918 is worthy of study on its own, if only to show how the conservative side undermined itself as a credible political alternative even as figuratively it dug the Republic's grave. While the subject has not attracted many writers, the outlines are now in place. We must now await further efforts to put it all together.

LEWIS HERTZMAN

York University, Toronto

Utopia and Reform in the Enlightenment. By Franco Venturi. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971. Pp. v, 160. \$8.50.)

The Shape of Utopia: Studies in a Literary Genre. By Robert C. Elliott. (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1970. Pp. xii, 158. \$6.50.)

In the publication of his 1969 G. M. Trevelyan

Lectures Franco Venturi has made available to a wider audience a series of essays that are stimulating, richly suggestive, and as impressive in their thesis as in the range of their scholarly reference. They are also frustrating and unnecessarily difficult.

Venturi is initially concerned with the way that intellectual historians tend to see their task. He protests that they have been excessively preoccupied with finding the roots and sources of ideas at the cost of slighting the question of how various ideas function in their immediate social and political context. "Evidently we must not follow the ideas back to their origins, but examine their function in the history of the eighteenth century. Philosophers are tempted to push upstream until they arrive at the source. Historians must tell us how the river made its way, among what obstacles and difficulties" (pp. 2-3).

As a model of that approach Venturi seizes upon the circumstances that influenced the meaning of the republican ideal in eighteenth-century political discourse, showing how a republican model initially associated with reform eventually played a decisive role in utopian thinking. In his view, ideas of political reform were generally articulated as restatements of a republican theory of politics, a republican theory owing at least as much to the example of contemporary republican institutions as it did to the history of classical antiquity. The first group of enlightened intellectuals to come to grips with immediate political problems linked the problems of greater intellectual liberty with the question of an enlarged political liberty. Toland, Molesworth, Collins, Moyle, Trenchard, Shaftesbury and their colleagues held that the struggles for a genuinely rational religion (deism) and a truly rational politics (republicanism) were, in fact, simply different aspects of the same endeavor. They were important as transmitters of the idea of a moral republicanism to enlightened thinkers on the continent who, in the troubled times around the middle of the century, were in need of a rational reform ideology.

By the middle of the century the existing republics had declined to a point where they existed at the sufferance of the great powers. It was clear, Venturi tells us, that their problems of endemic political instability and financial crisis were practically insoluble. As the existing republics became manifestly inadequate as models for the reform of the institutions of the large nation state, republicanism became increasingly a matter of an ethical idea. Hence, as Venturi shows, a thinker like d'Argenson could speak of the ideal French king serving as the protector of his people, making France a sort of monarchical republic. The republican ideal in the minds of

thinkers as diverse as Montesquieu, Diderot, and Rousseau essentially meant moral government free of the caprices of absolutism. Furthermore, influenced by the change in moral thought, the republican ethical ideal lost its classical association with the virtue of frugality and assumed overtones which tied morality and prosperity together. Venturi suggests, correctly it seems, that it is more useful to think of political thought in the late eighteenth century in terms of modifications of the republican tradition than in terms of an unfolding democratic theory.

As a moral ideal, the prospect of a republican monarchy served to animate the reforming efforts of men such as Turgot and many lesser figures. But in the 1770s and 1780s the possibility of reform seemed increasingly remote and the philosophers wearied of talk of it. Venturi chooses to discuss this process and the radicalization of the reform impulse by considering the nature and fate of Beccaria's ideas on the right to punish. Beccaria came close to advancing a utopian critique of social and political institutions, but he would not go beyond the suggestion that property rights might perhaps be unnecessary. He offered a reforming, utilitarian program designed to abolish unnecessary barbarity in the system of justice. In his discussion of the French responses to Beccaria's views, Venturi makes it clear that Voltaire had little interest in Beccaria's theoretical principles, but much interest in his ideas as practical weapons to be used in the war against palpable injustice. Diderot, considering it impossible to preserve the social order while also saving the criminal element, could not even make pragmatic use of the Italian's book. Others, Mably and Linguet for example, argued that the necessity for punishment derived from the unequal distribution of property and that unjust laws were required by an unjust society. Thus, Venturi argues, reformers were led to the conclusion that the only path to genuine justice led beyond reform to the abolition of the immoral social, economic, and political order. Reform was merely cosmetic, a change in appearances which would only hide the fact of radical institutional injustice. Only a society without sharp social and economic divisions, ideally a society without property, would allow the republican moral ideal to become reality.

This brief summary scarcely does justice to the scope of Venturi's perspective which embraces a host of minor figures in western Europe and the development of political ideas in Poland, Italy, Spain and elsewhere. Valuable as these references are, however, it is regrettable that Venturi has occasionally sacrificed clarity for the sake of breadth. Lectures cannot be expected to be as exhaustive or definitive as a monograph. None-

theless, even within the limits imposed by the lecture format, Venturi's ideas could have been put forward more clearly. The central theme of the work is obscure on a first reading, a defect that could be remedied easily with a paragraph sharply establishing the focus. Central terms are sometimes used in very special senses that are not adequately discriminated. The reader is too often left following Venturi into remote areas without a solid sense of purpose. Yet this splendid book sheds much light on a critically important topic, and it suggests a multitude of issues requiring further investigation. As a seminal work it ought to be read by anyone concerned with the political thought of the eighteenth century, but to be comprehended it will have to be read more than once.

Among the seven previously published articles brought together by Professor Elliott at least three ought to interest specialists in intellectual history and the history of political theory. In the first, "Saturnalia, Satire and Utopia," he focuses on the way in which both satirical and utopian literature create their effect, at least in part, by implicitly or explicitly establishing a standard in terms of which existing society is found defective. In utopian literature this criticism is the most positive argument in favor of the proposed utopian model. In early modern utopian literature utopia was offered as a nonrealizable standard in terms of which the faults of the present could be better seen and thus reformed.

In the essay on "The Fear of Utopia" Elliott shows that in modern times utopian theories have tended to function as descriptions of a "nowhere" which is to be brought into historical existence. As utopia has lost its association with reform and become the basis of radical political action and governmental policy, the term has come to suggest fanaticism and unrealistic expectations. Nonetheless, the terrors and frustrations of twentieth-century history would seem to provide adequate background for a flourishing utopian literature. Yet as the potential of behaviorist psychology, mind-altering drugs, and social engineering seem increasingly ominous, it has been difficult to create esthetically and morally attractive radical models of society. In his discussion of recent "Anti-Anti-Utopias" Elliott considers the ways in which B. F. Skinner in *Walden Two* and Aldous Huxley in *Island* have tried to elaborate postmodern utopias. In this insightful and stimulating brief book the author is sensitive to the continual interplay between writer, text, and society in a manner that makes his comments valuable to others besides students of literature.

RODNEY W. KILCUP

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Foundations of Political Action: An Exchange Theory of Politics. By Sidney R. Waldman. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company. 1972. Pp. 256. \$3.95.)

In *Foundations of Political Action*, Professor Waldman, building on the work of George Homans, constructs a model of political exchange, fortifies it with propositions from learning theory for realism, and demonstrates that many broad- and narrow-gauge social theories can be brought within its terms. He has written an interesting book.

Waldman is at once confident of the wide explanatory power of exchange analysis and critical of the psychological assumptions with which it has so far been infused by economists, sociologists, and political scientists. He sets out to refine the assumptions with data about the ways in which people seek rewards from one another and reinforce each other's behavior patterns. The result is a reduction of old and new lines of thought in the study of the individual and society to statements about the exchange of human activities.

Illustrative chapters on political culture, modernization, legitimacy, political parties and interest groups, and conflict resolution follow the general arguments. To regard political behavior as give and take is less commonplace in some of these areas than in others, and therefore the chapters are not equally provocative. But on the whole, they are a mine of ideas. The strength of the book is in these chapters. They can be consulted separately by those with matching interests.

At the end of the volume, Waldman goes on to suggest other applications:

The theory could be applied to an examination and analysis of electoral politics (the exchanges between parties and voters, between competing parties, between would-be officeholders and their following, between party activists and voters, between candidates and the media, etc.). It could be used to analyze the rationales underlying party and voter activities and, for that matter, to analyze the exchanges between legislative parties. It could be used to examine the relations of the mass media to the public, the government, and the business community, to analyze the relations between various interest groups, and to explain the bases of power in various institutions. It could be used to analyze the dynamics of revolutionary and radical movements . . . (pp. 205-6).

And so on, at some length.

Waldman's forte is the manipulation of ideas. He is as often as not content to establish the equivalence of exchange and other theories, describing many things with a single model rather than concentrating his resources to describe a few things better. It is suggestive, for example,

but not clearly advantageous to translate Peter Blau's idea of the growth of trust between those who exchange into the reward-and-reinforcement language of learning theory.

And Waldman is conspicuously more interested in putting theories together than in making sure they work, for all of his criticism of unchecked *a priori* reasoning in the social sciences. He sometimes falls into a categorical mode of expression—notably that X “explains” Y—that obscures an underlying commitment to empiricism. His statements should read as hypotheses to be tested, or further tested, whatever the nuances of his style.

Foundations of Political Action is not the best introduction to exchange theory for undergraduates. The writing is unnecessarily difficult. The general reader will still find Blau's *Exchange and Power in Social Life* more to the point. Waldman's book is to be recommended instead to those with a serious interest in the elaboration of exchange theory or in one or more of the topics he has selected for illustration.

The publisher includes this volume in its series on comparative politics only by stretching the term some.

ROBERT J. SICKELS

The University of New Mexico

Systems Theory in International Relations: A Study in Metaphoric Hypertrophy. By John J. Weltman. (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath and Co., 1973. Pp. 99. \$12.00.)

This book is a critique of the systems-theory approach to international relations. The author begins by suggesting that the roots of the approach are in general systems theory and sociological functionalism, both of which are characterized as “holistic” and overly abstract. He then focuses on the works of Morton Kaplan, Ernst Haas, and Richard Rosecrance.

Professor Weltman performs a valuable service in the second chapter by condensing the main features of *Systems and Process in International Politics*, and Kaplan's subsequent revisions of that work, into nineteen pages of quotations and commentary. Weltman discusses problems raised by Kaplan's notions of stability, equilibrium, regulation and disturbance. For example, he says, “In what sense a change involving change in the system itself can still be indicative of a form of *stability* is unfortunately not made clear” (p. 16). Weltman criticizes the “six essential rules” of the balance of power or multipolar system and the rules of the loose bipolar system as tautological or logically inconsistent or both.

In the third chapter, the author takes aim at *Beyond the Nation-State*. Weltman criticizes

Haas for using the systems approach to relabel old concepts without adding to their usefulness, for classifying states into ideological types, for talking about the motives or objectives of states and international organizations as if they were not "complex, ambiguous, and resistant to description" (p. 41), and for "the ease with which the approach is employed to give a pejorative characterization to one group of states" (p. 46). His main concern, however, is that "Haas is unable to demonstrate the necessity of the systems approach in arriving at his substantive conclusions" (p. 48). This is the weakest chapter in the book.

In the fourth chapter, Weltman criticizes Richard Rosecrance's *Action and Reaction in World Politics*. This chapter is much more on the mark than the previous one, emphasizing as it does that the main explanatory variables, the "disruptive" and "regulative" factors in Rosecrance's nine historical systems, are not defined precisely and are not measured independently of the dependent variable, international "stability." He also criticizes Rosecrance for overemphasizing the effect of ideology on cooperation and conflict in international systems.

The fifth and sixth chapters are devoted to a review and critique of works on "regions" or "subsystems" and on bipolarity and multipolarity. Although it is a fair review, the criticisms are neither original nor convincing. Weltman fails to discuss any of the empirical findings of scholars like Bruce Russett, Steven Brams, and Michael Haas.

Weltman reserves the final chapter for a summary and his ideas for an alternative approach. He criticizes systems theorists, especially Kaplan and Rosecrance, for "reifying" the concept of a system (p. 78). He criticizes them for not providing testable hypotheses or quantifiable variables. He suggests that even if quantification were possible, the systems approach would still be unable to provide novel hypotheses. I disagree. It seems clear to me that this approach already provided novel hypotheses. Hypotheses linking the "stability" (peacefulness) of international systems to bipolarity and multipolarity are novel. They are much more precise and testable than traditional "balance of power" formulations. Using international systems as units of analysis is novel. Indeed, it is one of the perhaps unanticipated effects of systems theory that we are now talking about hypotheses at all.

The alternative which the author proposes begins with Weber's fourfold typology of conduct: 1) goal-oriented conduct, 2) value-related conduct, 3) private, emotional conduct, and 4) traditional conduct. Weltman suggests that political action is primarily goal-oriented and

tradition-oriented activity. Social relationships are the results of interactions between individuals are therefore highly complex. "A state is not an organism, but a bundle of individual action" (p. 87). Nevertheless, the state may die if essential "behavioral orientations" are changed. These essential behavioral orientations are the product of tradition-oriented behavior, sometimes originating from goal-oriented activity.

Given this epistemology, Weltman suggests four "levels of analysis" for the study of cooperation-conflict in international politics: 1) the state, 2) "discrete interstate social relations," 3) a map of these relations in a given period of time, and 4) the "typological evolution of this map" (p. 90). What these levels mean is not entirely clear from the two pages which are devoted to them. Nor is it clear what the author means by saying that "in the abstract" his approach "would appear promising" (p. 91).

I found this book to be difficult to read, primarily because it condenses into such a small space the arguments which originally occupied several thousand pages. But that is also one of its primary attractions. It would be useful for graduate assignments, in conjunction with the original works. Nevertheless, Weltman is not consistently careful in his criticisms, and he shows very little awareness of the field outside the works cited in the book. This is particularly unfortunate since several writers have attempted to extend or modify the systems approach in ways which answer some of Weltman's criticisms. For example, Steven Brams attempted to replace the systems approach with a "structural" approach, based on mathematical theories which allow quantification of variables and hypothesis testing. The fact that these theories are "holistic" requires some rethinking on the part of critics of systems theory. Herbert Simon, in his *Sciences of the Artificial* and articles on decomposable systems, extended the range and applicability of systems theory far beyond the limits imposed by Bertalanffy or Talcott Parsons. A more satisfactory critique of systems theory would have to take into account a wider range of works than are discussed in this book. An exploration of the theoretical similarities between systems theory and "structuralism," although a very difficult undertaking, would be extremely valuable.

JEFFREY A. HART

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System and Structure: Essays in Communication and Exchange. By Anthony Wilden. (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1972. Pp. 540. \$23.75.)

This volume collects the numerous essays in which Anthony Wilden has developed some

aspects of communication theory and applied these insights to a selected group of thinkers and topics in the social and psychological sciences. Principal attention is directed to "structural" anthropology and psychoanalysis. The reader will encounter an extended critique of Levi-Strauss, the anthropologist, and Lacan, the psychoanalyst, who is credited with driving his French audience to reread (or, more likely, to read) the collected writings of Freud. Creative use is made of Gregory Bateson's "double-bind" principle and also of Bateson's theory of mind.

Wilden is at home with "the complex epistemological reorganization" now taking place, which he succinctly, if technically, characterizes

in a number of different but related ways: from stasis to process, from entity to relationship, from atom to gestalt, from aggregate to whole, from heap to structure, from part to system, from analytics to dialects, from closed systems to open systems, from causality to constraint, from energy to information, from bioenergetics to communication, from equilibrium theory to negative entropy—in a word, from atom to system and thence to ecosystem (p. 241).

Political scientists will be disappointed to find that power outcomes are not given explicit systematic treatment, although many of the intellectual tools required for such an undertaking are packed in the bag. However, one of the principal theses put forward by Wilden is expressly "political." The author endeavors to connect some features of the prestructuralist epoch with the class system. An example of this mode of approach is the discussion of Piaget in Chapter 11. The argument is that Piaget's conception of development is not truly contextual. Rather, it remains rigidly, not flexibly, systematic. This is attributed to the influence of a middle-class environment on Piaget's outlook. Such an environment is asserted to be incompatible with the acceptance of drastic change pursued by drastic methods.

Among the most rewarding chapters is Chapter 7 which examines analog and digital communication. Analog conceptions are continuous, Professor Wilden reminds us. Therefore, in a world of continual interaction (or process), these conceptions are more fundamentally oriented than digital frameworks can be. Chapter 12 discusses "Ecosystem and Metasystem," setting forth "a morphogenic model of emergence in open systems." Closed systems reiterate past patterns of relationship. Open systems, by contrast, are able to establish new ways of relating themselves to energy sources. The problem is to account for, and to provide programs for directing the crystalizing of new, if inveterately provisional, structures in open systems.

In future work it is to be hoped that Wilden will demonstrate how his approach can be used to obtain more innovative results than the revival of hypotheses about the rigid perspectives of the middle classes. The analysis of exchanges among valued outcomes can be fruitfully carried much further. As employed in the present essays the distinction between "symbolic" and "imaginary" exchange is one of the many promising leads.

HAROLD D. LASSWELL

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Congressmen's Voting Decisions. By John W. Kingdon. (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1973. Pp. 313. \$8.95, cloth; \$4.50, paper.)

John Kingdon is a reasonable man. His earlier study of the beliefs and strategies of political candidates investigated a reasonable subject by reasonable means and with reasonable conclusions. His new book on the House of Representatives more or less follows suit. Little here contradicts or departs radically from the recent tradition of legislative research, nor are many of the ideas or conclusions particularly startling. But neither are there glaring problems with what he has done. To be reasonable, however, is to risk being forgettable. I suspect that legislative scholars will read this book without any perceptible effect on their blood pressure, and come away without much more than the satisfaction of having made another attempt, however futile, to keep up with the work in their field.

Professor Kingdon focuses on congressmen's voting decisions on the floor of the House. While paying properly footnoted obeisance to the many studies which correlate (at a minimum) roll-call votes with everything imaginable, he recognizes that such analyses do not confront the human problem of an individual representative making a specific voting decision. His emphasis, therefore, is on how individual congressmen decide to vote under pressures of time and information. To find an answer, he turns to the members of the House themselves, asking them not about their approach to legislative decision making generally, but about why they voted as they did the week before. In multiple interviews with a stratified sample of congressmen, he asked them how they had made up their minds on recent votes which were somehow prominent, if not highly divisive. If his sampling and interviewing techniques do not permit exact replication, Kingdon's approach meets a more demanding standard—gathering useful information without confirming politicians' worst prejudices about political scientists.

The first half of Kingdon's analysis is devoted,

chapter by chapter, to a discussion of who and what might influence how a congressman votes. In order, he considers the impact of constituency, fellow congressmen, party and committee leadership, interest groups, the administration and executive branch, staff, and the media. In brief, he concludes that the first two are by far the most important, that the other possible sources of influence range in independent impact from marginal to negligible, and that, to the extent the others are important, they operate indirectly by influencing the attitudes of constituents and colleagues. Kingdon's enthusiasm for his subject seems to diminish somewhat in rough proportion to the importance of the influence he discusses in each chapter. His opening chapters are especially appealing, combining a relatively graceful style with a cogent synthesis of his own data and the literature from which he draws his inspiration. Unfortunately, his discussions of interest groups, congressional leaders, and the executive branch are somewhat more perfunctory, presumably because his data generally minimize their direct impact on individual decision making.

In his second set of chapters, Kingdon attempts to draw his disparate threads together into a model of congressional voting which he describes as "the consensus mode of decision." Without doing too much damage to the complexity of the argument, it may be summarized as follows: (1) when all or almost all of the potential sources of influence point in the same direction, that is the direction the congressman will take; and (2) this is what usually happens. Whether this argument appears reasonable or merely trivial depends ultimately, I suppose, on the knowledge that each reader brings to it. It certainly conforms with David Mayhew's recent emphasis on political self-preservation as a guiding principle of congressional behavior.

Kingdon avoids the danger of portraying the congressman-as-billiard-ball by emphasizing the extent to which the Congress and each of its members can create at least the appearance of a consensual decision-making environment. For example, the tendency for many committees to avoid conflict on the floor also eases the decision-making burden for the non-committee member by resolving or submerging the conflict he might otherwise confront. Even when conflict exists, however, it is mitigated (or avoided altogether) by a natural propensity to perceive and associate selectively, thereby constructing a decision-making environment which is apparently consensual and in harmony with the congressman's own predispositions. In Kingdon's terms, such "preconsensus processes" enable congressmen to remain within the com-

fortable confines of the consensus mode even on matters of high controversy.

In this book, Kingdon combines elements of a monograph and a text, imbedding the results of his own research in a synthesis which draws effectively on earlier work. It will be of some interest to specialists, but of greater value to teachers who descend from the heights of systems analysis to confront the question of how a congressman can vote for billion dollar bills without knowing the first thing about them.

STANLEY BACH

University of Massachusetts

A History of Regulatory Taxation. By R. Alton Lee. (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1973. Pp. 228. \$15.25.)

This book is not primarily for the public-law scholar nor for the student of Congress. The author is a historian, and his book is likely to be of greatest interest to economic historians and to those interested in the extension of the national police power through efforts of Congress to regulate or outlaw products or activities through the taxing power. For more than a century Congress has occasionally chosen to use its taxing power to eliminate such diverse products and activities as state bank notes, oleomargarine, adulterated flour and dairy products, phosphorus matches, drugs and narcotics, child labor, gambling, guns, and grain and cotton futures. In the case of agriculture and mining, Congress tried in the New Deal period to assist these occupations through the use of taxes that would help to regularize wages and prices through reducing supplies.

Regulatory taxes, Professor Lee tells us, were frequently chosen when Congress questioned the constitutionality of its police powers in regulating interstate commerce. And, of course, industries regulated through taxes sought to overturn such legislation through the courts. Since the Supreme Court tended to find acts to tax to be purely revenue measures and within the power of Congress until 1914, Congress continued to use the taxing power for regulating interstate commerce. From 1914 until well within the New Deal period, the Supreme Court justices found tax measures that raised little or no revenue unconstitutional because (1) they interfered with the rights of the states in their exercise of the police power, or (2) taxed some sectors of the public for the special benefit of others (agriculture and mining). The court thus restricted congressional regulation of interstate commerce whether directly or through the taxing power for a period of almost 25 years. Subsequently Congress usually has regulated business directly under the

interstate commerce clause. When Congress has used the taxing power in more recent years for regulation as in the case of narcotics and gun control, Professor Lee believes the results have been unsatisfactory.

Occasionally statements or assumptions of fact in the book are intriguing and suggest interesting further studies. For example, in chapter seven, the summary of the abolition of phosphorus matches through the taxing power includes the information that the Diamond Match Company, on request of President Taft in 1911, made its patents on the safety match available to its competitors and even sent men from its factory to other factories in the nation to assist in initial manufacture of this new match. I wonder whether this action was motivated purely by the altruism of the firm's president or board, or by concern to avoid further public outcry against the unsocial behavior by trusts, or what? How is such behavior stimulated? What about the recent addition of women and minorities on boards of directors of some of our major companies? Do such acts provide a more positive public image of the companies, of women and minorities? Are there policy consequences for the companies in employment? In other ways?

This is a short, useful, but not distinguished book, with a price tag that will limit its sales almost entirely to libraries. I wonder whether this and many other such books might not come out exclusively in quality paperback at a substantially lower price than \$15.25 announced for this one.

CLARA PENNIMAN

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Programs in Aid of the Poor for the 1970s. By Sar H. Levitan. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973. Pp. 146, index. \$6.00, cloth; \$1.95, paper.)

This book, which updates an earlier volume, contains a compact though detailed appraisal of U. S. government programs undertaken on behalf of the poor. Its author, Professor Sar Levitan, divides such programs among four categories and for each presents a concise description and evaluation of its ability to alleviate poverty at its present level of funding. (See pp. xi-xii.)

(1) "Income maintenance programs aimed at aiding the poor who are outside the work force" (largely the aged and female-headed families with dependent children).

(2) "Programs supplying goods and services" (medical services, food stamps, housing, etc.).

(3) Programs whose immediate goal is to avert the spread of poverty to new generations (birth control, child care, education).

(4) Programs to aid the working poor (manpower programs, the author's immediate area of specialization; equal employment opportunity; minimum wage legislation, etc.).

In the final chapter Levitan turns to goals and priorities. He recommends the adoption of comprehensive income maintenance, "more orderly . . . than the present haphazard, hit-or-miss public assistance programs," in which the income guarantee would, say, be set at "75 per cent of the level of income that would raise the recipient to the poverty threshold" (p. 134). Once this goal is reached, Levitan, in designing antipoverty policy, would emphasize programs in education, job training and job creation, and housing, and strengthen protective legislation to assure a proper institutional environment. The price tag of these "proposed modest priorities," he claims, "would be on the order of \$20 to \$25 million, and involve an increase of some 50 per cent of all public and private outlays in aid of the poor" (pp. 139-40).

As a primer, well-written and descriptive, this book, unlike most, will prove quite useful. No sophistication in economics is required of its audience. Thus, for the interested citizen or public official with limited time but an interest in familiarizing himself with the subject, it is a good starting point, and then some. For those with an analytic bent, however, it is a comfortable and fact-filled reference, generous in opinion and descriptive detail, but little more.

Levitan's openly displayed sympathy for anti-poverty measures is both a strength and a weakness. His value bias is so explicit that the reader can easily allow for it and refocus the issues in terms of his or her own values. The chapter headings, quotations from the Bible and Talmud, indicate that Levitan, motivated by empathy, sees aid to the poor as something that is "right," a matter of "doing good," mandated by a sense of social justice. Indeed, these selections, from sources as diverse as Maimonides and Matthew, may themselves justify the price of the book. But the singlemindedness with which Levitan discusses redistributive programs, focusing almost entirely on their ability to reduce measured poverty at the expense of political justification and cost-effectiveness, leaves me more than a bit uncomfortable.

There is, I think, a far more analytic, and thus more substantive, basis for our social concern with poverty, producing programs to alleviate it, than the treatment in this book captures. The discussion of income redistribution to the poor, for a setting of representative democracy, raises far more complex issues of optimal amount and form than Levitan seems to recognize. To be sure one must consider what the poor themselves

think redistribution can do for them, and how quickly it can do it. But, if the aim is to *do* something for the poor, not just to wish it, the preferences of the taxpayer-donors who must finance such programs must also be considered. This is illustrated, regrettably, by the importance taken on by the work incentive issue in the political failure of a series of income guarantee proposals. Whether the disincentives which preoccupied the opponents of such legislation are real is less important than whether voters, whose vocal support its enactment required, thought and cared about them. Levitan's presentation would be more penetrating, albeit more difficult for those not schooled in the micro-foundations of public choice, if it examined why and how redistributive programs, which nominally benefit only a minority of the electorate, emerge from representative political process. It would be more useful, in setting forth a feasible basis for policy, if Levitan took into account that redistributive programs represent mutual self-interest, benefiting both donors and recipients, rather than obligations that the well-to-do must suffer for moral reasons, even if these are opposed to their self-interest.

To be even more pragmatic, it might be well argued that Levitan should give more emphasis than he does to the nature of the process, bureaucratic or market, through which anti-poverty programs operate. Indeed, his implicit distrust of the market, manifested, for example, in comments on the effectiveness of trickle-down on the supply of housing, is in my view a weakness of his discussion.

Fairness to Levitan requires me to make clear that these criticisms apply not only to his book but to the bulk of the output of the "income maintenance research industry." I make no pretense that the opinion they reflect, which is my own, is shared by a majority of those knowledgeable in the field. Dominance of heart over mind may reflect an admirable perspective in some humanistic inquiry. As a characteristic of policy analysis, however, it is fatal. When it comes to matters of distribution, too many legislators and the voters they represent are from Missouri; and too many of my fellow economists, including many who fancy themselves among the most pragmatic, are from Utopia.

HAROLD M. HOCHMAN

The Urban Institute

The Politics of Depression: Political Behavior in the Northeast, 1893-1896. By Samuel T. McSeveney. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972. Pp. xvi, 333. \$9.75.)

In recent years historians have approached the historical roots of popular voting behavior with

the same resolve—and a few of the same statistical tools—that political scientists like V. O. Key have used to analyze contemporary patterns. In this book, the fruit of many years of meticulous fact-gathering by a student of Samuel P. Hays, a significant portion of the story has been told. New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut were close battlegrounds in the 1880s and 1890s, especially the Empire State with its big electoral bonus for anyone who could chart his way through a bewildering variety of voter groups and a labyrinth of political factionalism. Professor McSeveney attends closely to the wealth of minor civil division, census, and electoral data to show how the nuances of rhetoric and event interacted to produce subtle decisive shifts in voting behavior.

Ethno-religious groupings, the author is convinced, were the primary units of party identification. While most historians would perforce agree, a more synthetic conceptual approach and a more sophisticated analytic technique would have greatly strengthened McSeveney's argument. In any case there is little doubt that in the Northeast, as in the Midwest, disputes among pietistic (e.g., Methodist, Congregational) and liturgical (especially Catholic) voters triggered the deepest emotional responses. The pietists, seeking to modernize society overnight by suppressing intemperance, gambling, and political corruption, made the G.O.P. their vehicle for reform. The Democrats regrouped the liturgicals by making laissez-faire into an anti-modernizing weapon. This succeeded until the cruel impact of the Depression of 1893 forced the urbanized electorate to appreciate the benefits of a full employment high-tariff policy and (in 1896) a probusiness financial policy. Bryan's moralism, like Cleveland's, left the unemployed and underemployed cold and hungry for McKinley's full dinner pail.

Most of McSeveney's nonstatistical information comes from a close reading of a dozen major metropolitan newspapers. He also combed the private correspondence of the leading politicians, thereby adding authority to his analysis of leadership perceptions and maneuvers. Had the author a keener ear for the lively quote or the apt phrase, his monograph would be pleasant to read. As it is, only dedicated specialists are likely to work their way through this dissertation. Further research will be needed before the full picture of northeastern politics can be seen. Nonetheless, a vital piece of jigsaw is now available to anyone who puzzles over the historical mysteries of American voting behavior.

RICHARD JENSEN

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"Lessons" of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy. By Ernest R. May. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973. Pp. 220. \$6.95.)

This is a well-written and thought-provoking little book by a distinguished American historian. In the preface, Professor May cites three theses which he hopes to prove: one, "that framers of foreign policy are often influenced by beliefs about what history teaches or portends"; two, "that policy-makers ordinarily use history badly"; three, "that policy-makers can, if they will, use history more discriminatingly."

The book is divided into two parts, the first consisting of four case studies around Roosevelt's prosecution of the Second World War and his efforts to build a new world order, Truman's decision in 1947 to aid Greece and Turkey, Truman's reactions to the outbreak of war in Korea in 1950, and Kennedy's and Johnson's decisions to defend South Vietnam with American arms. Part two of the book includes an analysis of the Johnson Administration's decision to bomb North Vietnam, a chapter entitled "Prediction: U. S. Foreign Policy in the Next Decade," and a final chapter in which the author pleads the case for professional historians being better used by foreign policy makers in the future.

The most interesting part of the book, in my view, is the analysis of the four episodes in American diplomacy cited above. Professor May makes a persuasive case for the view that Roosevelt's preparation for the postwar world was heavily influenced by his fear of a return to isolationist sentiment similar to what occurred in the 1920s. Roosevelt faulted Wilson for failing in 1918-19 to bring the Senate fully into the policy formulation regarding the League of Nations and other postwar planning, and he made great efforts to avoid that "lesson" of history in planning for the United Nations and other such proposals. The author also presents a convincing case that Truman was heavily influenced in his decisions in 1947 and in 1950 by his perception of what happened in the 1930's, when the Western powers did not challenge Germany, Italy or Japan in their aggressions until almost too late. He argues that Truman, like Roosevelt, may have overreacted because of a faulty reading of history. Finally, he takes Kennedy and Johnson to task for badly interpreting history in the decisions to intervene in Vietnam and the way in which the war was fought.

These four chapters are especially interesting and well documented, and therefore the reader is left somewhat puzzled by this statement which follows the case histories and tends to contradict them: "As with decisions by Roosevelt and

Truman, so with those of Kennedy and Johnson one can plausibly argue that the outcome would have been the same even if inferences from history had played no part in the reasoning" (p. 115). Earlier Professor May states that he does not quarrel with the decisions made by Roosevelt in 1944-45, or with those of Truman in 1947 and 1950; he contends their decisions were sound but the reasoning by which they arrived at them leaves something to be desired from the viewpoint of a professional historian. He is tougher on Kennedy and Johnson, however, arguing that even though the decisions to go into Vietnam were made after the most careful staffing within the Executive Branch and agreed to by nearly all the highest echelons, the decisions were based on faulty premises and probably will be judged by history to have been "misbegotten blunders" (p. 121).

The chapter on predictions about U. S. foreign policy in the next decade does not measure up in scholarship to the earlier part of the book. To be scholarly about predicting the future, the historian would need to employ some of the analytical tools of the political scientist in order to assess what the international environment might look like in the 1980s and what changes might take place in American society by then. Here the author speculates about what the future might hold simply on the basis of his reading of the United States' behavior in the world since World War II. The historian's predictive powers are probably no better than those of political scientists or of competent journalists even though he has a clearer understanding of the past. What Professor May's study shows is that even history may not serve as a very good guide to understanding the future during periods of revolutionary change. In any case, this chapter lacks both documentation and convincing analysis.

Despite these few drawbacks, the book is worth reading. Thoughtful Americans will ponder, and debate, for years why "the best and the brightest" could have been so misguided about the degree of national interest the United States had in Vietnam in the 1960s. This book provides a fair and well-documented appraisal of what went wrong.

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Political Parties in Revolutionary Massachusetts.

By Stephen E. Patterson. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1973. Pp. ix, 299. \$12.50.)

Historians debate vigorously the question of when political parties appeared in the United States. Many agree that modern parties took

their basic form by the 1840s, but claims for the appearance of party earlier have a long tradition. Of course these claims are tied usually to different, modest definitions of party. Now Stephen Patterson has asserted that parties existed in Massachusetts from the 1750s to 1780. This not only clashes with other recent works, but also finds little support from Patterson's own evidence. Further, Patterson organizes his narrative with concepts that are anachronistic and chaotic. This is particularly unfortunate because he writes with skill and has worked hard. Though the book helps us to understand the complex divisions which accompanied Americans' passage to rebellion in one state, it is counter-productive with regard to party development.

Patterson insists that his parties were not "short-lived, issue-oriented coalitions but rather established parties that produced highly consistent voting patterns . . . over a number of years" (p. vii). They were not highly organized nor conscious creations of politicians but still a "structure of [two] party politics imposed itself on the controversy with Great Britain, defining the tactics of the Revolution" (p. 4).

Patterson recognizes that political elites still condemned "party" and "faction" because of their incompatibility with republican assumptions about government and society. He contends, however, that rhetoric lagged behind behavior, and discovers a gap between "antipartisan theory and partisan reality." Patterson tries initially to establish the reality of his parties by indiscriminately assembling usages of the term "party" or equivalents in Massachusetts from Jonathan Edwards in the 1720s to John Adams in 1817. These examples often have nothing to do with the "developing parties" which Patterson repeatedly asserts existed from 1757 to 1780. Sometimes "party" references are to temporary divisions within towns, but Patterson otherwise argues that mostly "the provincial parties represented intertown rather than intratown rivalries" (p. 4).

Indeed, from the late 1750s to the mid 1770s Patterson's claim rests primarily on his analysis of six available roll-call votes in the legislature in 1757, 1758, 1759, 1762 (when there were two), and 1764. These data, he warns, cannot be the basis for generalizations about the entire state. Of 204 towns in a 1761 tax list, only about 120 sent representatives to the legislature in any year, while absenteeism cut the average number responding in the six roll calls to 84. Patterson still finds some 122 "politically active" towns, of which 50 voted "with great regularity" with "the Court party," 52 voted with "the Country party," and 20 were "evenly divided." Partisanship appeared "in the remarkably consistent voting be-

havior of 102 of 122 politically active towns" (p. 33). But close examination of Patterson's active towns indicates that the data from which he generalizes should be reduced still more. Many towns classified as active frequently did not vote on all six roll calls. Thus, Hopkinton did not vote on the first five, but its single 1764 vote on whether Thomas Hutchinson would serve as the agent of Massachusetts in London earned it a place in the Court party. Similarly, 16 Court, 9 Country, and 8 evenly divided towns actually did not vote on half or more of the six roll calls. When votes with the opposition are added, 19 Court and 18 Country towns either did not vote or went with the opposition on half or more of the six roll calls. Other dubious classification criteria might be mentioned, but for more than a third of alleged "active" towns, I find voting neither very regular nor remarkably consistent.

Most of Patterson's efforts go toward showing that economic and geographic conflicts in Massachusetts influenced the course of Revolutionary politics. The difficulty comes in his insistence on describing any political conflict with any kind of social basis as partisan. About halfway through the book he sensibly remarks that "to men at the time, partisanship was a refusal to view public issues in a disinterested way. . . . In republican terms, partisanship was . . . selfishness . . . it was a political expression of economic differences" (p. 149). This may shed light on what eighteenth-century men meant when they accused rivals of being partisans. It does not at all mean that "established" parties imposed their "structure" on the Revolutionary period.

Patterson's Court-Country dichotomy relies heavily on a system of classifying towns on a commercial-cosmopolitan scale which Van Beck Hall developed for the 1780s in *Politics Without Parties: Massachusetts, 1780-1791* (Pittsburgh; University of Pittsburgh Press, 1972). Patterson applies Hall's index without modification to the 1760s (see p. 42), while rejecting the central contribution of Hall's study. Hall, finding sociopolitical cleavages similar to those Patterson uncovers, recognized that the 18th-century historian must do without the "ready-made" analytic structure which the party concept provides and must organize political data differently. Similarly, Jackson T. Main, in *Political Parties Before the Constitution* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1973), finds parties in state legislatures in the 1780s and describes their social, economic, and cultural roots. But Main's legislative blocs are more convincingly established and he accurately calls them "preparty 'parties'" (p. xviii).

Patterson's approach also clashes with that found in Robert Zemsky's excellent study of the

Massachusetts legislature before 1757: *Merchants, Farmers and River Gods: An Essay on Eighteenth-Century American Politics* (Boston: Gambit, 1971). Between 1739 and 1756 Zemsky found 17 roll calls in contrast to Patterson's 6 between 1757 and 1764. Yet Zemsky observed that the House was suspicious of roll calls, did not ordinarily decide questions that way, and kept its debates secret. The scarcity of public roll calls "is an implicit warning about the relevance of such data." More important, Zemsky found no evidence of party behavior and emphasized the weakness of institutions and the strength of an antiparty ethos.

Patterson's narrative mostly has nothing to do with parties, but with movement to Revolution by shifting coalitions in the 1770s. He frequently calls the Country party the "revolutionary" party, yet takes some pains to show that Countrymen divided over the Revolution and that factions in the late 1770s were far more sectional than earlier. Patterson asserts that the east-west division generally coincided with merchant-farmer and maritime-country cleavages, though parts of his narrative show considerable fluidity among these cliché dichotomies. The latter is the strength of this book, but to appreciate it one must ignore the author's conceptual confusions. This book needed tough criticism before going to press. The political scientist seeking insight into eighteenth-century political culture will profit more by turning to Zemsky, Hall, or Main.

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Clark University

Dams, Parks and Politics: Resource Development and Preservation in The Truman-Eisenhower Era. By Elmo Richardson. (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1973. Pp. 247. \$11.25.)

The Truman-Eisenhower era seems far removed from contemporary national concern with environmental issues. Professor Richardson demonstrates, however, that essentially the same issues generated political controversy of comparable intensity, though on a less visible level, during this presumably quiescent period. Students of natural resource policy will find the major conflicts familiar. They involve, first, the conflict between resource development and resource preservation, and, second, the debate over federal versus local control of resource development. Richardson's history discusses these recurring controversies as they were played out during the Truman and Eisenhower administrations. For the most part, the drama takes place within the Department of the Interior, with the conflict between the mutually exclusive objectives of development and preservation finding

embodiment in the Bureau of Reclamation and the National Park Service, respectively.

Conservation organizations such as The Sierra Club (renamed "The Sahara Club" by dam proponents during one such conflict) will find vindication in this book for their view that eternal vigilance is the price of a national park system. At every turn, it appears, there are interests eager to put the national parks to better use by the building of dams within park boundaries: Be it for the generation of hydroelectric power, for irrigation, or even for increased recreational opportunities, the Park Service and its supporters find the principle of "park inviolability" continually under attack. And, the attacks come not only from private economic interests but frequently from a collaboration of those interests with their own "colleagues" in Interior. Park proponents may well ask, with friends like this, who needs enemies?

Understandably, the Park Service's preservationist stance is frequently compromised by pressing economic needs, and Richardson's book is an interesting, and well-documented, account of the nature of conflict resolution within a politically fragmented department. As such, it is a useful companion volume to Harold Ickes' diary which discusses his tenure as Secretary of the Interior under FDR.

The second dispute which colors resource issues is the fundamental question as to who should have control of and ultimate responsibility for resource development, the private or the public sector? Naturally the issue is hardly ever stated so clearly; nevertheless that is what numerous policy questions in this area amount to. As Richardson says in the first pages, "By the time Roosevelt's presidency came to an end, Americans were committed to resource development, but still divided on the means to achieve it" (p. 18). He then shows that the difference between the Democratic administration under Truman and the Republican administration under Eisenhower on this important policy issue were slight. The Democrats leaned towards federal control of resource development while Republicans, such as Interior Secretary McKay ("Giveaway McKay"), leaned away. The difference was one of emphasis and not of substantial change. Thus in his concluding chapter Richardson asks perhaps the most pertinent question for political scientists, "... did it make any difference 'who was sitting on the lid' as policy maker" (p. 198)? A few pages later he answers by concluding:

... the intersection of the issues of preservation and development of resources during the decade offered striking evidence against the American belief in the effectiveness of party turnover ... An examination of

federal resource policy in 1956 reveals no substantial alteration in procedure or substance from 1946. The debate over centralism versus localism which raged at the beginning of the period proved to be directed not at the decision makers so much as at the polling booth (p. 201).

Richardson's history of resource policy under two administrations thus supports a conclusion suspected by many who have studied what Grant McConnell has called "the politics of land and water"; and that is that there is little substantive change and a lot of ideological debate in governmental resource policy. The same debates have continued throughout the 1960s and into the 1970s. It will be interesting to see whether the energy crisis, the food crisis, and the population crisis will force any significant modifications in federal policy.

JEANNE NIENABER

The University of Arizona

The Indispensable Enemy: Labor and the Anti-Chinese Movement in California. By Alexander Saxton. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971. Pp. 293. \$8.50.)

The anti-Chinese movement in the second half of the last century has often been interpreted as being economic in origin. According to this view, the anti-Chinese movement was a grass-roots phenomenon in which the mobilization of the white wage workers, farmers, and shop proprietors won the economic competition with the imported cheap Asian laborers. Professor Alexander Saxton has written this book to offer an explanation which is much broader than, but could incorporate, this cheap-labor argument. He contends that the California labor and party politics dictated the direction of the anti-Chinese course, and he has used historical evidence to illustrate the various political purposes which the Chinese labor issue served for the major proponents of the anti-Chinese movement. Thus, this book, a historical study of the labor movement in California and its relationship with the Chinese labor issue, presents an effort to put the anti-Chinese movement in the "right" perspective.

In the first of the book's three sections, Professor Saxton examines the ideological background of the anti-Chinese movement; he indicates that discrimination against Chinese in jobs and in the right to discover and exploit gold deposits was institutionalized since their earliest immigration. This discrimination reflected an attitude and behavior pattern which derived from the concept of white superiority, a concept stressed by the Democratic party through the years of its efforts to defend slavery and to stage a comeback after the Civil War.

In the second section, the national economic and political forces which shaped the course of the labor movement are carefully specified. Saxton also identifies the internal issues, the change of leadership, and the tactics each of the important anti-Chinese organizations used in campaigns against the Chinese laborers. Two major points are stressed here. First, the anti-Chinese stance was instrumental to the victory of the Democratic party in the 1867 California election, as well as the ascendancy of Kearny and the Workingman's Party, the election of Mayor Kallach in San Francisco, and the recruitment of membership in California trade unions. Second, the anti-Chinese movement became institutionalized in California politics and in the structure of organized labor. As the author writes on the jacket blurb, the Chinese issue "penetrated all tendencies of political ideology from socialism on the one side to Republican on the other, and helped to cement an alliance in California between trade unionism and the progressive movement."

I find that the author, throughout the discussion in the second section, does not include adequate materials in dealing with the reactions, the coping style, and the defensive moves adopted by the Chinese laborers and their leaders. This leaves the reader wondering what Chinese did except to be persecuted and forced to move. Furthermore, I have some questions about the selection of materials. For example, it would have been appropriate for the author to discuss the reliability of the newspaper materials and to tell the reader what was the quality of newspaper reports. In any case, these are minor shortcomings. As a whole, the second section of the book is most interesting, informative, organized, illuminating, and amply documented, and it can be recommended to students of race relations or labor politics.

The final section of the book deals with the impact of the anti-Chinese movement. The author points out that the American Federation of Labor's racially exclusive policies against Chinese and other Orientals reinforced the exclusionary practices which were later directed to blacks in organized labor. Moreover, it furnished a race- or nationality-based argument for a later-adopted federal policy in restricting immigrants from Asia and some European countries. In short, the author examines the impact mainly on national policies. He should also have considered the effects of anti-Orientalism on the life experiences of Asian Americans, especially the segregation, isolation, and discrimination they experienced before and after World War II.

WEN H. KUO

University of Utah

The Politics of Violence: The New Urban Blacks and the Watts Riot. By David Sears and John B. McConahay. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1973. Pp. 244. \$4.95.)

We are a decade in time and generations in consciousness beyond the events in Watts, but that riot or rebellion—the first of the truly big ghetto convulsions of the 1960s—is still a compelling subject for analysis. Consider, for a moment, its sheer magnitude. Sears and McConahay estimate that at least 31,000 adults took an active part in the disturbances at some point, a number which the authors note is equal to three combat divisions or to one and one-half times the maximum number of troops under Washington's command in the Revolution. Thirty-four people were killed in Watts, and more than a thousand were injured. The casualties amounted to more than double the American losses at the Battle of Bunker Hill.

The historical comparison is deliberate and not inappropriate: like Bunker Hill, Watts was in its own way a turning point, marking the end of the southern-inspired civil rights movement and the emergence of a new northern-generated militance. *The Politics of Violence* is a thorough attempt, based on survey data collected in the months following Watts, to explore from a social-psychological perspective the causes and some of the consequences of those six days in the summer of 1965. While the authors choose to call the events in Watts a riot (for that is the word most commonly used by their respondents and by the media), they are nevertheless fully cognizant of the symbolic implications of that term. But their central thesis—namely, that the riot was a profoundly political event, in effect a rebellion, rather than an aimless excursion for fun and profit—leaves no doubt where their sympathies lie.

The argument that the riots of the last decade were political rather than criminal manifestations is by now a familiar one. Indeed, many of the patterns revealed by this present survey will also be familiar to anyone who has followed the voluminous riot literature even in the most casual way. The virtues of this book, then, lie not in its often standard findings on the correlates and interpretations of riot activity in contemporary American cities, but rather in the complexity and implications of its theoretical perspectives.

The riot is viewed as a spark resulting from the conjunction in time and space of two vastly differently socialized populations: the new urban blacks and Southern California whites. The highest rate of riot participation, the authors observed, occurred among young blacks (under 30) reared in Los Angeles. The participation of this group significantly outstripped that of southern-

reared blacks and migrants from other northern cities. Thus the authors hypothesize that there was a distinctive psychology at work among these new urban blacks, a product in part of distinctive childhood socialization which made them more likely to riot. They argue that the prevailing cultural forces at work in the northern socialization process in contrast to those at work in the southern socialization process were likely in the generation preceding Watts to produce greater political sophistication (hence greater sensitivity to unchanging levels of political and social equality), greater feelings of subjective deprivation (the young northern blacks' comparison levels against which they evaluate their own achievement are set higher), and more positive black identity. Combined with the perception that conventional mechanisms for grievance redress did not work well for blacks, as well as with a host of locally generated grievances against Los Angeles politicians, police, and merchants, these attitudes would conduce to riot participation.

The survey data establish the accuracy of this argument. The authors are able to show that a politically disaffected, sophisticated, subjectively deprived group with grievances specific to Los Angeles existed, that its members were socialized in Los Angeles, and that these characteristics were related to riot activity.

One of the strengths of this argument is that it offers a more airtight explanation of riot participation than the monocausal psychological theories like frustration-aggression or relative deprivation, which have seemed to give social scientists such trouble in the testing. Tracing the roots of violence back to presumed early socialization experiences, as well as resting the explanation on grievances growing out of adult experiences in the political system, provides a rich longitudinal perspective unmatched in this literature.

To establish the Los Angeles context the authors construct a much less complex theory of white socialization to explain what the authors see to be that city's pervasive "symbolic racism" (yet how explain the eventual triumph of Tom Bradley in an overwhelmingly white electorate?). This symbolic racism, manifested primarily by a common resort to abstract moralistic judgments about blacks as a group, is the consequence in the authors' view of white Southern California's familistic culture of privatism, racial isolation, and intense property consciousness. These aspects of life in the white southwest are seen in turn to be products of childhood socialization in the white Protestant middle-class Midwest, the place of origin of a disproportionate number of Southern Californians. All of these characteristics served to produce a massive

naiveté about blacks and a commitment to a set of Babbitt-like political routines and conventions irrelevant to and unconscious of the black condition.

The portrait of the Southern California whites does great justice to many of our presuppositions, but it is less successful than the portrait of the blacks. For one thing the authors present many fewer data to back it up. For another, the portrait seems a stereotype. Some of the writing here is just plain silly-sounding, as when they tell us that these "middle Americans" value "honesty" more than "human values." It is, Karl Lamb would surely tell us, a one-dimensional view that stresses the barbecue pit and crabgrass killer as the dominant cultural symbols. But in the end this is a relatively modest problem in an otherwise meticulously crafted book.

The most significant contribution this work makes in my view is not that it is the most ambitious single-riot study conducted from a micro perspective, but rather that it is one of the only efforts to explore adult political behavior as a function of childhood socialization experiences. The import of the socialization studies is that they purport to identify learning experiences in the early part of life which have consequences for adult political life. Yet the socialization literature is curiously devoid of studies of adult behavior which is related explicitly to the earlier socialization experience. Naturally, the lengthy time dimension involved in such an effort is a problem. One cannot easily observe his childhood subjects grow to maturity, although this type of analysis requires following in effect one age cohort over time. But what the researcher can do instead is to identify and examine cultural forces which bear on the growing up process which he presumes prevailed in the time and place of the childhood of his adult subjects. To do this, of course, is to simplify and to aggregate what is in fact a much more complex and differentiated set of experiences. It is also to make some potentially risky assumptions (with what degree of certainty, for example, can one claim to have identified what the important cultural forces were?). But if that enterprise is formidable, it is by no means impossible. Sears and McConahay have performed the task boldly and convincingly in this book.

PETER K. EISINGER

University of Wisconsin, Madison

The Uses of Disorder: Personal Identity and City Life. By Richard Sennett. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1970. Pp. 198. \$4.95.)

This book advances a novel and interesting thesis: the root of our contemporary malaise is urban planning, and the solution is to enforce a

kind of creative anarchy on city life. I personally found the hypothesis improbable and the solution unappealing, but this is the kind of book in which evaluations are necessarily subjective. Those interested in the topic will want to read and judge for themselves. Fortunately, unlike many other social theorists with equally sweeping visions and wider fame, Sennett's prose is both lucid and fun to read.

Sennett believes life in America is pretty bad—sterile, intolerant, dull, narrowing, and violent. He locates the cause in an urban planning process that sees the city as a machine composed of interconnected parts and designs it so that the parts are separated except for functional interconnections. This results in social homogeneity in neighborhoods of the city and lack of contact among the inhabitants. The most deleterious effect of this style of organizing urban areas is that it reinforces the human tendency, experienced most strongly as a way of handling the adolescent identity crisis, to simplify and purify experience so that challenges are avoided and other people stereotyped and held at a distance. Moreover, Sennett feels that growing up in communities of this kind causes this disposition to "self-imposed slavery" to be perpetuated into adulthood. Only if the disposition is overcome in adolescence by social settings that "permit the young to act out their painless dreams [of a purified existence] and fail constructively" (p. 129) will individuals enter adulthood with the character structures that will enable them to deal with life in a creative way.

Sennett's argument is based on deductions from the psychology of Erik Erikson and a selected group of studies of aspects of city life (annoyingly, none of the studies is footnoted; on the other hand, they are clearly illustrations rather than evidence, so maybe it doesn't make much difference). Apart from the lack of empirical evidence—which is inevitable in this kind of a book—I found two problems with the argument (in addition to finding it intuitively unlikely). First, Sennett seems to me to mistake Erikson's psychology. Erikson regarded as unusual and pathological the kind of response to the adolescent identity crisis that Sennett identifies as typical in America. Second, Sennett is unclear about the genesis of the problem. He clearly believes things were not always this way but vacillates between regarding modern urban planning as the cause of unhealthy adolescence and identifying undesirable character structures as the basis of support for planning. Since Sennett's policy proposal calls for the re-creation of some aspects of the dense city life of the past, the former would make more sense. Yet, Sennett cites his own study of families in nineteenth-

century Chicago to indicate that the intense family life that he sees as producing an undesirable adolescence represented a reaction against the very urban disorder he proposes to reintroduce.

Sennett's policy proposal is to reproduce the density and disorder of the urban life of an earlier era through "survival communities" where people are forced to confront each other. "As a rule of change, the situations creating survival encounters would be as follows: there would be no policing, nor any other form of central control, of schooling, zoning, renewal, or city activities that could be performed through common community action, or, even more importantly, through direct, nonviolent conflict in the city itself" (p. 141). As an example, Sennett says, "If a bar down the street were too noisy for the children of the neighborhood to sleep, the parents would have to squeeze the bar owner themselves, by picketing or informal pressure, for no zoning laws would apply throughout the city" (p. 144). I personally do not find the vision of a society that deliberately creates unpleasant environments in order to encourage the formation of neighborhood T-groups an appealing one, nor do I believe that free time is so plentiful a commodity that we can afford to sacrifice it by giving up as much of the division of labor as Sennett proposes. Those who find life in America as sick as Sennett does and who find his diagnosis of the source of illness persuasive may disagree and opt for the "truly chaotic urban life" Sennett prescribes.

DAVID NEXON

Russell Sage Foundation

The Political Web of American Schools. By Frederick Wirt and Michael W. Kirst. (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown and Co., 1972. Pp. 295. \$7.95.)

This book has been needed for a long time. The field of "politics and education," as the authors note, is only gradually attracting the attention of political scientists. Additionally, among those few political scientists who do take an occasional look at schools, political socialization—as distinguished from educational governance—is the preferred agenda of research.

The great merit of this book is to place school governance within a framework normally applied to the *general* governing process. That is, they raise questions traditionally asked by political scientists and seek to answer them with the data available from studies of educational policy making. The framework which guides the book is, not surprisingly, systems theory. One might argue that the authors (one associated with a school of education, the other with a political science department) have thus guaranteed that

nothing need be excluded, and that is not really the point. Systems theory is a link between two disciplines; it has been used (uncritically) by educationists while being the focus of a major debate among political scientists. Wirt and Kirst selfconsciously address themselves to both educationists and political scientists and have chosen a good device to gain the attention of both.

The survey of the literature is exhaustive. Virtually everything written on the subject at the time is included and fitted neatly into the organizational framework. The inclusive nature of the literature search, however, leads to two problems. First, the authors simply cannot answer some of the questions they pose. Second, their review of the literature is uncritical. No effort is made to point out some glaring errors in research. Both problems are probably excusable, especially the former. Much would have been gained, however, had the authors provided some estimate of the extent to which the reported research conformed to accepted standards of scholarship.

Aside from these relatively minor faults, the book has much to recommend it. It is relatively free of obfuscating jargon and is quite well organized. All levels of policy making (federal, state, and local) are examined. A particularly strong point of the book is the degree to which it continually draws attention to the major struggle in educational policy making: the clash between experts and laymen. In a system which pays symbolic deference to the ideology of lay control, reliance upon experts has become a way of life. Wirt and Kirst uncover scant evidence to suggest any but the most occasional exception to the power of the experts. They note, however, that the "new politics" of public education, with its clearly participatory thrust, is viewed as a serious threat by the "bureaucratic forces." An intriguing question is, of course, who will win? On these points, the book is suggestive rather than conclusive. Perhaps this is because there are no answers. If the authors contemplate any extension of their work, it would be extremely useful for them to attempt to identify the conditions under which bureaucratic domination is successfully challenged. I am confident that the book will receive the sustained attention it so richly deserves.

HARMON ZEIGLER

University of Oregon

A Grain of Mustard Seed: The Awakening of the Brazilian Revolution. By Marcio Moreira Alves. (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday Anchor Press, 1973. Pp. 194. \$1.95, paper.)

Most of this book is not about revolutionary awakening, except of the kind which the author

himself has come to through his experience as a journalist, federal deputy, and exile. It is an account of repression, prefaced by autobiography and concluded with a strategy for overthrowing the system of repression.

Neither as history, nor as autobiography, nor as a program for liberation is the book satisfactory. But it is still worth reading. Many of its faults can be traced to the author's decision to write a popularized analysis of contemporary Brazil for a foreign audience. Within these limits, Moreira Alves largely succeeds. His book is free of the more simplistic ranting against blood-thirsty generals, profit-maddened capitalists, and the like. As introductory reading, it is a good companion piece to the recent Pelican paperbacks by two other Brazilian exiles—Miguel Arraes, *Brazil: The People and the Power* (1972), and Francisco Julião, *Cambão—The Yoke: The Hidden Face of Brazil* (1972).

As a serious chronicle of repression, however, the book is defective. In the first place, it is too sketchy. Better accounts can be found in the author's own previous (but untranslated) work: *Torturas e Torturados* (1966) and *O Cristo do Povo* (1968). Second, the analysis of economic repression and cooptation, fully as important to an understanding of Brazilian authoritarianism, is schematic and derivative. For some reason, Moreira Alves ignores the important work of Fernando Henrique Cardoso in this field.

As autobiography, the book is engaging, up to a point. Moreira Alves hardly sees himself as a Galahad of liberation. He questions his motives and casts a shrewd eye on his youthful naiveté. He is insightful about the functions of family connections and loyalties in Brazil. But I finished the book wanting to know more about Moreira Alves's personal development and, especially, about his experience in exile. The politics of exile is now a significant, and almost completely unknown, episode in the growth of Brazilian revolutionary thought. Moreira Alves, however, expressly states that "personal stories, though they may be of interest to clarify an evolution, are of little importance to the long popular struggle that is a revolution" (p. 3). This position is debatable, especially when the "impersonal analysis" which takes its place is hard to follow. But, to be fair, the book cannot be criticized unduly for omitting what the author did not intend it to contain.

It is as political analysis that *A Grain of Mustard Seed* is most puzzling. Moreira Alves's main conclusion is that armed struggle is "the only alternative the regime has left open" (p. 187). Resistance, therefore, depends mainly (or initially?) on this tactic. In one sense, the recommendation is plausible. Opposition from

within the system has been virtually a total loss. But it can also be argued that violent opposition is the one avenue that the regime has completely blocked off. The mechanisms of physical coercion at the disposal of the regime are vast, terrible—and successful.

It is not clear how a policy favoring armed struggle follows from Moreira Alves's analysis. My guess is that the author knows more about physical coercion than about the varieties of economic, utilitarian control—a myopia which he shares with many humanistic Catholics in Brazil. Running through the book is the assumption that the economic system is so transparently exploitative, despite censorship and propaganda, that the government survives mainly on the basis of brute force and with the connivance of the United States. But the economic system is fairly clever; and, though Moreira Alves recognizes its cooptative ingenuity in general, he does not explore it in much detail. His analysis is not therefore convincing as a basis for calculated revolutionary action, even though a sound case can be made that the present situation may end with a violent upheaval. The strengths and the vulnerability of systems like the Brazilian can more rigorously be appreciated by consulting Hirschman and Rothchild's "The Changing Tolerance for Income Inequality in the Course of Economic Development," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 87 (November, 1973), 544-566, and Alejandro Portes, "On the Logic of Post-Factum Explanations: The Hypothesis of Lower-Class Frustration as the Cause of Leftist Radicalism," *Social Forces*, 50 (September, 1971), 26-44.

PETER McDONOUGH

University of Michigan

Developmental Personnel, A Psycho-Social Study Across Three States in India. By B.C. Muthayya and I. Gnanakannan. (Hyderabad: National Institute of Community Development, 1973. Pp. vi, 185. Rs. 25.)

This study reports the results of a comparative survey of Indian Community Development administrators' background and psychological characteristics and the relationship of these factors to job satisfaction. The fact that the survey was conducted by the National Institute of Community Development may be interpreted as a reaffirmation by the Indian government of the importance of the administrative component in the development effort; in the recent past much attention has focused on Panchayati Raj, the political component. Students of administration will welcome the book for this reason, as well as for the massive amount of data that was gathered. Unfortunately, however, limitations in the

authors' analysis and presentation prevent readers from reaping the full benefits of this major research effort.

The authors begin by making the assumption (perhaps less true in employment-scarce India than elsewhere) that "one's job performance is, to a great extent, influenced by one's level of satisfaction on the job" (p. 7). Their goal is to identify the personal and psychological variables that produce job satisfaction in the hope that recruitment and training practices can be changed to produce more satisfied and productive administrators.

The survey was conducted in 1970 in Mysore, Tamil Nadu, and Kerala states. Data were gathered from 791 administrators who worked in 271 blocks at varying development stages in 18 of the 42 districts in these states. Specifically, 225 Block Development Officers (BDOs), 133 *mukhyasevikas*, 240 *gramsevakas*, and 193 *gramsevikas* participated in the study. Data were also gathered from 91 senior rural service college students in Tamil Nadu for comparison with the data collected from this state's administrative sample. Finally, 411 job performance evaluations were gathered from collectors, district development assistants, and BDOs in the sample. The first two groups evaluated the BDOs, and the BDOs evaluated their subordinates who participated in the study. The investigators used a mail survey and visited sample blocks to insure that schedules were properly completed. The schedules were tailored to suit administrative roles and asked both closed and openended questions. The closed-ended questions related to participants' backgrounds, personality variables, job satisfaction, social intelligence, and satisfaction with their assigned community. Openended questions probed attitudes about the Community Development and Panchayati Raj programs.

After the introductory and methodological chapters a deluge of data is presented without much analysis. Almost a hundred tables are presented in the 110 pages that cover the chapters reporting the closed-ended data on respondents' background characteristics, their response to various personality and job satisfaction measures, and correlations between background and personality variables and job satisfaction. Much of the accompanying text merely restates data apparent in the tables without interpretation. For example, the authors report that significant portions of the respondents occupied their present positions before the initiation of the Panchayati Raj Program and that many were recruited from the Revenue Department. But they do not suggest how these previous experiences may affect their relations with the elective representatives of this program.

Further, the authors do not explain how ecological differences between the states may account for differences in responses. For example, what is it about the Mysore setting that explains why BDOs there have higher job dissatisfaction scores relative to those of BDOs in the other states? No recognition is given to the South Indian focus of the study or how the findings might relate to other areas of India. This lack of analysis is particularly disappointing because one would expect Indians to have greater insight into these questions than Westerners who work from a different cultural base.

The next chapter discusses administrators' opinions about the Community Development and Panchayati Raj programs. The openended responses were organized by role into four categories—attitudes about administration, training, Community Development, and panchayats and elected representatives. No tables are presented here, although often they would have been more appropriate than the text, which is a quantitative description of the findings. Particularly in this chapter, the authors missed an opportunity to focus and analyze their data because of their failure to include quotations from the participants' openended responses.

Finally, the last chapter summarizes the findings and devotes two pages to the presentation of eleven suggestions. Consequently, the suggestions are vague and merely identify some issues related to job satisfaction. The wealth of data discussed in the book is not adequately used to support these suggestions or to specify how changes could be made to enhance satisfaction.

The book represents a hopeful start toward understanding the attitudes and behavior of Indian development administrators. One has the impression, however, that the book was published quickly and without adequate thought about how the data could be most usefully presented to other scholars. In addition, the authors should have included a copy of the questionnaire and noted references for the various scales that were used, such as the nine personality measures. Finally, an effort should have been made to place the study's findings in perspective by referring to other administrative studies. One hopes that the authors will provide more analyses of these rich data in the future.

DAN FRITZ

*University of Southern California
Leonard Davis School of Gerontology*

The Hero's Children: The Post-War Generation of Eastern Europe. By Paul Neuburg. (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1973. Pp. 383. \$2.95.)

The Hero's Children is about social change in

Eastern Europe since World War II and particularly, since the death of Stalin, about the relationship of the Party to the people, and especially the young. It also addresses itself to the general problem of how stable the regimes in question are and how the ideologically generated processes of modernization affected the population and its political attitudes. Throughout, Neuburg, a writer and journalist, compares Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Bulgaria in regard to the issues raised. His book is an ambitious undertaking based on the author's travels in Eastern Europe (undertaken since 1968), his knowledge of the area because of his background (a Hungarian "56-er") and recent sociological surveys and other relevant literature coming out of Eastern Europe. The author has an obvious "feel" for the area, enhanced by his many conversations with the natives during his visits.

Neuburg has been most successful in conveying "the daily life and concerns" of young people in Eastern Europe (especially in Chapter 6, "Ways of Life"). At the same time his enterprise falters when he intends to provide a somewhat grandiose and overambitious conceptual-theoretical scheme, embodied in what he calls the "central idea" of the book, namely "of the Party as Hero and the young as the Hero's Children."

The idea of the Party as Hero and the youth as its children seems to me to be contrived, adding little to clarify or focus the main concerns of the book. "Heroic" means, apparently, ideological as opposed to pragmatic. The lack of clarity is illustrated by such propositions as: "It is however only in theory that the Party may pose for ever on the one hand as the Vanguard of Perfection and Rationality Incarnate and on the other as History's Hero and the Champion of Progress. In practice, as both the Being static at the centre of all affairs and the Motor of Becoming inexorably productive of change, it is bound to become ensnared by just the dialectics it thought itself destined to command on behalf of the future" (p. 56).

If one overlooks such cumbersome theorizing, many interesting points and concerns emerge. Perhaps the most important, which transcends Eastern Europe and its younger generations, is the relationship between materialism and idealism, affluence and political liberalism, improved standards of living and rising nonmaterial aspirations. These issues have been raised and debated frequently in the Soviet context, but at present they are more appropriate to Eastern Europe. The issue may also be posed as the degree of interdependence between the political-ideological and economic spheres. The author, like

many Western social scientists, believes that the developing economic arrangements and institutions of Eastern Europe are less and less compatible with high levels of centralization, ideological constraints, and the still prevailing authoritarian superstructures. "As specialists take over one specialized function after another, and as each new generation becomes better at managing for itself, so the State, while remaining a live body, will cease to have any room for the Party as its centre" (p. 361). It is the familiar proposition of the apolitical specialists squeezing out the die-hard ideologues, and if true, it has vast implications. Yet, especially for a sociologist aware of the functionalist perspective, it is hard to conceive of a society run by such pragmatists without another elite stratum elaborating and dispensing some set of values which transcend the instrumental concerns of the specialists.

Nevertheless even those like myself who are skeptical about such ideas, usually subsumed under "convergence" or "modernization," must concede that there is something to them, especially in regard to Eastern Europe. Of course it is not easy to determine why Eastern European societies are becoming more "Westernized": is it because they have become more urban, industrial and productive, or is it because their historical traditions and values, geographical conditions and cultural contacts have been different? In any case, one aspect of modernization and convergence can hardly be disputed. It is the growing similarity between the social problems—crime, delinquency, family instability, various forms of escapism, pollution, etc.—that urban, industrial societies create, notwithstanding their different political arrangements. The same applies to our old Western favorite, alienation, more elusive yet hard not to recognize when encountered under socialism as much as under capitalism. Yet critics of Western societies rarely suggest that high levels of scientific, technological, and industrial development, and the attendant complexity, provide barriers to antidemocratic tendencies or trends. Quite the contrary, they are often seen as merely providing better tools for the manipulation of the masses, or devices for lulling them into a false sense of security and satisfaction with their lot.

While many of the major speculations and projections of the book are difficult to substantiate, there is an abundance of interesting information and insightful comment about the attitudes of East European youth. These very attitudes lend themselves to divergent interpretations about their contribution to the long-range political stability of the systems involved. Thus we learn, or are given fresh evidence and examples of, the pervasively apolitical attitudes of the

young, their intense materialism, consumer orientation, cynicism about political ideals and ideologies (and especially the official ones), their achievement orientation, their support of authority even when mixed with disrespect for its prevailing ideological legitimations. We also learn that, "Instead of wholly destroying former conventions, change and the effects of the Party's social policy have combined to spread formerly middle class attitudes through almost the whole of what now counts as society" (p. 242). Sociological surveys cited further, indicate that "Occupations are . . . rated by the majority much less according to the satisfaction they offer than according to the money they bring in" (p. 273).

The young are not in the mood to challenge authority or to harbor extravagant expectations concerning either political freedoms or social justice or spiritual fulfillment. The young generally doubt the value of revolutions (p. 276). A Polish student summarized prevailing attitudes: "We don't dream of shaking off the yoke. Only of making it more bearable" (p. 319). While these attitudes in their somewhat paradoxical combination are not apt to please the Party, neither do they seriously threaten its power in the foreseeable future. It will probably take a long time before either material expectations become so intense as to be incapable of satisfaction, or their satisfaction will lead to the type of spiritual quest and restlessness that characterizes large segments of the young in Western societies. But even if that were to occur, both the surviving traditions of the area and the watchful eyes of Big Brother to the East will, in all probability, constrain the forces pressing for radical change.

PAUL HOLLANDER

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The Making of an Australian Prime Minister. By Laurie Oakes and David Solomon. (Melbourne: Cheshire, 1973. Pp. 318. \$A3.50, paper.)

This is the tale of how heroes make history, a gossipy but readable account of the events which brought Gough Whitlam to power in December 1972, the first federal Labor government in Australia since 1949. Laurie Oakes is political correspondent for the Melbourne *Sun* and David Solomon is political correspondent for the *Canberra Times*.

Quite simply, this is a story of the events which changed the demoralized party of 1966 into the victors of 1972, with their promises (or threats) to create a Sweden in the South Seas. The book offers a useful summary of this period. It contains important clues for deciphering Australian politics: splenetic personal feuds, veto groups,

endemic localism, the mild chicanery of the partisans, the substitution of trigger words and the gut reaction in the absence of anything resembling ideological conflict. It is a reminder of the Labor party traumas between 1967 and 1971, of the sheer bumbledom of the Coalition's closing years, and the bizarre qualities of Australian political leadership. It conveys color and it contains an amount of useful detail, names, figures, events. It demonstrates again that the best informed observers of current politics, and the most active, are the lobby correspondents. The problem is how to put their talents to better use.

For the tone of the book is also a comment on the poverty of political debate in Australia. Ideas and philosophies are subordinated to the task of detailing the gloss and the marginalia of the campaign. The authors' brushwork is deft but without much depth in theme or structure. The book deals mainly with the curiously self-conscious power-play of a small group of individuals as recorded by the media. Ideas or policies of any kind are scarcely discussed. This is unfortunate because social issues were of growing and perhaps decisive importance in the outer suburban electorates of Sydney and Melbourne. The rise of an "ideology of concern," heralding perhaps some change in the traditional, materialist affiliations of the Australian electorate goes largely unrecorded. The book does not attempt to develop the explanation of the social and political significance of the incidents it chronicles. Its content is also a commentary upon what the media see and report in Australian politics. It serves itself as a carrier of traditional beliefs and ideas about politics. Initially attractive, the book's failure to do more than speculate and generalize finally becomes tedious. Even in politics, the human element becomes boring when it is left so entirely to its own devices. Despite its title, this is not of the same species as the "Making of a President" series.

Oversimplified history of this kind produces distortion. The authors fall victim to the deceptive simplicity of their own narrative. Some issues are not fully developed: the significance of the changing class composition and outlook of the Labor party under Whitlam; the tensions within the Unions in Labor's thrust for power. More seriously, discussion of the campaign as a power-struggle is too one-sided; Liberal leaders are presented as strolling actors surprised to be caught on stage when the curtain went up. The story of how a government crumbled and power slipped through the fingers of the exhausted men in office is told too baldly. Also, for a man whose ascent to power was apparently predestined, Whitlam remains himself a shadowy figure.

Admittedly, this is asking the book to be something it was not meant to be. Yet if we accept the book uncritically at face value we run a hidden danger: Australian readers may too readily accept the deceptive simplicity of the narrative. The book's flaw is making a major (even momentous) political event seem so obvious as to require no further explanation. The fact that it was "time," as the slogan went, was enough. For a political system whose own political vocabulary and imagination is limited, the plausible rationalizations which this book presents should not be substituted for a genuinely critical attempt at explanation and understanding.

H. V. EMY

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Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics. By Guillermo A. O'Donnell. Politics of Modernization Series, No. 9. (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1973. Pp. 219. \$3.25, paper.)

The key to a fair appraisal of this publication by O'Donnell is to be found in the first sentence of the preface where he states, "I wrote this work while doing graduate study in political science at Yale University" (p. vii). He does not call it a book and this is indeed accurate, since *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism* lacks not only an introduction and an index but also integration. The publications in this series are apparently not intended to be finished products, but rather tentative contributions to the discussion of Latin American topics. Throughout the work O'Donnell emphasizes the preliminary character of his findings. An equally significant point in the above quotation concerns the university where the author did his graduate work in the United States. It should be noted, however, that O'Donnell, an Argentine, has also done advanced study in Latin America and has published in Spanish.

This publication is a collection of four essays in which the author applies some approaches from his graduate training to the study of Latin America. The work would be iconoclastic were it not that the images attacked here are scarcely taken seriously anywhere today. O'Donnell probably did clear the conceptual ground as he intended, but the reader is obliged to waste a great deal of time while the author fiddles around with approaches of dubious utility for the study of Latin America. The annoyance is most serious in the first part of Chapter I (and a point frequently returned to) where he takes up the old argument that more socioeconomic development leads to more political democracy. O'Donnell knows full well, and the reader need not be

reminded, that this finding has little support in Latin America. This same sort of exercise is undertaken throughout Chapter IV where he applies some elements of game theory to the study of party competition in Argentina. It is obvious from his caveats and the manner of applying the model that he could have come up with the same conclusions without bothering with the approach. It is, as he notes, an impossible game in Argentina, and one does not require much theory, let alone axioms, to know this.

More must be said about the preliminary nature of this work and of the author's intentions in writing it. He is apparently attempting to clarify concepts and determine the types of relevant data in order to carry out empirical work. This publication is not, therefore, a contribution to data or new material, but rather an effort to deal with existing information in sorting through various approaches. In order to clarify his argument O'Donnell frequently uses propositions and hypotheses which indicate where he is going, but as could be expected, not enough material is available to test them. And this is in spite of an abundance of footnotes which makes for very hard reading. Because of the tentativeness of this exercise, its conclusions must be viewed with skepticism. For instance, on page 51, O'Donnell argues that political democracies are found at intermediate levels of modernization. Since Chile and Uruguay are at this level, and are no longer democratic, one concludes that a proposition has been disproved. However, on page 114 he notes that the chances for survival of the democracies are not good. In short, he cannot be directly contradicted because the work is highly tentative, is not integrated, and is not meant to constitute a single argument.

Insofar as any theme dominates the work, it is the relationship of modernization and political systems. The author argues that in Latin America the size of the domestic markets and the productive structure of the modern areas are the major determinants of social differentiation. Increased differentiation means greater social complexity, and political pluralization is the political expression of this differentiation. O'Donnell finds that the Latin American countries differ on the dimensions of this differentiation and these in turn both directly and indirectly determine the three patterns of political system he defines. He then does historical, and largely structural, analyses of Argentina and Brazil and concludes that at high levels of modernization there is an elective affinity for what he terms "bureaucratic-authoritarian" regimes. These regimes are characterized by the growth of organizational strength of social sectors, governmental attempts at control by "encapsulation,"

the career patterns and power bases of most incumbents of technocratic roles, and the pivotal role played by large bureaucracies (p. 95). His argument is supported by abundant evidence and is depressingly thorough and accurate in the case of Argentina. The argument is persuasive enough in general, although less so in the case of Brazil, but many readers will probably quibble over the definitions and measurement of both modernization and the types of political systems. This is a far-reaching argument, and I expect that O'Donnell will both modify and strengthen it in his present empirical work.

This is a useful work for those interested in the politics of Latin America. It is not easy to read and the argument is complex and partial, but O'Donnell has done an impressive job of both stating the conceptual problems and bringing together much of the material by which they might be studied and perhaps even solved.

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The Price of Liberty: Personality and Politics in Colonial Nigeria. By Kenneth W. Post and George D. Jenkins. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1973. Pp. 494. \$27.50.)

This is a political biography of Alhaji Adegoke Adelabu, son of Ibadan and erstwhile Leader of the Opposition in the Western House of Assembly in the period preceding Nigeria's independence. Though he died in a car crash in 1958, at the age of forty-three, Adelabu's career sheds much light on the nature of opposition in the Western Region and on the decline of the NCNC as a nationalist party. The subtitle of the book, however, is misleading because this is not a study of Adelabu's personality on the order of the George's study of Wilson, say, or of Tucker's study of Stalin.

Though the authors had the great good fortune to have access to their subject's private papers—which allows them to weave a fascinating story in meticulous detail—nowhere do they attempt to interpret Adelabu's motives or style outside of the period and of its political exigencies. Adelabu's appeal, however, derives as much from his puckish sense of humor and his roguish ways as it does from his political skills! "I am humbler than Shaw, physically stronger than Gandhi, more cultured than Stalin, older than Jesus, more educated than Shakespeare, more worldly-wise than Socrates and better tailored than Lincoln" (p. 123). Making no reference to personality theory and seemingly not steeped in Yoruba culture and rhetoric, the authors are alternatively admiring, amused, and appalled by their

subject, but nowhere do they help us to understand his style.

The strength of *The Price of Liberty* lies in its political history of regionalism as experienced by one who opposed its triumph. The decade of the 'fifties saw a retreating imperialism mesh with indigenous forces to construct a federal framework based on narrow communal and sectional interests. This arrangement came to be called the "Regionalist System" and it was to have disastrous results for Nigeria. Adelabu opposed regionalism from the first, partly because he was a nationalist resisting centrifugal forces, but mostly because he was a son of Ibadan, and saw in the dominance of the Action Group the decline of his power in his own constituency. The logic of the situation—not his personality—led him to align himself with the opponents of the Action Group, the NCNC and its leader, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe.

But beyond Adelabu's own political machinations there is the fascinating story of decolonization in Nigeria. Here the authors make an important contribution by filling in and correcting in significant places the landscapes left for us by earlier works of Coleman, Sklar, and Post himself. Taking Adelabu's point of view, for example, they show that the break between the Western branch of the NCNC and the national party occurred as much from the vacillations of the national leadership and its attempt at compromising its fight with the regionalists as it did from Yoruba suspicions of Ibo dominance. The impression, therefore, that the NCNC was doomed to become a regionalist party like the NPC and the Action Group, and that communalism was fated for Nigeria would seem not to be justified by the data presented by Post and Jenkins. This is an important point, as this study of Adelabu makes clear, and it is one that ought to be more fully discussed in a separate study of Dr. Azikiwe.

ROBERT MELSON

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Revolution and Politics in Russia. Essays in Memory of B. I. Nicolaevsky. Edited by Alexander and Janet Rabinowitch with Ladis K. D. Kristof. Russian and East European Series Vol. 41, Russian & East European Institute, Indiana University. (Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1972. Pp. xii, 416. \$12.75.)

The late Boris Ivanovich Nicolaevsky was probably the most learned, imaginative, prolific, and influential historian and analyst of the origins and development of Bolshevik rule in Russia of our generation. This volume was originally planned as far back as 1965 as a *Festschrift* to be

presented to him on his eightieth birthday, 20 October 1967. But the completion of the volume, which includes many detailed and ambitious contributions, was delayed. Nicolaevsky's death on 21 February 1966 resulted in the transformation of the projected *Festschrift* into a memorial volume, which did not see the light of day until over six years later. It was fitting that the Russian and East European Institute of Indiana University, which is now one of the leading centers of Russian studies in the English-speaking world, should have sponsored the volume.

Boris Nicolaevsky, whom hundreds of students of the Russian revolutionary movement (including this reviewer) remember with deep gratitude for his help as well as with respect and affection was born on 20 October 1887, in a small town in the foothills of the Urals. He was the son of a priest. Like many of his idealistic contemporaries, he began his revolutionary activities while still at school, and was arrested at the age of sixteen. His formal education ended at this point: for the rest of his life in Russia until his arrest and expulsion in 1921, he continued intensive study of Russian social and political conditions and history and of the revolutionary movement and actively participated in the social democratic movement. Nicolaevsky was at first inclined to side with the Bolsheviks after the split in the party in 1903, but, as Professor Ladis Kristof points out in his excellent contribution ("The Formative Years") this was due much less to ideological reasons than to the fact that "the Mensheviks were universally blamed for the split" (p. 13). (The historian now in possession of more facts can only marvel at this early success of Bolshevik propaganda.) Professor Kristof's account of Nicolaevsky's political activities up to 1917 is of particular value not because Nicolaevsky's political career was as important as those of the major figures in the Menshevik ranks, but because it too displayed the fairness and objectivity which always characterized Nicolaevsky's judgment as a historian. He certainly did not hesitate to condemn actions which he thought were detrimental to the aims of the social democratic movement. But a political opponent did not automatically become *caput lupinum* for whom no good word could be said, nor did an ally escape criticism when he was deemed to deserve it.

In exile Nicolaevsky continued, indeed much expanded, his scholarly activities. He remained in Europe until 1940, when the advance of Hitler's forces on Paris drove him into a second exile, the United States. He had meanwhile amassed a unique collection of all kinds of rare and unpublished materials on the Russian revolutionary movement. It comes as a shock to

those of us, like myself, who remember Boris Nicolaevsky's apartment in West Side New York bulging with documents, files, and packages to learn that the major part of his collection was lost in Paris. According to the late Professor Mosely, Anna Mikhailovna Bourgina, later to become Mrs. Nicolaevsky, "risked her own life by remaining behind in occupied France (after Nicolaevsky's departure) in order to safeguard the collection" (p. 33). The major part of the collection was, however, discovered by agents of the Alfred Rosenberg office and transferred to Frankfurt, to the Institute on Judaism and Bolshevism. In the confusion at the end of the war, when these materials were discovered by an American lieutenant, he (reportedly) handed them over to the Soviet authorities because they were mostly printed or written in Russian, and they were promptly shipped to the Soviet Union. We learn these facts from the article on "The American Years" by the late Philip E. Mosely who died before this volume saw the light of day. It was indeed Mosely who, more than anyone else, made it possible for Nicolaevsky to live and work first in New York, then in California, for twenty-seven years, writing, advising younger scholars, and continuously rebuilding his collection of materials. This collection remains one of the most valuable sources on Russian revolutionary history in existence outside Russia. The bulk of the collection is now at the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace at Stanford University, where Mrs. Nicolaevsky has continued the work of indexing and annotating it. More than ten thousand items from the collection are in Indiana University Library.

The "Selected Bibliography" contributed by Anna M. Bourgina (Mrs. Nicolaevsky) is of the greatest value. It makes no claim to completeness, because Nicolaevsky's contributions to socialist periodicals were so numerous that they can probably never be fully listed. Even so, Mrs. Nicolaevsky has listed his articles and reviews from the main periodicals to which her late husband contributed in eighteen closely printed pages. These include both Nicolaevsky's ephemeral comments on current events in the Soviet Union (which were usually better informed and more perceptive than those of anyone else, as events later confirmed) and detailed historical studies based on much research. The bibliography also lists the main books—on Azev the spy, on Forced Labor, on Marx, and the invaluable annotated editions of papers and letters of Axelrod, Martov and Plekhanov, among others. It is worth adding one of Nicolaevsky's main works which does not appear in the bibliography: it was regrettably never published for lack of funds, even though funds have so often been forth-

coming for less worthy publications. This work consists of the first six volumes (this was as far as he had got when he died) covering the least studied period of Russian social democracy—between 1906 and the First World War. The completed volumes are deposited in typescript in several libraries and go up to 1912. They consist of unpublished documents from the author's own and from other collections with extensive introduction and commentary. These volumes throw an entirely new light on the history of the period as traditionally reiterated by a generation of historians.

The remaining fourteen contributions span a period of more than one hundred and fifty years—from a study of Andrei Turgenev (Raeff) to one on the vital CPSU Praesidium meeting of February 1961, the evidence on which is dissected with great ingenuity by Robert M. Slusser. The span of time and the variety of subjects, every one of which would have interested Nicolaevsky, and on every one of which he would, had he lived to see this volume, have had penetrating comments to add, are an appropriate tribute to his scholarship. Equally appropriate are the scholarship and high standard of all the contributors. The reviewer of a symposium is invariably faced with the problem of either selecting unfairly or giving a catalogue. Two outstanding articles can be passed over, however, because in each case, since they were written, the author has published an important volume which embraces the subject of the earlier article—Robert C. Tucker on "Stalin's Revolutionary Career before 1917," now in part covered by the first volume of his monumental biography of Stalin; and Stephen F. Cohen's "In Praise of War Communism: Bukharin's 'The Economics of the Transition Period,'" which is now also dealt with in Cohen's splendid biography of Bukharin. The other subjects covered are the Group for the Emancipation of Labor (Frankel), Russian and Jewish Social Democracy (Wildman), Marxist Revolutionaries and the Dilemma of Power (Getzler), the Railwaymen in the General Strike of 1905 (Sablinsky), the Social Democratic Movement in Latvia (Kalnins), the Petrograd Garrison and the Bolshevik Seizure of Power (Rabinowitch), the Berlin Conference of the Three Internationals in 1922 (Sukiennicki), the Kaminsky Brigade (Dallin), the Rehabilitation of Pokrovskii (Keep), and a Possible New Soviet Model of Modern Society (George Fischer).

So much for the catalogue of what is to be found in this important publication in the field of Russian revolutionary history and of the Soviet Union. Without wishing to be invidious in selecting particular articles for emphasis, I think it is important for readers of the *APSR* to know

which particular articles open up new ground, in the sense that they are the result of research on unpublished or very little known material. Professor Marc Raeff's contribution on "Andrei I. Turgenev and his Circle" falls into this category, since it provides new information on the least known of the three famous Turgenev brothers, Andrei, who died at the age of twenty-two in 1803 before he could achieve the fame of his brothers Alexander and Nicolai, but who was probably very typical of the enlightened generation of young Russians of good family at the turn of the nineteenth and eighteenth centuries. Professor Raeff sees in him and his circle fore-runners of Stankevich and his circle thirty or forty years later and has some very perceptive things to say on the subject. Then there is Professor Kalnins' contribution on Latvian social democracy, although not based on unpublished sources, makes extensive use of Latvian language sources which few historians of Russia can read. Lastly, there is Professor Dallin's study of the Kaminsky Brigade—not because of the importance of the episode in the Second World War, but because this is the first published study of the result of extensive research in the German wartime archives. Kaminsky, as Professor Dallin says, was a persistent Soviet type, combining "ability and arrogance, ambition and mediocrity, nihilism and conviction" (p. 280). He and his brigade ended as little more than bandits: his main contribution to the far from simple story of Russian collaboration with the Germans in the Second World War has been to enable Soviet propaganda, Western gullibility and plain ignorance to combine to tarnish the reputation of the genuinely idealistic, if misguided movement associated with the name of Vlasov. It is much to be regretted that many more fine contributions to this book should have had no more than a mention in this review.

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Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol. 8/1973.

Edited by Stein Rokkan. (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget & Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications, 1973. Pp. 286. \$15.00.)

What distinguishes *Scandinavian Political Studies Vol. 8* (edited by Stein Rokkan with the assistance of Helga Hernes and Helen Aare-skjold) from the previous volumes of the Nordic political science associations' yearbook, is the number of articles which deal with the penetration of national by international politics. Several deal explicitly with the major recent event in four of the five polities (all but Iceland)—the strategy toward and decision about the European Community.

Three papers discuss the relationship between situation and strategy. Knud Midgaard, Halvor Stenstadvoll, and Arild Underdal (Oslo) analyze "political interlocutions." Do not be put off by the unfortunate terminology; interlocution, a term taken from philosophy of language, is used here to group for analytical purposes diverse phenomena, many of interest to political scientists: debates, negotiations, conversations, dialogues. In the spirit of Erving Goffmann and Thomas Schelling (who although respectively from sociology and economics coincide in their emphasis on the structure of situations in which actors operate), Midgaard et al. begin "a systematic study of the situations political actors confront when participating in debates and negotiations. . . ." In examining the familiar category "time," a distinction is made between "time available for negotiations" and "time in relation to other events and processes." Short time available is said to favor such games as "chicken," longer time, games of attrition. Likewise, for the usually vacuous concept of "context" are substituted analytically useful subcategories which alert us to the actual or potential consequences of our negotiations for other actors (who, therefore, might be tempted to try to affect them).

Related in spirit, although very different in technique, is the investigation by Bo Bjerulf (Lund, Sweden) of the impact of formal voting rules on strategic dispositions of actors. It aims to "establish the strategic potentials and other properties of two common voting procedures and to discuss the potential effects of these properties on parliamentary decision making." Carl-Einar Stalvant (Stockholm) examines the recent negotiations between Sweden and the Common Market. His account confirms that the Swedish decision makers *either* misunderstood the nature of the Community, underestimating the seriousness of its political aspirations, *or* planned their diplomatic strategy *as if* those assumptions were true in the hope or on the chance that favorable results could be obtained.

A second group of articles deals with the impact of the international environment or of foreign policy choices upon domestic politics. Jørgen Elklit and Nikolaj Petersen (Århus, Denmark) note that the referendum on the EEC elicited the highest turnout ever (90.1%) in Danish elections. Henry Valen (Oslo) shows that in the Norwegian referendum the turnout rate was 5% *below* the previous election; he found that turnout varied with degree of *local* unanimity. The relatively unified (anti-EEC) environments in the periphery resulted in extraordinarily high mobilization; the center was generally less homogeneous, reducing participation rates

(although in homogeneous—pro EEC—wards in Oslo, turnout was also high). The net effect was to reduce the traditional disparity in participation between center and periphery. Ottar Hellevik and Nils Petter Gleditsch (Peace Research Institute-Oslo) attribute the periphery's uncommon influence instead to what they believe to be the relatively better position of peripheries (geographical and social) under direct, rather than indirect, representation. Also dealing with the interpenetration of foreign and domestic politics, Kari Sulevo (Helsinki) attempts, with the aid of content analysis of Finnish press editorials, to connect changes in the international system with changes in Finnish attitudes towards a Nordic grouping. While the thesis makes good sense—the postwar history of the other Nordic countries also suggests that the Nordic option is a function of the opportunities available in the wider international environment—this excessively abstract and largely impenetrable article fails to make a convincing case. Finally, the review of the leftward shift in Icelandic politics by Olafur Grimsson (Iceland) indicates the part played by the fisheries-limit and defense treaty issues in internal politics there.

Risto Alapuro (Helsinki) makes a stimulating comparison between the ideologies and political impact of nationalist-fascistic student movements in interwar Finland and Roumania. He uses Lipset's idea of the attractions of fascism for deprived groups and Gusfield's concept of "status politics" to account for student ideologies. The decline of the status of bureaucrats in newly independent and relatively democratized Finland was significant to students, largely oriented toward bureaucratic careers. Similarly, in interwar Roumania the vast and rapid expansion of higher education was far beyond what could be absorbed. In both countries student ideologies were "populist," looking for support to the peasantry. In Finland, for example, the organized student movement, which immediately after the civil war had recruited from both Swedish-speaking and Finnish-speaking students, by the mid-1920s became a Finnish-speaking movement leading a struggle against the "Swedish upper class." Alapuro argues that this is status politics. But we have penetrating hypotheses by Albert Breton and Harry Johnson to shed light on such situations, showing the "rational" (interest-connected, goal-connected) elements in what seems purely status politics. In this case one would guess that the competition with Swedish-speakers for jobs, particularly bureaucratic jobs, was a not negligible factor. The appeal to the peasantry, or to the nation, becomes a tool in elite rivalry.

Alapuro also argues, correctly in my view, for the possibility of separate explanations of the sources of leadership for, and mass support of, a movement. He turns to Barrington Moore for an explanation of the varying resonance of similar ideas in different social settings, and concludes that the "structure and social importance of the peasantry" determined the depth of response to fascism in Roumania and its transient nature in Finland. I hope that such fascinating comparisons of the political development of the Nordic countries, comparisons with outside countries as well as each other, will continue to be central in *SPS*.

Election and media studies are "traditional" in *SPS*. An interesting conclusion from the study of party identification in a multiparty system by Ole Borre (Århus) and Daniel Katz (Michigan) is that if the "bourgeois" and "socialist" parties in Denmark are grouped together, and if party identification is taken to mean identification with the bloc, then it is a better predictor than in U.S. election studies. Claes-Olof Olsson and Lennart Weibull (Göteborg, Sweden) argue that the "gatekeeper" concept in communications research needs to be more closely tied to the political system; they suggest more weight instead on "national conceptions of news." Since their data deal with the reporting of news in Scandinavia, it would be interesting to test their contention in less consensual systems as well.

There is great variation in the readability of these articles. One of the purposes of publication in a world language is to gain a wider audience for the excellent research done in the Nordic countries—and in its short history *SPS* has succeeded remarkably; one may hope, therefore, that more resources will be devoted to editing for clarity of organization and expression, minimization of abstract terminology where possible, and sufficient concreteness in background and illustration to make the contents readily understandable to foreign readers. *SPS* has an indispensable analytically organized annual bibliography.

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Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, and Future. Edited by Alfred Stepan. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1973. Pp. xi, 265. \$10.00.)

This is unquestionably an important book, containing rigorous and systematic analyses, yet it frustratingly adds up to something less than the sum of its individually quite impressive parts. Its basic concept is not to be faulted: a symposium, held on the occasion of the seventh anniversary of the Brazilian military's seizure of power, in

which a select group of social scientists probe the nature and dynamics of the system which had emerged between 1964 and 1971. Fully competent in describing concisely what had occurred to that point and generally sound on important questions of causation, the participating scholars have met with far less success in their projections and prognostications.

Since the future of this authoritarian regime is one of the major concerns of this volume and serves to distinguish it from other recent collective efforts (such as those assessed in this *Review*, 67 [September-December 1973] 1089-90 and 1421-24), it seems legitimate to ask how well the authors' predictions fit the actual developments of the past five years. They fit reasonably well up to the date of publication in late 1973 but rather poorly since then. Comparison of the constituent essays which have best and worst withstood the test of time leads me to conclude that in this instance, there is an inverse relationship between the rigidity of analytical schemes and the quality of forecasting. Thus, the greatest weaknesses of this study, as well as much of its broader interest and significance stem from a "deliberate search for new conceptual frames of reference to help put the process in Brazil in a larger comparative framework" (p. viii). As might be expected in a collaborative venture, the attempts in this respect have been uneven, with the results even more so.

The opening chapter on "Politics and Economic Policy Making in Authoritarian Brazil, 1937-71" by University of Wisconsin historian Thomas Skidmore underscores the continuities between the Estado Novo (1937-45) and the post-1964 period of authoritarian rule. While this essay is essential for an adequate appreciation of contemporary Brazil, it, like the rest of the book, lags behind the changing reality. The present for Skidmore is the early months of the Médici administration (October 1969 to March 1974); by now the policies of the Geisel government and particularly the elections of November 1974 must lead one to question his flat assertion that the regime has left itself no "extractive option" (p. 16). In a similar vein, the dominance of the "hard line" within the officer corps basic to his political analysis was very doubtful at the time Skidmore was writing; since then the trend has been strongly in the opposite direction. One of the keys to the durability of the regime is not an alliance of the technocrats and "hard-line" military, the feature upon which Skidmore concentrates, but rather a coalition of the technicians and the military moderates so clearly in command of the present government. Essentially, then, his look into the future (pp. 44-46) is flawed by the mistaken assumption that the military's hard-line rightists were entrenched in

positions from which they could determine the subsequent course of events.

While of interest for comparative perspectives, particularly in the contemporary Peruvian case, Stepan's own chapter adds nothing to his previous work on the Brazilian military and its role in politics. Indeed, this is the most dated portion of the book, with no information past 1969 and most of the analysis dealing with trends through the mid-1960s. This failure to deal with important tendencies already evident by the time of writing weakens the entire volume, since none of the other contributors has ever conducted research on the Armed Forces, the most crucial element of the Brazilian political system. The economic chapters by Albert Fishlow, Samuel Morley, and Gordon Smith are of a high quality, but need to be balanced by a reading of diverging analyses by Professor Werner Baer, such as his chapter in *Brazil in the Sixties*, edited by Riordan Roett (Nashville, Tenn.: Vanderbilt University Press, 1972). The most serious defect of these papers is a consistent failure to bring out the neo-Bismarckian character of Brazil's present political economy and concomitant overvaluation of the political influence of internationally linked industrialists and the private financial sector.

Prominent Brazilian sociologist Fernando Henrique Cardoso has contributed a highly conceptual essay on "Associated-Dependent Development: Theoretical and Practical Implications" (pp. 142-76). Containing substantial ideological and polemical elements, it should require the serious scholarly reader to seek first-hand familiarity with the works of the Brazilian authors under attack by this productive and creative contributor to the currently burgeoning literature on dependency theory. (It might be noted that Hélio Jaguaribe, Cândido Mendes, and Celso Furtado have significantly refined their analyses in more recent studies than those of the 1966-69 period upon which Cardoso focuses.)

The most provocative, yet in some ways the least persuasive paper is Philippe Schmitter's attempt to view Brazilian developments in terms of "Portugalization" (pp. 179-232). Given subsequent events in that European country, this term may by now have taken on a connotation quite different from that intended five years ago by Professor Schmitter. Departing from the premise of his earlier work that "there may be an elective affinity between certain structural and behavioral attributes of 'delayed-dependent' development and protracted authoritarian rule" (p. 184), this University of Chicago political scientist weds a Bonapartist model to a study of policy outputs and outcomes. In his own terms "deliberately speculative and evaluative," Schmitter's essay places very heavy stress upon

trends of the 1964-69 period, reinforcing his argument with very selective data from 1970-71. By contrasting his picture of evolution toward a "single, no-party system" (pp. 209-11) with the vigorous comeback of the opposition party, the Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB), in the November 1974 elections, one can recognize the dangers of this type of straight-line projection. Indeed, accepting Schmitter's basic interpretation of the present regime (pp. 228-32), one would have expected that the 1974 elections would either have been manipulated to prevent major gains by the opposition or the results set aside. Instead, there is considerable evidence that the government at its highest levels welcomed the reinvigoration of the parliamentary opposition as a step toward decompressing an authoritarian situation. Implicit in Schmitter's analysis is a belief that the 1973-74 presidential succession would accentuate factionalism within the military; since the actual effect of this process was rather one of consolidation, one must doubt others of Schmitter's imaginative speculations.

The varied writings of Juan Linz are of such consistent excellence that we have come to expect a great deal of him. In this case we are not disappointed. Although the only contributor not to have conducted research in as well as on Brazil, he does an outstanding job of putting Brazil in comparative perspective. Since he, even more explicitly and directly than Schmitter, is concerned with the future, it seems fair to assess his thoughtful interpretation in light of subsequent developments. Events have borne out this Yale political sociologist's view that nonparty legitimacy—either charismatic or corporatist—would not be tried in Brazil, nor would institutionalization involve fascist-type or socialist, populist single-party solutions. Certainly Brazil's current leaders could fully subscribe to Linz's conclusion that "it will be a very difficult task to create a broadly popular hegemonic or predominant party in Brazil" (p. 249). Yet they may note with interest his choice of *will* rather than *would* as the operative verb. Then, too, one might question the assumption that institutionalization of the political system need be achieved within a few years as long as progress toward this end is being made and congruent changes are being brought about in the society and economic realm.

RONALD M. SCHNEIDER

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Class, Race and Political Behaviour in Urban Jamaica. By Carl Stone. (Kingston, Jamaica: Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of the West Indies, 1973. Pp. 188. \$3.50.)

During the last decade scholars have traced

the development of the two-party system in Jamaica, examined the involvement of race in the electoral process in Trinidad and Guyana, explored the charismatic qualities of the leader in Granada, and emphasized the impotence of colored and black political elites to effect social and economic change throughout the Commonwealth Caribbean. Professor Carl Stone's book is a useful contribution to West Indian political science. Unlike most previous researchers he has worked at the microlevel and employed questionnaire material derived from quota samples representative of the adult population of a subinsular community—in this case Kingston, the capital of Jamaica.

The political situation in Jamaica is well known in outline, but Stone clarifies some of the details. Since universal adult suffrage was introduced in 1944, politics have been dominated by the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP), created by Alexander Bustamante, and the Peoples' National Party (PNP), founded by Norman Manley. Eight general elections have been held in the last 30 years; the JLP has won five, the PNP three. The JLP was originally an offshoot of the Bustamante Industrial Trade Union. The PNP rapidly established its own union wing, first the radical Trades Union Council, and, after the expulsion of the Marxists from the party in 1952, the National Workers Union.

There is still a tendency for the JLP to be associated with big business and the lower class, and for the PNP to draw its staunchest support from the brown middle stratum in Kingston, but both parties are now essentially multiple-class coalitions, geared to collecting as many votes as possible at the general elections. Each party has a low commitment to ideology, each is led by a politician claiming messianic qualities, each supports the national ethic of multiracialism, each bestows patronage on capital and labor. The author correctly concludes that "voting preserves a facade and appearance of mass control over political life, while social and economic elites exercise preeminent influence on the day-to-day decision-making process" (p. 71).

Stone argues that "material affluence and income are the main determinants of social status in contemporary urban Jamaica, although race, education, training, and class acculturation clearly affect the economic life chances of the individual" (p. 11). He therefore subdivides his Kingston sample into occupational grades, with big businessmen at the apex of the socioeconomic scale and at the base "a somewhat loosely defined residual category of unskilled and low status labour such as casual workers, domestic servants and itinerant street vendors" (p. 12).

A sense of solidarity among Kingston's manual

workers has been frustrated by the emergence of a unionized elite, which has been co-opted by the two political parties seeking to maintain the *status quo*. At the opposite pole stands the unemployed sector, which comprises more than one-fifth of the capital's labor force, and is alienated from the multiple-class coalitions. Neither political party can preserve its upper class support and at the same time satisfy the demands for material improvement voiced by the underprivileged.

The book shows that as the occupational scale is descended, alienation from the established order increases. Discontent is expressed in abstention from voting, a marked preparedness to support a third party, and willingness to resort to violence. Urban Jamaicans express polarized attitudes to race and nationalism. The majority favors the *status quo*, but the lower class demands an end to white economic domination, and rejects multiracialism in favor of black solidarity. Blacks tend to be more radical than browns in all matters that pertain to race and economy; unionized labor is more conservative than nonunionized workers when confronted with the same issues. The unemployed, however, are the most vocal supporters of black power, the Ras Tafari, black capitalism and nationalization of the bauxite industry. There is a time-series relationship between unemployment and crime, and the unemployed are involved in sporadic street riots.

The strength of this book lies in its attempt to quantify the qualitative judgements made by other social scientists who have worked in Jamaica. Moreover, the author displays considerable realism when he points to the durability of the two-party system, the capacity of the parties for regeneration, the dependence of the lower class on sporadic political patronage, the low quality of leadership which has characterized "third" parties in Jamaica. He shows that problems emerge when extrapolating from the alienated poor in Kingston to the situation in rural Jamaica, where the presence of a landholding peasantry is conducive to the *status quo*.

Methodologically the book has two weaknesses. Many of the occupational groups in the sample are very small, but statistical tests of significance are not employed to provide a rigorous basis for comparison between them. Second, Stone's dismissal of M. G. Smith's concept of social and cultural pluralism, on the grounds that interviewees complain only of material deprivation, is nothing short of cavalier. Stone's error does not invalidate his findings, but reference to the plural framework of Jamaican society would enhance his conclusions.

COLIN G. CLARKE

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Elites against Democracy: Leadership Ideals in Bourgeois Political Thought in Germany, 1890-1933. By Walter Struve. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1973. Pp. 486. \$20.00, cloth; \$9.75, paper.)

Struve is a social historian, who, as such, claims to be far better qualified to examine the phenomenon of elitism than are social scientists, whose work is often "a function of their attentiveness to the manipulative and policy requirements of the U.S. *imperium*" and to "the class they serve" (p. 475). Plagued by "fantasies" that power is exercised primarily by "holders of formal political offices" or by dispersed "functional elites," social scientists have become mere "cheerleaders of the American Century and analysts for the ruling class" (p. ix).

This is a collection of biographical essays in which Professor Struve argues that in response to the rise of Marxism, such "bourgeois" thinkers as Friedrich Naumann, Max Weber, Walter Rathenau, and Oswald Spengler devised elite theories which they hoped could direct the power of the masses in support of the "bourgeois social order." All advocated an "open-yet-authoritarian elite," or "democracy of personnel selection" (p. 3), which would rest on three assumptions: A few men would always rule and make all crucial decisions; other citizens could or should play little if any role in formulating decisions or in controlling the elite; finally, recruitment would not be restricted to only one segment of the society. In Struve's opinion, the goals of this democracy without "popular control" were not only to strengthen Germany, but more importantly to "establish the uncontested hegemony of the bourgeoisie" and to satisfy the demands of "monopoly capital" (p. 17). He insists that the latter goals applied regardless of whether the theorists themselves were aware that they were serving these goals; the bourgeois social origin and status of these thinkers determined their views.

In a chapter entitled "The Sources of National Socialist Elitism," Struve links these theorists, the National Socialists, and the "United States imperialists," all of whom called for elites which would "function within the parameters of bourgeois society" (p. 419). By weakening the aristocracy and the old upper class, the National Socialists destroyed the impediments to "monopoly capital" and thereby helped bring West German capitalism into the "U.S. *imperium*" (p. 459).

Certainly, few influential German writers at the time advocated "popular control," although Struve's failure to describe how such control should be exercised makes it difficult to deter-

mine how elitist a thinker really is by comparison. Also, although he excessively minimizes its relative significance, Struve is correct in noting that many Germans argued for a non-Marxist social order with the firm support of all Germans in order to strengthen German foreign policy claims. This is, however, hardly an original insight, as the works of Fritz Fischer, Gerhard Ritter, Karl Dietrich Erdmann, and others reveal.

The book's strengths are outweighed by its weaknesses. The terminology which Struve uses is extremely imprecise. Such terms as "big bourgeoisie," "haute bourgeoisie," "middle class," "monopoly capital," "left liberals," "right wingers," etc. are used with little or no effort to define them or to distinguish them from one another. Perhaps the major problem is that Struve borrows uncritically the language of such writers as Jürgen Kuczynski, whose writings endure allegedly because they are based securely in "the fertile bed of Marxism" (p. 468). A second major weakness is Struve's unsubstantiated argument that earlier German elite theories describe contemporary United States, Britain and France "better than the dogmas of political democracy" (p. ix). Because Struve fails to provide parallels and examples, his asseffion remains unconvincing.

Finally, Struve's persistent attempts to assert economic causation in political thought remain highly unpersuasive not only because he provides such meager evidence, but because he admits to having "slighted the economic nexus of social history and the impact of the development of the institutions of monopoly capitalism upon bourgeois political and intellectual culture" (p. 20). His argument of the importance of social origin and status is slightly more credible, although he by no means succeeds in showing that such factors determine political ideas. For example, he asserts that the social origins and status of Leonard Nelson and most of his followers "impeded their efforts to comprehend Marxism" (p. 208). Struve ignores the fact that Nelson, his students, and Marx himself were intellectuals with almost identical social origins.

Political scientists who are seeking biographical information will perhaps find this book of limited use although earlier biographies by Heuss, Mommsen, Kessler, and others are more highly recommended. Those who want a more precise understanding of elites and elite thinking may safely leave this book on the shelf.

WAYNE C. THOMPSON

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The International Labor Movement in Transition: Essays on Africa, Asia, Europe and South America. Edited by Adolf Sturmthal and James G. Scoville. (Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1973. Pp. 294. \$12.50.)

For a number of years, Adolf Sturmthal, one of the deans of comparative trade-union studies, has been exploring the related questions of:

[First] What were the conditions which caused some labor movements in some periods to emphasize political rather than economic objectives and means of action? And second, what were the circumstances that led to the development and vast expansion of the collective bargaining system in the United States and Great Britain.

Related to these questions, and one of the central subjects explored in this volume, is the likelihood that other countries in the world would replicate the U.S.-British experience, with the expansion of collective bargaining.

Sturmthal himself has set forth a general theory of union development, in terms of market conditions. He holds that at the stage in development when labor is in excess supply, one can expect unions to stress political action. The obverse is that when labor is in short supply, i.e. when the modern sector grows, birth rates decline, etc., unionism will take on more of an economic, a collective-bargaining emphasis. All of the foregoing are conditioned, however, by a particular country's social and political history. Ideology, in the case of labor movements, can also continue as a kind of independent variable, for a long period after economic conditions have changed.

Thus, one finds certain "constants," as Sellier's chapter in the volume records for France, where the statist-dirigiste tradition tends to force unions and management back toward a dependence on government action, even in periods which seem opportune for autonomous collective bargaining. Or a tradition of enterprise dependence, apparently deeply imbedded in Japan, which persists even when labor market conditions seem to favor the emergence of unionism and bargaining, more in the American (or British) style.

Sturmthal and his co-editor, Scoville, have collected a series of contributions on union development in a variety of countries to test their general theses. The result is a useful volume though as is almost inevitable in such cases, the contributions are uneven, and a few of them appear to be wide of the mark of testing the editors' general theses.

Jan Pen, for example, contributes a chapter on Dutch union attitudes toward central wage policy, which is interesting enough, but doesn't shed much light on the editors' central theses about

union development. One of the factors (among a number) which Pen says makes it increasingly difficult today to bring about union acceptance of any central wage policy is the rise of "affluence" and with it a new-left socialist critique. That critique attacks every accommodation with the "establishment," as well as the unions' failure to pay sufficient heed to nonmaterial factors such as environment.

In such a setting it becomes difficult for the Dutch unions (especially the socialist-oriented NVV) to cooperate with any government (read establishment) plans for a central wage policy. This conclusion is interesting in itself, but a bit difficult to assimilate into the Sturmthal-Scoville overriding general schema of union development.

The chapter on German union evolution by Peter Lösche comes closer to testing some of the Sturmthal-Scoville theses. Lösche concludes that the early, enduring ideological commitment of German unions to revolutionary political (and social) reform explains the labor movement's general philosophy and political program, since the end of World War II. On the other hand, labor market conditions and great shortages since the German economic miracle got under way, help explain the increasing practical emphasis on bargaining in the past decade or so.

The chapter on "The Economic Power of Argentine Manufacturing Labor Unions" by Carlos E. Sanchez and Aldo A. Arnaldo bears out the relationship between political and economic unionism, though in a somewhat special manner. The political support of unions by the Peron government helped build the modern Argentine labor movement in the 1940s, but this movement went into decline with Peron's overthrow in 1955. New political support, and the passage of favorable legislation in 1958 strengthened the unions, and they translated this strength into new bargaining efforts. The authors demonstrate the striking bargaining gains thereupon achieved for union members in a number of industries. This appears to be a case where political power is translated into economic bargaining power, without clear evidence that labor market conditions changed substantially.

Peter Kilby in his chapter on unionism in Nigeria sees little likelihood in "Sturmthal's prediction, that voluntary collective bargaining, will, in fact, emerge at the labor-scarce stage." He finds that Nigerian unionism, structured along Anglo-Saxon lines fails "to serve any 'essential' need and thus elicits no sustained loyalty from either its leaders or its members." Rather, he goes on to say, unions are a "channel for the protest of relatively privileged wage earners against the distribution of the national wealth

between themselves and those at the apex of the distribution pyramid. . . ." (p. 258). Kilby concludes that the politicized Anglo-Saxon model [Nigeria] has resulted in a worse rather than an improved state of industrial relations, as compared to "the pre-existing non-unionized situation" (p. 258). Kilby generalizes his findings about the undesirable results and prospects of Nigerian unionism to other "underdeveloped countries."

Aside from those already referred to, there is a chapter by Bert Hoselitz on labor markets and two on Japan, one by H. Kawada and R. Komatsu and the other by Koji Taira.

While the volume does not always meet the editors' objective of testing their theses about union development, it is stimulating and useful. At the least, it should convince most readers that conventional Anglo-Saxon models are not likely to offer very much help in understanding union development in most of today's world. On the other hand, I find that *elements* of this "model" offer partial insights into union behavior in many unlikely areas. Complaints about "economism" by Communist Party officials against mainland Chinese unions, the emergence of a craft-union bargaining mentality in parts of Asia, these as well as some pieces of this very volume under review attest to the continued usefulness of the bargaining model as *one* (though by no means the only one) angle of vision into aspects of union activity and philosophy. Like all other general theories of unionism, including those of Sturmthal and Scoville, however, the Anglo-Saxon model does indeed have important limitations.

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Native Fascism in the Successor States, 1918-1945. Edited by Peter F. Sugar. (Santa Barbara, Calif.: American Bibliographical Center—Clio Press, 1971. Pp. 166. \$4.50, paper.)

The twelve short historical studies published here were originally presented as papers to a conference on this theme organized by the University of Washington in 1966. Three features of the collection make it a useful addition to the growing literature on European fascism: the juxtaposition of a "native" and an American interpretation of developments in each country; the inclusion of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia (generally omitted from similar symposia); and the exclusive focus on native Central and East European fascism. The value of these features would have been enhanced by a clearer division of labor between the contributions on each country, by greater consistency of documentation, and, most important, by a definition of the basic

term of reference, fascism. The editor's statement that it was "simply taken for granted" and that all contributors show a "basic common understanding of which movements were truly fascist" (p. 148) is less than useful in the light of the variety of definitions used by the contributors.

What all the contributors do agree is that the regimes which stayed in power in these countries between the wars were something other than fascist (Pilsudski's Poland is compared to France under de Gaulle [p. 86]), but the description of Horthy's regime as walking a tight-rope between "aristocratic parliamentarianism and fascist authoritarianism" (p. 70) raises the fundamental problem of definition which becomes increasingly important in any analysis of the "authoritarian" regimes as they move toward fascism without actually reaching it.

In view of the general use of the German and Italian varieties as yardsticks and in view of the basic economic, social and cultural differences between their settings and those of Eastern Europe, it is not surprising that native fascism in the successor states has exhibited some distinctive characteristics. The differences among the six countries often appear greater than the similarities, though some interesting common features do emerge. Professor Fellner stresses the strong religious, particularly Catholic, element, and certainly this was important in the political life of Austria, Slovakia and Romania, but nationalism in its various forms seems a far more important condition for, and determinant of, fascism in East Europe.

Some interesting and fairly distinctive East European patterns of social support for fascism can be extrapolated from the studies. The mass peasant base one might have expected did not materialize. As for the workers, the Hungarian Arrow Cross was exceptional in attracting some of the non-unionized to its ranks; the overwhelming majority of the relatively small proletariats were socialist or Communist. Students played an active role, and Professor Ranki offers some evidence to show that officers and ex-officers adhered in greater numbers than their West European counterparts, but all this fell short of the support necessary to gain political power. The editor's observation that the fascists were merely biding their time until the authoritarian regimes degenerated into fascism is unpersuasive, particularly as it is not borne out by his contributors. All the studies emphasize the political weakness and peripheral nature of native fascism until events in the international arena jolted it into prominence.

The quality of the contributions in this collection is uneven. Some are valuable: Professor Havranek's *Fascism in Czechoslovakia* explores

relatively unfamiliar ground, while Professor Fellner's *The Background of Austrian Fascism*, Professor Barany's *The Roots of Hungarian Fascism* and Professor Wandycz's *Fascism in Poland 1918-39* all provide useful appraisals of well-known material. As a whole, however, the collection does not add significantly to our understanding of this important phenomenon. This is in part due to the lack of a clear comparative framework for which the editor's suggestive conclusion does not really compensate. A systematic, comparative cross-national study of native fascism in this area might concentrate and shed more light on the relationship between this phenomenon and key variables such as political culture, economic conditions, social structure and political organization. In this way the mining of the "mountain of problems presented by the study of these fascist movements" could proceed beyond "surface scratching" (p. 156).

ALEX PRAVDA

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Indonesia After Sukarno. By J. M. van der Kroef. (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1971. Pp. 253. \$6.00.)

This volume from the prolific pen of Professor van der Kroef considers the political and economic condition of Indonesia from the outset of the abortive coup of October 1965 until the holding of the country's second general elections in July 1971. The period in question is demarcated by two episodes which indicate political change of great significance, namely, the fall of Sukarno and the electoral validation of the succeeding order of Suharto. Professor van der Kroef deals methodically with these episodes and other related issues of the period. His point of entry is the abortive coup itself, arguing on the question of initiative that "it now seems likely that P.K.I. leaders, alarmed in August 1965 over reports of Sukarno's rapidly declining health, allied themselves with a number of dissident Army officers, some of them in the Central Java-based Diponegoro division, others in the East Java-based Brawidjaja division" (p. 6). Van der Kroef is prepared to distinguish, however, between the P.K.I. *per se* and a coup group within it, and claims:

It seems equally evident, however, that the statements of Sudisman and other Indonesian Communists that the P.K.I. as such was not involved in the coup, have some substance of truth also, although wittingly or not many party and front members were obviously engaged in preparations for it. Available evidence thus far strongly suggests that, either because of caution or because of poor coordination, only a few politburo members and party provincial and district leaders appear to have been aware that a coup was being planned (pp. 9-10).

Concerning a related aspect of the abortive

coup Professor van der Kroef asserts, though without convincing evidence, that "The Government of People's China from the start was aware of and materially assisted the *Gestapu* conspirators" (p. 6).

After this diagnosis of origins, the author considers the immediate consequences of the abortive coup, including the bloodbath of the implicated and the innocent. In discussing the actual toppling of Sukarno, he makes the cogent observation that Sukarno's political fall was not inevitable but was a consequence in part of his insistence on trying to protect the pivotal role of the radical left and also of his refusal to concede any sense of accountability as president. Of further interest is a consideration of the role and position of the political parties during the post-coup period of manoeuvre when the military leadership of the recently instituted New Order was determined to circumscribe their activities. In assessing the process of constitutional change, which was not completed until after the end of the period in question, the author investigates some of the less appealing features of Suharto's New Order and remarks that "the treatment of the political prisoners and the obvious inability of Indonesia's judicial system to cope with them and with the problem of civil and human rights which they pose, had already by the end of 1968 become perhaps the worst unrelieved scandal of the Suharto regime" (p. 72).

Other matters that are considered in some depth and in an informed manner are the prospects for Communist revival (in which a healthy skepticism about some governmental claims is displayed) the so-called "act of free choice" in West Irian, the problems of economic rehabilitation, and the changing character of foreign policy. In the chapter on foreign policy, attention is devoted to the break with China and the extent to which the formal reinstatement of the "independent and active" formula does correspond with actual state practice. In addition, the author addresses himself to Indonesia's support for ASEAN seen as the basis for a new security arrangement for Southeast Asia outside of a formal security pact. The concluding chapter discusses the preliminaries to the elections of 1971 and highlights the emergence of *Golkar* and the role of the Army in managing a political enterprise designed to root the New Order in constitutional legality; actual results are given without a detailed breakdown.

The general tone of this volume, exemplified in some of the author's concluding comments, indicates a skepticism about the stability and enduring quality of what is described as a semi-military regime. Professor van der Kroef puts forward the thesis that such a regime will become "unsupportable" if it fails to provide tangible

economic benefits. To the extent that this regime has not succeeded in transforming the deep-rooted constituencies of Indonesian politics, such an argument is valid if less than conclusive on its own. As a general survey of its time, this book contains a substantial amount of detailed information and on balance makes a successful attempt to interpret a complex series of events.

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The Blacks in Canada: A History. By Robin Winks. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1971. Pp. 546. \$15.00.)

Beginning with the first black in New France about whom there is information, young Olivier Le Jeune, Professor Robin Winks proceeds with meticulous detail and lucid exposition to give us an example of history writing at its best. The result is a definitive history of blacks in Canada which will stand as a benchmark for further research, whether historical or not. Sociologists and political scientists will remain indebted to Winks for giving us, in such easily accessible form, the materials from which to build further and more contemporary analyses, for example, on the development of civil rights in Canada or the extent of ethnic differentiation within the black community.

The black experience in Canada, as Winks documents, has not been a happy one. One may wonder if it could have been otherwise. Blacks first came as transported slaves, and if slavery was not always devastating in its effects, particularly for the relatively few in New France and household slaves generally, it was still the most deplorable of human conditions. Blacks were often caught up in social movements originating elsewhere that concerned their fate—most obviously abolition, but also 'back to Africa' schemes, Booker T. Washington's self-help movement, the heartbreaking efforts at settling utopian communities, and other similar developments. In all of these, whites were largely indifferent, occasionally involved on the side of blacks, and often sanctimonious in assessing the benefits of life in Canada. In one area, Nova Scotia, racism was strong almost from the outset, and the combination of poverty and discrimination continue almost till today to make miserable the lives of black residents.

Given the thoroughness of Winks's historical research, and the fairness with which he assesses the handicaps confronting blacks in Canada, it is perhaps surprising how unsympathetically Winks treats those leaders, both black and white, who have attempted to better the condition of blacks. As a sociologist, I suspect that this lack of sym-

pathy is due to the historian's inclination to place inordinate emphasis on the significance of leadership. For one thing, while it is true that some leaders were charlatans and easily seduced away from the goals of helping blacks, others were magnificent, even in their blind convictions that what they were doing was right, when all evidence was to the contrary. Here I think of such people as John Clarkson, a white Englishman, who led a group from Nova Scotia to Sierra Leone, under the most incredible hardships. Another is Josiah Henson, thought to be the model of Harriet Beecher Stowe's Uncle Tom. But more important, I believe, were the devastating consequences of slavery, that made any leader's task almost impossible. While there seems to be some inclination now to speak of the benign aspects of slavery, basically I feel this is absurd, and Winks himself makes no such claims. What he seems not to fully appreciate, though he does document it, is the way slavery, particularly plantation slavery, overwhelmingly destroyed those social and psychological mechanisms for dealing with the future beyond mere survival. When former slaves were faced with the poorest of land, as in Nova Scotia, with the general difficulty of establishing communal settlements by any less than angels, as in Upper Canada (now Ontario) and with instances of white hostility—then their successes, no matter how limited, need to be viewed more sympathetically.

Winks comes through as an activist, eager for blacks to take the initiative in changing their status, and critical of whites who do not help them. This is most evident when he deals with four mechanisms of self-help. His activist stance leads him to view black churches as appropriate to a stockade mentality, but generally not helpful in breaking down barriers. Yet his meticulous research may allow others to make different judgments, as they consider clerics and leaders of the old school like White and Oliver in Nova Scotia. With respect to education, he tells us horror stories that Canadians are inclined to wish did not exist. For example, up until 1936, blacks in the village of Birchtown, Nova Scotia, did not receive any schooling, and that in an area where blacks had been present since 1787. The last segregated school in Ontario did not close its doors until 1965. With the black press, Winks can tell what is to him a more satisfying story—it has often been bold and forthright in the defense of black interests. At the same time, the black press suffers not only from overwhelming competition from the United States, but also from the general circulation press in Canada. Finally, he asserts, the organization of blacks into associations for the protection and promotion of their

interests remains more a task for the future than a mature effort.

This last statement leads me to conclude that Winks has written not only a definitive history of blacks in Canada, but also, and inevitably, a comment on the history of Canada. Blacks today remain a fragmented community to some degree because Canada is a fragmented society. If blacks did not face as dreadful conditions in Canada as they did in the United States, this is a reflection of the slower, more civil pace of life in Canada, and the greater emphasis on control of overt aggression. It was reflected in the proud heritage of British justice, which made judges the principal heroes of abolition, virtually ending slavery in the 1820s, though it was not legally abolished until 1834. At the same time, these styles of life contributed to a slowness in improving conditions for blacks, compounded of a reluctance to alter the status quo and a moralistic sense of superiority to those in the United States, which prevented acknowledging the existence of problems.

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The Afro-Asian Movement: Ideology and Foreign Policy of the Third World. By David Kimche. (Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press and New York: Halsted Press, 1973. Pp. vii, 296. \$16.75.)

The promise of the short title, "The Afro-Asian Movement," is, within a clearly definable range, most usefully fulfilled; and only a publisher would expect a study of this length to deal fully with "ideology and foreign policy of the third world"—perhaps "some aspects of . . ." and "in the third world" would have been more disarming—and accurate.

For Dr. David Kimche's study, based on a Ph.D. thesis and written while he was a visiting Research Associate of the Shiloah Center of Tel Aviv University, is primarily a history of the several continuities of events which have constituted the Afro-Asian Movement. This descriptive chronology, with its accounts of conferences, preliminary meetings, follow-ups and consequences, is narrative in style and contains commentaries with shrewd insights obtained from a study of the relevant conference papers and documents, contemporary press and radio files, a wide range of secondary sources, and interviews with key participants. Consistent with the purposes of the Shiloah Center, this is a study "where Israeli scholarship is in a position to make a special contribution."

Following a survey of pre-1945 Afro-Asian activities adequate for the purposes of his study,

Dr. Kimche devotes roughly a third of the book to a critical description of the "governmental" Afro-Asian sequence—the road to Bandung, the two conferences of the nonaligned nations in Belgrade and Cairo, and the "demise of Afro-Asianism" at the abortive Algiers conference of June, 1965. Dr. Kimche then moves back to 1954 and picks up the sequence of the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization, following it through its many manifestations as the pressures which negated Bandung—the Sino-Russian disputes, and Sino-Indian border conflict, the divergence of purposes within the region—destroy the coherence of the movement even as it climaxes in the Havana Solidarity Conference of 1966.

To this narrative Dr. Kimche adds three "case studies" dealing with India, Indonesia, and Africa. These are useful in anchoring the flights of Afro-Asianism to the realities of national politics, but the choice of topics also reveals the imbalance of the study. It is heavily influenced by informants whose information, usually anonymous, is not possible to assess. The space devoted to India and the understanding Dr. Kimche shows of Soviet policies is not balanced by his handling of China; his intimate accounts of selected African policies are not balanced with Southeast Asian studies—the Indonesian case study is not complete.

Readers must unfortunately be warned that the index is totally inadequate and that footnoting is inconsistent.

Dr. Kimche's main contributions are (i) his exposition of differentiated streams of Afro-Asian activity, (ii) his account of the Bandung Conference, placing it clearly in context so that the actualities and the "myth" of Bandung can be distinguished and the impact of the latter assessed, and (iii) his explanation of the positive factors which have moved a new generation of leaders from heady dreams of international politics to the creation of functional organizations more nearly designed to solve specific problems—from "solidarity" to the Southeast Asian Council of Ministers of Education, for example.

This is not to belittle the contribution the author has made in his analysis of Afro-Asianism: changing leadership turning to internal problems whose solutions are not furthered by ideological disputes centered on the legitimacy of Maoism, tensions within the Afro-Asian movement, and the changing relationships of Afro-Asian countries with the major powers. All of this is, in its essentials, convincingly argued.

How important to Dr. Kimche's total contribution is then his failure to deal with China in China's terms? He makes no relevant reference, for example, to either Chairman Mao Tse-tung

or to Mao's thought; the only reference to China's position regarding great power hegemony (p. 245) is expressed in racist terms based on the author's conversation with Oscar Kambona and others—despite his listing of the *Peking Review* in the bibliography. Chou En-lai appears enigmatically, surprises his audiences, and disappears once more behind the bamboo curtain, forever inscrutable.

This approach may not in fact be a deficiency. Dr. Kimche's China is China as seen by Nehru—is the China of all those with whom the study deals. That this was so—and indeed may still be so in many cases—is a fact of great significance. Bafflement with China led to boredom with China's arguments; African leaders and others had more important problems. China's impact was tremendous, but to understand this one should, perhaps, not understand China.

There are other problems. The reader will, for example, have to bring considerable knowledge to bear if he wishes to follow all the author's comments on esoteric local or regional political problems. Opposition to Malaysian participation is stated, but Indonesian inspired Maphilindo and "confrontation" is not mentioned. Only a specialist in Nigerian politics will presumably recognize the initials NCNC, while others will puzzle over North Kalimantan. Nor is Burma's seclusion noted or the work of the Colombo Plan mentioned; the declaration of the Colombo Powers is referred to but the important contents are not provided.

But these comments serve only to stress the nature of Dr. Kimche's undoubted contribution which lies in the clear, expository sweep he has given to the chronology of the Afro-Asian movement and to the perceptive comments he has provided in explanation.

FRANK H. H. KING

University of Hong Kong

Psychological Dimensions of U.S.-Japanese Relations. By Hiroshi Kitamura. (Cambridge, Mass.: The Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1971. Pp. 46. \$1.75, paper.)

A series of events which had occurred from the summer of 1971 to the fall of 1972—starting with President Nixon's announcement of his plan to visit Red China and ending with Japan's restoration of diplomatic relations with Red China—opened a new era in the relationship between Japan and the United States.

In his short but excellent essay written just a few months before these developments began, Mr. Kitamura, a Japanese career diplomat, pre-

dicted that these "changes in the relationship will inevitably require both countries to make the following psychological adjustments: (1) to try to resolve psychological distortions concerning the other which have long existed in both countries; (2) to try to adjust traditional psychological attitudes to changes in the U.S.-Japanese relationship so that both countries can accommodate to the new situations which surround them" (p. 8). If we fail to take initiatives in these adjustments, he warns, "we are likely to find ourselves in a stalemate as serious in its own way as that of the 1930s" (p. 8). The author points out three sources of psychological problems: (1) an unbalanced relationship, (2) cultural differences, and (3) racial differences, which respectively constitute the titles of the chapters in the main part of this book.

The psychological problems of the Japanese arise more from an unbalanced relationship. They become unique, he emphasizes, when "certain psychological traits of the Japanese character have become intertwined with the relationship of unevenness" (p. 10). Three elements of the Japanese character: sense of hierarchy, "amae" psychology, and attention gap and their psychological derivatives are explained in detail. "Amae," a "Japanese word which has no English equivalent, means to depend and presume upon other's benevolence" (p. 12).

The psychological problems of Americans, on the other hand, arise more from cultural dissimilarities than from other sources. Many Americans are so confident and zealous in their search for moral good and material wealth that they regard their faith and values as the best and those of different cultures as inferior. These aspects of the American national character affect the cultural dissimilarity and transform it into a source of psychological problems.

In the concluding chapter, the author suggests how "the two countries could make psychological adjustments in order to avoid a harmful escalation of conflicts caused by the interaction of psychological factors" (p. 35). The most important and effective psychological adjustment is to realize the vital role that psychological factors have played in Japanese-American relations. The ultimate resolution of the psychological problems then requires eliminating the sources Kitamura has enumerated. He offers his prescriptions for both the American and Japanese sides. Although written five years ago, this retains its validity. As Professor Edwin O. Reischauer aptly puts it in his introduction to this book, "It is perhaps just as well that Mr. Kitamura was unaware of impeding developments, for otherwise his attention might have been drawn to these concrete issues and away from the more

important underlying problem of mutual understanding between Americans and Japanese."

ICHIRO MIYAKE

Doshisha University, Japan

The Virgin Islands: A Caribbean Lilliput. By Gordon K. Lewis. (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1972. Pp. 382. \$12.00.)

The U.S. Virgin Islands are a small group in the northeastern Caribbean with a total area about one-ninth that of Rhode Island and a population not large enough to fill the Los Angeles Coliseum. Before reading this excellent book, one might make this observation in complete innocence. Afterwards, one is aware, at least, of the insensitivity of it. Just as when we were children we heard of Lilliput as a funny little place with funny little people, so when we became adults we learned that it was really a mirror of ourselves.

Professor Lewis tells us everything we always wanted to know about the Virgin Islands, raising disturbing questions along the way. It is not an exercise in fault-finding or in placing the blame, but rather a thoughtful analysis of an extremely complex situation. The Virgin Islands are a microcosm of most problems facing most societies, with the added complications of political status and economic dependency. The United States purchased the islands from Denmark in 1917 for military reasons, without giving much thought to the people who were included in the sale. During the U.S. Navy's administration, the islands were looked upon as little more than "a war vessel or fleet at anchor" (p. 55). Civilian rule since 1931 has not been much better. "The territory . . . is altogether at the mercy of Congress," Professor Lewis writes after a lengthy discussion about the "glacial pace," indifference, and arrogance of the U.S. Congress. "The same is true of the various federal agencies that control and supervise so much of the territorial activities. Everything that the territory gets is given as a favor, not as a matter of right" (p. 350). He points out, however, that in many areas where the islanders exercise jurisdiction, they, too, are often unjust. Their wretched treatment of the West Indian aliens provides evidence of this.

Woven skilfully into the larger issues is a veritable textbook about the Virgins: history, government, politics, the economy, and society. Of obvious value to the scholar and student, it would also be useful to the tourist, who might read it instead of the "fun-in-the-sun" brochures. Professor Lewis compiles an insider's list of hotels, restaurants, and shops, while discussing seriously the nature and impact of tourism, the

"mainstay" of the islands' present prosperity. A nice, easy style combined with substance is the hallmark of this book.

The issue of race is as pervasive as that of colonialism, and Professor Lewis seems to understand it well. "It is almost official dogma in the islands that color, as a problem, does not exist. . . . It would be more true to say that there is a color problem but that it is not couched in the harsh, polarizing terms of the North American white-black confrontation" (p. 248). He affirms, however, that the "Americanization" of the islands has introduced certain racist attitudes of the mainland variety. Because race cuts across all class, caste, and social lines in the Virgins, it has not been a cohesive force so far, but Professor Lewis perceives a number of signals for the growth of "black power" sentiment. Still, in writing about the governorship of Ralph Paiewonsky during the 1960s, he notes that "the Virgins were the only place in the United States where it was possible to witness the spectacle of a Jewish governor ruling in alliance with a black legislature, with a handful of white continentals seeking to penetrate the inner corridors of power" (pp. 326-327).

This pluralism is compounded by the "American connection." Status is not yet a political issue, and Professor Lewis asserts that the Virgin Islanders have a "dependency complex" stronger than that of any Caribbean people. Nonetheless, viewing the situation in the context of Caribbean affairs, he is bold to suggest that the Virgin Islands may sooner or later seek to be independent.

This is an outstanding book. One may disagree with Professor Lewis's analysis based upon one's reason or prejudice, but no one can dispute his humanity, his clarity, and his scholarly treatment of the subject.

CHARLES D. AMERINGER

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The Brazilian-American Alliance, 1937-1945. By Frank D. McCann, Jr. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1973. Pp. xiv, 527. \$18.50.)

U.S.-Brazilian relations constitute an unusually significant chapter in the history of U.S. policy toward developing countries. Until the second World War, Britain continued to be Brazil's largest foreign investor, although trade was already shifting toward North America. By 1945 U.S. influence had become predominant. Obviously the war must have been an important factor.

Frank McCann has now told the story of how the strategic demands of war brought the governments of Franklin Roosevelt and Getúlio Vargas

into an alliance which insured "hegemony over Brazil's economic and military sectors" for the U.S. (p. 454). The U.S. badly needed Brazilian raw materials and military bases on Brazil's northeastern coast. In return for meeting those needs, Brazil extracted financial and technical help for its own mobilization effort.

The raw materials (especially quartz) and bases served their purpose. Brazil's northeastern bulge became the "trampoline to victory" in the Battle of the Atlantic and the North African campaign. The Brazilians were proud to have played a wartime role that included sending an expeditionary army division which fought (after agonizing delays in their proper training and equipping) under the command of the U.S. Fifth Army in Italy.

This wartime alliance was built to outlast the war. U.S. policy-makers wanted to maximize the future trade potential with Brazil. They also wanted to make the U.S. the exclusive foreign supplier of military equipment and training. As postwar history has shown, both goals were achieved. In the process the U.S. made a commitment to aid basic Brazilian economic development, including industrialization. As early as 1940 the U.S. pledged a \$30 million loan to build Brazil's first steel mill at Volta Redonda. As McCann notes, this was a forerunner of the ambitious aid programs directed at the Third World in the 1950s and 1960s. Anyone interested in the rationale and context of such programs can learn much from McCann's careful analysis of government thinking. Vargas bargained shrewdly, trying to play off U.S. and German offers. But the coming of the war clouded the German option. Brazil accepted the American bid and headed into an ever deeper dependence on the U.S. Neither German trade, nor British investment, nor French military missions were ever again to threaten U.S. hegemony in Latin America's largest country.

McCann's impressively researched monograph offers richly informative detail on the leading Brazil actors: Oswaldo Aranha, the expansive Ambassador to Washington and later Foreign Minister; Getúlio Vargas, whose enigmatic political style kept his enemies off balance; Dutra and Góes Monteiro, the opportunistic generals who finally shifted from a pro-German to a pro-Allied stand. On the U.S. side, the feud between Sumner Welles and Cordell Hull is once again documented. This time we see how, before his ouster, Welles had effectively helped make growing U.S. hegemony palatable to the Brazilians. He was greatly aided by Jefferson Caffrey, the U.S. Ambassador in Rio, who had developed an extraordinary rapport with the Brazilians.

The author gained access to numerous public

and private archives in both the U.S. and Brazil, including U.S. military records. As a result his excellent documentation relies almost entirely on primary sources. Specialists will want to compare McCann's interpretation with the relevant chapters in Moniz Bandeira, *Presença dos Estados Unidos no Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro, 1973), although it should be noted that Bandeira did not consult U.S. archives. McCann's fluent style further enhances a book which will be essential reading for anyone interested in the origins of postwar U.S. economic and military policies toward the developing world.

THOMAS E. SKIDMORE

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Conflicts and Conspiracies: Brazil and Portugal, 1750-1808. By Kenneth R. Maxwell. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1973. Pp. 289. \$14.95.)

Brazil becomes the center of attention for eighteenth-century European diplomats and merchants in Kenneth Maxwell's fascinating and important study, *Conflicts and Conspiracies: Brazil and Portugal 1750-1808*. Based upon extensive archival research in Brazil, Portugal, and Great Britain, Maxwell's complex yet readable account tells how Portugal fashioned a colonial policy in Brazil to keep British merchants out without antagonizing Portugal's position inside Britain's informal empire. Unfortunately for Portugal, this colonial policy led to abortive movements for independence in Brazil, and eventually led to closer and more direct relations between Britain and Brazil.

As Professor Maxwell tells the story, Portugal joined Britain's informal empire in 1703 through the Treaty of Methuen which opened British markets to port wine, and Portuguese markets to British textiles. As British goods flooded the Portuguese market, British factors eventually controlled most of Portugal's export trade and provided credit for Portuguese colonists in Brazil. What made this all possible was the discovery of gold and diamonds in Brazil, and Portugal's easy wealth encouraged her to continue buying British goods rather than spurring industrial development. The death of João V in 1750 and the accession of José I and his minister, the Marquis of Pombal, offered Portugal the opportunity to control the future infiltration of British merchants without breaking the Anglo-Portuguese alliance. Pombal, Portugal's virtual ruler from 1750 to 1777, initiated a new colonial policy which was supposed to raise mining taxes, protect Portuguese merchants and producers of sugar and tobacco from British creditors, and use the anticipated increased revenues to finance Portuguese industrialization.

The effects of Pombaline reforms in Brazil proved to be quite different from original expectations. Pombal invented a colonial policy innocuous enough not to antagonize the British government, but almost lost Brazil to revolts. Anticipated changes in gold-mining taxes led in 1789 to a major conspiracy in the gold fields of Minas Gerais. Removal of price controls in 1781 apparently sparked a revolt in Bahia in 1798. Both conspiracies failed, and the possibility of losing Brazil led to reforms in Brazilian colonial policy. Even though British traders had been closed out of newly revived Brazilian industries, Britain watched Brazil's growth with great interest. As Maxwell aptly points out, Brazil had become more important to Great Britain than Portugal was. Thus it came as no surprise to knowledgeable observers when the British encouraged the Portuguese court to abandon Portugal to the advancing Napoleonic forces in 1808 and to move to Brazil, Portugal's most important asset. Finally, after 1808 Britain eventually replaced Portugal as Brazil's major trading partner.

Maxwell's analysis of interrelationships among Brazil, Portugal, and Great Britain is a major addition to the existing literature on international relations in the eighteenth century. His organization and conclusions about British influence in Brazilian revolts, however, tend to weaken the thesis. Despite efforts to connect the Minas conspiracy with British-linked merchants in Rio, there appears to be little direct relation between the Brazilian uprisings and private or public British policy. Even Maxwell admits that natural factors and human factors transformed Pombaline reforms into an inflexible body of regulations. Inflexibility then led to conspiracy. Thus the accounts of the two conspiracies become isolated segments unrelated to general questions of Anglo-Portuguese relations. Despite these shortcomings, *Conflicts and Conspiracies* is an impressive work which should become required reading for anyone interested in the interaction of these three countries.

DONNA GUY

University of Arizona

Social Hierarchies: 1450 to the Present. By Roland Mousnier. Translated from the French by Peter Evans. Edited by Margaret Clarke. (New York: Schocken, 1973. Pp. 206. \$9.00.)

Professor of History at the Sorbonne, Mousnier has arrived at a wide-eyed discovery of functional theory that will not impress American social scientists because it virtually ignores the enormous stratification literature of the last 30 years. Before criticizing the book, I shall summarize the argument in sufficient detail to do justice to the oddness of its propositions.

Stratification systems reward individuals to ensure that they carry out necessary societal functions (p. 11). Each function is evaluated by general opinion about the knowledge needed to carry it out and the degree of responsibility involved (p. 14). A person's main function corresponds to his job (p. 15), but other stratification criteria such as race, birth, religious purity, property, community activities, and personal qualities are grouped together to determine a person's rank. To understand the system of a given society, scholars should examine correlations among these scales; many sociologists, such as Aristotle, Plato, and Voltaire, mistakenly focused only on economic factors.

The main types of stratification are estate, caste, and class. The most important is the estate (or order) type, because societies organized on this principle are most numerous (p. 49) and most likely to prevail in the future (p. 189). Based on social esteem, rank is established by consensus on the importance of a function. Such consensus is the basic organizing principle of society (p. 49). Estate societies develop in two phases. The first is based on a religious intensity of feeling (p. 51), and the highest positions are filled by those with the most ardent faith. Social rank derives from the prestige attached to the strength of a person's feelings (p. 61). This phase is democratic because anyone, regardless of birth, can reach a level of intense feeling, act upon it, and thereby attain the highest rank (p. 62). In the second phase, the hierarchy is structured not by degree of faith but by adherence to the substance of faith (p. 64).

The rest of the book describes the order principle that organized various societies, about ten pages to each: military in seventeenth-century France; administrative in Mandarin China; theocratic in Rome and Tibet; liturgical in seventeenth-century Moscow; ideological in Revolutionary France, Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union; and technocratic, increasingly dominant in the twentieth century.

The book's argument is flawed in three ways. First, despite lip service to sociological complexity, the author rejects vulgar Marxism only to accept vulgar functionalism. Class society theorists, Mousnier incorrectly believes, hold that wealth determines prestige and power. Rejecting this view as simplistic, Mousnier accepts its converse: prestige determines power and wealth. The simple monism of his causal chain thus ignores the complex interplay of sociological variables. His further proposition that "men in general" concur on the importance of social functions implicitly assumes that what is good for society is so self-evident that all men (women are invisible in the entire book) will concur.

Second, Mousnier never confronts the mea-

surement problems his theory involves. He lists a number of stratification criteria, but he never explains how to decide which estate an individual should be placed in if all these criteria must be taken into account, nor does he explain how to identify discrete estates when the criteria not only overlap but also consist of continua rather than of unambiguously bounded categories. Nor is the problem of weighting considered. In short, the author fails to consider the stratification literature of the past 30 years.

Third, Mousnier's theory of emotional stratification—high positions are filled by those with the most ardent faith—is hard to believe. Apart from the problem of measuring degrees of fervor, the notion that popes, princes, and presidents attained their positions because their faith was more ardent than that of acolytes, nuns, peasants, factory workers, or housewives contradicts both common sense and social science. The casual rejection of the findings of thousands of stratification studies makes this book almost useless to social scientists.

JOAN HUBER

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Manuel de Pratique Diplomatique: L'Ambassade. By Farag Moussa. (Brussels: Bruylant, 1972. Pp. 411. 1,569 francs.)

It is often said that the role of the ambassador has become less and less important with the passage of time and the changing world order—especially with the coming of instant communications and the arrival of a whole host of technical problems that have to be dealt with through diplomatic channels. With detailed instructions from the foreign office on every important issue, the argument runs, and with a steady flow of technical experts going abroad to negotiate particular problems, what is there left for the ambassador to do?

This question, as well as many related issues, are ably dealt with by the author in his handbook on modern diplomacy. He includes a discussion of the nature of the modern embassy and other types of diplomatic missions, the structure and organization of the embassy, the members of the ambassador's team and their functions, the relations of the embassy with the authorities of the sending and receiving states and with other foreign embassies, the relations of the embassy with the press—a problem of growing importance—and other special problems such as the role of the non-resident ambassador, the protection by the embassy of the interests of third states, and the special status of ambassadors who represent more than one state.

The book is designed to fill three main gaps

in the literature on the practice of modern diplomacy. First of all, the classical works of the interwar years, like those of Raoul Genet and Ernest Satow, are no longer as useful as they once were. The emphasis of this book is on the realities of contemporary diplomacy, and most of the illustrations are drawn from the postwar period down to 1971. Second, most recent works on the subject place a good deal of emphasis on the legal and protocol aspects of diplomacy; Moussa's emphasis is on practice rather than theory. Finally, it should be noted that, unlike most of the books on diplomacy which deal with the diplomacy of international conferences or special diplomatic missions, this one is basically a study of the embassy as an instrument of bilateral diplomacy.

The author is well equipped, both by temperament and background, to carry out his mission. He is the son of an Egyptian career diplomat and has himself served both in the foreign service of his country and as an international civil servant with the Arab League. Consequently, he has consulted not only the books and memoirs written by scholars and diplomats, he has also put to effective use the diplomatic lists, the circular notes and the directives put out by various embassies and foreign offices. Moreover, in the preparation of his manuscript, he has conferred with many diplomats at all levels representing different kinds of countries and social systems. As a result, the book contains a good many helpful examples and illustrations of the main points made in the text, with numerous references to the experience of the new nations.

The writer's principal concern is the embassy and, of course, the embassy's principal officer, the ambassador. Admittedly, the ambassador's role has undergone great changes during this century. Today, for example, there are some 50 agencies and departments of the United States government interested in foreign policy and many of these have representatives stationed abroad. As a result, our ambassadors in many posts find themselves surrounded by commercial, labor, agricultural and military attaches, CIA officials, foreign-aid and treasury experts, public affairs and cultural relations officers, and a host of other technical experts. They thus tend to function more as managers of a team than as chief negotiators for their governments.

Yet even in his negotiating role, as the author points out, the ambassador serves as much more than just a letter box whose principal mission is to deliver messages from the Department of State or the Foreign Office. In the normal course of events he enjoys considerable latitude. In a good many areas of activity, for example, most ambassadors are not tied down by specific in-

structions from their foreign offices. Moreover, some of them may have played an important role in framing the foreign policies of their governments and in formulating their own set of instructions, and they always have the privilege of recommending changes in their instructions, many of which are accepted by their foreign offices. There are other tricks in the trade, as well: some may find it more convenient to follow the spirit of their instructions rather than the precise letter, while others may even ignore or hold up the execution of their instructions for a period of time. Finally, the *manner* in which ambassadors transmit or present their government's views may be as important as the communications themselves.

Aspiring young foreign service officers will be glad to know that even in this rapidly shrinking world of ours, the ambassador still has an important part to play in the great drama of international politics. And whether they aspire to be ambassadors or not I strongly recommend this book to them—and to all others interested in the modern embassy—for it is exceptionally well organized, easy to read, and very well documented. We owe the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace still another debt of gratitude for sponsoring this very useful project.

FRANCIS O. WILCOX

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The United Nations: A Reassessment—Sanctions, Peacekeeping, and Humanitarian Assistance. Edited by John M. Paxman and George T. Boggs. (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1973. Pp. xii, 153. \$10.00.)

Not long ago, serious assessments of the United Nations more often than not were somewhat optimistic in outlook, even when they expressed doubts about the commitments of governments to a powerful organization. Emphasis tended to be upon growth of UN programs and the potential for constructive development in the direction of expanded UN services and functions.

The overall tone of this book is radically different. In this volume, the product of a symposium held at the University of Virginia School of Law in March, 1972, the contributors question again and again the fundamental ability of the United Nations to serve the world order system effectively. For example, on the first page of their preface, the editors assert that the organization's "record of response to the needs of the international community in the recent past has at best been shabby" (p. vii), Richard Falk comments on the inability of the UN to deal with the growing worldwide ecological challenge effectively,

and suggests that a "central guidance capability"—which, presumably cannot be engendered through the UN—is required for ecological salvation. Michael Reisman states of the Bangladesh war that "the quintessential obscenity of this holocaust was the attempt by the Security Council to condemn India as an aggressor when India decided to intervene and stop the carnage in East Pakistan" (p. 31). John Salzberg argues, also of the Bangladesh crisis, that "the failure of the United Nations to fully respond to . . . the massive violations of human rights (by the Pakistani government) contributed to the inevitability of the armed conflict" (p. 114).

But it is Gidon Gottlieb, in the book's lead article, who raises the most fundamental challenge when he declares that "conventional wisdom that the United Nations should be made more effective is no longer taken for granted" (p. 1). He then expresses "ten fundamental doubts" in the form of questions, about the desirability of trying to make the UN more effective. The author is clearly nagged in particular by two basic kinds of questions about the very essence of the UN. The first reflects his skepticism that Charter provisions speak realistically and authoritatively to the political divisions of today's world. The second expresses the fear that a more "effective" UN, far from providing a transition to improved structures of world order, would only legitimize further the virtually unchecked sovereignty of the 140 or so states of the world.

These are serious questions, deserving of the fullest consideration by a group of scholars gathered to "reassess" the work of the United Nations. Yet in spite of the evidence that a number of the contributors to this volume may share at least much of Gottlieb's skepticism, these questions are not addressed in any very coherent fashion. The reader is left with the frustrating impression that the participants here (with a very few exceptions) are prepared only to "muddle through" in about the same way as the UN itself does, offering serious criticisms of various aspects of the work of the organization, but little in the way of suggestions for constructive alternatives.

This sense of frustration is no doubt heightened by the problems inherent in any symposium format—problems that seem magnified when the symposium is reduced to print. First, the contributions are of uneven quality and tone. Some are imaginative and original (Reisman's discussion of civic enforcement of international humanitarian law is a good case in point). Others are little more than *reportage* of the details of events that might not be widely known, while still others (most notably, the discussions by U.S. and Soviet spokesmen of UN peacekeeping forces) are

largely presentations of two governmental positions that are by now depressingly familiar.

Second, however time-honored the practice of asking a selected few to introduce symposium topics for panel discussion, such introductory comments cry out for further development when one sees them published. It is no disparagement of the remarks of Inis L. Claude, Jr., John Norton Moore, and Richard B. Lillich to say that the page or two allotted each is scarcely sufficient for provocative comments on the issues of sanctions, peacekeeping, and humanitarian assistance, respectively. Finally, the commentary and discussion following each section is only as interesting or relevant as the individual speaker chose to make it. Discussions of matters tangential to the subject do not enhance the reader's sense of coherent and fully developed analysis, whatever snippets of knowledge or insight they may contain.

If the profound reservations expressed in this volume about the capacity of the United Nations to respond effectively to world order needs are warranted—and many of them surely are—then this is the time for more serious attention to constructive alternatives to, or revisions of, the UN system. One can only hope that effective action will be taken before, rather than after, the system collapses catastrophically. Perhaps the chief merit of books such as this one is that they remind us of the urgency of that task.

LYNN H. MILLER

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The Politics of Nuclear Proliferation. By George H. Quester. (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973. Pp. 245. \$11.50.)

In an uncertain international order, in which the influence of the superpowers may be declining, the norms of behavior familiar during the years of their universal antagonism may be dissolving and the autonomy of a certain kind of middle power may be increasing—in this setting the issue of nuclear proliferation is beginning once again to appear on the agenda of world politics. India exploded an underground nuclear "device" early in 1974. The dramatic rise in the cost of fossil fuels has enhanced the importance of nuclear reactors, of which weapons-grade fissionable material can be a byproduct, in both national and international politics, as evidenced by the Nixon promise of both fuel and reactors to Israel and Egypt, or France's deal with Iran. And in May 1975 a major international conference will review the operation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty which was agreed upon in 1968 and became effective in 1970.

By its provisions the superpowers sought to limit the nuclear club to its then five members—the Soviet Union, the United States, Britain, France and China—with a vague promise to engage in arms limitation themselves, even vaguer guarantees of support for non-nuclear powers subjected to nuclear threats, and complex provisions for using the International Atomic Energy Agency to prevent the diversion of nuclear material and technology from civil to military purposes. It was an instrument imposed on the international community by the superpowers with the support of one other member of the club of five—Britain, plus two or three near-nuclear powers—Canada and Sweden, for instance, and of a host of small countries who could never aspire to such a status and feared the consequences of proliferation for regional order in their area. Will it hold in a situation where the evolution of a "special relationship" between Washington and Moscow may be inescapable, the value of nuclear guarantees more dubious than ever, and access to weapon technology and nuclear materials is steadily becoming more diffused?

Professor Quester knows a great deal about this problem and has chosen to make a particular kind of contribution to the elucidation of it. He has not re-examined the arguments for and against nuclear proliferation, or its probable impact on world politics, which was hotly debated by such writers as Pierre Gallois and Leonard Beaton, or examined by Stanley Hoffman, Raymond Aron, myself, and many others, in the 1960s. Instead he has been traveling to the capitals of the countries that were particularly outraged or nervous in the later 1960s at the prospect of foregoing the nuclear option forever, and has listened to the arguments taking place there. It is a book about probabilities rather than consequences, and this explains the arrangement of his chapters. After a rather perfunctory examination of the Soviet and the American positions on proliferation and the Treaty, he takes us immediately to New Delhi (India never signed the NPT). Although the book was published at the end of 1973, he can be said effectively to have forecast the Indian bomb, in the form it took, namely a so called "peaceful" explosion, detonated underground, largely designed to assert Indian scientific prestige and political credibility, and in the knowledge that neither superpower would be prepared to react forcefully against an action by so large a country yet not affecting their own security. Professor Quester doubts, however, whether India can rest content simply with a demonstration of nuclear know-how and argues that she may find herself on the same escalator as her five nuclear predecessors: "In

terms of India's image, an early detonation without a rapid follow-up to H-bombs and advanced delivery systems might also make India look foolish and incompetent for the longer run, as Indian postdetonation progress will inevitably be compared with that of Communist China" (p. 80).

He then takes us to Jerusalem (he rightly talks of capital cities, since nuclear weapons are the subject of debate between scientist, soldier, official and politician, not voters). Israel too is a nonsignatory of the Treaty, and Jerusalem had strong strategic incentives, even before the Yom Kippur war, for introducing a more effective system of local deterrence than ground and air forces: yet it would be politically ruinous for her relationship with the United States or the hope of any progress in relation with her neighbors, to test a nuclear bomb. He tells us, "It is thus entirely possible that Israel will become the first example of quasi-proliferation, understood to have nuclear weapons ready to fire but never having proved this, to those in the world who require a detonation as a proof" (p. 102).

From Jerusalem the examination moves to Tokyo, the capital of an advanced yet vulnerable country, whose experts can envisage no specific scenario that would require a Japanese bomb but where "the NPT seems to imply that Japan is taken for granted as acquiescent and not a great power . . . the loser of World War II" (p. 111). And so on down the scale of probabilities: Stockholm, where the nuclear option was seriously considered ten years ago and then rejected; Brasília, Buenos Aires, and Santiago, capitals that wish to keep their options open; Ottawa, where it was long ago decided that a Canadian bomb made no sense; Canberra, where the debate was much sharper; Bonn, once the great source of Soviet anxieties but now more irked by the Treaty's inspection provisions than by its substance; Rome and Pretoria.

Professor Quester has made a useful contribution to expert discussion on proliferation, but he gives little assistance to the layman. He is weak on narrative, he is weak on the presentation of his sources, and he does not even help the reader with a simple table showing which countries had signed or ratified the Treaty when he wrote. He makes some mistakes of fact such as discussing Euratom as if it were still separate from the European Community, and, more important, he does not adequately discuss the relationship of other factors—the growing cost and complexity of delivery systems, the demography of the country whose leaders must make a choice, the stability or strength of government, the quality of its adversaries—to the nature of that choice.

ALASTAIR BUCHAN

Late of Oxford University

Third-Party Settlement of Disputes in Theory and Practice. By Lillian L. Randolph. (New York: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1973. Pp. 385. \$18.50.)

The author's announced purpose is to demonstrate that independent third-party action generally can assist in obtaining peaceful resolution of and party satisfaction relating to disputes. In dealing with this worthy goal, Professor Randolph treats the role of third parties in international and "inter-nation" (municipal) situations. The author finds that the goal of peaceful resolution of disputes has special relevancy in the area of international disputes, particularly where the danger of catastrophic violence exists. The goal of party satisfaction relates more to municipal disputes.

We are told that the perspectives of the three participants in the process vary. Disputants are generally supportive of peaceful resolution or party satisfaction. Third-parties and the public are seen as favoring resolution because of concern over catastrophic violence. It is argued that these interacting considerations will induce disputants to accept third-party judgments, since the larger interests of all will be served thereby.

The author accords enormous importance to public support as a condition for strong third-party authority, saying "such [support] enables third parties to proceed to resolution irrespective of the will of the parties" (p. 13). Instead of seeking to identify the reasons for the general defectiveness of public support—especially internationally—the author urges the improvement of the third-party process through the acceptance of national commitments to such dispute-resolving processes prior to the existence of a dispute or by at least allowing the third party's power to influence the other parties.

Professor Randolph examines the interplay of forces which contributes to successes or failures of third-party activities. One scheme of analysis was to compare settlements resulting from situations where a party or parties dominated the settlement process with settlements resulting from a mediator-dominated situation. The author concludes that a party-dominated situation was more likely to fail in resolving the dispute than when the process was mediator-dominated. Since the party-dominated situations were international in character, and since mediator-dominated situations were those having a municipal quality, the author concludes that the third-party process has not been very successful in mitigating the tensions of states. When, however, settlements of a regional nature were investigated, it was concluded that in the European region settlements were mediator-dominated. In

other regions the settlements were party-dominated.

The question must be asked whether the author's conclusions are sufficiently related to hard facts or to precisely identified concepts to be entirely credible. Unfortunately, she uses such terms in the argument as "public support," "catastrophic violence," "power," "party-mediator domination," "persuasion," and "enforcement," among others, without providing precise operational meanings for such concepts. Since so much of the author's thesis is based on the meaning attributed to these terms, and since the reader is given so little sense of meaning of these terms in the several contexts discussed, the value of the author's argument is diminished.

For example, in the case of "public support," it would be helpful to know the situs, quantity, quality, intensity, reliability, institutional framework, and sanctioning process related to such support in order to appraise the utility of the third-party process. Or, it would be helpful to be able to identify and measure the amount of violence which must be experienced before it becomes "catastrophic," whether, for example, catastrophic violence is limited to weapons capable of mass destruction, or whether such violence as a substantial or total interruption in the world movement of energy would qualify; or, indeed, how one would measure national or individual perceptions of the presence of such catastrophic violence. The book combines generalities and abstractions with much specific information, but the specifics often fail to support the more general propositions. One is left to speculate about the real availability of third-party processes, especially in disputes among nations. Nor does the author make clear in what circumstances it would be possible to derive substantial benefit at the world level from successful experience with municipal use of third-party processes.

The book contains four very detailed and useful appendices. The first lists world institutions applying permanent procedures and identifies cases which have come before them. The second lists states possessing membership in international tribunals and parties to international agreements or specified clauses providing solely for pacific settlement of disputes. The third identifies the voting records of national judges sitting on the World Court. The fourth is a synopsis of the activities of the World Court, the European Court of the Communities, and the European Commission of Human Rights.

CARL Q. CHRISTOL

University of Southern California

Evolution and International Organization: Toward a New Level of Sociopolitical Integration. By Volker Rittberger. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973. Pp. 120. 22.50 guilders.)

Rittberger's volume is an interesting approach to the study of international organization using an evolutionary-theoretical framework. International organization is seen as a new distinct level of sociopolitical integration similar, in the evolutionary perspective, to other levels such as the state, the tribe, etc. The first and major part of the study attempts to establish a causal linkage between the advance of industrial civilization as a basic social force and its concomitant sociopolitical and ideological processes on the one hand, and the transition from the nation-state level to the international organization level of sociopolitical integration on the other. Rittberger contends that the linkage between these processes of change is mediated by the emergence of the intelligentsia, seen as a major sociostructural consequence of the advance of industrial civilization. Other independent variables likely to enhance the growth of international organization are highly destructive international wars and "previous international organization experience." The last variable is based on the belief that international organization seems to breed more international organization. Of particular relevance here is functionalist theory with its assertion that the successful transnational satisfaction of needs through intergovernmental organizations is likely to lead to additional organizational efforts.

An obvious problem is the operationalization and measurement of these variables. The spread of industrial civilization is measured by the production of pig iron and crude steel per capita of total population of all independent states. The measurement for the emergence of the intelligentsia is based on the number of students enrolled in institutions of higher learning as a proportion of the same total population, while the experience of war relies on the Singer-Wallace data on interstate wars. (J. David Singer and Michael Wallace, "Intergovernmental Organization and the Preservation of Peace, 1816-1964; Some Bivariate Relationships," *International Organization*, 24 [Spring 1970], 520-547). Finally, "previous international organization experience" and the growth of international organization, the dependent variable, emphasize the growth of IGO bureaucracies and are measured on the basis of budgetary expenditures of UN system and predecessor organizations as a proportion of national government expenditures.

Utilizing bivariate and multivariate analysis, Rittberger concludes from the correlations that

his hypothesis is basically confirmed. But the relationship between "previous international organization experience" and international organization building is ambiguous; it seems that these experiences contribute to the growth of UN specialized agencies rather than to that of the total United Nations system, supporting evidence perhaps for the functionalist theory and its law of "inverse salience" that declares that international organizations are more likely to grow when their tasks are less susceptible to controversial interpretation by national leadership groups. (Joseph S. Nye, *Peace in Parts* [Boston: Little, Brown, 1971], p. 98.)

Rittberger's second basic hypothesis posits that increases in international organization building tend to reduce the instances of warfare among nation-states. His correlation coefficients do not support this hypothesis, and therefore he suggests that international organization building within the global context is ineffectual as a constraint on national leadership groups, especially those of the major powers.

While the innovative theoretical nature of the book is appealing, some critical points must be raised:

(1) In much of the book Rittberger talks about "supranational bureaucracies" which seem to be equated with any IGO bureaucracy. Since the term "supranational" in much of the international organization literature has a special connotation referring to the ability of IGO institutions to issue binding regulations upon the population under their jurisdiction, the term should not be applied loosely.

(2) The term "integration" used frequently in Chapters 2-4 is not defined. In Chapter 5, however, we have a very extensive definitional discussion (pages 84-88), and the reader wonders whether or not this definition applies to the whole book.

(3) The measurements used for the first hypothesis seem to lack sufficient refinement for adequate results. The production of pig iron and crude steel as a measure of industrial technology, the indicator for the spread of industrial civilization, may not be appropriate for the last 25 years. Students enrollment in institutions of higher learning may be an inadequate measure for the emergence of the intelligentsia.

These comments should not detract from the fundamental value of this book, which is worthwhile reading for all interested in the study of international organization.

WERNER J. FELD

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The Great Wheel: The World Monetary System, a Reinterpretation. By Sidney E. Rolfe and James Burt. (New York: Quadrangle/The New York Times Book Co., 1973. Pp. 279. \$9.95.)

The argument of this book—for it is primarily a polemic set in a historical frame—is directed mostly at business executives, practicing and presumptive, and at all those who operate in international markets and are (not unreasonably) anxious about the international monetary system with which they have to live. Not to worry, they are soothingly told. Lie back and enjoy it. All that scary stuff about competitive devaluation starting the world economy down the slippery path to economic nationalism and depression, the authors declare, is unscientific myth, an old wives' tale. Grown-up people should not be taken in. Of course floating rates of exchange do create problems, and you can lose your shirt—but the authors offer extensive, sensible and practical advice (pp. 195-255) on how best to cope with them.

The polemic shows good marketing sense. The prospect is for continuing inflation and thus for continuing instability of exchange rates, so the book should sell well, especially in business schools and corporation finance departments.

But politics professors and students might also take a good look at it, especially the historical framework which takes up more than two-thirds of the book. There are minor inaccuracies and some rather rash and sweeping simplifications of complex historical processes. But it does provide the missing monetary dimension to a lot of international political history—and it does so in a brisk and commendably readable style, slowing the pace and expanding the supportive detail as the story approaches the present.

Used with caution, Chapter 12 on Mercantilism Revisited might also make a useful addition to reading lists for international political economy courses. It attempts a straightforward exposition of an important issue in contemporary international relations. Mercantilism is castigated by the authors—as by most neoclassical economists—as "the economic concomitant of nationalism," yet the text also makes it plain that from Keynes on, mercantilist policies have been primarily motivated by a genuine concern in government that the market economy should provide not just more wealth, but more welfare. This—as Cooper, Kindleberger, Camps, and others have perceived—is the central dilemma of economic interdependence. As men in an undergoverned frontier society sometimes had to violate social norms to secure their families' welfare, so governments in an undergoverned world

economy are sometimes led into policies that may well not serve the international interest. Even the United States—one might say particularly the United States—cannot escape this dilemma. Here, in a nutshell, is one reason for treating the authors' conclusions about the international monetary system with caution. For this *Candide*, at least, the book is altogether too Panglossian.

A second reason is that the main conclusion has been overtaken by the Arabs and their petrodollars. The authors contend that Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) could serve, like South African gold in the international monetary system of the 1890s and US dollar deficits in 1950s and 1960s, as the growth-engendering drive behind what Adam Smith called "the great wheel." But now we have the different problem of coping with too much liquidity—or at least too much liquidity in what is subjectively thought of as the "wrong" place.

A third reason is that at this point some rather flimsy—even deceptive—steps are built into the wall of argument. For instance, to say the United States Treasury introduced the idea of SDRs (p. 191) abbreviates the facts to the point of distortion. And it's a bit much to present Paul Einzig as a champion of SDRs when (as he would have quickly protested if he were alive now) he always maintained that the initials stood for "Speedier Doom Results."

SUSAN STRANGE

London School of Economics

International Studies and the Social Sciences: Problems, Priorities and Prospects in the United States. By James N. Rosenau. (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1973. Pp. 147. \$9.00, cloth; \$5.00, paper.)

Five basic assumptions underlie *International Studies and the Social Sciences*, and if they are true, the impressive edifice built by Professor James Rosenau, in a study undertaken for the International Studies Association, survives and stands. If they are false or only partly true, the whole monolithic structure crumbles and falls as an independent and comprehensive system. The assumptions are: (1) International studies have undergone a scientific revolution. What preceded this revolution may have been useful for the times, but its philosophical and historical orientation and the older scholars who still espouse it have at best a minor and subordinate role for the future. (2) The decline of international studies in higher education results from the boredom of students who are introduced to current events and foreign policy problems but not given the analytical

skills to understand them. (3) International studies have suffered from a "pressure for relevance [which is] insatiable" (p. 19). "Funding agencies want relevance; students want relevance; colleges want relevance. . . ." (p. 18). (4) The way to discover the parameters and growth of international studies is to request selected scholarly journals, whose editorial boards have in recent years weighted the field in a given way, to pick an elite sample of generalists and send them questionnaires. When less than half reply to a question, write this off as a methodological error or the impatience of scholars with details. (5) There is a widespread skepticism about the scientific approach. "From the President of the United States to the local newspaper editor, from the halls of Congress to . . . academe, from the seats of power to the centers of revolution . . . social science is seen more as an obstacle than a tool of progress" (p. 76). The answer to skepticism is to mount "campaigns designed to educate officials and publics. . . ." (p. 77). "Either through the International Studies Association or some other appropriate organization, the case . . . should be energetically and continuously pressed on the society and its public officials" (p. 109).

The tragedy of the present study with all its advanced scientific terminology and apparatus is that these five propositions or underlying assumptions are at most only partially true. Indeed, for them to be otherwise would be a refutation of everything we know about the advancement of knowledge. Most of the study's conclusions are inherent in the approach; the methodology and the questions raised not surprisingly reflect a clearcut and well-stated viewpoint. In this the study is not unique. Its uniqueness rests only in the pretense it brings no fixed views to the problem. Listen to its credo: the wave of the future is with "quantification, advanced methodologies, and technical terminology," and "these outlooks and procedures will lead to increased comprehension and an enhancement of man's ability to cope with new challenges" (p. 78). Not only does the study represent a point of view; a missionary effort on the part of ISA or others is called for to propagate and extend the viewpoint. Some modest role remains for other outlooks and procedures. For example "the commitment to explicitness and precision in research does not preclude the use of intuition and imagination in the formulation of problems and hypotheses" (p. 78). Yet to pretend for one moment that Rosenau and his colleagues don't bring to their study commitments that virtually predetermine their inquiry's shape and direction is illusory. Nor would it be any different for those of us with opposing views and assumptions—say, the members of the Niebuhr panel at the 1974 annual

meetings of the American Political Science Association.

My criticism, then, is that Rosenau's criteria of selection of questions and issues and the use he makes of his dramatis personae once he has them prejudice all the interesting and oft-debated problems he considers. But on his specific assumptions: (1) The scientific revolution he heralds has had far more modest results than he proclaims. That rather ancient group of pre-scientific historians and philosophers such as Niebuhr, Kennan, Marshall, Halle, and Morgenthau continue to be read, and a new group has emerged, all absent from his elite sample but including Brzezinski, Deutsch, Hoffman, Claude, Huntington, Osgood, and Sterling—and yes, Kissinger. Something must be wrong with a study whose computer failed to pick up even one of this group. (2) If students, especially in the late 1960s were bored with current events and foreign policy problems, how much greater was their boredom with diagrams and models (an objective questionnaire would be useful here)? (3) The pressure for relevance can be overdone. Paul Freund notes that if he had studied only what was relevant as a student in the 1930s he would never have gone beyond business cycles. Is there an opposite risk of making a fetish of what is patently irrelevant to the consumer or patient in the bed? (4) The overall framework of the Rosenau study leads to the selection of certain journals, certain scholars (see my alternative list above) and certain questions. Would the results have been the same if he had queried the editors of the *Review of Politics*, *Social Research*, *Foreign Policy*, *Foreign Affairs*, and *Political Science Quarterly*? (5) The approach to skeptics on science is comparable to that of recent nominating committees of APSA which year after year chose scholars representative of one school of thought and thereby invited contested elections. In 1974, the nominating committee had two choices: to continue this practice or to broaden the spectrum of political science by nominating someone well-regarded by all sectors. Rather than calling for a nationwide campaign for a single methodology and approach, I would challenge Rosenau to broaden his concept of science to include philosophy, policy analysis, and history. This might be a more promising way of reducing skepticism while building networks of new mutualities of interest and respect. For all these reasons I find his assumptions incomplete and his study, while provocative and suggestive, less than the broad design required to describe contemporary international studies.

KENNETH W. THOMPSON

*International Council for
Educational Development*

Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1930 to 1945. By Antony C. Sutton. (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1971. Pp. 401. \$10.00.)

This book is Mr. Sutton's second volume in a three-volume series on the transfer of western technology to the Soviet Union. Mr. Sutton's present work covers the period 1930 to 1945 when the Soviet economy largely acquired its present industrialized base. The author, a Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution, quotes Stalin as saying that about two-thirds of all the large industrial enterprises constructed in the Soviet Union before and during World War II were built with United States help or technical assistance. The author maintains that Stalin forgot to mention the remaining one-third of the enterprises. These, Mr. Sutton contends, were the result of technical assistance provided by the industrialized nations of western Europe—largely Germany.

Against this background of Soviet economic development, Mr. Sutton advances his "inability hypothesis" concerning the Soviets' lack of indigenous technical ability to generate their own progress, hence the heavy dependence on western technological transfers. Although major writers on the Soviet economy have recognized the importance of Soviet dependence on western technology, this aspect of Soviet industrialization has not been fully examined. Mr. Sutton sets out "to close the empirical gap" on the amount and the extent of Soviet borrowing from the West.

The author has done a prodigious amount of research work to support his hypothesis. The bulk of his material comes from the U.S. State Department Decimal File and official German sources, as official Soviet sources were not too plentiful for this period. In addition, he has covered the relevant major western industrial and financial publications. The data are well organized and clearly presented. After stating his objectives, Sutton deals with the Soviet termination of foreign concessions in the early 1930s, and he concludes "... that any joint enterprise with a Communist nation is inexorably destined for seizure when the advantages to the Communist nation have ceased or when no further financial or technological investment can be extracted from the foreign partner" (p. 31).

After the Soviets had experimented with concessionary agreements, they turned to the technical assistance agreements and individual contracts with foreign companies, engineers and consultants. It is this type of agreement that Mr. Sutton investigates and analyzes during the period under review. He treats the various industries on a chapter by chapter basis, and his grasp of the technical details is superb. There are or-

ganizational charts, engineering designs, photographs of equipment, tables of data, helpful footnotes, appendices, bibliography and an excellent index to satisfy the requirements of serious scholarship. One minor shortcoming in his organization of the material is that some chapters have conclusions while others, for no apparent reason, do not.

Following his treatment of the major industrial sectors of the Soviet economy, Mr. Sutton analyzes the process of technical transfer and the problems the westerners encountered as well as the difficulties the Soviets experienced with the assimilation of the borrowed technology. Mr. Sutton then compares the amount of western technology received with Soviet growth rates for various sectors of the economy for the period 1930-1945. He finds that the sectors of the Soviet economy which experienced high growth rates were mainly the ones which received western technical assistance. These areas were primarily in heavy industry. In his conclusion he returns to his "inability hypothesis" and finds that the data support this hypothesis. He only finds two major Soviet innovations, SKB synthetic rubber and the Ramzin "once-through" boiler, and points out that these were supplemented with western methods by 1945. Mr. Sutton recognizes an additional Soviet achievement in the conversion of American and British equipment to the metric system. Hence, Soviet technology from 1930 to 1945 was western technology converted to the metric system.

One finds it very hard to disagree with Mr. Sutton's findings. If anything, he overstates his case, but it would be extremely difficult to refute the mass of evidence he presents. At times, he seems to begrudge the Soviets this transfer of technology and lays inordinate stress on Soviet technological inabilities. In point of fact, once the Soviets made the decision to industrialize, deliberate borrowing from the West was the primary means of achieving this end, especially since many engineers from the old regime had fled abroad and those that remained were regarded with suspicion. In effect, their policies resulted in a minor technological transfer in reverse. Also, Sutton fails to mention the depres-

sion of the 1930s in the West, and its effect on idle firms and unemployed engineers. These were able to maintain their salaries and skills working on projects in the Soviet Union.

In the course of examining the transfer of technology from the West to the Soviets, this study throws an interesting and surprising sidelight on the subject of doing business with the Soviets. The West has not generally approved of Soviet foreign and domestic policies, but there exists in many quarters a strong opinion that the Soviets have excellent credit and keep their word with respect to business agreements. This view is touted during the present time of detente when the Soviets are seeking trade concessions. Those businessmen who are seeking opportunities in the Soviet Union would do well to read Mr. Sutton's book. Perhaps the Soviets have changed, but during the period under review the Soviet record shows breaches of contract, unethical practices, patent infringements, defaults on salary payments, pirating of designs and much evidence of bad faith in their dealings.

Mr. Sutton's book is a valuable contribution to the literature on the Soviet economy. It might be suggested as a supplemental text in courses in comparative economic systems and in economic growth and development. The bulk of development literature deals with various types of growth models, some of which are very sophisticated and highly theoretical. Mr. Sutton's method of dealing with technological transfers, an important component of economic development, demonstrates that an extremely complicated process can be analyzed and presented in a clear manner by diligent and patient research. His preferences are obviously for a market-type economic system, but he concludes: "In the light of the history of technological transfers, the Soviet choice of western techniques has been superb" (p. 292). That the Soviets have adopted western technology is beyond doubt. The hypothesis which needs to be tested for the present is whether a centralized planning system can put it to work efficiently.

CARL B. TURNER

North Carolina State University, Raleigh

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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
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
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
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
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


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
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
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
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
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
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


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
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
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


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
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
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